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  ABSTRACT                                       
 
This study examines the peacebuilding potential of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in 
areas of protracted conflict in Ethiopia. The findings highlight the potential transformative 
capacity of these NGOs and the challenges of their peacebuilding work. The research design 
adopted in this study was that of a mixed design method with an emphasis on the qualitative 
method. Data was collected through 52 in-depth interviews, a survey involving 120 households, 
two focus group discussions and various secondary sources. Bivariate analysis and thematic and 
content analysis were conducted.  
The evidence from the empirical findings illustrate that by applying an “indigenous 
empowerment perspective”, many of these NGOs have incorporated peacebuilding components 
into their development programmes, and have made significant contributions in five ways. 
Firstly, their activities have helped to activate and re-establish customary institutions and 
strengthened their jurisdiction over land, social and cultural issues. Secondly, their facilitation 
efforts in peace processes have played an important role in the establishment of inter/intra-ethnic 
peace groups. The facilitation efforts helped in strengthening the pastoralists’ own indigenous 
laws and in drawing-up by-laws relating to natural resource access, use and maintenance. Laws 
on murder, theft and injury were reinforced. A legal framework with the capacity to resolve 
group differences peacefully was developed. Thirdly, the NGOs’ inter/intra-ethnic relations 
initiatives helped to reinvigorate the “values” of communal resource sharing, to build cross-
border cooperation, thereby reducing the incidence of cross-border raids and resource-based 
conflicts. Fourthly, the NGO cross-border peacebuilding initiatives helped to revitalise economic 
opportunities; these improved the capacity for trade and also increased the links between traders 
across the border, thereby creating a reciprocal interdependence and a vested interest in reducing 
conflict. Finally, the NGO development programmes have, in certain areas,  created sustainable 
access to the natural resources and increased the reconstruction of physical infrastructure; these 
factors, in turn, contributed to a reduction in the likelihood of resource-based conflict and 
vulnerability to drought.  
The study suggests that if development NGOs operating in those conflict areas are to have a 
meaningful impact, then their peacebuilding projects need to build on indigenous institutions and 
local actors. The study also highlights how the present policy of the Ethiopian state has restricted 
the peacebuilding role of NGOs. The study further posits that the Ethiopian state’s judicial 
system and its local administration are structurally unable to address the full impact of protracted 
conflicts and that traditional conflict resolution mechanisms facilitated by NGOs, strategically 
situated, are best able to play this role. Although it is conceded that NGOs are not the “panacea” 
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This chapter introduces the following: background to the study; the purpose and significance of 
the study; the thesis topic; the research objectives and assumptions that underpin this study; the 
clarification of some of the terms used in the study; and, the organisation of the thesis. 
 
1.2 Background to the Study 
 
This study seeks to examine the peacebuilding potential of NGOs in the Oromia and Gambella 
regions of Ethiopia. Ethiopia comprises more than 80 distinct cultural and linguistic groups. 
Centuries of interaction between these groups have created a complex pattern of relationships 
and a long history of competition and co-existence (Markakis, 1989; Zewde, 1991). Their 
conflict situation involves an intricate network of interrelated causes, with overlapping historical 
dimensions that exacerbate contemporary conflict (Abbink, 2006). However, many of the 
conflicts relate to scarce resources and socio-cultural dynamics, and have been relatively small-
scale; typically, these were rapidly resolved by applying the various customary conflict 
resolution mechanisms (Vaughan and Tronvoll, 2003). This history of conflict predates the 
policy of multi-national federalism. 
After 1991, Ethiopia witnessed a transition from the past imperial and military regimes
 
to multi-
national federalism. The new regime introduced a Constitution based upon the principle of 
“ethnic federalism” and self-determination up to secession. The Constitution aimed to “address 
the claims of ethnic groups in the country of historic discrimination and inequalities and to build 
a multi-ethnic democracy” (Keller, 2002: 21). Multi-ethnic federalism embraces autonomy and 
shared governance for nations (Horowitz, 1997) and attempts to address both the psycho-social 
and structural causes of protracted conflicts.  
The regional and local self-government experiment in the country introduced new opportunities 
and challenges. The Constitution, ratified in 1995, established a federal system with nine 
regional states based on local language and ethnicity. Technically, minority groups acquired the 
right to self-determination. Nevertheless, this right reinforced ethno-national sentiments, and 
“created” and “aggravated” conflicts over access to resources among the small units of the 
2 
 
Federal States (Clapham, 2004:53). It also overlooked widely-used indigenous mediation 
mechanisms. This affected inter- and intra-ethnic relations and transformed the nature and 
intensity of conflicts from concession and arbitration to rivalry and conflict (Feyissa, 2003). 
Furthermore, Clapham (2004) stresses that the newly coined and ethnic-based regional 
demarcations have adversely affected the historical alliances and long-standing culture of 
association among various national groups. Currently, points of contestation have included 
boundary disputes in areas of mixed cultural, linguistic and ethnic affiliations, besides the 
resource conflicts which already existed (Abbink, 2006; Getachew, 2006). This ethno-nationalist 
sentiment has been exacerbated further by the diverging identity discourse based on indigeneity, 
livelihoods systems, and entitlements and has led to serious conflicts causing thousands of 
deaths, evictions and devastation of property (Feyissa, 2011). These clashes are still seen today 
(Abbink, 2006).   
In response to the prevalent ethnic conflict, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic 
Front (EPRDF) held a referendum in an attempt to achieve a durable solution to that conflict 
(Adunga, 2010; Bassi, 2010). For example, the Ministry of Federal Affairs facilitated a 
referendum to demarcate formally the boundary and to resolve the disputes between the Somali 
clans and the Borana Zone (Bassi, 2010). As a result, the Borana not only lost access to the most 
fertile pastures, but lost land in the wetter areas. The Borana especially resent the loss of territory 
that plays an important role in defining the Borana’s social, spiritual and communal world 
(Helland, 1982; Legesse, 2000). As the government’s referendum disregards such symbolic and 
psychological bonds, conflict remains latent. The government’s referendum (2004) eroded the 
accepted and agreed-upon conflict negotiation mechanisms (Abbink, 2006). This, in turn, forced 
the federal government to place armed units, known as Mekelakeya, or rapid reaction forces, to 
contain the outbreaks of violence in those areas. In December 2003, the Ethiopian government 
deemed it important to use the military to maintain peace and stability in the Gambella region, 
after the loss of numerous lives. Nonetheless, most of the government-sponsored peace 
initiatives have failed; few have led to durable settlements. Indeed, according to Feyissa (2009) 
and Woldemariam (2009) only one-third of the government-sponsored settlements at the official 
level in these areas have, since 1991, resulted in a sustainable lasting peace
1
. This indicates not 
                                                          
1
A case in point is when the House of Federation, which is vested with the ultimate power to interpret the 
Constitution (Article 39 cum 61-62), supervised and resolved through referenda,  the conflict between the Silte and 
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only the limited success of a “top-down” approach towards peacebuilding, but as Abbink (2006) 
argues, such conflicts cannot be suppressed, contained, or resolved for more than a short period 
through coercive inducements; the “top-down” approach failed to address the deep roots of the 
conflict and to transform them, and so conflict remained latent and likely to continue.  
Several studies of post-1991 conflicts in Ethiopia have indicated that most conflicts are attributed 
to psycho-social/psycho-cultural and structural factors (Feyissa, 2009; Tadesse, 2007; Abbink, 
2006; Meckelburg, 2006; Clapham, 2004; Vaughan and Tronvoll, 2003). Furthermore, and 
despite the adoption of multi-ethnic federalism in 1995 with the Federal Proclamation, termed 
the Intervention Bill (No. 359/2003)
2
, Abbink (2006: 391) and others have concluded that “there 
is a pattern of local conflicts not decreasing according to plan, but continuing and in many cases 
deteriorating”. In this regard, the Gambella Regional State and the Borana Zone have witnessed 
substantial changes in the nature, intensity and magnitude of conflict. In Gambella, the sheer 
number of inter/intra-ethnic conflicts led Borchgrevink and Lie (2009: 45) to describe the post-
1991 conflicts as making Gambella “one of the most conflict-ridden regions in Ethiopia”. For 
example, from 1970 to 1990, there were fewer inter/intra-ethnic conflicts than the eighteen in the 
period from 1990 to 2005 (Young, 1999; Abbink, 2006). Between 1991 and 2006, out of a total 
of 48 inter/intra-ethnic conflicts in the country, twelve were related to the Gambella region 
(Hussein, Kebede and Schaafsma, 2006; Feyissa, 2009). Likewise, in the Borana region, the 
intensity and magnitude of conflicts have changed, particularly in the Woredas of Yabello, Arero 
and Moyalle (Abbink, 2006; Bassi, 2010; Adunga, 2011; Scott-Villiers et al., 2011). Between 
1990 and 2004, out of a total of thirteen major inter/intra-ethnic conflicts in the Borana Zone, 
nine were related to the Borana and the Garri ethnic groups compared with five intra-Oromo 
conflicts (Odhiambo, 2012: 11)
3
. The human costs of these conflicts are profound, resulting in up 
to two thousand deaths and almost one hundred thousand displaced persons (Abbink, 2006). In 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Gurage in the SNNPRS. These two parties were considered to be sub clans of the same ethnic group. The Ministry 
of Federal Affairs also facilitated a negotiated settlement between the Gumuz and Berta ethnic groups in the 
Benishangul Gumuz Regional State. 
2
 Federal Negarit Gazette, Proclamation No. 359/2003.  
3
 Some important events in the history of conflict in and around the Borana Zone are summarised by Abbink (2006), 
Hussein, Kebede and Schaafsma (2006), Bassi (2010), and Odhiambo (2012). It should be noted that Abbink’s 
(2006: 408-411), Hussein, Kebede and Schaafsma’s (2006: 30-31) and Odhiambo’s (2012: 11) inventories of those 
local-level conflicts were not complete but they sum up the main intra-ethnic and intra-ethnic conflict incidents 
between 1991and 2005/6. Their lists mainly left out sporadic and reciprocal conflicts, religious conflicts, and several 
direct clashes between different local ethnic and language groups. 
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addition, the violence resulted in a massive loss of assets including livestock, as well as the 
deaths of hundreds of people, and the significant displacement of thousands of others.  
In the light of the continuing debate on the challenges of  “transitions to democracy”, post-
conflict reconstruction and the state-building process, which are suggested as panaceas for all 
political and economic problems (Crocker, 2003; Fukuyama, 2004), there are no simple answers 
to the question of why the level of violent conflict in these areas has not been going down. For 
instance, Mansfield and Snyder (2007) as well as Ayoob (2007) argue that the transition from a 
totalitarian regime to a multi-ethnic democratic federation is characterised by frequent and 
fragmented ethnic conflict. Thus,  the “State’s failure to contain protracted conflict and the 
narrowing down of political spaces to impose order is not as morally indefensible as it may 
appear at first sight since the state may be struggling to translate their judicial statehood into 
empirical statehood” (Ayoob, 2001:133). While the aforementioned arguments may justify the 
current overwhelming support for state coercion to prevent a relapse into cycles of violence and 
counter-violence, some observers and practitioners, among them Clapham (2002), warn about 
unintended consequences of these reconstruction projects. Whereas the task of preventing a 
relapse into violence forced the state to exert concerted pressure to sustain the settlement 
demands, at times it crushed internal dissent and forcibly assimilated minorities, thereby 
jeopardising the longer-term goal of sustainable peace. This was the case in Ethiopia, where the 
government used military force to resolve disputes and banned local political parties which, in 
turn, bred resentment among other groups, such as the Anywaa ethnic groups in Gambella 
(Feyissa, 2009). Additionally, given the potentially innovative role that indigenous institutions 
are playing currently in the promotion of more stable societies in the country and also given only 
a limited degree of functionality in the judicial system, Abbink (2006) asks whether one should 
give indigenous institutions a chance. Abbink (2006) concludes that the state-building process 
that undermines social cohesion and indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms could exacerbate 
violence and become an additional stumbling block to the peace process. Thus Doe (2009) calls 
for an ‘indigenisation’ of post-conflict state reconstruction: a project that also accommodates 
indigenous societies and institutions while promoting unity through the principles of 




Figure 1. Ethiopia’s political map showing its borders, neighbouring countries and 
ethnically based states with their self-governing administrations and their own capitals. It 
also shows the national capital: Addis Ababa. 
 
 
Source: Maps of World, 2012  
1.2.1 Indigenous conflict resolution practices 
 
Recent literature on post-1991 Ethiopian conflict provides more evidence of how an externally- 
anchored institutional reconfiguration and transformation process has undermined long-lasting 
cross-ethnic alliances and has endangered customary authority structures. Watson (2003) 
referred to a rise in the intensity of conflict in the pastoralist areas of Ethiopia, and argued that 
the source of the conflict was exacerbated further by the pastoralists’ inability to maintain or 
establish institutions to moderate and govern natural resources-based differences. This 
shortcoming transformed resource use from cooperation and negotiation to competition and 
confrontation. Agreeing with Watson (2003), Scott-Villiers et al. (2011:5) contend that 
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customary institutions have not just experienced difficulties in resolving disputes and 
maintaining order because of “irrationality of the disorder”, but also because of a weakening of 
their institutional capacity to handle disputes and maintain pre-existing institutional equilibrium 
for peace and security. Bassi (2010) further asserts that the current Constitutional arrangement 
for the ethnic groups has resulted in the co-option of customary institutions into modern 
governance, particularly judging from current outcomes in the pastoral area of the Borana, 
thereby destroying their potential to lead the conflict resolution process. In the absence of formal 
political institutions and a functional judicial system to guide negotiations and address conflict, 
indigenous institutions have the potential to lay the foundation for reconciliation and 
peacebuilding. Pavanello (2009) thus calls for the revitalisation of the institutional capacities of 
indigenous institutions to address contemporary challenges.  
While the case for indigenous conflict resolution methods seems strong, critics of such methods 
assert that these could not address the changes in the nature and magnitude of local conflicts, 
making it less feasible to advance post-conflict reconstruction. There is also a naïveté in 
assuming that indigenous methods are the only legitimate ways of resolving conflict. Doe 
(2009), for example, warns against wholesale resourcing of indigenous resources that perpetuate 
local systems of oppression, exclusion and exploitation. While acknowledging the limitations of 
current approaches and the need for improvement, Abbink (2006) highlights the significance of 
customary procedures for local ethnic groups that help to provide a moral basis for maintaining 
order. Abbink further contends that the state should actively incorporate them into judicial 
procedures. From recent practical experience in the Gambella and Borana regions, for example, 
Borchgrevink and Lie (2009) and Bassi (2010), argue that the state’s judicial system is 
structurally unable to address protracted conflicts, and reacts to conflict in a coercive, “top-
down”, and insensitive manner. In a similar vein, Rahmato (2002) reflects on the role of 
indigenous informal organisations in promoting democratisation, and asserts that informal 
organisations, particularly where indigenous conflict resolution has taken place, may not always 
conform to the normative meaning of “Civil Society”. However, in the absence of any vibrant 
middle-class-based Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), such informal organisations are 
instrumental in counteracting the intrusions of totalitarian and corrupt civilian regimes. Zewde 
(2002) confirms Rahmato’s point by arguing that despite their weakend status these informal 
organisations continued to exercise a wide-ranging influence in regulating social relationships 
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and allowing space for expression, outside of state control. Finally, little or no attention has been 
given to the role that Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) play in peacebuilding. 
1.2.2 NGOs in peacebuilding  
The transition from violent conflict to negotiated settlement and the creation of new types of 
relationship are complex issues and require comprehensive, multi-dimensional and multi-level 
approaches for effective conflict transformation (Gidron, Katz and Hasenfeld, 2002; Michelle, 
2006). More recently, there is a growing body of research that recognises the importance of 
increased involvement of NGOs, local agents and indigenous resources in conflict-torn areas 
(Orjuela, 2005; Paffenholz and Spurk, 2006; O’Brien, 2009). These organisations have gained 
momentum after they responded to conflicts in Africa and Eastern and Southern Europe in the 
post-Cold War era (Aall, 2003; Zupan, 2005; Schmelzle, 2006; Neufeldt, 2007). In their policy 
documents, for example, both the World Bank (1998) and United Nations (1992, 1995) have 
acknowledged the NGO sector’s contribution to peacebuilding. Gidron, Katz and Hasenfeld 
(2002:7-12) suggest various ways in which the NGO sector could play a meaningful role:  it may 
help facilitate dialogue and negotiation; help to build the capacity of indigenous communities 
and their institutions for handling conflict; help to provide a neutral forum for dialogue and for 
community building; and, foster development of the rule of law that reduces the likelihood of 
violence in divided societies. More specifically, Aall (1996) argues that NGOs view indigenous 
institutions and their conflict strategies as primary resources for conflict resolution and 
development, and encourage all stakeholders to take joint ownership of the task of 
peacebuilding.  
In Ethiopia, the importance of “development NGOs” in conflict resolution and peacebuilding 
endeavours has not yet been fully investigated, but their pivotal role in reconstruction and 
development was recognised before and after the great famine of 1985/86 (Rahmato, 2002). 
Their engagement in good governance, democracy, human rights and peacebuilding is a 
comparatively recent development (Rahmato, 2002, 113-119; Rahmato, Akalewold and Yoseph, 
2008) and has received little attention. By undertaking an exploratory study of the peacebuilding 
potential of development NGOs, this study aims to broaden the intellectual debate in this field. 
Apart from relief and rehabilitation work, these NGOs have been encouraging local communities 
to participate in peacebuilding (Rahmato, Akalewold and Yoseph, 2008; Ojulu, 2011). In both 
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regions of Gambella and Borana, the NGOs were instrumental in reinvigorating and formulating 
innovative approaches to the conflict. They did so through individual and institutional 
development, intra- and inter-ethnic relationship building and the provision of services. The 
aggregate effect of these activities was to build the capacity of indigenous communities and their 
institutions for handling conflict. A precondition for the NGOs’ success in strengthening 
indigenous institutions was their reliance on the local people and their resources. 
Historically, these NGOs were established in order to overcome various aspects of the 1984/1985 
drought-induced famine. They aimed to contribute to relief and rehabilitation and to assist 
government’s poverty reduction strategies. Not all NGOs were established exclusively for the 
purpose of peacebuilding and conflict resolution. After these formative years, most NGOs are 
oriented toward livelihood protection and diversification, and natural resource management to 
enhance the resilience of the pastoralist communities, thereby reducing those communities’ 
vulnerability to drought related shocks. After 1991, however, NGOs have also become active in 
new fields of good governance, democracy, human rights and peacebuilding activities and thus 
have taken on new roles and responsibilities; hence their importance has increased significantly. 
In both the Gambella and Borana regions, the initial efforts to integrate peacebuilding were 
precipitated by a general increase in intensity of violence, the destruction of their development 
infrastructures and requests or even pressure on the part of government and donors. In Borana, 
the increasing pattern of protracted conflicts that caused destruction of development 
infrastructures built over a decade earlier, served as an impetus for such consideration for NGOs 
such as Care Ethiopia, Goal Ethiopia and Action for Development (AFG). Likewise, in 
Gambella, the intractability of conflict provided the impetus for working on peacebuilding: the 
Research Center for Civic and Human Rights Education (RCCHE), Pact Ethiopia and the 
Agency for Cooperation and Research in Development (ACORD) integrated conflict resolution 
initiatives in response to the increasing outbreaks of violence and conflict in the region. Still 
other organisations, such as the Ethiopian Evangelical Church Mekane Yesus (EECMY) and 
Hilfswerk der Evangelischen Kirchen Schweiz (HEKs) offered a religious rationale for the need 
to advance peacebuilding.      
Nonetheless, these initial and very modest attempts at addressing the causes of conflict through 
facilitating peace dialogues were carried out by a very small number of NGOs. Their work was 
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random and isolated, with little effect on the course of the conflict. NGO mandates changed 
during the late 1990s and early 2000s. First, there was increasing consensus that it is far more 
difficult for NGOs operating in conflict-prone areas to separate development from peacebuilding 
(Bush, 1998; Watson, 2001; Schmelzle, 2006). NGOs should therefore integrate peacebuilding 
approaches into development projects to address the challenges. Second, as has been mentioned 
previously, the state’s failure to contain protracted conflict and deliver services and resources to 
socio-cultural or ethnic groups in these regions, led NGOs to step into this vacuum and enter into 
partnerships with customary institutions. Third, because of the wealth of indigenous knowledge 
and the existing local institutional apparatus, indigenous institutions were found to be more 
suitable for building durable peace and creating sustainable development than top-down 
development practices. Therefore, it was argued, the NGOs could help prepare the ground for 
organising people for participating, planning and contributing to peace and development projects 
(Watson, 2001).  
1.2.3 Impact of the new Proclamation on the NGOs’ peacebuilding mandates 
In recent years, several NGOs appear to have abandoned their focus on peacebuilding and have 
shifted to long-term development activities. The government promulgated the new Proclamation 
to Provide for the Regulation and Registration of Charities and Societies (PPRRCS) in 2009. 
That Proclamation has had an adverse impact on the constitution and operation of NGOs as well 
as on their involvement in advancing good governance and sustainable peace (Rahmato, 
Akalewold and Yoseph, 2008). As a result, “development NGOs’’ have suffered a decline in 
influence since then. Thus, the work of those NGOs which incorporated peacebuilding 
components in their projects was affected and they were not able to carry out their conflict 
resolution activities in an unhindered way. The post-2005 election-related crisis has resulted in 
antagonistic NGO-Government relationships or NGO co-option, and affected the operation of 
NGO sectors. While this Proclamation reveals long-standing antagonistic relationships between 
the CSOs and the government, its enforcement signifies the extent to which the space for NGOs 
has narrowed down. Hence, the study investigates how relations between the government and 
CSOs/NGOs have affected their efforts in peacebuilding. The study also considers how the 
mandates of NGOs have been changed, following the introduction of the new Proclamation 
(PPRRCS) in 2009.   
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1.3 Purpose and significance of the study 
Research on NGOs committed to the resolution of protracted conflict is slowly burgeoning. The 
focus in the past has been on the NGOs’ roles in rural development and agricultural projects, 
health, water and sanitation, and education. More recently, studies have highlighted the 
contribution that those NGOs engaged in conflict resolution could make (O’Brien, 2009; Gidron, 
Katz and Hasenfeld, 2002). It has been recognised that peace cannot be built only by signing 
peace agreements at the highest political level; on the contrary, diverse networks of individuals 
and institutions need to be involved in the peace process (see, for example, O’Brien, 2009; 
Lederach, 1997; Dimond and McDonald, 1996). The importance of a bottom-up approach, which 
includes the participation of those involved in the conflict, would contribute to an organic and 
sustainable process of peaceful conflict transformation. Value should be given to indigenous 




The topic of this research is: 
 
 ‘Exploring the Peacebuilding Potential of Development NGOs in Areas of Protracted Conflict 
in Ethiopia; with special reference to Oromia and Gambella Regional States’  
 
The first reason for the interest in these two regions is that since 1991 these regions have 
continued to experience marked and protracted conflicts. The second reason is the richness of 
indigenous knowledge in the two regions, combined with a wealth of indigenous institutions and 
their capacity to regulate access to the resources in a drought-prone environment and to resolve 
disputes (Watson, 2001). Third, while none of the NGOs investigated was established 
exclusively for the purpose of peacebuilding and conflict resolution, a number of NGOs claim to 
contribute positively to peace processes in both areas.   
 
The NGO sector regards indigenous institutional practices as a counterbalance to the long-
standing political and economic marginalisation of the peripheries by central government. Given 
these criteria, the Gambella and the Borana Zone of Oromia Regional States of Ethiopia were 
chosen for this study. Further details concerning the rationale for choosing these two conflict 
areas are discussed in the “Research Methodology” (Chapter Four). 
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1.5 Objectives and Assumptions 
 
The following are the main objectives and assumptions that underpin this study: 
 
Objective 1:  To examine the policy frameworks that impact on NGOs in Ethiopia. 
 
It is assumed that the Proclamation (PPRRCS) narrowed the political space in which NGOs 
operate in conflict-prone areas. Furthermore, the Proclamation seems to have created, 
intentionally or unintentionally, a “bogus dichotomy” between peacebuilding and development. 
Exploring a policy framework that impacts on the NGOs’ operations could identify a policy gap 
in the Proclamation and as a result, NGOs may be able to reclaim political space for grass-roots 
initiatives. Both the literature review and qualitative data from key informants provide 
information on this Objective.  
 
Objective 2: To ascertain the nature of State and Civil Society relationships.  
 
It is assumed that the involvement of CSOs/NGOs in advocacy in the pre-2005 and post-2005 
elections-related crises resulted in NGO/Government relationships being marked by antagonism 
and suspicion on the one hand and by co-option on the other. The Proclamation would appear to 
reflect government’s suspicion of CSOs by making it difficult for them to carry out their 
mandates. This Objective will be explored in the literature review and with key informants. 
 
Objective 3: To assess current indigenous conflict resolution practices that are still used. 
 
The indigenous practices of the different ethnic groups, including oral customs and rules, have 
been used to resolve a range of inter-communal and inter-group conflicts. However, these 
customary conflict resolution practices are slowly being eroded. Examining and analysing such 
indigenous practices may nevertheless give them recognition and advance their inclusion into the 
judicial system. Key informants and focus group members will yield qualitative information on 
this Objective.  
 
Objective 4: To explore the perceptions of the beneficiaries of services rendered by the NGOs.  
 
The interventions of NGOs have positive or negative, intended or unintended impacts on the 
beneficiaries’ lives, livelihoods and inter-group conflicts. Moreover, depending on their 
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particular worldviews and experience of violence, beneficiaries provide different types of 
information for impact assessment. A project may succeed according to pre-set developmental 
criteria set out by the NGOs but fail in terms of the beneficiaries’ perceptions (Bush, 1998). 
Projects that have contributed to positive changes could be transferred to similar areas and those 
with negative consequences will be able to inform future development endeavours. Qualitative 
data from focus groups in the two specified regions as well as the household questionnaire will 
explore this Objective. 
 
Objective 5: To explore the perceptions of the NGOs about the impact of their services. 
 
NGOs operating in conflict-prone regions have already conducted impact assessments of their 
interventions. A project may fail according to pre-set developmental criteria set out by the NGOs 
but succeed according to broader peacebuilding criteria (Bush, 1998). Exploring such changes 
brought about by the projects, and re-examining NGOs’ impact analysis would help the 
researcher to compare the NGOs’ and beneficiaries’ perceptions. Key informants including 
Program Coordinators and representatives/ directors of NGOs, will provide information on this 
Objective. 
 
Objective 6: To find out which strategies NGOs use to resolve conflict. 
 
It is assumed that NGOs may view indigenous conflict strategies as a primary source for conflict 
resolution. It is also assumed that NGOs anchor the peacebuilding process around indigenous 
peace actors. They may revitalise and enable traditional peacebuilding mechanisms to grow and 
make an impact on the judicial mechanisms. Qualitative data from the key informants and focus 
groups will address this Objective. 
 
1.6 Clarification of terms used in the study 
 
The following concepts and terms, which are used extensively in this study, are clarified below. 
Furthermore, other significant concepts are addressed in Chapter Two where the conceptual 





  Peacebuilding  
 
There is no common agreement on a definition of the concept of peace, either for those involved 
in conflict or for those working on peacebuilding. Its meaning can range from the non-existence 
of war to non-violence. Galtung (1975) distinguished the existence of two kinds of peace. 
Negative peace is the cessation of direct violence, and it is not an end in itself, but provides a 
transitional stage to positive peace. Positive peace includes the absence of structural violence and 
cultural violence; positive peace entails the structural transformation of the warlike behaviours of 
communities (Bercovitch and Kadayifci, 2002). Dietrich and Sutzl (2006) rejected any single and 
all-encompassing definition of peace and they promoted the concept of a“plural peace”, arguing 
that there are different views and practices of peace in different cultures. In being critical of the 
neglect of the “plurality of peace” and therefore lacking respect for otherness, Dietrich (2012) 





Galtung (1996) also differentiated peacebuilding. He stated that peacemaking pertains to the 
arbitration or negotiation method that takes place among the parties in conflict with the aim of 
achieving resolution of conflicts. Peacekeeping on the other hand, presupposes third party 
intervention in buffer-zones (e.g., UN Peace force in Ethiopia and Eritrea, Sudan, or regional 
organisations in Somalia, Liberia, etc.) to keep apart warring groups from the disputed area and 
prevent direct violence so that negotiation can recommence. Galtung also stated that 
peacebuilding addresses the structural causes of conflict focussing also on the social, 
psychological, and economic environment at the grass-roots level. Similarly, Lederach (1997:20) 
argued that peacebuilding is more than just a post-conflict reconstruction; it “encompasses, 
                                                          
4
 Whereas “moral peaces” recognises peace as a future freedom from the violence and insecurity of existence 
guaranteed by the authority of the divine God, “modern peaces” rejects an apocalyptic promise of peace which takes 
place in the afterlife, and perceives peace as a contractually organised absence of direct violence enforced by state 
systems. In contrast, “energetic peaces” perceives peace as the establishment and maintenance of harmonious 
relations between humans, nature and the universe sustained via spiritual and human emotional capabilities such as 
empathy and compassion. Rejecting “modern peaces” claims to a homogenous and universal peace, “postmodern 
peaces” calls for pluralist and relativist interpretations of peace. Dietrich (2012) suggests “Transrational peaces” that 
considers both the modern and the spiritual sphere of human experience to be fundamental for the understanding of 
peace. “Transrational peaces” attempts to integrate “modern peaces” with the “energetic peaces” approach and deals 
with conflicts sustainably by moving away from incompatible systems and exclusive positions to a systemically 




generates, and sustains a full array of processes, approaches, and stages needed to transform a 
conflict toward a more sustainable, peaceful relationship”.  
 
Peacebuilding is a process that is flexible and that can change in response to the situation and the 
stage of the peacemaking efforts (Bush, 1998). Bush, in a seminal article, has broadly defined 
peacebuilding to refer to “those initiatives, which foster and support sustainable structures and 
processes that strengthen the prospects for peaceful coexistence and decrease the likelihood of 
the outbreak, reoccurrence, or continuation, of violent conflict” (1998:33). Bush (1998:32) also 
pointed out that any peacebuilding endeavour, to be meaningful, “has to be reflected in positive 
changes in the lived experience of those in, or returning to, conflict zones”. For the purpose of 
this study, the researcher will be using the term peacebuilding to refer to those initiatives that 
seek to create political, economic, and social spaces, within which indigenous actors’ knowledge 
is acknowledged, developed and employed as an essential resource necessary to build a peaceful 
and just society. 
 Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and Development NGOs 
According to Anderson (1996: 638): “NGOs are privately organized and privately financed 
agencies, formed to perform some philanthropic or other worthwhile task in relation to a need 
that the organizers feel is not adequately addressed by public, governmental, or UN efforts’’. The 
World Bank defines NGOs as “private organizations that pursue activities to relieve suffering, 
promote the interest of the poor, protect the environment, provide basic services, and undertake 
community development activities’’(Aall, 1996: 367). At one level, NGOs are defined as being 
opposed to State and other pro-profit organisations in terms of their underlying organisational 
structure and functions. This covers a wide spectrum of institutional functions to include 
advocacy, human rights and democratisation (Bratton, 1990; Fowler, 1991). However, NGOs 
could also be defined as voluntary, self-governing private organisations, not devoted to sharing 
out profit to members and formed for public purposes outside the formal state apparatus but 
working within the parameters laid down by the State (Clark, 1995; Bratton, 1989b).  
             
Aall (2001:367) defines NGOs as “private, self-governing, not-for-profit institutions dedicated to 
alleviating human sufferings; or to promote education, health, economic development, 
environmental protection, human rights and conflict resolution; or encouraging the establishment 
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of democratic institutions and civil societies”. This definition broadly encompasses three kinds 
of NGOs: these are the humanitarian NGOs, human rights NGOs and the Conflict Resolution 
NGOs. The interaction and interdependent operation of these NGOs plays a constructive role in 
conflict situations.  
 
Prior to 2009, the Ethiopian Ministry of Justice was responsible for registering and regulating the 
operation and function of NGOs in accordance with its rules and regulations. It grouped the 
organisations under its auspices into the following five main categories: local or national NGOs, 
international NGOs, professional associations, civic and advocacy groups, and religious 
organisations. It categorised non-government organisations as either local or international. These 
organisations are primarily engaged in development activities, relief and rehabilitation work. On 
the basis of Article 2 (2, 3 & 4) of the new Proclamation (PPRRCS), NGOs operating in the 
Gambella and the Oromia regional states can be divided into three groups. The first group is: 
“Ethiopian Charities” or “Ethiopian Societies” formed under the laws of Ethiopia with not more 
than ten percent of their funds received from foreign sources. The second group is: “Ethiopian 
Residents Charities” or “Ethiopian Residents Societies” formed under the laws of Ethiopia and 
receiving more than 10% of their funds from foreign sources. The third group is: “Foreign 
Charities” formed under laws of foreign countries and receiving their funds from foreign sources. 
These distinctions and their implications for peacebuilding are further elaborated on, and 
discussed in Chapter Three.  
 
In this study, the concept of “Development NGOs” is used to denote those Mass Based 
Organisations (MBOs) or “Ethiopian Charities”, “Ethiopian Residents Charities”, “Foreign 
Charities”, and religious institutions that have incorporated peacebuilding goals and/or 
components alongside other development objectives. Those objectives could include improving 
relationships between conflicted communities as part of Rural Development or development 
work as an integral part of their broader programme. The current Proclamation (PPRRCS) does 
not distinguish between civil societies and NGOs. Article 2 (5) of the Proclamation defines 
“Mass-Based Societies” to include professional associations, women’s associations, youth 
associations and similar Ethiopian societies. In the thesis, the conceptions of civil society given 
above by Chandhoke (2004) and Hadenius (2001) are all used and compatible. 
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 Conflict Resolution  
Kriesberg (2001) and Aall (2001) write that conflict resolution is an evolving field of study 
encompassing many perspectives and methods. Kriesberg (2001:407) also underscores the 
complexities and multi-disciplinary nature of the term and states that its continued evolvement 
has made it challenging to define. In a more-or-less inclusive sense Kriesberg (2001: 407-415) 
defines the term as “an orientation towards changing the conflicts so that they can be conducted 
constructively in the sense that violence is minimized, antagonism between adversaries is 
overcome, outcomes are mutually acceptable to the opponents, and settlements are enduring”. 
The concept of conflict resolution covers a wide spectrum of perspectives, largely depending on 
the nature and time of conflicts, and ranging from diplomacy at international level to domestic 
violence, from alternative dispute resolution at industrial level to mediation and negotiation of 
deep-rooted ethnic and communal antagonism. 
 
Conflict resolution strategies also entail a variety of approaches and programmes. These 
approaches can enhance the participants’ awareness of their own role in a conflict, thereby 
transforming how they perceive conflict. They can also help participants to identify their own 
agency as well as their own practices to resolve conflict or at least ameliorate the situation (Aall, 
2001: 372-373). This study perceives conflict resolution as a reduction of antagonism in areas 
marked by protracted conflict, by using indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms as well as 
other approaches. Within the context of this study, the terms conflict resolution and conflict 
transformation are used interchangeably, the latter being linked especially to Lederach’s (1997) 
conflict transformation approach. 
1.7 Organisation of the thesis 
 
This study will be set out as follows: 
 
Chapter One: Introduction to the problem  
Chapter Two: Mapping the conceptual frameworks to the study 
Chapter Three: The analysis of conflict in the Borana Zone of the Oromia and the Gambella 
                       Regional States 
Chapter Four: Methodlogy 
Chapter Five: Discussion and analysis of the main findings 









This chapter presents the conceptual thinking within conflict resolution/transformation that 
underpins this particular study. First, it examines the nature of contemporary conflicts, and the 
shift in conceptualisation of conflicts from traditional interstate to intrastate conflicts. In the 
second section, this chapter briefly explores Edward Azar’s analysis of “protracted social 
conflict” (PSC). Drawing upon a rich tradition of multi-disciplinary researches, in his seminal 
book, The Management of Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Practice (1990), Azar has 
presented us with Protracted Social Conflict (PSC), a model of locating the principal sources of 
contemporary conflict in developing countries. Therefore, the rationale for espousing this PSC 
model for this study was to ensure that the conflict analysis would be based on a fine-grained 
analysis and an understanding of the complex web of interrelated and overlapping factors 
affecting conflict at different levels. In no way is the researcher suggesting that Edward Azar’s 
model is the only analytical framework to locate the primary causes of conflicts in multi-
cultural societies. Detailed and complex frameworks for analysing the sources of contemporary 
conflicts have already been developed in the field of conflict resolution (Mail et al., 2005; 
Brown, 2001, 1996, 1993; Mitchell, 1981). The third section of this chapter examines some of 
the principal conflict resolution approaches in more detail, and considers their empirical and 
practical orientations that aim at resolving protracted social conflicts. Within this broader 
setting, this third section attempts to explore four approaches to conflict resolution: these are the 
“indigenous empowerment” approach (Lederach, 1997; Rupesinghe, 1995, 1996); the multi-
track conflict resolution approach (Lederach, 2003; Rupesinghe, 1995, 1996; Burton, 1987, 
1990; Azar, 1990); the “interactive conflict resolution” approach (Azar, 1990; Burton, 1990; 
Kelman, 1991), and the “discursive conflict transformation” approach (Fetherston, 2000; Jabri, 
1996). It must be noted that while these approaches do not see any particular method as 
distinctive, they are nevertheless united in their common ground, which attempts to empower 
those at the grass-roots level. This chapter then moves on to discuss the limitations of these four 
approaches as well as the controversy surrounding conflict resolution initiatives in 
contemporary conflict contexts.  
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The final section of the chapter presents some discussion on the recent prominence given to 
indigenous institutions and the role of NGOs, and how they could work together to contribute 
towards a more sustainable peace and long-term development in conflict-prone areas. Different 
views about the role of NGOs and the need to consider indigenous institutions as well as the 
importance of “peace-building from below” in Ethiopian contexts are also presented.  Finally the 
relationship between civil society and the state is explored. The politics of NGO-government 
relations is particularly important in the case of Ethiopia because these could adversely affect the 
structure and functions of the NGOs in conflict resolution activities. 
  
However, it is not the purpose of this second chapter to engage in detail with the complex 
theoretical and philosophical debates about the meanings of NGOs and civil society, which have 
been rigorously debated by several authors (Keane, 1998; Hadenius, 2001; Chandhoke, 2004). 
Furthermore a concise overview will be given to indigenous institutions which have also been 
written about extensively (see for example, Leach et al., 1997, 1999; Watson, 2001; Chambers et 
al., 1989). This study aims to explore the increasing prominence of indigenous approaches used 
by NGOs in development and conflict resolution initiatives. The following section briefly 
examines the nature and sources of contemporary conflict.  
2.2 Internal Conflict/Ethnic Conflict   
 Since the end of the Cold War, globally, the world has witnessed a substantial rise in internal 
conflicts. This development has resulted in a radical shift in the conceptualisation of armed 
conflicts from the traditional interstate conflict to intrastate conflicts. Contemporary academic 
literature characterises these conflicts as follows: “protracted social conflicts” (Azar, 1990); 
“deep-rooted conflicts” (Burton, 1987); “internal conflict” (Brown, 1996) and “intractable 
conflicts” (Gidron, Katz and Hasenfeld, 2002). Azar (1990:93) defines protracted social conflicts 
as “the prolonged and often violent struggle by communal groups for such basic needs as 
security, recognition and acceptance, fair access to political institutions and economic 
participation.” He underlines that these conflicts are often between communal groups and the 
state; often in states in which one ethnic or religious group controls the “machinery of the state” 
and uses it to discriminate against other groups. Burton (1987) characterises deep-rooted 
conflicts as being based on human needs that are non-negotiable, such as identity, recognition, 
participation, and security. He argues that identity groups will seek almost any means to fulfil 
19 
 
their needs. Furthermore, he argues that such conflicts cannot be curbed, contained, or resolved 
for more than a short period through coercion or even by negotiated settlements. Brown (1996:I) 
defines internal conflict as “violent or potentially violent disputes whose origins can be traced 
primarily to domestic rather than systemic factors, and where armed violence takes place or 
threatens to take place primarily within the borders of a single state”. Gidron, Katz and 
Hasenfeld (2002) sum up intractable conflicts as being prolonged, persistent, and violent, being 
viewed in a zero-sum relationship and as irreconcilable interests competing for needs and values 
that are essential for the conflicting groups’ survival. These descriptions and conceptions of 
protracted conflicts, deep-rooted conflicts, and intractable conflicts could apply to the post-1991 
Ethiopian context where the nature of conflict has evolved from Civil War (1974-1991) to 
protracted social conflict.  
 
Additionally, these conflicts are more-or-less confined to “developing” and “underdeveloped” 
countries and are often termed “ethnic conflicts”. A feature common to many ethnic conflicts is a 
division between the antagonists along ethnic lines. Kaufman (2001:17) defines ethnic conflict as 
a conflict arising from a contest for political power and involving “ethnic markers such as 
language or religion or the status of ethnic groups themselves”. Ethnic conflict constitutes an 
important subgroup of internal wars for a multitude of reasons; these include its ubiquity, the 
scale and intensity of violence, its impact on regional stability, its propensity to involve external 
powers and international actors and its centrality in theoretical and policy debates (Brown, 
1996). Lake and Rothchild (1998: 339) conclude: “at the close of the twentieth century, ethnic 
and other social conflicts are without a doubt the world’s greatest causes of human suffering”. 
Constructivist theory may argue that there is nothing intrinsically “ethnic” in these conflicts; 
nevertheless, Lederach (1997) describes them as “identity conflicts”. He then argues that it is 
critical to address the fundamental needs of the population such as security, recognition, and 
access; moreover, peace processes can take time and all it takes is for a few extremists to derail 
the process. 
 
Similarly, the traditional conflict resolution field came under attack and new approaches that 
were multi-disciplinary and multi-cultural were advocated. Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 
(2005:78) state “It seems unlikely on the face of it that a single all-encompassing explanation 
will be adequate for conflicts of different types in all countries.” Michelle (2006:438) comments 
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that contemporary violent conflicts “tend to be internal (even if significantly impacted by larger 
geopolitical realities), asymmetric, involve fragmented decision-making, and are often directed 
at civilians”. Likewise, Miall (2004) argues that classical conflict resolution theories were 
developed in response to symmetric conflicts, and are unable to provide an adequate basis for the 
analysis of the new conflicts. These arguments have resulted in calls for a radical shift towards a 
re-conceptualisation of these theories. For example, Miall (2004:3) proposes a shift from theories 
of conflict to theories of conflict-in-context, arguing that in the “context of globalisation our 
analyses of conflict must give proper consideration to the social, regional and international 
context.” Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse (2011) also contend that the field of conflict 
resolution should include the following: first, it should be at multi-level, so that analysis and 
resolution has to embrace all levels of conflict from intra-personal to the complex interplay in the 
global world; second, it should be multi-disciplinary and multi-cultural within an intricate and 
interconnected local/global cultural environment; third, it should be both analytical and 
normative; and fourth, it should be both theoretical and practical as the field entails a constant 
mutual interplay between theory and practice.  
 
There is no neat classification of theories dealing with sources of intrastate conflicts. Scholars 
have struggled to define those structural causes of violent conflict which situate the source of 
conflict within the socio-political structure (Azar, 1990; Burton, 1990; Kelman, 1991; Keashly 
and Fisher, 1996) and to relate them to the nature of the protagonists’ and social-psychological 
conditions. Researchers have encountered difficulties in understanding and explaining the nature 
and sources of conflict. Michelle (2006) proposed an intermediate level, between social-
psychological and structural causes, which tends to combine both factors. To date, most 
specialists in the conflict resolution field would confirm the existence of numerous actors and 
factors that need to be taken into account. Furthermore the actual analysis of the conflict has 
direct implications for conflict resolution approaches because the perception and definition of 
conflict determines the process and the method for how to deal with conflict (Miall, 
Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 2011). For example, if violence is caused by structural factors 
then conflict resolution should focus on addressing issues of rights, justice, and political issues; 
however, if conflict is caused by psychocultural factors, then conflict resolution should 
emphasise relationship building and the need to work on eliminating misperceptions, fears, and 
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hostility between the groups (Michelle, 2006). When both the structural and the psychocultural 
factors are the root causes, there is a need for structural interventions alongside psychocultural 
interventions. 
 
The following section briefly introduces Edward Azar’s analysis of “protracted social conflict”. 
Azar’s (1986, 1990) approach will serve as a key analytical tool for this study together with 
Lederach’s (1997) seminal work. 
2.3 Protracted Social Conflict (PSC) 
Drawing upon an expansive and decades-long analysis of violent conflict in post-colonial 
countries, Azar (1990) presents the concept of protracted social conflict (PSC), as a model for 
understanding contemporary conflict in developing countries. Azar identifies four clusters of 
causes as the main source of protracted social conflict. These are “group identity”, “deprivation 
of human needs”, “governance and the state’s role”, and “international linkages” (1986:33-4). 
The model does not claim that there is a single and encompassing root of violence; rather, it 
emphasises that the source of PSC is predominantly within and across these four clusters of 
variables. The model also presents the systematic interdependence of the four clusters of 
variables, which, however, can be differentiated. Furthermore, these should be seen as 
interconnected and as both producing and reproduced by conflict. Azar’s (1990) PSC model is a 
product of multi-disciplinary traditions of conflict resolution ranging from Herbert Kelman to 
John Burton and Azar tries connecting with these. He makes continuous attempts to 
reconceptualise the root cause of contemporary conflict associated with interstate conflicts. Azar 
(1990) is thus concerned with responding to the challenges posed largely by a disproportionate 
pre-occupation with interstate war and nuclear stalemates that have obscured a proper 
understanding of prevailing social conflict.  
 
What makes Azar’s (1990) PSC model relevant and appropriate for the prevailing patterns of 
conflict in post-colonial violent context are: (a) it gives a clearer understanding of the origins, 
nature, dynamics and possibilities for resolution of the conflict; (b) it highlights the values of the 
factors and actors that constitute the conflict and that could alter the conflict situation, including 
the interests and capacities of third parties to influence it; (c) it identifies likely constraints on 




These four clusters identified by Azar (1990) as possible causes of protracted social conflict will 
be discussed in relation to this study. 
2.3.1 “Group identity” 
Azar’s (1986: 31) PSC analysis focuses on the nature of relationship between “identity groups” 
and the state. Azar uses the term “identity groups” to denote disadvantaged, marginalised and 
repressed social groups on the basis of race, religion, ethnicity and cultural group. When the 
societal needs of the identity groups such as security, identity, recognition and other needs are 
unmet and unsatisfied, then protracted social conflict is likely. According to PSC analysis, the 
nature of the relationship between identity groups and states is at the root of what Azar (1990: 7) 
called the “disarticulation between the state and society as a whole”. The state’s machinery is 
often dominated by one ethnic or religious group which controls and uses it to discriminate 
against other groups. For example, in Ethiopia the state apparatus has been largely controlled by 
the Amahra to the detriment of the other ethnic groups (Gebrewold, 2009). Thus the state’s 
failure to satisfy the basic needs of all and to mediate security, identity protection, breeds social 
fracture and protracted social conflict. The colonial powers supported one or the other group, and 
entrusted local political elites to take over the task of state-building after their departure (Doe, 
2009). These groups have continued to dominate the politics and economy while excluding other 
groups and elites in the same country because of their cultural, religious or ethnic background 
(Gebrewold, 2009). For example, in Ethiopia, historically neglected or disadvantaged minority 
ethnic groups under authoritarian regimes (1974-1991) were fighting for cultural and political 
recognition and for local/ethnic identities and they have only recently acquired their cultural and 
political rights (Abbink, 2006).  
 
Azar relates the disjuncture between state and society in many parts of the developing world to 
the political legacy of colonialism and to the collapse of the domestic government structure. It is 
no longer possible, Azar argues, to overlook the influence of the colonial legacy of “divide and 
rule” and artificially imposed territorial statehood. Colonialism abolished traditional institutions 
and undermined long-lasting traditional authority structures and social cohesion, thereby side-
stepping indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms. It is also not possible to ignore the social 
and political legacy of colonialism or the historical and cultural domination by “a single 
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communal group or a coalition of a few communal groups unresponsive to the needs of other 
groups in the society” which “strains the social fabric and eventually breeds fragmentation and 
protracted social conflict” (Azar, 1990: 7). Helland (1996) notes that the Borana and Somali 
ethnic problem derives from the imposition of boundaries which created obstacles to the 
pastoralists’ movements in search of pasture and water. The colonial powers incorporated 
different ethnic groups unequally into a divisive system of colonial power; for example, in 
Kenya where the Kikuyu were dominant and in Rwanda where the Tutsis were dominant or 
Sudan where the Arabs have dominated the politics and economy at the expense of the majority 
ethnic groups (Gebrewold, 2009). In Ethiopia, Bassi (1996) describes how the Italian colonial 
powers shaped the nature of conflict between the Somali Clans and the Borana Oromo. The 
Italian colonial structures recruited and armed local Ethiopian Somalis and encouraged groups of 
Garri and Mareexaan to join the other askari (African troops) attached to the Italian army which 
carried out the invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 (Bassi, 2010). The Somali groups used this superior 
weaponry to expand southeast into Borana territory, thereby consolidating their control over 
water and pasture which until then had been Borana (Watson, 2001). Hence group identity or 
“ethnic identity” has been a key source of conflict in Ethiopia. However, the dominance of one 
group over the other is also linked to the the fact that the stronger and more powerful group will 
control the resources.       .   
2.3.2 “Deprivation of human needs” 
Following Burton (1990), Azar (1990) identified the deprivation of human needs such as security 
needs, development needs, political access needs, and identity needs as one of the underlying 
sources of protracted social conflicts. He notes that unlike interests, needs are ontological and 
non-negotiable, so that, if conflict comes, it is likely to be protracted and often violent. 
Gebrewold (2009) notes that grievances resulting from need deprivation are usually expressed 
collectively in the form of civil disobedience and guerrilla war. Azar (1990:9) notes failure to 
redress these “grievances by the authority cultivates a niche for a protracted social conflict”. 
Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse (2005) argue that dissatisfied groups come to articulate 
their grievances, mobilise, specify goals and strategies, and eventually mount a militarised 
challenge to existing state power-holders. This is clearly integral to the process of conflict 
formation, further exacerbated by historical animosity and contemporary resentment against the 
socio-cultural, economic and political constraints outlined in the previous section. Abbink 
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(2006), Keller (2002) and Clapham (2002), for instance, demonstrate how Ethiopian ethno-
regional and autonomist movements of the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), Tigray 
People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and others moved from demands for political access and 
autonomy, through protest to outright rebellion in a demand for secession. This was the 
background to the liberation war from 1975 to 1991 culminating in Eritrean succession in 1991.  
Azar (1990) views protracted conflict as being the result of distorted developments in society: 
whereas historical context and denial of basic human needs generate protracted conflict, it is 
made more destructive by exploitative patterns of development, a distorted pattern of governance 
and a militarised form of politics. The solution, from Azar’s point of view, entails reducing the 
level of underdevelopment and addressing the other clusters of fundamental needs, such as “good 
governance, civil politics, supportive international environment, accommodative state,” and 
democratic political confrontation by communal groups. Azar regards these as preconditions for 
resolving protracted conflicts (1990:155). Azar related this to an equally broad understanding of 
“development” and “political access”:  
 
Reducing overt conflict requires reduction in levels of underdevelopment. Groups which seek to satisfy 
their identity and security needs through conflict are in effect seeking change in the structure of their 
society. Conflict resolution can truly occur and last if satisfactory amelioration of underdevelopment 
occurs as well. Studying protracted conflict leads one to conclude that peace is development in the 
broadest sense of the term. (1990: 155) 
 
This view roughly coincides with Sen’s (1999) distinction between instrumental and substantive 
human freedoms. Conflict resolution tends to focus on addressing the first while remaining silent 
on the second. Its very notion hinges not only on an appeal to satisfying unmet human needs but 
also on the view that selective provision of these needs is not, and cannot be, a means of conflict 
transformation. Whatever promotes legitimate decision-making capacity, strengthens 
autonomous development, and sustains civil rather than military politics, is conducive to the 
meeting of basic needs/human development and can make conflict transformation possible. The 
Ethiopian context is a good example of how developmental requirements and security needs are 
still not being sufficiently addressed, perpetuating the dynamics of the conflict relationship.  
2.3.4 “Governance and the role of the state” 
 
Azar referred to a society in which the state has been “endowed with authority to govern and use 
force where necessary to regulate society, to protect citizens, and to provide collective goods”. 
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He then cited “governance and the state’s role” as the critical factor in the satisfaction or 
frustration of individual and identity group needs. Azar (1990:10) takes a governance-oriented 
view of the sources of contemporary conflict and argues: “Most states which experience 
protracted social conflict tend to be characterised by incompetent, parochial, fragile, and 
authoritarian governments that fail to satisfy basic human needs”. A functioning state 
presupposes a centralised authority able to defend its territory from external aggression and to 
regulate conflicts within and between elites and economic groups. It should treat all members of 
the political community as equal citizens from a legal point of view and should deliver services 
and resources to the socio-cultural or ethnic groups. The failure of a state to provide these 
functions will greatly exacerbate conflict.  
 
According to Clapham (2004), PSC is prevalent in Sudan, DRC and Ethiopia because of internal 
political, ethnic, and religious differences and because of their inability to establish institutions to 
moderate these differences. In short, Azar credits the emergence of protracted social conflict to 
the collapse of the domestic government structure. 
 
At the state level, Azar (1986: 33-4) cites “highly centralised political structures as sources of 
conflict” because they “reduce the opportunity for a sense of community among groups”, 
increase alienation, and “tend to deny to groups the means to accomplish their needs”. He 
suggests a decentralised political system: “For conflicts to be enduringly resolved, appropriate 
decentralised structures are needed”. Any such system should “serve the psychological, 
economic and relational needs of groups and individuals within nation-states” (1986: 33-4). One 
ethnic group may perceive that state power has been permanently “captured” by another, and is 
therefore driven to challenge the legitimacy of the state in order to change the situation, as in 
multi-ethnic regions in Ethiopia. This has also been a feature in a number of ethnically 
heterogeneous countries, such as Ethiopia, Nigeria, Kenya and Sri Lanka (Horowitz, 1997). 
Bermeo (2002) for instance, points to how centralised political systems in multi-ethnic nations 
have failed to meet minority demands for policy-making authority over education and language. 
She mentions political and economic discrimination as well as cultural grievances. Gurr (2000), 
Hechter (2000), and Stepan (1999) suggest a decentralised governance structure as a way to 
alleviate grievances and accommodate demands within the bounds of “normal” politics. 
Recently, federalism, together with other democratic reforms, has been conceived as one of the 
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institutional mechanisms to address and manage inter-ethnic or intra-state conflicts (Horowitz, 
1997; Coakley, 2000; Hechter, 2000). For example, in Ethiopia, as indicated above, the EPRDF 
government ushered multi-ethnic federalism and decentralisation as ways of diffusing social and 
political tensions and ensuring local cultural and political autonomy.  
 
Azar also viewed the role of elites/individuals as a decisive factor in the formation as well as 
termination of conflicts and violence. At the elite/individual level, particularly in the context of 
an exclusionist political space, ruling elites generally favour the status quo and oppose changes 
that would reduce their power (Gebrewold, 2009). They manipulate the state apparatus in order 
to cling to power and block political access to all those who are not part of their own narrow 
patronage network. The absence of any power sharing arrangement, but with a strong patronage 
network, gives rise to “all-or-nothing” or “zero-sum game” power struggles (Bratton, 1989a). In 
this context, political demands are not mediated through formal political institutions. The 
dominant social group uses the “coercive repression” or “instrumental co-option” to deny 
political rights to ethnic majorities, usually through a restrictive franchise and emergency 
legislation (Bratton, 1989b). Ethnic nationalism thus becomes “persuasive” among the populace 
because it appeals to basic needs, historical grievances and contemporary resentments against 
socio-cultural injustice that perpetuate communal antagonisms and solidify protracted social 
conflict (Brown, 1996). This intensifies further as a political crisis spirals into war. Examples of 
this process include the Darfur rebels against the Sudanese government; the southern Sudanese 
against the Khartoum regime; numerous ethnic groups against the Amhara and Tigraians in 
Ethiopia; various armed and unarmed rebellions against Mobutu in Zaire; and various armed 
clan-based rebels since 1979 in Somalia (Gebrewold, 2009). All of these groups have been trying 
to change their society or state to their advantage.  
 
Thus, Azar (1990) argues, ethnic relations can improve through the creation of a stable political 
order whereby the state’s institutions cannot be captured and controlled by opposing ethnic 
groups and those institutions cannot be turned into an instrument of ethnic favoritism or ethnic 
justice. However, the success of this approach relates to the nature and form of the reconstructed 
state. In short, the state cannot be used as an instrument of privilege for one group over another: 
inter-ethnic accommodation anywhere depends on a balance of power.  
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2.3.5 “International linkages”: Global and regional sources of contemporary conflict 
 
Azar views “international linkages” as one of the four main clusters of variables making 
protracted social conflict prevalent in developing countries. According to Azar, these states 
experience protracted conflicts for two reasons: first, they are too dependent on the international 
economic system and the network of political-military linkages; second, they are too weak to 
contain the impact of regional and global sourcses of conflict. On one hand, Cold War 
competition funnelled Soviet and US military and development aid to their allies and fostered 
power struggles for local, regional and international hegemony (Geberewold, 2009). On the other 
hand, the end of superpower rivalry over the African continent weakened countries by the 
withdrawal of external subsidies and support (Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 2005). As a 
result, governments are weak, borders are porous, and the trafficking of small arms and light 
weapons is easier across borders (Geberewold, 2009). This facilitates livestock raiding, 
exacerbating internal as well as regional security implications. For Rotberg (2004), Somalia, 
Ethiopia and Sudan, for example, are unstable because of Cold War superpower rivalry and 
subsequent militarisation of the region. These factors contributed to civil and interstate wars, 
leading to displacement, refugees, famine and hunger as well as to state weakness and collapse. 
 
Furthermore, some states destabilize their neighbours and contribute to their own destabilization 
(Geberewold, 2009). For example, according to Tadesse (2007), states such as Sudan and Eretria 
increased their military support to rival proxies in Somalia and Southern Sudan, thus spreading 
instability to the Somali-Borana and Gambella borders of Ethiopia. Tadesse (2007) suggests that 
the neglect of local and regional actors in Sudan and Somalia has considerably damaged various 
peace efforts in the Somali-Borana and Gambella borders of Ethiopia. In the global war on 
terror, Western powers need Kenya’s and Ethiopia’s cooperation in the search for Islamic 
militants in Eastern Africa (Geberewold, 2009). This means that these countries are increasingly 
becoming key players in the systemic security apparatus of the Horn of Africa region and in its 
geopolitics. Therefore, the role of global and regional factors is significant for understanding the 




In conclusion, this section has outlined a framework for the analysis of contemporary conflict 
that draws on Edward Azar’s account of protracted social conflict, and then proceeds to “update” 
it via a “levels of analysis” approach at international, state and sub-state levels.  
 
The following section will focus on conflict resolution approaches that could address the root 
causes of protracted social conflict.   
2.4 Conflict Resolution Approaches 
 
Numerous approaches have evolved out of theoretical assumptions concerning the origins, 
nature, and dynamics of conflict. Depending on the perceived cause of a particular conflict, 
conflict resolution may be seen to be structural change at state level, or relational change at 
conflict party level, or cultural change at all levels. Burton (1990), Azar (1990), Kelman (1991) 
and Fisher (1997) provide an “interactive conflict resolution approach” aimed at promoting 
dialogue and creating a favourable atmosphere for the adversaries to overcome “the incompatible 
beliefs” and transform conflict-habituated systems. In his efforts to increase emphasis on the 
importance of indigenous resources and local actors, Lederach (1997) presents an “indigenous 
empowerment approach” that is attentive to short-term and long-term resolution processes. In 
being critical of the liberal peace intervention with its emphasis on the perspective approach, 
Richmond and Mitchell (2012: 8-9) suggest “Hybrid Forms of Peace”, that focus on  identifying 
the needs and interests of local individuals and groups, as these issues are often obscured by the 
prescriptive approach. Focusing on the conflicting parties and the grass-roots, Rupesinghe 
(1995), Burton (1990) and Azar (1990) also suggest the multi-track conflict resolution approach. 
The approaches relevant to this research relate to the work of Azar (1990), Burton (1990), Curle 
(1991) and Lederach (1995a) and as such, suggest a combination of conflict resolution strategies 
aimed at institutional, group, community and societal levels.   
 2.4.1 Indigenous empowerment: Empowerment of Indigenous Actors/Institutions    
 
Within the framework of “peacebuilding from below”, Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 
(1999: 18) underlined the shift in emphasis away from viewing “third-party intervention” as the 
primary responsibility of external agencies such as NGOs, and towards appreciating the role of 
indigenous peacebuilding agents. This shift plays a crucial role in addressing what Lederach 
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(1995a) calls a “cultural gap” in conflict resolution. The outcome of ensuring a successful 
conflict resolution intervention is a central pre-occupation of “indigenous empowerment”. 
Firstly, there is a strong tendency to see conflict transformation as a direct outcome of the 
involvement of local parties with “external agencies supporting and nurturing domestic peace 
constituencies, developing peace institutions and eliciting culturally sensitive approaches to 
peace processes” (Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 2005: 19). Secondly, the local agencies 
are seen to represent the proactive side of the intervention and the external agents its passive 
side. Thus, without reconstructing the local capacity and culture for peacebuilding, there could 
be no meaningful project and therefore no concrete programme for conflict transformation. 
 
Drawing on Freire’s (1993) notion of a “consciousness-raising” approach, both Curle (1994) and 
Lederach (1997) have tried to make the case for indigenous empowerment for peacebuilding. 
Curle (1996) consciously seeks to move away from his original view of “soft muscle” mediation 
by third party intervention at a Track One level to an empowering approach: “Context-sensitive 
and which works to empower civil society and to deepen its capacity for non-violent social 
change’’ (Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 2005: 218). From recent practical experience in 
Central America, Lederach (1995b, 1997) also starts out with the “bottom up” approach, which 
underscores “indigenous empowerment for equal rights of self-development” through active 
participation in the collective decision-making that affects the lives of communities. It should be 
noted that the distinguishing feature of this model is not simply its support of indigenous 
empowerment; instead, its main characteristic is the assertion of a positive relationship between 
“self-development of the people/liberating human potential” and transcending asymmetric 
violence. Secondly, the model recognises the principle of indigenous empowerment that leads to 
ownership, people’s agency, and structural transformation (Lederach, 2001).  
 
Lederach contends: 
The principle of indigenous empowerment suggests that conflict transformation must actively envision, 
include, respect, and promote the human and cultural resources from within a given setting. This 
involves a new set of lenses through which we do not primarily ‘see’ the setting and the people in it as 
the ‘problem’ and the outsiders as the ‘answer’. Rather, we understand the long-term goal of 





The emphasis on empowering local citizens is “to enable the people to articulate those needs and 
to provide them with capacities and skills to address those needs”; this ultimately increases the 
control that individuals have over their collective futures (O’Brien, 2009: 43). Furthermore, 
Miall (2004: 5) argues that if protagonists can be “empowered to explore, analyse, question and 
reframe their positions and interests”, then it is possible for them to address and transcend the 
deep-rooted sources of conflicts. For these theorists, conflict resolution is about how parties can 
move from the perceived “irreconcilable”, zero-sum, destructive patterns of conflict to positive-
sum constructive outcomes.  
 
Lederach’s (1997) approach has implications for reinvigorating the long-standing reciprocal and 
dialectical interdependence among ethnic groups in protracted conflicts. For example, Bassi 
(2010) and Pavanello (2009) note that the current Ethiopian Constitutional arrangement for the 
ethnic groups has resulted in the de-legitimising of customary institutions into modern 
governance, particularly in the pastoral area of the Borana. These indigenous practices were 
sidelined and their potential for resolving conflict was weakened. 
   
Enhancing the capacity of indigenous institutions and actors to address and manage resource-
based conflicts through development-related interventions is of critical importance. Furthermore, 
in the context of the new political narrative of “exclusive ethnic space” the ethnic groups enter 
into conflict not only because of the erosion of customary laws that legitimise and govern 
resource rights, but also because of the deterioration of effective means of regulating inter-ethnic 
relations (Bassi, 2010; Scott-Villiers et al., 2011). In other words, any breakdown in 
communication reduces social interaction between antagonists; disputes are then less regulated 
and more likely to escalate because parties come to view themselves as being in a zero-sum 
relationship (Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 2005). Thus, Lederach’s approach could help 
to rebuild strong cross-ethnic bonds of trust, cooperation and solidarity, thereby ameliorating 
potentially volatile situations and creating conditions for successful development.  
 
It has been suggested that any intervention by an NGO in conflict resolution is contingent upon 
the nature and stages of the conflict (Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 2005: 12). It is 
suggested that the primary role of an NGO in this situation should be to identify the “ripe 
moment” (Zartman, 1986) for intervening with conflict resolution procedures (Fisher and 
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Keashly, 1991). Thus, interventions by NGOs play a complementary role in conflict 
transformation at all levels: this could reduce the incidence of violence, initiate cross-border 
communications and improve the quality of judicial proceedings (Michelle, 2006).  
 
The extent to which a given NGO’s “indigenous empowerment” projects contribute towards 
conflict transformation in practice will be the focus of the fieldwork undertaken in this research. 
The following section outlines Lederach’s (1997) peacebuilding pyramid model, seen in 
conjunction with other models.  
2.4.2 Multi-track conflict resolution approach in protracted social conflict 
 
Conflict resolution in Ethiopia at all levels has always taken place within a highly politicised 
landscape. Specifically, political negotiation among political parties has focused on influential 
politicians with less involvement of the Track Two approaches (middle-range leadership 
community) and even less about Track Three initiatives (indigenous resources and local actors). 
Given the history of coercive political negotiations at the top-level, it is not surprising if Track 
Two and Track Three initiatives are viewed as having “less real power” and influence on the 
dynamics of peacebuilding and negotiations. Nonetheless, most of the Track One peace 
settlements have failed to control protracted conflicts let alone build a sustainable lasting peace. 
The political negotiations between two ethnic-based regional parties in the Gambella Regional 
State is a good example of how state-centric top-down dialogues among political leaders often 
fail to address the root causes and sources that generate conflict. The top-level peace process was 
challenged from the very beginning and was not accepted by various factions, notably by the 
Anywaa (discussed in detail in the following chapter). The peace process was useful for 
obtaining a temporary peace, but it typically did not address the underlying grievances held by 
victimized communal groups. Thus it becomes increasingly important to empower such 
communities to undertake their own conflict resolution initiatives. 
 
During the past few decades, the “multi-track/multi-level” conflict resolution approach has been 
advanced as a leading alternative to the “top down/trickle down” approach (Lederach, 1997:45). 
Lederach (2003), Rupesinghe (1996), Aall (1996), Burton (1990) and Azar (1990) make major 





 and “eclectic” approach that embraces multi-track interventions. These 
interventions range from the elite’s formal agreement to participatory local knowledge and 
wisdom for empowerment, from short-term to long-term development framework, and from an 
outsider’s neutral approach towards a partnership with local actors. From this shift stemmed two 
major contributions to the core construct of a contemporary conflict resolution approach. The 
first major contribution is a shift in emphasis of peacebuilding processes from Track One (a 
state-centric top-down approach) to include Track Two (non-official) and Track Three 
(indigenous and grass-roots) initiatives (Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 2005). The second 
contribution was that interventions by third parties increased emphasis on the importance of 
indigenous resources and local actors, and led to strengthening of local capacities for indigenous 
conflict resolution. Therefore, to ensure successful conflict resolution intervention in the face of 
growing conflict with accompanying conflict transformation, a “multi-track/multi-level” 
approach became a central pre-occupation of the conflict resolution approach.  
 
Burton’s (1990) and Azar’s (1990) “problem-solving approach”, and Curle’s (1991) “soft 
negotiation/mediation approach” both seek to create an enabling atmosphere and to promote 
dialogue for middle-range leaders such as religious, academic, and NGO leaders involved in 
Track Two initiatives. At this level, third parties may use Boulding’s (1989) “integrative power” 
to work with constituencies to initiate development projects aimed at long-term problem-solving 
and intended to erode the culture of violence and sustain the peace processes on the ground. 
Track Three initiatives focus on promoting transformative dialogues, educational initiatives and 
conflict resolution training programmes for grass-roots leaders; for example, local leaders and 
leaders of indigenous institutions. Lederach (1997) contends that with the emphasis on “bottom-
up” processes, the “middle-range leaders” can serve to link “top-level” and grass-roots levels. 
Track Two initiatives can facilitate both the vertical and horizontal flow of 
information/communication for the parties or their constituencies. Track Two actors should be 
proactive in order to provide a vertical linkage between different communication spheres and a 
horizontal linkage between competing issues. The easiest way to effect this synthesis of “a 
pyramidal organisation” for conflict transformation, it turns out, would be to rely on the 
coordinated “horizontal” and “vertical” relationships across the three levels to operate by 
                                                          
5
 According to Mac Ginty (2010) hybrid peace approach refers to the interaction between “top-down” and “bottom-
up” peace initiatives that may draw on traditional, indigenous and customary practice.  
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“pyramidal participation”. Thus Lederach’s solution is the organisation and coordination of 
genuine participation by multi-track/multi-level parties. 
 
There is evidence that suggests that NGOs operating in both the Gambella and Borana regions 
adopted a combination of Track Two and Track Three approaches in dealing with their 
protracted social conflicts. Empirical evidence from the field indicates coordinated “horizontal” 
and “vertical” relationships across the three levels that adapted to effect “pyramidal 
participation”. More will be said about this in Chapter Five. The following section deals rather 
broadly with an “interactive conflict resolution approach” that aims to foster the psychological 
and political preconditions necessary for peaceful conflict transformation.  
2.4.3 “Interactive conflict resolution approach” 
 
The “Interactive conflict resolution approach” was originally called the “subjectivist controlled 
communication and problem-solving approach” that is closely linked to the works of 
contingency theorists such as Azar (1990), Burton (1990), Kelman (1991) and Keashly and 
Fisher (1996). The problem-solving approach is based on a “human needs” analysis and is 
primarily a social-psychological intervention for addressing protracted conflict (Fisher, 1997). It 
aims at promoting dialogue and creating a favourable atmosphere that provides the adversaries 
an opportunity “to search for mutually acceptable outcomes to apparently intractable conflict” at 
the intermediate or grass-roots levels of divided societies (Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 
2005:288). Most recently, in the field of conflict resolution, this interactive conflict resolution 
approach has incorporated problem-solving activities. For example, Fisher (1997:4) defines this 
interactive conflict resolution approach as “facilitated activities in communication, training, 
education or consultation that promote collaborative conflict analysis, resolution and problem-
solving among parties engaged in protracted conflict in a manner which addresses basic human 
needs and promotes the building of peace, justice and equality”. Fisher’s interactive conflict 
resolution approach strives to address entrenched patterns that characterise “conflict habituated 
systems” (Diamond, 1997). It should empower trainees to explore, analyse and reframe their 
interests (Chigas, 1997), and create an enabling environment for negotiation (Lederach, 1997). It 
should also increase tolerance and reduce prejudice, thereby transforming attitudes and 




Azar’s (1990) PSC model indicates that no conflict can be solved if the negotiation process 
focuses mainly on a “just” distribution of the contested or scarce material resources. Most of the 
time, traditional approaches to interstate conflicts focus too much on the contested material 
resources while ignoring the social-psychological aspect of protracted conflict, thus making 
traditional conflict resolution strategies ineffectual (Michelle, 2006). Azar (1990) suggests a 
Track Two approach that entails bringing parties together in an unofficial face-to-face 
environment where they explore each other’s need for recognition and acceptance. In a similar 
vein, Jordan and Hartling (2002) places the emphasis on the “relational-cultural factors” that help 
to shift the discourse from a single worldview of justice and move towards a more relational 
language of mutual empowerment. In order to move the peace process forward, these writers 
insist upon increasing the level of trust between the antagonists by addressing mutual needs and 
fears, employing confidence-building measures, and actively mediating with third parties. For 
example, Bassi (2010) and Adunga (2010) argue that the Somali-Borana conflict cannot be 
solved by the government’s referendum approach to the Somali-Borana border demarcation. The 
conflict between these ethnic groups involves psychological issues, such as diverging identity 
discourse based on indigeneity, the livelihoods system, as well as the entitlements and 
citizenship of both peoples going back to the colonial period. 
 
NGOs operating in the Borana and Gambella areas brought together individuals from opposing 
groups and offered them conflict resolution training aimed at “individual empowerment”; this 
entailed building conflict analysis skills, negotiation and problem-solving skills, identifying 
conflict-connectors and dividers skills, and human rights awareness. These skills are all 
important in supporting inter-group tolerance and building trust in areas of protracted social 
conflict where noticeable support for inter-group trust is lacking. Bassi (2010) and Scott-Villiers 
et al. (2011) emphasise the disintegration of long-standing cross-cutting bonds as a principal 
cause of conflict in the pastoralist communities of Borana. Therefore, building integrative ties 
and establishing relationships and mutual interests were of critical importance. These steps are 
important not only for breaking set patterns of conflicting behaviours and addressing the 
dynamics of conflict, but also for empowering parties to negotiate joint and mutually beneficial 
solutions. Rebuilding the long-standing cross-cutting linkages plays a pivotal role in supporting 
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collective tenure, customary and territorial rights, customary law, governance and leadership. 
These issues will be further discussed in subsequent chapters.  
2.4.4 “Conflict resolution and development” 
 
In addition to promoting “relationship-building”, Burton (1990) emphasises the importance of 
satisfying basic needs in order to address the economic causes of deep-rooted conflicts. In 
developing his understanding of PSC, Azar (1990) associated protracted conflict with 
exploitative patterns of development and communal discrimination. For Azar, effective conflict 
transformation requires addressing the structural inequalities and the deprivation of basic human 
needs; this step contributes towards security, identity and other developmental requirements. 
There is a growing body of conflict resolution literature which demonstrates a conceptual 
synergy between development and conflict resolution theories as a strategic model in addressing 
PSC (see, for example, Lederach 1997, 1995a; Azar, 1990; Burton, 1990; Curle, 1991). Drawing 
on this idea of convergence, O’Brien (2009) suggests a critical peace building approach that 
incorporates both community development and conflict resolution initiatives for communities 
marked by protracted conflict. Recent empirical research conducted by O’Brien (2009) in South 
Africa and Northern Ireland clearly demonstrates how development NGOs integrated conflict 
resolution strategies and how conflict resolution NGOs integrated development strategies in their 
interventions. In Ethiopia, the identity of minorities and rights of groups are largely safeguarded 
in the Constitution. However, the on-going socio-economic deprivation of the vast majority, as 
well as their chronic vulnerability to drought, and limited access to scarce natural resources and 
deprivation of basic needs are still not being sufficiently addressed. Referring to the link between 
levels of economic underdevelopment and violent conflict, Collier (2007) and Homer-Dixon 
(1995) suggest that socio-economic diversification and increased economic growth have the 
potential to reduce poverty and inequalities which will in turn reduce the conflict. For example, 
Scott-Villiers et al. (2011) and Pavanello (2009) note that conflicts in the pastoralist communities 
of Ethiopia are primarily caused by economic marginalisation, economic inequality and 
deterioration of their livelihoods rather than by ethnic diversity. Their research is based on the 
assumption that many of these NGOs operating in the study areas have incorporated 
peacebuilding components into their development programmes and have made significant 
contributions towards addressing the economic cause of protracted conflicts. The possibility of 
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practical impacts on the beneficiaries’ lives, livelihoods and inter-group conflicts will be the 
focus of the empirical work of this study.  
 
The following section will be concerned with the controversy surrounding conflict resolution 
initiatives. It will look at the limitations of “indigenous empowerment”, multi-track, the 
interactive conflict resolution as well as the development initiatives as approaches for peace in 
contemporary conflicts. It also alludes to the structure/agency debate and the importance of 
analysing power dynamics.   
2.4.5 Critique of conflict resolution approaches: limitations concerning the indigenous 
empowerment, multi-track, and the interactive conflict resolution initiatives 
 
First, generally speaking, the field of conflict resolution has always been contentious, inviting 
criticism from realists who see the field as “soft-headed” and theoretically uncritical for not 
placing a greater focus on power and coercion (Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 2011). The 
realists critiqued the “soft-power” approaches of conflict resolution as being unrealistic, or as a 
combination of an idealistic and ahistorical account of the state-building process. Drawing on 
historical cases of state formation and state building in Europe and Asia, Fukuyama (2004) and 
Carothers (2003) argue that violence has always been a key ingredient. Fukuyama (2004) 
describes post-colonial states ridden with protracted conflict as “early modern autocratic stage” 
and in need of strong state institutions that would guarantee peace and security leading to social 
and economic development. Gebrewold (2009) highlights the hard power of the state as being 
indispensable for a successful peace process. For instance, Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 
(2011) note the decisive military victory against Tamil military resistance by the government 
forces in Sri Lanka in 2009. This is seen by realists as evidence for hard power. Looking at the 
Gambella case where the Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF), known as Mekelakeya, 
often intervened to manage and de-escalate conflict, Feyissa (2009) also validates the coercive 
power of the state in the de-escalation of conflict and bringing temporary peace. Young (1999) 
notes how the power of the EFDRE settled the power struggle between antagonistic and 
irreconcilable ethnic groups of Gumuz and Berta of the Benishangul-Gumuz Regional State.  
 
State intervention is important given the intractability of conflicts that often spread quickly and 
reach across wide areas of the region. Even where there has been relative stability, the presence 
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of the military continues to play a critical role in preventing, containing and ending violent 
conflict. For instance, the federal government has placed Mekelakeya to contain the recurrent 
outbreaks of violence between intra-Oromo and non-Oromo ethnic groups in the Borana Zone. 
The federal government is also a major player in influencing the outcome of political 
negotiations to the extent that it exerts pressure on antagonists and alters the power balance 
through positive and negative inducements.  
 
As noted above, the theories and practices of conflict resolution approaches recognise the role of 
the state in “guaranteeing” peace and security. In the case of Ethiopia, Vaughan and Tronvoll 
(2003) argue that reliance on the coercive power of the state alone is inadequate. These writers 
claim that even though state institutions will need to have a greater coercive capacity, the effect 
of coercion will erode over time, and it is better to attempt to influence the behaviour of people 
in conflict situations by the use of the “carrot rather than the stick”. Thus while coercion can 
restrain violence at least temporarily, it cannot promote lasting peace. A durable peace requires 
not only the cessation of violence but more, crucially it needs, “bottom-up” peacebuilding. 
Furthermore, neither customary nor state institutions hold the monopoly of “rights” or “justice” 
in the pastoralist areas of Borana and Gambella. These institutions are both very active and 
operational, but with varying degrees of legitimacy in this jurisdiction (See, section, 5.5:131-
148). On one hand, the structural incapacity of the state’s judicial and military systems has 
rendered them less effective in shaping the dynamics of local conflict. On the other hand, it is far 
more difficult for indigenous institutions to deal effectively with “political” causes of conflict 
such as conflict over political boundaries, representation and power. Undoubtedly, customary 
institutions complement the emasculated state structure and could help it to consolidate its 
institutional capacity. Likewise, Track Two and Track Three initiatives may not completely 
replace the government role nor could they contain external factors. Instead, they are well placed 
to complement and assist the peace process by bringing together political elites and community 
leaders of conflicting parties to explore their grievances (Michelle, 2006). Thus a call is needed 
for incorporating a hybrid model that combines Track Two and Track Three initiatives for post-
conflict rebuilding in protracted conflict areas, especially in Ethiopia.  
 
Second, “indigenous empowerment” initiatives have also received their share of critiques. For 
example, Watson (2003) notes that such initiatives ignore the significant asymmetry between 
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conflict groups that determines differential access to resources thus excluding and marginalising 
some groups. Looking at aada seera Borana (Borana laws) that govern resource sharing 
arrangements between the Borana and Garri Somali ethnic groups, Oba (1996:131) documents 
contrasting interpretations of the aada seera Borana. For the Borana, the law was “designed to 
protect resource for a common good” and can only work as long as the so-called “guest 
inhabitants” (those who are not the indigenous Borana but who have been given permission 
through indigenous mechanisms) accept aada seera Borana and recognise its common customs 
and laws. For the Garri, the customs and laws, which the Borana alone fully understood, are 
meant to maintain the status quo by controlling access to resources to their own advantage. 
Therefore, for the Garri, the reinvigoration of these rules and their extension to the ethnic groups 
is simply reinforcing the Borana hegemony and institutions that “produces and reproduces 
violence”. Similarly, Muir (2007) expresses the concern that without mobilising cross-ethnic 
consent in the affected society, such initiatives will be perceived more as an imposition than a 
compromise. It is therefore necessary to analyse how the use of indigenous institutions might 
affect the needs of all groups in the future, especially if it continues to be seen as pursuing 
inequitable justice and accentuating the ethnic divide. The first great merit of Watson’s (2003) 
and Muir’s (2007) critiques is that they directed attention to the need to study the 
institutionalised and asymmetric power relations in order to prevent the perpetuation of violence. 
 
In a similar vein, Doe (2009) observed uncritical resourcing of “indigenous processes” which 
may turn out to epitomise transparent mechanisms for perpetuating local systems of oppression, 
exclusion and exploitation. Indigenous structures were largely exclusive, “often nostalgic and 
inimical to minorities, women and justice”. In the case study of Borana institutions, Muir (2007) 
points out indigenous women were not included in the primary structures of decision-making in 
natural resource management and conflict resolution institutions. As a result, “indigenous 
empowerment” initiatives reflect the resurrection of this aspect of traditional patriarchal culture 
in modern Borana society. Another limitation of indigenous empowerment is that some 
observers perceive that for all their “idealisation” and potential for conflict resolution, there is 
still doubt whether these institutions have the legitimacy and capacity to respond to 
contemporary conflicts. For instance, Bassi (2010) notes the challenge for the Borana indigenous 
institutions to cope with the change in the nature and magnitude of local conflicts that has 
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outstripped those institutions’ capacity to manage and contain these conflicts, thereby generating 
instability. In a comparable way, Watson (2003) is equally sceptical of the potential of 
indigenous institutions to cope with conflict emanating from natural resource management as 
well as indigenous capacity for development.  
 
Jabri (1996) and others in the conflict resolution field, have been highly critical of many of the 
ways in which third party organisations respond to a crisis. Fetherston (2000), for example, 
points out that contemporary conflicts have been analysed in isolation with asymmetric power 
relations, thereby obscuring the role of domination and social exclusion that generate and 
perpetuate violence. “Third parties attempting mediation” might reinforce and reproduce 
asymmetrical relationships (Jabri, 1996:198). In doing so, they may unconsciously interpret 
conflict through the dominant discourse and design its resolution accordingly, and they may 
simply “reproduce the exclusionist, violent discourse and practices which perpetuate it” (Jabri, 
1996: 181). In the case study of the Borana institutions, for example, Watson (2003: 307) 
expresses the concern that “the focus on the Borana institution might cause the need of other 
ethnic groups in the region to be overlooked, and might create inequalities and exclusion, and 
exacerbate tension”. In the same way, Abbink (2006) argues that the effort to contain conflict 
through indigenous empowerment could overshadow the search for its underlying cause in 
contemporary conflict in Ethiopia. Fetherston (2000) urges development agencies to adopt 
measures to analyse the structure of relationships that generate conflict, and then transform the 
structure by empowering the weaker party.  
 
The Borana and Gambella experience in Ethiopia illustrates the importance of analysing the 
discourse that legitimises and encourages reciprocal killings and cattle rustling, leading to 
counter raids and attacks. Such an analysis can change negative conflict attitudes at grass-roots 
level, and can pave the way to reconstruct an independent counter-discourse that promotes non-
violence (Scott-Villiers et al., 2011).  
 
However, the normative stances of conflict resolution strategies have been challenged on the 
grounds that these have some major defects. A big part of the challenge that the third party 
approach faces is that it does not limit the scope of its application and feasibility for a 
complementary range of third party interventions (Fisher, 2001). This stance is also profoundly 
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indifferent to the ability of the third parties to engage the conflicting parties and get them to 
debate on “deep political disagreements” on equal terms (Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 
2005:301). Torell (1999) agrees that the capacity to participate in decision-making hinges on 
institutionalised opportunities for discursive challenges and a critical political culture. However, 
Warren (1996) argues that it is possible to empower individuals while also denying them power 
over others though distribution of scarce resources. Furthermore, although the normative stance 
is able to identify those actors central to the incidence of violence, it has a strong tendency to 
assume that these actors have the “will and interests” to stop such violence. Nevertheless, this 
could only be accomplished, Jabri (1996), argues, by a change to the existing power structure 
following the overturn of asymmetric power arrangements.  
 
Finally, another criticism of interactive conflict resolution is that it has focused on the short-term 
or immediate impact on attitudes and on positive change at the personal level. Positive inter-
group changes are less likely to translate into action at the grass-roots level. Also, this approach 
looks at behavioural tendencies rather than actual behaviour; deeply prejudiced people tend to 
avoid inter-group contact (Tropp and Pettigrew, 2005; Pettigrew, 1998; Tam et al., 2009; 
Malhotra and Liyanage, 2005). Setting controversies aside, there is growing evidence to suggest 
that inter-group contact has made some inroads into breaking set patterns of conflicting 
behaviour by offering opportunities for building cross-ethnic ties. Fisher (1997) argues that inter-
group contact should be seen as one element of a multi-level and multi-faceted peacebuilding 
process. It should also be seen as an instrument to complement broad-spectrum peacebuilding 
processes. Inter-group contact platforms are particularly well suited for communicating the 
deliberations of key actors and affecting public opinion. Furthermore, choosing key actors rather 
than ordinary people is believed to have a discernible effect on peace. There is a special reason 
for this: what distinguishes key actors from nonparticipants is that they are people or groups with 
a significant influence over the conflict dynamics. They can strongly influence decisions for or 
against peace, and can “spoil” or undermine peace. By engaging these key actors in the inter-
group contact programme, while at the same time exhibiting the attributes and the needs of their 
corresponding ethnic groups, they could be a link to the broader community (Scott-Villiers et al., 
2011). This is what makes them suitable as a linkage between the two. These key actors are part 
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of a chain that runs from grass-roots through key figures and the “bottom-up” process to the 
officials of government’ (Lawson, 1988). 
Further discussion of the role of indigenous resources and the role of the NGO sector as part of 
civil society will take place in the following section.  
2.5 Indigenous Institutions, development and peacebuilding 
 
This section discusses the following: theorising indigenous institutions, the role of the NGO 
sector in conflict resolution and peacebuilding and finally, the nature of the relationship between 
the State and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs). 
 
Historically, development and peacebuilding have been treated as distinct disciplinary areas, 
with their own practice, relevance, discourse, and impact on social contexts. However, in recent 
years there have been attempts to understand their convergence, interaction, and how they could 
be integrated to contribute towards a more sustainable peace and long-term development in 
conflict-prone areas (see, for example, Goodhand and Lewer, 1999; Watson, 2001). In the 
development field, questions have been raised about the capacity of development agencies to 
bring about longer-term and sustainable development, and their capacity to respond to 
development-related conflicts without harnessing institutional capacities of indigenous 
institutions and entering into “genuine” partnerships for bottom-up development (Bush, 1998; 
Goodhand and Lewer, 1999; Watson, 2001). Theorists on conflict resolution have been critical 
about the need to consider indigenous institutions and the importance of “peace-building from 
below” which involves building on local agents and indigenous resources (Aall, 1996; Lederach, 
1997; Galtung, 1996; Fisher, 1997). In practice, and instead of focusing on each of these aspects 
in isolation, there have been attempts to integrate them. For example, development organisations 
operating in areas of protracted conflict are integrating indigenous institutions into development 
and conflict resolution initiatives.  
 
The underlying assumption is that integrated conflict resolution and development initiatives built 
on local agents and indigenous resources at grass-roots could contribute towards a more 
sustainable peace in societies experiencing protracted conflict. This assumption is grounded in 
actual practice in the field and in previous research (Goodhand and Lewer, 1999; Watson, 2001; 
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Lederach, 1995a; Bebbington, 1994; Uphoff, 1996; Bush, 1998; O’Brien, 2009). These themes 
are at the interface between two areas of work: indigenous institutions and the NGOs’ roles in 
conflict resolution and development studies. The following section briefly examines the concepts 
of institutions, NGOs and civil society and their interface in the context of protracted social 
conflict.  
2.5.1 Conceptualising indigenous institutions 
 
It has long been accepted that customary institutions have not just experienced difficulties in 
resolving disputes and maintaining order because of the “irrationality of the disorder”, but also 
because of a weakening of their institutional capacity to handle disputes and maintain pre-
existing institutional equilibrium for peace and security (Scott-Villiers et al., 2011:5). Moreover, 
the failure of “state-centric” and top-down development practices, which were technology 
driven, resulted in serious environmental degradation and the undermining of livelihoods, 
thereby forcing renewed interest in local institutions and wisdom (Oba, 1998; Tache and Bassi, 
2011). The terms “indigenous empowerment” and “social bridging” have been coined in order to 
draw attention to the importance of local organisational capacity, and have been portrayed as 
“the missing link” between the local community and development agents in development and 
conflict resolution (Lederach, 1995; Harriss and De Renzio, 1997; Watson, 2001). Conflict 
resolution theorists including Lederach (1995b, 1997, 2005), Azar (1990), Aall (1996), Fisher 
(1997) and Diamond (1997), have all highlighted the significance of indigenous “resources” and 
their empowerment roles in ownership, people’s agency, and conflict transformation. In the 
fields of development studies (Watson, 2001, 2003; Leach et al., 1997) and anthropology (Scott-
Villiers et al., 2011; Bassi, 2010), attempts have been made to study the convergence among 
indigenous institutions in the areas of conflict resolution and participatory community-based 
development. In the current climate of protracted social conflict, with an increased awareness of 
the role played by indigenous actors and institutions, and their potential for sustainable 
livelihoods and development, indigenous empowerment has become even more important. Thus, 
an increasing number of development thinkers and conflict resolution theorists have recently 
taken up the task of conceptualising and analysing indigenous institutions, and their role in 
maintaining peace and order. They are also examining the way in which they are used by 
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different development agents in the region as building blocks for conflict resolution and 
community-based development. 
 
North (1990:3) defines institutions as setting “the rules of the game in a society or, more 
formally, the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction… [which] define and 
limit the set of choices of individuals”. Leach et al. (1997:26), writing from an “environmental 
entitlement framework”, which is a framework for conceptualising society-environment 
relations, define institutions as “regularised patterns of behaviour that emerge from underlying 
structure set of rules in use…rules are constantly made and remade through people’s practice”. 
More recently, Watson (2003), from a natural resource management perspective, defines 
institutions as having authority to rule and regulate daily behaviours and practices, and to 
determine individuals’ or groups’ inclusion in or exclusion from rights or entitlements; they 
regulate conflicts within or between socio-cultural or ethnic groups. Watson (2001) further 
argues that institutions are more important than determining who should participate in and 
contribute to social order, and benefit from the resources. An institution comprises a set of rules, 
practices and group identities, as well as decision-making groups that claim jurisdiction over a 
given natural resource, including a monopoly over coercion and extraction, for the sake of social 
order (Smith, 1994). In order to maintain order and establish lasting security it exercises powers 
over all the people within its jurisdiction (Oba, 1996). 
 
From this viewpoint, indigenous institutions include informal organisations, indigenous practices 
and knowledge, and regularised practice, customary rules and regulations relating to access to 
resources. They are dynamic rather than static, and continuously integrate new information from 
external sources (Watson, 2003; Homann, 2004). Within indigenous institutions, indigenous 
knowledge is characterised by elements of “ecological particularism”, generated in a local 
natural environment and under specific environmental relationships, and internalised in culture 
and practices (Gadgil et al., 1993). Moreover, indigenous knowledge is a “cultural heritage”, 
being experienced, tested, and transformed by a given community over time, and when 
transmitted to the next generation it secures the reproduction of social reality (Brokensha et al., 
1980). The bearers of indigenous knowledge are indigenous people who share common 
knowledge, common culture, and common language and who recognise common customs and 
laws that regulate and govern their relationships (Goemans, 2006: 27). Therefore, indigenous 
44 
 
institutions constitute an important component in maintaining order and stability as well as 
development because they are formalised and have the ordered organisational capability needed 
to pursue collective goals in a predictable and coherent way (Oba, 1996).  
 
In recent years there has been a growing interest in using indigenous institutions as a “bridge” to 
community development and conflict resolution because they are a “ready-made” apparatus for 
participatory development (Watson, 2001:15). They promote participatory and sustainable 
development (Watson, 2001; Chambers et al., 1989). For instance, the Borana indigenous 
institutions and their knowledge systems embodied a higher degree of grass-roots participation in 
development. NGOs have been making use of the structure as a “ready-made” apparatus for 
launching participatory development (Watson, 2001, 2003). Moreover, they argue that the 
Borana indigenous practices and knowledge are enormously adaptive to precarious and changing 
environments (Watson, 2001). Watson (2003), writing from a natural resource management 
perspective, highlighted the potential of the Borana indigenous water and pastoral practices. The 
interest in these institutions was increased further in the early 1990s, when development agents 
were disillusioned with the state’s institutional incapacity as a “partner in development” and the 
failure of top-down development practices. These agents were forced to search for alternative 
institutions to carry out development (Watson, 2003; Harrison, 2002). Additionally, 
disenchantment with the state’s failure to govern effectively and to deliver services and resources 
to the peripheries compelled some commentators to suggest that indigenous institutions were 
better positioned to empower people to increase their opportunities (Bebbington, 1994).  
 
However today, the indigenous institutions are deteriorating. For example, during the last thirty 
years the deeply-rooted and indigenous management of natural resources, by the Borana 
pastoralists, experienced severe external disturbances (Homann, 2004). Whereas a deterioration 
or lack of capacity undermines the capacity of institutions to provide a tool for participatory 
development, limited social capital decreases the success, sustainability and appropriateness of 
development projects. Thus a call is needed to revitalise the institutional and “ideological” 
capacities of indigenous institutions and to enter into “genuine” partnerships with particular 




A big part of the challenge is how to reinvigorate institutional capacities, and to transcend the 
conditions that undermine their potential to promote proactive responses, manage conflict, and 
positively transform disputes (Onwuka, 2009). A further challenge is in combining traditional 
resolution mechanisms with other processes of promoting transitional justice (Minja, 2009). This 
process involves empowering the existing socio-political institutions, creating coalitions of 
various social groups and bridging the differences between the many disadvantaged groups 
(Katz, 2006). What forces if any, can strengthen and propel institutions forward to peace and 
development? Many would argue that community based NGOs as well as international NGOs 
could make a difference.  
2.5.2 The role of NGOs in conflict resolution/peacebuilding 
 
NGOs can fill a gap in service delivery and strengthen indigenous institutions for peacebuilding 
because they view indigenous institutions and their conflict strategies as primary resources for 
conflict resolution and development; they encourage stakeholders to take up the task of 
peacebuilding in their own hands (Aall, 1996). According to Katz (2006), NGOs are a significant 
part of civil society. As indicated in Chapter One, the NGO sector includes non-state and non-
market associations, groupings, trade unions, churches, educational and cultural associations; all 
of these engage to express their fundamental rights (Moen, 1998). Fowler (1991) argues that the 
political role of NGOs within civil society, their “symbiotic association” with the grass-roots 
level and their cultural as well as social capital allow them to play intermediary roles as “agents 
of change” and “catalysts for peacebuilding from below”. By virtue of their existence as 
autonomous actors and their democratic approach (Bratton, 1989a, 1990; Diamond, 1994), it is 
argued that NGOs could bolster civil society and reinvigorate grass-roots organisations, thus 
becoming the driving forces in the democratisation processes, decentralisation and empowerment 
of the poor and marginalised. They are primed to occupy the political vacuum left by a 
diminished state.  
 
Globally, after 1991, NGOs became increasingly involved in democratisation and peacebuilding 
processes in Rwanda, Somalia, and Bosnia. This was accompanied by renewed interest in the 
role of NGOs (Paffenholz, 2004). Whilst NGOs have been actors in conflict prevention and 
resolution for several decades, international debates on their role in conflict resolution started to 
46 
 
burgeon in the early 1990s (Orjuela, 2005; Aall, 1996; Paffenholz and Spurk, 2006). Aall (1996) 
argues that after many years of being overlooked by powerful states and international 
organisations, NGOs are now believed to be capable of facilitating peace and reconciliation at 
grass-roots level in societies split by ethnic or religious conflict. The United Nations (UN), for 
instance, recognised the peacebuilding contributions of regional organisations and NGOs and 
civil society groups in the early 1990s. NGOs can be involved in conflict prevention by 
addressing the deeper structural issues and conditions that are most often at the root of conflict. 
They can also address the fears and misunderstandings between different communities, and 
initiate and facilitate dialogues and uphold accepted solutions.  Aall (2001) argues that if a 
culture of conflict prevention is going to be inculcated into the international community’s 
collective security agenda, there is a need for increased emphasis on the importance of 
indigenous resources and greater partnership with local actors. In this regard, the concept of 
“partnership” has become useful because it is closely associated with a people-centered 
approach, involving indigenous empowerment, greater cultural sensitivity and self-reliance; 
these, in turn, address the issues of the NGOs’ legitimacy and accountability (Harrison, 2002).  
 
Within the field of conflict resolution, studies have shown empirically that NGOs have made a 
contribution to the conflict resolution and peace processes (O’Brien, 2009; Gidron, Katz and 
Hasenfeld, 2002). Applying an institutional framework to participatory development and 
peacebuilding, a number of development agencies initiated indigenous empowerment 
programmes, and made significant contributions towards building sustainable peace. For 
instance, in western Africa, Onwuka (2009) demonstrates how the Economic Community of 
West African States’ (ECOWAS) Council of the Wise revitalised indigenous institutions to 
address contemporary challenges. In the study of Rwanda, Mutisi (2009) noted the reinvigoration 
of the gacaca indigenous approach towards addressing the Rwandans’ distress following the 
genocide of the 1990s and their post-conflict reconstruction needs. She notes that the 
revitalisation of gacaca courts in Rwanda not only helps to build peace, justice, and 
reconciliation, but also transforms the nature of conflict. In a similar vein, Wasonga (2009) 
illustrates how the revival and use of mato oput, a traditional Acholi approach to peace and 
justice, in northern Uganda, contributed towards trust building, reconciliation, and restoration.  
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In Ethiopia, various aid and development NGOs have made radical changes to their mandates to 
respond to the issue of conflict. Apart from relief and rehabilitation work, these NGOs have been 
encouraging local communities to participate in peacebuilding (Rahmato et al., 2008). For 
example, traditional approaches to conflict resolution are now being revived and made 
operational in the pastoral and agro-pastoral areas of the country. In the South Omo zone of the 
Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Regional State (SNNPRS) traditional structures of 
elders strengthened by the Ethiopian Pastoralist Research and Development Association 
(EPaRDA) are now lead actors in mediating inter-ethnic conflicts. An NGO known as Pact 
Ethiopia, under a project called Stability for Ethiopia’s Lowland Marginalized Communities 
(SELAM-C) employed a participatory, bottom-up approach and built on traditional pastoral 
conflict mediation and prevention mechanisms and practices to foster peace more effectively in 
the communities in the Borana Zone of Oromia Regional State and the South Omo zone of the 
SNNPRS. The Inter Africa Group has been working on early warning and response mechanisms 
through the collection and analysis of information in the South Omo zone, Borana zone and 
Somali region. 
A growing number of NGOs (such as Care Ethiopia, SOS Sahel, Mercy Corps, Action for 
Development (AFD), Gayo Pastoralist Development Initiative (GPDI), Oromo Pastoralist 
Association (OPA) and EPaRDA) have gained experience of working in conflict-prone areas of 
Ethiopia (Scott-Villiers et al., 2011; Kurtz and Scarborough, 2012). They use a variety of 
approaches including facilitating cross-ethnic and border dialogue (Scott-Villiers et al., 2011), 
and revitalising local institutions and empowering the local community (Tache and Irwin, 2003). 
Rupesinghe (1995) underlines the significance of building indigenous capacity to handle disputes 
within a conflict-strife community, a process which will necessarily involve the need for local 
knowledge of indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms. Mercy Corps, OPA and others have 
used an elicitive model in their cross-ethnic Peace Accords in the Borana, drawing on their 
knowledge of Borana culture to facilitate freedom of movement and access to natural resources 
by the Garri and Gabra ethnic groups. Participants in a conflict resolution training programme 
facilitated by Pact Ethiopia have gone on to play significant decision-making roles in the 
Anywaa-Nuer in the Gambella peace process (PACT, 2006a, 2007). Likewise, NGOs in Borana 
have built cross-ethnic ties across the Garri, the Gabra and the Borana. These NGOs are a long-
term resource for peacebuilding, and are changing resource sharing arrangements. Thus, the 
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convergence between conflict resolution and development projects could transform the context 
of conflict. NGOs also work towards structural transformation; for instance, by empowering the 
marginalised or deprived groups (Curle, 1996; Lederach, 1995a). In Gambella, as in South Africa 
and Northern Ireland, NGOs help to build the capacity of indigenous actors to demand issues of 
rights, justice, and political reform.  
However, the relationship between the State and CSOs continue to be fraught with tensions and 
ambiguities and this will be discussed in the following section.  
2.5.3 The nature of the relationship between the State and CSOs 
 
One should be cautious not to “mythologise” the role of NGOs in conflict resolution by 
supposing that they can substitute, supplant, or supplement an inefficient state’s services. On the 
contrary “they make moral claims that are in opposition to those of the dominant political elite, 
and they actively challenge and seek to change the forces that fuel and maintain conflict and 
prevent peace” (Gidron, Katz and Hasenfeld, 2002: 17). The success of NGOs in promoting and 
building democratic institutions, and particularly in mitigating conflict, presupposes the 
existence of strong and mature organisational and functional capacities, organic grass-roots 
relationships and an “open political system”. Organisational and functional capacity is 
manifested in a form which Chandhoke (2004: 186) describes as the “civility of civil society”; in 
other words, its decisions and activities presume deliberation, reasoned interaction and conscious 
procedures as well as stable and non-violent rules of behaviour. It can also be best described in 
what Gidron, Katz and Hasenfeld (2002: 16-18) refer to as “social capital”, “cultural capital” and 
a “mobilising structure” for advancing their causes.  
An open political system will depend on the nature of the regime, its political culture and the 
“political space” allowed for non-state actors to take initiatives independently of the state (Riker, 
1995: 23). Gidron, Katz and Hasenfeld (2002: 18) emphasise that: “The state’s propensity 
toward repressive behaviour affects civil society organisations’ choice of strategies” (emphasis 
in the original). The function and operation of the NGOs depend on the “openness of the political 
system” as it has a direct implication on their legality, mandates and functional and 
organisational structures. States may manifest their attitudes towards NGOs in different ways to 
limit their operations. Authoritarian states may formulate proclamations that restrict those Civil 
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Society Organisations (CSOs) that intend to transgress “boundaries” laid down, thus restricting 
their mandates, organisational forms, resources and leaderships (Gidron, Katz and Hasenfeld, 
2002; Chandhoke, 2004). States raise the issues of sovereignty and/or the legitimacy of states to 
act in their own self-interest (Chandhoke, 2004). The States may view NGOs’ active 
involvement in local political activity as a threat to their authority and clamp down on their 
activities. International NGOs may be threatened with expulsion and local ones with closure if 
they oppose the state too vehemently. The nature of civil society is also determined by the stage 
of “political maturity” of the state. It is a key determinant that defines the extent to which 
political space is sanctioned for the CSOs (Bashaw, 2008). 
 
Critics have also attacked the over-optimistic perception of the NGOs’ role as facilitators, 
catalysts, advocates and networking partners and the role they play in reinvigorating grass-roots 
organisations and being driving forces in democratisation processes. Local NGOs are 
increasingly used by donors as implementing and executing agents and they can become 
disconnected from the grass-roots (Marcussen, 1996; Katz, 2006). Bureaucratic rationalisation 
and professionalisation then undermine the core virtues, such as flexibility, responsiveness, 
willingness to experiment and take risks. These factors marginalise and disenfranchise efforts by 
voluntary or solidarity groups within organisations, thereby weakening both the state and civil 
society (Edwards and Hulme, 1992; Clark, 1991). Moreover, there have been persistent questions 
on their legitimacy, accountability, transparency and responsibility in Africa (Bebbington, 1994). 
According to Uphoff (1993), the assumption that grass-roots organisations and NGOs present 
huge potential for rural development does not mean that they are “inherently or invariably 
superior” to the state and market: nor does it mean they are more democratic, less clientelistic or 
rent-seeking than the state (Marcussen, 1996:417).  
 
However, there is some evidence to indicate that NGOs have had some positive impact on the 
state’s legitimacy and functioning, and this has resulted in positive outcomes for both the state 
and the NGOs (see for example, Ndegwa, 1996; Fisher, 1998). Clarke (1998), for example, 
argues that NGOs are able to carry out project-based tasks that neither the state nor the market 
can achieve. The state can benefit by allowing NGOs to fill this functional gap in service 
delivery while retaining power, thereby strengthening its legitimacy. Furthermore, Bratton 
(1989a: 429) asserts that the NGO/state relationship can be complementary when NGOs try to 
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“occupy space which the state has never penetrated or from which the state elites have decide to 
retreat”. The same applies where the state is structurally unable to exert its autonomy and/or 
deliver much needed services. Bratton (1989a) argues there is a strong tendency for the 
relationship to be conflicting when NGOs through civil society attempt to “reconstitute the 
political discourse and transgress the boundary laid down” (Chandhoke, 2004: 10). In Ethiopia, 
conflict resolution has been conceived as a purely political issue, to be addressed by government 
mechanisms. For NGOs to conduct conflict resolution activities in an unhindered way, they need 
to forge a partnership with government and work in close collaboration with the state.  
The ambiguity of the state/civil society relationship lies in changing dynamics where civil 
society may need to adopt an adversarial stance when rights are denied or a collaborative stance 
where civil society could assist the state with development or conflict resolution. NGOs need to 
work out their stance in relation to the state. 
Bratton (1989b) suggests the need for a proper separation of responsibilities and duties between 
the government and NGOs, to achieve balanced cooperation without infringing the autonomy of 
either of these actors. Marcussen (1996) recommends that, instead of working to erode the 
legitimacy of the state, NGOs need to prioritise working through grass-roots movements and 
organisations as well as collaboration and co-operation with the government. Nevertheless, the 
approach can be challenged for its implied compromise of NGOs’ integrity, responsibility and 
autonomy (Fisher, 1998). Bratton (1989a: 430) points out that the relationship is not essentially 
one-sided and a zero-sum game: “It runs a range of mutual disengagement on one hand and 
direct confrontation or close collaboration.” Moreover, though autonomous, NGOs need an 
effective state to guarantee their autonomy; NGOs depend upon the state for political order and 
adequate infrastructure (Mamdani, 1996; Bratton, 1989b, 1990). The success of maintaining 
autonomy depends on having a balance between confrontation and close collaboration. 
The politics of NGO-Government relationships and the debate about whether NGOs should build 
complementary or adversarial relationships with the state are very important issues in the 
Ethiopian context. As indicated above, the government promulgated the new Proclamation to 
Provide for the Regulation and Registration of Charities and Societies (PPRRCS) in 2009. That 
Proclamation has had an adverse impact on the constitution and operation of NGOs as well as on 
their involvement in advancing good governance and sustainable peace (Rahmato, Akalewold 
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and Yoseph, 2008). This research is based on the assumption that involvement of CSOs/NGOS 
in democratisation and their attempts to influence the State’s national policy though lobbying 
and advocacy resulted in NGO-Government relationships deteriorating to the point of 
antagonism and, suspicion and in some cases co-option. The Proclamation could be seen as the 
state wanting to contain the influence of NGOs that could erode the legitimacy of the state. 
This aspect of the politics of NGO-State relations could adversely affect the structure and 
functions of NGOs and, in turn, affect their involvement in peacebuilding activities. This 
assumption is grounded in actual practice as indicated in various researches (Katz, 2006; 
Chandhoke, 2004; Gidron, Katz and Hasenfeld, 2002; Bebbington, 1997; Marcussen, 1996; 
Fowler, 1991).   
2. 6 Conclusion  
 
The chapter sketched a framework for an analysis of contemporary conflict that draws on 
Edward Azar’s account of protracted social conflict. Briefly, Azar locates the roots of protracted 
social conflict in factors such as group identity, deprivation of human needs, governance and the 
state’s role, and international linkages. These factors were discussed with a view to gaining a 
better understanding the situation in Ethiopia. Furthermore, conflict resolution approaches and 
the use of indigenous approaches were discussed. The role of NGOs and their relation to the 
State were briefly alluded to. 
The following chapter introduces the historical and socio-political context of the Gambella and 











CHAPTER THREE: THE ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT IN THE BORANA ZONE OF 




This chapter provides a brief overview of the socio-historical and political dynamics of 
protracted social conflicts in Ethiopia. It is intended to provide only sufficient background to 
assist readers in locating the roots of protracted social conflict in the Borana Zone of the Oromia 
and the Gambella Regional States of Ethiopia. This chapter describes the source and evolution of 
the conflict in each region, provides a sketch of the major parties to the conflict, and gives some 
background about the relevant NGOs, their genesis, and their relationships to government.  
3.1 Conflict Analysis of Gambella Regional State 
 
Much has been written about the Gambella region’s history and the cause of conflict. These 
sections will reflect the scholarly work already done by researchers from this region. The 
following sub-section, focusing on Gambella Regional State, presents a summarised historical 
overview drawn from Feyissa (2011, 2009, 2006 and 2003). Further insights into this rather 
complex history have been taken from Zewde (2002, 1987), Johnson (1986) and Meckelburg 
(2006). The purpose of this subsection is to outline briefly the multi-level actors and factors 
pertaining to the Gambella conflict and to describe their systematic interdependence as this 
appears from a perspective foregrounding Gambella.  
 3.1.1 The Gambella context: Location and Demography  
 
The Gambella People’s National Regional State (GPNRS) is in the south-western part of 
Ethiopia about 780 kilometers from the national capital, Addis Ababa. It is bordered by the 
Benishangul Gumuz and Oromia Regions to the north, the Southern Nations, Nationalities and 
Peoples’ Regional State (SNNPRS) to the east and Oromia to the south. The South Sudan 
borders it to the west. It has a total population of 306,916 (CSA, 2007). This region has nine 
districts (Woredas): Gambella, Abobo, Akobo, Gog, Itang, Jor, Jikaw, Dima and Godere special 
Woreda. Gambella town has a total population of 41,867 (CSA, 2007). The main ethnic groups 
include the Nuer (40%), Anywaa (27%), Mezhenger (6%), Amhara (8%), Tigray (2%), and 
Oromo (6%), the Opo and the Komo (3%) and other minorities (8%) (CSA, 2007). The Anywaa 
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are predominantly cultivators living along the major tributaries of the Sobat River and reside in 
eight of the nine districts except in Godere special Woreda. The Nuer are agro-pastoralists and 
are located in Jikaw and Akobo. The Nuer group is further divided into the Gaajak, the Gaajok 
and the Gaaguang. The Gaajak and the Gaaguang resent the Gaajok’s political domination within 
the Nuer-based regional political party (Feyissa, 2011). Other groups in the region include the 
Highlanders who are either “non-indigenous” immigrants, such as ethnic Amhara, Oromo, 
Tigreans and Kembatta, or they were defined as non-Nilotic people with a “brown” skin colour: 
they primarily live in Gambella town, Abobo (Anywaa-dominated), and Godere (Mezhenger-
dominated) districts (Feyissa, 2011). The region is predominantly lowland with a few midlands. 
The area’s low population density, coupled with access to pasture and water attracted settlers 
from both Southern Sudan and other parts of Ethiopia (Borchgrevink and Lie, 2009). 
The relationships between these ethnic groups are complex and changing and they influence the 
intra-ethnic and inter-ethnic conflict dynamics in various ways. The Nuer (40%) and Anywaa 
(28%) are two larger ethnic groups who fought over ethnic identities, local and national 
representation in government, federal funds, language at schools and land for agriculture 
(Anywaa) or pasture (Nuer) (Abbink, 2006; Feyissa, 2009). These two major ethnic groups are 
locked in conflict and dominate the region’s conflict dynamics (Tadesse, 2007). The Sudanese 
civil wars, also, have forced a significant number of Nuers to cross the border and settle in the 
Gambella region of Ethiopia. The Anywaa claim that they are indigenous residents of the 
Gambella area and there is a common belief among the Anywaa that the Nuers and the 
Highlanders are controlling their resources (Feyissa, 2006). Moreover, the Sudanese civil war 
has also made modern weapons more accessible and exacerbated the faction fighting and inter-
ethnic conflicts (Tadesse, 2007; Meckelburg, 2006). The new conflicts are fought using these 
arms, causing more casualties than former conflicts that used conventional arms (Human Rights 
Watch, 2005; Tadesse, 2007). Together with the loss of human lives associated with large-scale 
cross-border cattle raiding by the Lou Nuer and the Murle from Southern Sudan, all these factors 





3.1.2 Historical background and socio political context 
 
 Incorporation into the Ethiopian State (1898) 
 
As early as the 1840s, the Turco-Egyptian and the British colonial empires tried to incorporate 
the region under their rule (Young, 1999). The inhospitable climate and geographical barriers 
were not attractive to non-natives but outsiders came to the area for short periods in search of 
lucrative commodities such as coffee, ivory and gold (Zewde, 1987). The quest for territory, 
however, intensified in the late nineteenth century with the opening of the Gambella trading post 
and the area’s greater significance to the British colonial aspiration of controlling the Nile valley 
(Ram, 2009). This trading post was in a place subject to a conflicting jurisdiction of the adjacent 
trading areas of Egypt, Sudan and Britain. In the wake of disarray from the British colonial 
empire and the Mahdist irredentist movement in Sudan, Emperor Menelik extended his authority 
over Ethiopian-Sudan territorial boundaries (Young, 1999). Thus, the Gambella region was fully 
incorporated into the Ethiopian empire under Emperor Menelik in the late nineteenth century, 
primarily to counter the threat of British advances from south Sudan (Ram, 2009). This set the 
stage for a formal border agreement with the British colonial power in Sudan in 1902 delimiting 
the boundary between Ethiopia and the Sudan (Young, 1999). The Anywaa and Nuer land was 
divided between the British East African Protectorate and the Ethiopian Empire. As a result of 
the boundary agreement, most Anywaa have become Ethiopian citizens whereas most Nuer have 
become Sudanese citizens (Feyissa, 2011). The imposition of colonial and modern administrative 
boundaries and national borders undermined the long-standing cross-community movement and 
interdependence on which these communities relied for economic and social wellbeing.  
The incorporation of this region not only initiated commercial relations between the governors of 
highland areas adjacent to Gambella, but also provided an opportunity for a movement of people 
from the highland to the periphery, notably the Amhara and Oromo; this movement was from 
north to south west (Johnson, 1986). A system of indirect rule was established, through which 
the appointed representatives of the central government were charged with the maintenance of 
order as well as with controlling taxes from the profitable trade (Zewde, 1991). The main 
concern of the Ethiopian state throughout this period was the establishment and maintenance of 
the border with Sudan, while the relationship with the Gambella was characterised by benign 
neglect (Zewde, 1991). 
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 Resettlement and sedentarisation schemes (1985) and land nationalisation policy 
After the period of bureaucratic modernisation started in 1945, the state intensified the process of 
state building, through the policy of integrating the peripheries into central government, to 
strengthen its control. Mass resettlement and sedentarisation schemes were introduced in the 
early 1960s and increased under the military regime in the late 1980s (Meckelburg, 2006). By 
1985, the Durge had resettled up to 60,000 Highlanders (Kurimoto, 2005), most of whom were 
settled on traditional Anywaa territory (Meckelburg, 2006). This invoked a deep sense of 
injustice on the part of the indigenous people, both towards the central government and the new 
settlers, marking the beginning of the indigenes vs. migrants discourse (Feyissa, 2006). Thus, a 
highland community, representing Highland culture and way of life, was established on 
“expropriated land” while the indigenous inhabitants’ institutions and traditional subsistence 
economy were devastated (Borchgrevink and Lie, 2009). Furthermore, the Highlanders were 
mainly non-Nilotic people with brown skin pigmentation (red in local parlance), while the 
natives were predominantly “black” people (the Nilotic lowlanders) (Feyissa, 2011). This 
provided a discourse based on skin colour- the Highlanders’ and the Nilotic lowlanders’ 
distinction - that eventually shaped political thinking in the region. 
While this marked the beginning of the indigenous versus non-indigenous discourse, the land 
nationalisation policy that emerged with the Durge regime from 1974 was more radical. It had 
devastating effects on the traditional subsistence economy and settlement patterns as well as on 
the ethnic composition of Gambella (Borchgrevink and Lie, 2009). An additional issue was the 
new regional party structure: the Workers Party of Ethiopia (WPE). This was a communist 
vanguard set up by the Durge and was met with massive resistance from the Anywaa community 
(Feyissa, 2011). The advancement of the Nuer in the WPE was very much resented by the 
Anywaa elites. At the same time, there were twice as many Nuers as Anywaa in the WPE’s local 
administration that entrenched its political power over the region in several ways. The Nuer and 
Highlanders’ demographic pressures, the disillusionment of the Anywaa elites, coupled with the 
violent uprooting of Anywaa’s indigenous institutions through Durge’s “cultural revolution”, 
further exacerbated Anywaa’s opposition to the central government and continued to spread by 




 The emergence of Gambella People’s Democratic Movement (GPDM) 
These historical factors created much discord among the Anywaa, who have come to be 
identified with rebellion. Furthermore, the continued deprivation of basic needs fuelled public 
grievances, while “state-building” projects continued to replace indigenous institutions and 
centralised authority served to stimulate dissent in the peripheries (Young, 1999). The various 
grievances, fighting over natural resources and structural marginalisation resulted in the 
destruction of Gambella. In the late 1980s, the Anywaa dissenters crossed the border and 
established the Gambella People’s Democratic Movement (GPDM). They started to collaborate 
with the Sudanese government and the Ethiopian liberation movement in fighting the Ethiopian 
government (TPLF and OLF), originally for independence but later for autonomy. The armed 
rebellion of the Anywaa aligned the socialist Durge regime closer to the Nuer-based secessionist 
Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), fighting for independence from the Islamic North of 
Sudan (Borchgrevink and Lie, 2009). As a result, the Durge regime had strongly favoured the 
Ethiopian Nuer in the local administration, while the marginalised Anywaa joined the GPDM, 
under Sudanese patronage (Feyissa, 2009). Thus, the Durge authorities allowed the SPLA to set 
up military training and base-camp facilities in Ethiopian territory and to recruit from the Nuer 
population, while the SPLA army began counter-insurgency operations against forces aimed at 
toppling the Durge regime, notably against the GPDM (Gebrewold, 2009).  
 The Sudanese civil war 
A spill-over effect and a deliberate mutual destabilization by Ethiopia and Sudan evolved with 
geopolitical and domestic ramifications (Tadesse, 2007). The Sudanese support for the Eritrean 
rebels fighting the Durge regime for independence had already drawn the socialist Durge into the 
Sudanese civil war, regionalising the conflict (Gebrewold, 2009). The Durge regime was backed 
by the Soviet Union, whereas Khartoum received US support. While the SPLA received 
armaments from the Soviet Union via Addis Ababa, Khartoum stepped up its general support for 
insurgent groups aimed at overthrowing the Durge regime and allowed international actors to 
assist the anti-Durge uprising from Khartoum. While SPLA soldiers operated on the Ethiopian 
side, anti-Durge forces were “active on Sudanese soil” (Borchgrevink and Lie, 2009: 56). 
Finally, in 1991, the fall of the Soviet Union took place which led to the end of the Cold War and 
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it is against that background that the uprising led by the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front 
(TPLF) managed to topple the Durge regime, after 15 years of struggle (Young, 1999).  
 Multi-national Federalism (1991) 
After emerging as the victors in toppling the socialist Durge dictatorship and occupying the 
Gambella region, the GPLF (Gambella People’s Liberation Front) and Anywaa were rewarded 
by taking control of the Gambella regional state (Feyissa, 2009). They remained the dominant 
political force during the transitional period (1991-1994). The empowerment of the GPLF was 
interpreted both by the Anywaa and the Nuer as the recognition of the Anywaa political 
ownership of the Gambella Regional State; the Nuer elites were identified with the previous 
Durge dictatorship. In subsequent years, the Anywaa have used this support to renegotiate their 
political influence and role vis-à-vis the Nuer. They consolidated their own position by 
designating the Nuer as non-indigenous, therefore, “nominal foreigners without Ethiopian 
citizenship” (Feyissa, 2009:98). This step marked the beginning of a difficult struggle for 
indigeneity as well as a bone of contention between the Anywaa and the Nuer. For example, 
between 1991 and 1992, militant sections of the GPLM attacked civilian Nuer in what appears to 
be an attempt to discourage the Nuer’s bid for indigeneity and thousands of Ethiopian Nuer 
citizens fled to the Sudan along with southern Sudanese refugees (Feyissa, 2011). Another 
violent clash erupted in January 1998 in Itang, an area with a mixed population with two ethnic 
groups of Openo (Anywaa) and Cieng Reng (Nuer). Here, a family quarrel escalated and 60 
people were killed, ten villages burned and 3000 persons displaced before a state of emergency 
was declared after six months to end overt hostilities.  
 Conflict over Political Ownership of the Regional States  
A spiral of revenge killings followed this Itang incident, fuelled by both sides. In 2002, this 
political tension escalated into a deadly conflict between the Anywaa and the Nuer (Feyissa, 
2011; Human Rights Watch, 2005). In June 2002 the political competition between the Anywaa 
and the Nuer elites manifested itself in the escalation of conflict between the Thiang Nuer and 
the Openo Anywaa that cost the lives of more than a hundred people and the destruction of many 
villages (Feyissa, 2009). In response to regular conflict between these ethnic groups, the federal 
government took a series of political measures including imprisoning and dismissing senior 
political figures suspected of inciting the violence. In 2003, the federal government dissolved all 
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political parties and imposed a merger between the GPLM and the Nuer-based party and created 
new ethnic parties modeled on EPRDF’s People’s Democratic Organisations (PDOs). The 
government also divided power according to population size. Two subordinate administrations 
were established. The first of these, the office of the presidency is allocated to Anywaa. The 
Nuer are compensated with the second of these: the office of the vice-presidency as well as a 
party leadership. Each side was given a number of devolved powers, but ultimate power was 
reserved for the regional People’s Democratic Organisations (PDOs), affiliated with the EPRDF.  
Nevertheless, this power sharing arrangement satisfied neither the Anywaa nationalists, who 
demanded the dominant political position, nor the Nuer, who refused to be included in such an 
arrangement. Although the population of the Nuer was 40% of the region and therefore the Nuer 
Party could expect an enduring electoral majority, a 34% share of the seats in the regional 
cabinet was not a triumph for either the Nuer or for the Anywaa whose ambition had never been 
to share any kind of power at all (Borchgrevink and Lie, 2009). Additionally, the pragmatic 
political promotion of the Nuer by the EPRDF, dismissal of Anywaa officials from their jobs, 
suspension of the GDPC, and re-division of the Anywaa district into two separate Nuer and 
Anywaa zones suggested to Anywaa that their country had been usurped (Feyissa, 2009). These 
political measures taken by the federal government had alienated a large segment of Anywaa 
society, framing a new round of conflict between the Ethiopian state and Highlanders and 
Anywaa. In due course, the dismissed policemen and alienated youth found their way back into 
the rebellion and joined the Anywaa factions fighting for independence. This development 
hardened ethnic divisions, and fuelled armed rebellion, which nearly developed into civil war in 
the region.  
The violent ethnic struggles that arose in Gambella aimed to destroy anything that symbolised 
the federal government’s establishments. These threatened the Highland population who claimed 
to represent all of the state institutions, and often used the civilian population as a shield. This 
viewpoint was so pervasive that almost all highland civil servants and business women and men, 
even those who worked for international organisations, came to be identified with the state 
(Feyissa, 2011). Accordingly, not only government establishments were attacked but also 
civilian Highlanders and six road construction workers (Highlanders) were killed. Subsequently, 
a spiral of revenge killings followed with Highlanders and the Ethiopian National Defence Force 
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(ENDF) deployed in the region where they indiscriminately killed hundreds of Anywaa, 
destroying thousands of houses (Human Rights Watch, 2005; Hussein, Kebede and Schaafsma, 
2006). Displaced people crossed the border to Southern Sudan. The ENDF’s involvement in the 
massacre was so widespread that almost all Anywaa, even those who were opposed to violence 
but supported the Anywaa cause, came to be identified with the Anywaa armed groups and the 
GPLF (Gambella People Liberation Front). The perceived Highlanders-ENDF alliance fed into 
the Anywaa fears of ethnic extinction and made them conclude that there is no prospect for real 
autonomy without power. The only solution to long-lasting autonomy according to their thinking 
was through armed resistance. The government relied on its coercive force merely to make peace 
that gave rise to increased violence. The Anywaa realised, however, that there was little 
protection to be provided by the ENDF, and this further contributed to the fear and bitterness in 
the relations between the Anywaa and the federal government/ Highlanders. 
3.2 Conflict Analysis of Borana Zone of Oromia Regional State 
 
Comprehensive accounts of the region’s history and the causes of conflict could be found in the 
works of Oba (1996), Adunga (2011), Bassi (2010) and Scott-Villiers et al. (2011). The 
following section briefly outlines the intra-ethnic and inter-ethnic conflicts that relate to access to 
scarce natural resources in the Borana Zone and their systematic interdependence, spanning the 
incorporation into the Ethiopian Empire and the onset of multi-national democracy. Further 
insights into this rather complex history have been taken from Adugna (2010, 2011) and 
Getachew (2002). The final sub-section looks briefly at Borana indigenous institutions and their 
natural resource management system.   
3.2.1 The Borana context: Location and Demography 
 
The Borana Zone is at the southern edge of Ethiopia. It is one of the thirteen zones of the Oromia 
Regional State bordered by the Somali and Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples’ 
Regional State (SNNPRS) to the east and west, with Kenya to the south. It has a total population 
of 2,019,383 (CSA, 2007). It is made up of the following thirteen districts or Woreda: Adolana, 
Arero, Bore, Dire, Gelana, Abaya, Hagere Mariam, Liben, Moyalle, Odo Shakiso, Teltele, 
Uraga and Yabello. These districts fall between two agro-ecological zones: the semi-arid 
lowlands to the south and the more humid lands at higher altitudes to the north (Irwin and 
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Mitiku, 2004). There are many different ethnic groups living in the Borana Zone. In addition to 
recent arrivals from elsewhere in Ethiopia
6
, members of the Oromo (including Borana, Gabra, 
Guji and Arsi) and Somali ethnic groups dominate the conflict dynamics in the region; these two 
groups are the larger encompassing ethnic identities. The Borana Oromo is the oldest branch of 
the Oromo people and is the main group (Levine, 1974), followed by a smaller number of Gabra 
living in the Arero, Moyalle and Yabello lowlands (Getachew, 2002). Other minority 
communities include the Somali groups, who are divided into the Mareexaan, Digodia, and 
Garri. The Garri, who have forged mutual interdependence with the Borana, are bilingual: “those 
who live in close proximity to other Somali groups speak Somali languages and the Garri who 
live close to the Borana speak Oromo, thereby making cross-ethnic allegiances that nevertheless 
change over time” (Watson, 2001: 8). The Borana are predominantly cattle pastoralists (Bassi 
2010). The Gabra, Garri and other Somali groups rely mainly on camels and are highly mobile; 
they rely on grazing in the Borana plains in the dry season
7
. These distinctions are important as 
they have implications, as described in the following section, in inter-ethnic conflicts. Those 
conflicts can be based on the group’s sense of identity as well as on diverging discourses on 
cattle or camel pastoralism, with contrasting notions of inter-ethnic alliance and entitlement to 
natural resources (Watson, 2001).  
3.2.2 The historical background and socio political context 
 
Protracted conflicts within and between these pastoral ethnic groups of the southern and eastern 
parts of Ethiopia are not new (Bassi, 2010; Bassi and Tache, 2011). Historically, Oromo, and 
even intra-Oromo and non-Oromo ethnic groups, clashed over scarce natural resources, such as 
pasture and water (Oba, 1996). The Borana have previously retained a close alliance with the 
Garri and the Gabra, but were rather antagonistic towards the Somali (Homann, 2004). The 
Somali and the Garri began to increase their expansion into the Borana territory from the “end of 
the 19
th
 century onwards and they increased their control over large parts of eastern Borana” 
(Homann, 2004: 46). Large-scale expansion had ceased since then, but periodic and reciprocal 
raiding and resource-based conflicts became the dominant form of interaction (Levine, 1974). In 
this relatively established situation, moreover, the Somali clans reoriented their strategies of 
                                                          
6
 These include the Amhara, Gedeo, Burji and Konso. 
7
 Except for the Waata Wondo, a marginalised group of crafts people, the Arsi depend on subsistence farming and 
animal husbandry, while the Guji are agro-pastoralists (Watson, 2001). 
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access to resources to avoid competition and conflict and instead, used concessions and 
negotiation (Getachew, 2002). The Garri and the Gabra allied to the Borana used a tirriiso 
network (patron-client relationship), and enjoyed access to wet-season pastures and permanent 
water points jointly with the Borana (Oba, 1996: 121). Over the years, living in close proximity, 
the Borana and non-Borana ethnic groups have developed not only social and economic ties but 
have also forged a political-military alliance and have waged numerous raids against the 
opposing neighbouring communities (Oba, 1996; Bassi,  2010).  
According to Oba (1996), although the inter-ethnic exchanges involve a certain degree of 
asymmetry that favours the Borana, they also involve elements of reciprocity and 
interdependence. For the Borana, strong cross-ethnic ties mean more economic exchange 
through social networking; for example, guns and household items in exchange for ivory and 
rhino. They also led to inter-ethnic marriages with pastoralist Somali clans that allowed 
unrestricted access to the Borana’s wells and grazing lands, particularly the underutilised dry 
season pasture (Bassi, 1996). Furthermore, for the Borana, these ties helped create a buffer zone 
to shelter them from more hostile Somali clans; for the Garri and Arjuan, marriage ties are used 
as a legitimising discourse in establishing settlements in the Borana territories. For instance, Oba 
(1996) points out how the Garre Somali clans were able to settle in Borana territory and establish 
small settlements through trade and intermarriage, thereby gaining access to key resources. 
 Colonial period (1887) 
 
In the wake of disarray arising from the British colonial influence in eastern Africa, Emperor 
Menelik extended his authority over the Ethiopian-Kenya territorial boundaries and incorporated 
the Borana region into the Ethiopian empire in the late nineteenth century (Helland, 1996, 2001). 
This set the stage for a formal border agreement with the British colonial power in Kenya in 
1902-1903, delimiting the boundary between Ethiopia and Kenya (Oba, 1996). The Borana land 
was divided between the British East African Protectorate and the Ethiopian Empire. As a result 
of this boundary agreement, most Borana have become Ethiopian citizens and a few Borana in 
the southern have become Kenyan citizens (Helland, 1996). The agreement also divided “tribal-
grazing land”, following the “Oromo-Somali” line (Oba, 1996). This meant that Borana 
pastoralists in Northern Kenya lost access to key water resources in Ethiopia and pastoralists on 
the Ethiopian side were denied access to grazing areas in Northern Kenya. The boundary 
62 
 
agreement also undermined long-standing and mutually recognised ethnic territories, as well as 
resource management systems negotiated through customary institutions, on which these 
communities relied for years. For example, Oba (1996) notes that the Garri and Ajuran clans 
moved out of such arrangements (“Peace of Borana’, discussed below) and forged a military 
alliance with the Dogadi clans to control Borana territory.   
 Ethnic Federalism  
In recent years, inter- and intra-ethnic conflicts over the use of natural resources have been 
exacerbated by many factors. These include: the scarcity of water, recurrent drought, population 
density, lack of sustainable economic opportunities, change in land use practices and the 
introduction of irrigation schemes for mechanised and commercial farming (Pavanello, 2009). 
Since 1991, the intensity and magnitude of these conflicts have changed, particularly in the 
Woredas of Yabello, Arero and Moyalle (see, for example, Abbink, 2006; Bassi, 2010; Adunga, 
2011; Scott-Villiers et al., 2011)
8
. Between 1990 and 2004, thirteen major inter/intra-ethnic 
conflicts occurred in the Borana Zone of which nine were related to the Borana and the Garri 
ethnic groups and five were intra-Oromo conflicts (Odhiambo, 2012: 11). In recent years, the 
source of the conflict was exacerbated by the pastoralists’ inability to maintain or establish 
institutions to moderate and govern differences concerning natural resources, thereby 
transforming resource use from compromise and negotiation to competition and confrontation 
(Watson, 2003). For example, major conflicts involving the Borana, Gabra and Garri 
communities took place in and around the Woredas of Yabello, Arero and Moyalle between mid-
2008 and early 2009; these conflicts were over access to and utilisation of, water resources and 
grazing land. There were also territorial disagreements. The violence resulted in massive loss of 
assets including livestock, the deaths of hundreds of people, and displacement of thousands of 
others. 
                                                          
8
 According to several informants, the Peasant Associations (PAs) of the Arero, Yabello, and Moyalle Woredas have 
had a history of violence. For example: the conflict among Garri-Somali, Gabra-Oromo, and Boran-Oromo in the 
Wachille PA of Arero Worada; the conflict among the Guji-Oromo, Boran-Oromo in the Bulbul PA of Arero 
Worada; and the Mareexaan, Digodia ethnic groups of Udet Worada of Liban Zone, Somali Regional State (2001, 
2004, 2006, 2008, 2009, 2009 and 2012) (Odhiambo, 2012; Bassi, 2010). The PAs of Yabello Worada such as 
Surupa, Beldim-Raso, and Char-Dhedhertu have a high rate of violence among the Guji, Gabra, Arsi and 
Mareexaan. Intra-and inter-Oromo conflicts were also commonplace in the PAs of the Moyalle Worada: between 
Boran and Garri, Mareexaan and Digodi, Digodi and Borana (2000, 2001, 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2008). At the time 
of writing this paper, conflict had broken out between the Gabra and Boran in Arero Worada, spilling over to the 
Sululta PA of Yabello and killing many people. 
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Clapham (2004) stresses that the newly coined and ethnic-based regional demarcations have had 
an adverse effect on the historical alliances and long-standing culture of association among 
various national groups. These demarcations have forced groups to change their alliances along 
ethnic lines, negatively affecting historic alliances and resource sharing arrangements (Abbink, 
2006). For example, with the adoption of ethnic federalism (1994) the Digodia and the Garri 
shifted their historic alliance from Oromo to Somali identity, thereby attaining new control over 
the wells and surrounding rangelands of Eel Lae and Eel Goof in the Arero, Liben and Moyalle 
districts, which they had used jointly with the Borana for years previously (Getachew, 1996; 
Bassi, 2010). As a result, the Borana, Garri and other Somali groups have been fighting over 
these resources in both the Arero and Liben districts. Currently, points of contestation have 
included boundary disputes in areas of mixed cultural, linguistic and ethnic affiliations, besides 
the resource conflicts which already existed (Clapham, 2004). For example, the inter-ethnic 
conflicts between the Borana-Konso and Borana-Garri in and around Yabello in 2008/9 were 
over administrative and boundary issues. These conflicts led to the displacement of 27,000 
people and to raiding and looting of 1500 head of livestock (CORDAID and FSS, 2009). The 
relationship between Oromo and non-Oromo has deteriorated, coupled with an ethno-nationalist 
discourse inspired by the elite to gain power (Assefa, 1997). This ethno-nationalist sentiment has 
led to serious conflicts across the Borana Zone causing thousands of deaths, evictions and 
devastation of property; these clashes are still seen today (Abbink, 2006). 
The introduction of Ethiopian federalism not only exacerbated tensions between the Oromo and 
non-Oromo, but also aggravated latent conflict lines between Gabra and Borana groups who 
have co-existed in the area for centuries (Adunga, 2011; Bassi, 2010). After the transition to 
federalism, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) not only supported 
the Gabra, but also incorporated them into the local administration and increased their 
representation in the federal parliament, although they are a minority (Bassi, 2010). In 
subsequent years, the prospect of the Gabra building an exclusive administrative zone in the 
Borana territory further contributed to the fear and bitterness in Gabra-Borana and Gabra-Guji 
relations (Bassi, 2010). Such demands made the Borana fear that their country had been usurped 
and played an important part in the trajectory leading to the outbreak of numerous conflicts. For 
example, Bassi (2010) notes that in 1991, conflict first broke out between the Gabra and Borana, 
after the Gabra attempted to demarcate a separate administrative district in the kebeles of Yabello 
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and Arero districts. This marked the beginning of a rancorous struggle for political power, 
framing a new round of conflict between the Borana and the Gabra who had been at peace for 
years. In April 2005, after a number of cruel episodes of reciprocal killings, violent clashes 
erupted in Surupa kebele (Yabello), an area with a mixed population comprising three Oromo 
groups; the Guji, Borana and Gabra. Thus, a large-scale raiding party formed by Guji attacked 
the Gabra in Surupa and surrounding villages. In the conflict, more than 35 Gabra were killed, 
ten villages were burned and 43,000 persons were displaced before the Ethiopian National 
Defense Force (ENDF) intervened to end the conflict.  
 The 2004 referendum 
 
This pattern of protracted conflict with territorial claims and counter-claims along the Oromia-
Somali border persisted over the following decades. In response to the prevalent ethnic conflict, 
the EFDRE Government ushered a referendum as the only way to achieve a durable solution 
(Adunga, 2010; Bassi, 2010). Thus, in 2004, the Ministry of Federal Affairs facilitated a 
referendum to demarcate formally the boundary and to resolve the disputes between the Somali 
clans and the Borana Zone (Bassi, 2010). As a result, the Borana not only lost access to the most 
fertile pastures, but also lost much land in their wetter areas; they especially resent the loss of Eel 
Gof and Tulla Wayu eela and, two [Goofa (El Gof), Laye (El Lae)] of nine well complexes that 
they had relied on for centuries. Borana identity is attached to these eela and territories not only 
because they contain natural resources, but also because they play the important role of defining 
the Borana’s social, spiritual and communal world (Helland, 1982; Legesse, 2000). As the 
government’s referendum disregards such symbolic and psychological bonds, conflict remains 
latent.  
It also undermined seasonal mobility and access to a vital resource, or destroyed reciprocal 
arrangements between Borana and Somali pastoral communities and fuelled ethnic conflict 
(Homann, 2004; Bassi, 2010). It further eroded accepted and agreed-upon conflict negotiation 
mechanisms and allowed a run-away effect in these ethnic-styled conflicts. This forced the 
federal government to deploy armed units, the Mekelakeya, or rapid reaction forces, to contain 
the outbreaks of violence. It also made the parties perceive their situation as being zero-sum: in 
other words, either losing or gaining resources mainly related to territory endowed with wells, 
grazing land and ritual places. Neither was prepared to compromise, and the outcome imposed 
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such massive costs on each other that both parties ended up worse off than they would have been 
if customary procedures had been adopted (Adunga, 2010). For example, although the outcome 
of the referendum to a certain degree favours the Somali clans, the result is a loss of the seasonal 
grazing area they had shared for a long time. For instance, during the long dry seasons in 2008 
and 2009 the Garri and the Borana fought two conflicts over their borders in Moyalle, killing 300 
people and displacing as many as 100,000.
9
 In 2012, the Garri and the Borana fought conflicts 
over their borders during the long dry season, killing 18 and displacing more than 20,000 people 
to northern Kenya.
10 Oba (1996), Bassi (2010) and Watson (2003) argue that the disintegration 
of indigenous institutions and long-standing cross-cutting bonds is a principal cause of conflict. 
Therefore, indigenous institutions, and establishing relationships and mutual interests remain of 
critical importance. 
3.3 The Borana indigenous institutions 
 
The following section looks briefly at Borana indigenous institutions and their natural resource 
management system. Note that any detailed study of the Borana indigenous institutions is beyond 
the scope of this study. 
In the view of various academic and development researchers, the Borana natural resource 
management (NRM) system epitomises a case of a remarkably effective and well-managed dry-
land area (for example, Homann, 2004; Watson, 2001). This is because of the richness of the 
natural resources, the indigenous knowledge of the Borana, the wealth of Borana institutions and 
their capacity to regulate access to the resources in a drought-prone environment (Watson, 2001). 
Over the years, the Borana had to respond to recurrent drought by digging numerous deep water 
wells, both adadi (shallow wells) and tulla (deep wells). They relied on these water points even 
in the dry season, and divided the rangeland into areas suitable for the wet and dry seasons, 
moving their herds across these reserves seasonally (Helland, 1982; Homann, 2004). Over the 
years, the Borana pastoralists produced distinct indigenous institutions and developed local 
knowledge, which enhanced their resilience against hazards and drought and also preserved their 
rangelands (Helland, 1982). Furthermore, a stable and organised maintenance system was 
                                                          
9
 Thousands flee Ethiopia clashes. Refer to http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7912242.stm. 26 February 2009 
10
 Ethiopia: 20,000 flee Moyale clashes - Red Cross. Refer to http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-19028609. 
28 July 2012.  
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essential for sustainable access to the wells and grazing land, and had to involve cooperation 
between different users (Watson, 2003). These factors necessitated the development of flexible 
and strong indigenous institutions and regulations. As a result, the structural frameworks of 
Borana society, including the nagaya Borana (the peace of the Borana), the Gadaa system, and 
aada seera Borana (Borana laws) have evolved to provide a complex social structure to govern 
and regulate access to, and utilisation of, the critical natural resources (Helland, 1996).  
The principles of the Gadaa system have been in place for many years and govern the daily lives 
of the members of these ethnic groups (Legesse, 2000). They control the management of, and 
access to, natural resources. Gadaa is a customary socio-political system that determines the 
social stratification of male Oromo based on their age, and defines particular rights and 
obligations (Legesse, 2000). At the head of the age-cycles is the aba gadaa (father of the gadaa), 
who is elected in a meeting known as gummi gaayo, (or the meeting of the multitude), performs 
rituals and gives rulings in the case of disputes, assisted by his gadaa councils. Gummi gaayo 
takes place every eight years and can be attended by all men in Borana to discuss matters of 
concern, appoint the aba gadaa, and renew and update aada seera (Watson, 2003). The aada 
seera is a set of normative principles and verbally expressed norms that govern the Borana way 
of life and social practices (Bassi, 1996). According to this age-graded system, persons within 
the age range 40-48 years are known as Luba and are regarded as elders responsible for security 
and resolving conflicts. The committee of elders consists of individuals from conflicting parties 
who come together for reconciliation and arbitration (Legesse, 2000). 
Access to natural resources is regulated by an intricate web of interrelated and overlapping social 
structures, entitlements and laws. The Borana as well as non-Borana Oromo must accept aada 
seera Borana and recognise the common customs and laws that regulate access to these 
resources (Oba, 1996; Helland, 1996). According to the aada seera, all Borana men, defined by 
being a member of a Borana clan, own Boranaland (Watson, 2003). Therefore, all Borana have 
the right to use the water and grazing land. In addition to these general rules, there are specific 
rules concerning access to and use of land and water. Primary rights to the eela are with the aba 
knofi (the original excavator of the well or the direct descendant of the aba knofi) (Helland, 
1996; Watson, 2003). Access to these resources depends upon being a member of the clan (gosa) 
of the aba konfi and permission for continuous access is only granted subject to providing labour 
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for the maintenance of the well, as well as exchange of cattle (Helland, 1982). The person who 
performs these functions is aba hirega, a person responsible for the day-to-day running of the 
water, appointed by the aba knofi. 
Similarly, access to dheeda grazing land depends on membership of a common dheeda (Watson, 
2001). Jarsa dheeda are elders who are responsible for making general decisions on access to 
seasonal grazing lands and for resolving disputes. The various non-Borana groups gain access to 
these resources by establishing links with the aba hirega and jarsa dheeda councils, but they 
always retain the status of being a “guest” (Oba, 1996; Helland, 2001). Aba hirega and jarsa 
dheeda play crucial roles in ensuring the upkeep of the wells. They organise mobility of herds in 
the customary pastoral system, provide orderly resolution of conflict and maintain law and order 
(Muir, 2007; Watson, 2003). Jarsa dheeda are also responsible for enforcing the principle of 
Dongora Serra; in other words, regulating unlawful settlement in unfenced grazing land. For 
example, any person who refuses the decision of the aba hirega on the required contribution for 
maintenance and construction of wells and ponds will be fined from one to five head of cattle. 
Frequent violations can cause an individual or a group to be denied access to pasture and water; 
that person can be made into a social outcast and can face severe consequences affecting his or 
her own entire clan lineage, resulting in a denial of access to basic resources (Oba, 1996).  
In years of abundant rainfall, the cattle herds’ rotation is governed by seera marraa bisaanii: 
“the law of grass and water” (Bassi and Tache, 2011). Seera marraa bisaanii divides seasonal 
grazing areas into Lafa sera roba (grazing land to be used in rainy seasons) and Lafa seera 
bonna (grazing land to be used in dry seasons) (Homann, 2004). According to these rules, the 
herds are only moved into the waterless rangeland during the wet season, when surface pools are 
available, and are returned to the well cluster during the dry season (Oba, 1996). During 
droughts, the Borana tightly regulate pasture and water through herd management (Homann, 
2004). Examples include: 
  Kalo (fencing forage banks for weak animals),  
 splitting herds into lactating stationary groups,  
 preserving Lafa haawichaa (grazing land for the lactating herd). 
 sending the non-lactating groups into forra (remote dry season grazing areas),  
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 and maintaining a high level of mobility across the forra and wells to make the most 
effective use of scarce resources.  
Violations of these customs and laws often cause numerous clashes between the users. For 
example, Homann (2004) reported tensions between Gabra and Borana in Dida Hara (Yabello) 
and in Borana and Garri Web (Arero), due to the violation of these rules. In addition to the 
pasture and water, aada seera Borana prohibits forest destruction or accessing the forest 
resources during the wet season because of the value of forests as dry season grazing reserves 
(Tache and Irwin, 2003). In cases of violation of these customs and rules, abba reera (the cluster 
head) could discipline the violator with a fine of five head of cattle. This is governed by the 
principle of Karra Matta which is a customary law enforced by imposing a fine as punishment 
for unlawfully cutting down natural forest. During prolonged drought, restrictions upon camel 
pastoralists such as Gabra and other Somali clans are often more exclusive, leading to violent 
conflicts in the Arero forest area (Homann, 2004). This conflict arises because the Borana use the 
forest in the dry season whereas the Gabra and Garri camel pastoralists depend on forage leaves 
from bushes in both the dry and wet seasons (Watson, 2001).  
 
At present, the management of the indigenous natural resources by the Borana pastoralists has 
been weakened by various factors: these include a poorly-designed pastoral development 
intervention, the establishment of private commercial ranches, rapid growth of the human 
population, and, recurrent droughts (Pavanello, 2009; Homann, 2004). The combined impact of 
all these factors results in serious environmental degradation and destabilizing their coping 
mechanisms, thereby threatening their livelihood (Homann, 2004). Some observers point out that 
these management institutions are either idealised or have outlived their usefulness, having failed 
to develop durable mechanisms to meet new challenges (Watson, 2001). Despite this criticism, it 
should be noted that the present judicial system has not demonstrated the ability to diffuse 
tensions; moreover, the failure of “top-down development” practices has made development 
agencies reconsider customary procedures to empower actors in negotiation and compromise 
(Abbink 2006, 402). For example, there is an effort by the Ministry of Federal Affairs to 
institutionalise Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanisms involving indigenous institutions and 
their laws. Worada-level conflict management committees including the Worada Administration 
and Security office, the Justice Office, as well as police and local elders were allocated the task 
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of ensuring early warning of conflict, and promoting peace building and conflict resolution 
activities. Watson (2001) also indicates that development organisations are working to revitalise 
the institutional and “ideological” capacities of indigenous institutions and to enter into 
“genuine” partnerships for bottom-up development. Here, various NGOs working with 
indigenous institutions as facilitators have made efforts to enable the community to achieve 
development (Bassi and Tache, 2011; Watson, 2001). For example, SOS Sahel, Care Ethiopia 
and Action for Development (AFD) showed a strong commitment to build upon the existing 
know-how and to work with indigenous institutions as ways of achieving development. Their 
commitment arose because of the wealth of Borana institutions, their institutional apparatus for 
initiating participatory development and the history of development practices in the region 
(Watson, 2001).  
3.4 An overview of Government-NGO relationships   
 
Since 1991, Ethiopia has experienced many changes in its system of government and in 
government policies. These changes led to the proliferation of the ‘Third Sector’ in the country 
(Rahmato, 2002:113-119). More than 2,305 international, national, and local NGOs participate in 
various undertakings, with the total number of beneficiaries being roughly 26 million (Rahmato, 
Akalewold and Yoseph, 2008).
11
 The emergence of a multitude of international and local NGOs 
since the 1984/85 famine, and especially after the change of government in 1991, necessitated 
the creation of a regulatory and coordinating mechanism. In June 1993, the Ethiopian 
Government introduced the National Policy on Disaster Prevention and Management (NPDPM) 
to coordinate the activities of NGOs in the country. 
 
Ethiopia’s ratification of the Cotonou Agreements in 2000 was a landmark in the history of 
Ethiopian CSOs.
12
 An important feature of the Cotonou Agreement is the recognition of “non-
state actors”, participating alongside governments, in fighting poverty, delivering social services, 
promoting growth, and fostering democracy and good governance.
13
 Participation by CSOs has 
                                                          
11
See the report of Rahmato, Akalewold and Yoseph, 2008. CSOs/NGOs in Ethiopia: Partners in development and 
good governance.  A report prepared for the Ad-hoc CSO/NGO Task Force, Addis Ababa. 
12
The African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries and the European Union concluded a new 20-year Agreement 
of Cooperation in June 2000, replacing the earlier Lome Conventions. Refer: www.deleth.ec.europa.eu. 
13
The term “NSA” is moderately wide and includes many groups of social and economic factors such as CSOs. The 
Agreement   envisages two major functions for NSAs: a) as service suppliers; b) as collaborators in dialogue or 
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thus become a legal right in Ethiopia. More than 120 NGOs were legally registered to engage 
mainly in promoting good governance, democracy, human rights and peacebuilding before the 
new Proclamation came into force in 2009 (Rahmato, Akalewold and Yoseph, 2008).
14
 The 
Cotonou Agreement, which came into force in 2003, encouraged the growth of CSOs. 
 
Prior to the 2005 election, government authorities often criticised NGOs for not taking guidance 
from the government. NGOs working in activities perhaps deemed “political” were often 
accused of undermining the role of local government by supporting opposition parties, and 
disrupting the government-NGO relationship at the local level.
15
 Despite the relatively enabling 
environment, which led to the mushrooming of CSOs, the post-2005 election crisis in the country 
is considered to be a turning point concerning NGOs. Because of their active participation in 
advocacy and lobbying, some activities of NGOs were curtailed.
16 
Since the 2005 election, a 
significant number of donors suspended direct budgetary support to the Ethiopian Government, 
but as an alternative they have begun supporting development through a scheme known as the 
Protection of Basic Services (PBS) (Rahmato, Akalewold and Yoseph, 2008). 
 
The government promulgated the new Proclamation for Regulation, Registration of Societies, 
and Charities in 2009. That Proclamation has made a number of constructive impacts on the 
arrangement and function of CSOs/NGOs. It identifies numerous types of CSOs and provides 
diverse regulatory frameworks for all kinds of Societies and Charities. It also allows CSOs to 
engage in income generating activities, and this could help them to strengthen their internal 
capacities and ensure the sustainability of their activities (Rahmato, Akalewold and Yoseph, 
2008).
17
                    
Some aspects of the Proclamation, however, have had an adverse impact on the constitution and 
operation of NGOs as well as on their involvement in advancing good governance and 
sustainable peace (Rahmato, Akalewold and Yoseph, 2008). Article 16(6) of the Proclamation 
allows only for those Ethiopian charities or societies that can engage in the “advancement of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
advocacy agents.   ACP Secretariats. 2003. The Cotonou Agreement: A user’s guide for non-State actors. Brussels. 
See chapters 2&3. 
14
EU/CSF, Updated mapping study on non-state actors in Ethiopia. Draft Final Report, June 2008. 
15
See IFES report by Edward, Stephen, and Genet. 2004. Ethiopia Pre-election Assessment Report. 
16
See CRDA A Strategic Evaluation Report by Dr, Brian Pratt. 2008. A report for CAFOD, CORDAID,    Christian 
Aid.       
17
See the information provided in www.ethioSAP.org. 
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human and democratic rights, promotion of equality of nations, nationalities, peoples, gender and 
religion, promotion of the rights of the disabled and children, promotion of conflict resolution or 
reconciliation and, promotion of the efficiency of justice and law enforcement services”. 
Moreover, it determines that foreign international CSOs are prohibited from participating in any 
conflict resolution or reconciliation-related work. However, the Proclamation does not apply to 
foreign or international organisations operating in Ethiopia “by virtue of an agreement with the 
Government of Ethiopia” (Article 3(2)).  
 
That Proclamation used source of funding as the criterion to classify organisations as “Ethiopian 
Charities”, or “Ethiopian Societies”, or “Ethiopian Residents Charities”, or “Ethiopian Residents 
Societies”, or “Mass-based Societies”. All these are required to register to seek legal recognition:  
 
“Ethiopian Charities” or “Ethiopian Societies” are those Charities or Societies that are formed under 
the laws of Ethiopia, generate income from Ethiopia and are wholly controlled by Ethiopians. 
However, they may [be] deemed as Ethiopian Charities or Ethiopian Societies if not more than ten 
percent of their funds are received from foreign sources. (Section 1, article 2(2)) 
 
“Ethiopian Residents Charities” or “Ethiopian Residents Societies” mean those Charities or Societies 
formed under the laws of Ethiopia and which consist of members all of whom dwell in Ethiopia and 
who receive more than 10% of their funds from foreign sources; (Section 1, article 2(3) 
 
“Mass-Based Societies” includes professional associations, Women’s associations, youth associations 
and similar Ethiopian societies.  (Section 1, article 2(5))    
 
The new Proclamation, however, has carefully prescribed the nature of NGOs involvement. 
According to the Proclamation:   
 
Those who can take part in activities that fall under Sub-article 2(j) the advancement of human and 
democratic rights; (k) the promotion of equality of nations, nationalities and peoples and that of 
gender and religion; (l) the promotion of the rights of the disabled and children’s rights; (m) the 
promotion of conflict resolution or reconciliation; the promotion of the efficiency of the justice and 
law enforcement services; and (n) of this article shall be Ethiopian Charities. (Section 3, article 14(5) 
 
Ethiopian mass-based organisations may actively participate in strengthening democratisation and 
election, particularly in conducting educational seminars on current affairs, observing the electoral 
process and cooperating with electoral organs. (Section 4, article 58(7)   
 
Most of the local organisations that are unable to generate 90% of income from the domestic 
resource base are reduced to “Residency” rights only. Section 1, article 2(2)-(3) of the 
Proclamation, when read in conjunction with section 3, article 14(2) (j)-(n), serves to strip most 
organisations of their right to engage in rights-based activities. In doing so, the Proclamation 
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reduced the locus of these rights from mass-based organisations to domestically-based resources. 
This introduced a new element in democratic rights: the debate on the right to participate in 
section 3, article 14 (2) (j)-(n)) is not only based on citizenship and representing mass-based 
organisations, but also on the source of funding. The result was an uneasy linkage of two 
inconsistent criteria for CSO survival; one being citizenship, the other being sources of funding.  
 
The first concern is how far these rights may be circumscribed or stretched on the basis of 
sources of funding. In other words, even if there were agreement on the legitimate bearers of 
political rights, such as Ethiopian citizens, how could the source of funding override or obliterate 
these rights? The question is significant because it strips citizens of rights on the basis of source 
of funding. The second concern is that the two criteria, domestic resource base and citizenship, 
are divergent and increasingly so; this is because local resources are inadequate to support 
meaningful participation and contribution within the country. As is the case in other developing 
countries and given Ethiopia’s underdevelopment and limited tradition of fund raising, foreign 
funding is likely to be the main source of funding for the domestic resource base in the years 
ahead. Therefore, to base rights on funding sources is to disenfranchise growing numbers of local 
organisations.  
 
Nevertheless, it would be inaccurate and simplistic to assume that these questions had never 
surfaced in NGO-government forums. During periods of the NGO-government forum, CSOs 
jointly set up a Legal Framework or Enabling Environment Taskforce to work with the 
government’s taskforce in drafting and refining the draft law. They promoted an alternative legal 
proposal that linked the exercise of these rights to citizenship rather than to sources of funding. 
While the government remained unwilling to recognise their proposal, it allowed “Ethiopian 
Charities” to engage in income generating activities
18
, and thereby incorporate their demands 
into the Proclamation.  
 
The reform drew opponents as well as supporters from those sectors already set in motion by the 
NGO/CSO consortia, women’s and youth associations, and opposition political parties. On the 
one hand, the proponents of the Proclamation argue that the reform would enable the mass-based 
                                                          
18
 Section 9, article 100(1&2) of Proclamation No. 621/2009: Proclamation for Registration and  Regulation for  
Charities and Societies,  6 January 2009 
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organisations to grow organically from within indigenous institutions. This would help to 
remould those organisations modelled after foreign CSOs and dependent on financial and 
ideological support by donors. A government representative who participated in the drafting 
taskforce commented: 
 
These rights did not vest in the hands of the international NGOs, nor with the local NGOs with any 
viable and quantifiable memberships. Therefore, the view is, such rights had to be demanded from the 
government by the membership-based associations through lobbying and promoting the interests of 
their members, both in the legislative and executive branches of the government (A Staff member, 
Charities and Societies Agency (CSA), December 2011). 
 
On the other hand, the opponents argue that the reform presented only the political aspect of 
rights and it equated the sources of funding with only the political dimension. As a result, any 
reform which recognised the role of mass-based organisations in political movements 
undermined the contributions of social movements for democratisation. By cultivating its 
institutional and legal framework but curtailing its sources of funding, the reform drove a wedge 
between political and social movements, and created an environment for the emergence of party-
affiliated mass-based organisations. It is unlikely that these would add value to deliberations 
about the promotion of democratisation and good governance in society. 
 
Much has been written about the role that NGOs and “non-state-actors” could play in 
democratisation and conflict transformation (Sen, 1995; Lederach, 1997; O’Brien, 2009). If 
Ethiopian NGOs were free to carry out these activities, much more could be done to promote 
peace. 
3.5 Conclusion  
 
This chapter presented a brief socio-political and historical overview of the Gambella and 
Borana regions. The context was set for understanding the factors that shaped conflict in these 
regions. Additionally, a “levels of conflict” analysis approach was used to illuminate factors that 
perpetuate and exacerbate conflicts in both regions.  
The following chapter discusses the methodology used in this study. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: METHODLOGY 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter introduces the reader to the methodological approach to the study. It describes the 
research design, sample size and selection, research instruments, research assistants, pilot study, 
data collection approaches, data analysis methods, and credibility and validity. Research ethics 
and the limitations of the study are also discussed. 
4.2 The research design 
 
This study utilises a mixed design method with an emphasis on the qualitative method. 
According to Morse (2003:190), a mixed design is “the incorporation of various qualitative or 
quantitative strategies within a single project that may have either a qualitative or quantitative 
theoretical drive”. This study intended to integrate exploratory qualitative and explanatory 
quantitative approaches throughout all its stages. Presumably, this has resulted in triangulation of 
data from various methods and approaches. A description of the study’s quantitative aspects is 
provided; however, it is important to identify the components of qualitative research that make 
this the primary method of this study. 
 
Creswell (1998: 15) has provided a standard definition of qualitative research: 
 
Qualitative research is an inquiry process of understanding based on a distinct methodological 
tradition of inquiry that explores social or human problems. The researcher builds a complex, holistic 
picture, analyses words, reports detailed views of informants and conducts the study in a natural 
setting. 
 
The notion of qualitative research is based on a constructivist/interpretivist paradigm. In this 
paradigm, the interpretation and exploration of the lived experiences of people and the meanings 
that they attribute to particular events are important (Willig, 2001). The researcher also plays an 
important role in qualitative design and is involved with participants in the empathetic 
understanding of the phenomenon being studied (Willig, 2001).  
Semi-structured interviewing and focus group discussions are the most widely-used method of 
data collection in qualitative research. According to Babbie and Mouton (2005:289), in 
conducting qualitative interviews the interviewer has a “general plan of inquiry” or guide to ask 
questions of the respondents. Thus, this design took into account a deliberate selection of key 
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informants (KIs) who have a good understanding of the subject matter under study (Babbie and 
Mouton, 2005). This also involved the negotiation of access to organisations or KIs, and as well 
as ensuring their commitment to eliciting information (Roche, 1999:110). 
A focus group discussion (FGD) is defined as “a carefully planned group discussion designed to 
obtain perceptions on a defined environment” (Krueger, 1998:88, in Smithson, 2009:358). It 
enables the researcher to explore the existing indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms, and to 
explore the impact from the perspectives of the beneficiaries. Focus groups are small (about 8-12 
people) and usually consist of people with similar interests. The incorporation of FGDs into the 
overall qualitative design adds to the richness of the data. 
In addition to qualitative methods, the use of quantitative methods in this study was essential. 
According to Patton (2002:14), the quantitative method involves the “use of objective indicators 
and standardised measures so that the varying perspectives and experiences of people can be fit 
into a limited number of predetermined response categories to which number are assigned”. A 
quantitative researcher may use non-experimental methods and a predetermined schedule to 
measure perceptions of people, including change (De Vos, Strydom, Fouche and Delport, 2005). 
Non-experimental methods are commonly employed in measuring change through impact 
assessment (De Vos et al., 2005). Roche (1999:23) defines impact assessment as “the systematic 
analysis of the lasting or significant changes - positive or negative, intended or not- in people’s 
lives brought about by a given action or series of actions”. This study employed one group post-
test design that uses the group itself as a partial control for alternative hypotheses (baseline 
data/need assessment) by measuring the group’s perceptions of change (Adelman, 1991). 
Based on this framework: 
 The current study used a random sample of respondents from Gambella Town and the 
Borana Zone.  
 A retrospective approach was employed to reconstruct NGOs’ project indicators in order 
to ascertain the communities’ perceptions and experience of the NGOs’ programmes. 
 A standardised, pre-coded household questionnaire was used to collect data. 
 The quantitative analysis is explanatory in nature and serves to determine changes in 
perceptions. Part of the analysis involved measuring the frequency of occurrence of 
different characteristics in the sampled population in order to draw conclusions. The 
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Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS evaluation version) for level of change and 
interactions between variables, was conducted to determine whether group differences in 
survey responses exist as far as beneficiaries’ perceptions are concerned. 
 However, the study does not claim to provide a direct causal relationship between the 
programme/NGOs’ intervention as an independent variable and any change in 
perceptions of the beneficiaries as the dependent variable; this is because a control group 
cannot be utilised because of inherent methodological and ethical challenges (Roche, 
1999).  
4.3 Sample Size and Selection 
4.3.1 Sampling and selecting the KIs  
 
Until 2012, the Ministry of Justice was responsible for registering and regulating the operation 
and function of NGOs in Ethiopia. The Ministry had a database with the names, addresses, 
activities and locations of all NGOs in Ethiopia. This database was used as a sample frame to 
select the NGOs in the study. Moreover, the sampling was carried out after an extensive review 
had been undertaken. This included an analysis of the profiles of NGOs operating in the Borana 
Zone and Gambella Regional States, and directories of NGO consortia and available literature on 
NGOs working in these areas. Twelve NGOs from the Borana Zone of Oromia and twelve NGOs 
from Gambella Regional State were selected with probability proportionate size (see the 
sampling procedure diagram, Figure 2, under section 4.3.2: 80). Four interviewees were also 
selected from representatives of the Charities and Societies Agency (at Federal level) and Bureau 
of Finance and Economic Development (at local level), who were responsible for registering and 
regulating the operation and function of CSOs/NGOs in Ethiopia. The selection of KIs was 
crucial as this study seeks to engage the NGOs using in-depth interviews to examine their 
relationship with the government, as well as to explore the strategies they adopt to resolve 
conflict and the changes that have taken place over time. Thus, a relatively large sample of 48 
NGO directors and programme coordinators/ project managers and four governement 
represenatives were selected for the study (the profiles of the NGOs, key representatives of these 




The sampling procedure for KIs and FGDs was as follows: 
 As explained earlier, the Oromia and Gambella Regional States were chosen from the 
nine Regional States of Ethiopia to select the sample for the KIs and FGDs.  
 A purposive sampling procedure was used to select these States. 
 Using purposive sampling again, Gambella Town in the Gambella Regional State and the 
Borana Zone in the Oromia Regional State, were selected. 
 A total of eighteen NGOs in the Borana Zone and nineteen NGOs in Gambella Town 
were targeted. 
 Purposive sampling procedures were used to select twelve NGOs from the Borana Zone 
and twelve NGOs from Gambella region. 
 Using purposive and proportionate size sampling again, eight International NGOs 
(INGOs) and four Local NGOs (LNGOs) were selected from each group of twelve NGOs 
selected from both areas of the study. 
 A large number of INGOs were selected compared to relatively few LNGOs because:  
 The number of INGOs is far higher than the number of LNGOs, primarily due to 
the organisational and functional capacity needed for participation in these remote 
and underdeveloped regions.   
 In contrast to LNGOs, the selected INGOs exhibited a specific focus on peace and 
conflict-resolution activities. 
 From each of the eight INGOs selected from the two study areas, one INGO 
director/head (D/H) and one programme coordinator/ project manager (PC/PM) were 
selected. Thus, eight INGO D/H and eight PC/PM were selected from the Gambella 
region INGOs and the same from the Borana Zone INGOs. Therefore, sixteen KIs were 
selected from the eight INGOs in Gambella Town and sixteen KIs were selected from the 
eight INGOs working in Borana. This made a total of 32 KIs from sixteen INGOs. 
 From each group of four LNGOs, one NGO director/head (D/H) and one programme 
coordinator/ project manager (PC/PM) were selected. Thus, two KIs from each LNGO 
were selected making a total of eight KIs from the four LNGOs from Gambella and eight 
KIs from the four LNGOs from Borana Zone. This made a total of sixteen KIs from the 
eight LNGOs selected from the two areas under study.  
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 Thus, 48 KIs were selected from the sixteen INGOs and the eight LNGOs from both 
study areas.  
 Additionally, using purposive sampling, one representative from Bureau of Finance and 
Economic Development (BFED) from each region was selected. Using purposive 
sampling again, two representatives of the Charities and Societies Agency (CSA) were 
selected.   
4.3.2 Selecting the Focus Group Participants  
 
Two focus group discussions were held in the two study areas. This number was determined to 
represent all ethnic group members: these included community elders, peace committee 
members, and youth and women who participated in peacebuilding activities or worked closely 
with development NGOs. One FGD was deemed to be adequate in each area since the technique 
complemented the data collected through the household survey and KI interview. The FGD 
participants were selected using the NGOs’ records and snowballing sampling to obtain a 
representative selection of views ranging from those of the younger members to those of the 
senior elders. This was done purposely as:  
 elders are considered to be full of wisdom and custodians of the customary laws due to 
their experience of various cycles of community socio-economic, political and ritual 
phases including indigenous conflict resolution;  
 the youth play an active role in conflict; and, 
 development agencies used these groups as a bridge to community development and were 
active in many development projects initiated by these groups. 
It was important to work with these pre-existing inter/intra-ethnic groups who were responsible 
for resolving conflicts and for managing development projects initiated by development 
agencies. These heterogenous groups were best able to address the research questions 
meaningfully given their past experiences and could thus offer rich insights. Powell et al. (1996), 
suggest the use of heterogeneous groups for both pragmatic and methodological reasons.
19
 
                                                          
19
 Carey (1994) recommends that researchers should comply with the principle of homogeneity to facilitate free-
flowing discussion. Nevertheless, work by Kitzinger and Barbour (1999) shows that there are only slight differences 
when comparing homogeneous and non-homogeneous groups and that these do not suggest that the maintenance of 
homogeneity is a prerequisite for successful focus group research. They argue that the purpose of the study should 
dictate the degree of homogeneity, and they go on to recommend that exploratory research could use heterogeneous 
groups, as they may produce richer information. 
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In Borana, the FGD was carried out in the Pastoralist Association (PA) of Surupa, Yabello 
Worada, and Kebele 05 of Gambella Town where the quantitative surveys were conducted. The 
total number of FGD participants in Surupa was thirteen, consisting of four Gabra, five Borana 
and four Guji while nine FGD members consisting of five Nuer, three Anywaa and one 
Highlander participated in Kebele 05 of Gambella Town. The initial target was to have eight 
participants in each category but for Surupa, thirteen people who were contacted through NGOs 
and local government officials actually arrived on the appointed day. The FGD sought to 
understand how the indigenous justice system was applied to resolve conflicts. The FGD also 
aimed to examine how the NGOs planned and implemented their development and peacebuilding 
projects through the existing indigenous institutional context. In so doing, it aimed to explore 
their contributions to peace and development, focusing especially on the role of the indigenous 
system in conflict resolution. As a result a relative assessment method “before and after” the 
intervention was used to clarify the former and existing real situation or change within the 
community (Roche, 1999). The FGD also had the objective of identifying indicators of change 
that would lay the ground for the subsequent survey and semi-interview schedule held in the 
















        
                    
    Figure 2. Sampling Procedure for Key Informants 
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  Legend* 
1. FGDs- Focus groups discussions (2 FGDs)                                                          
2. INGOs – International Non-governmental organizations (from 16 INGOs 32 KIs)    
3. LNGOs- Local Non-governmental organizations (from 8 LNGOs 16 KIs were drawn) 
4. R /Ds - Representatives or Heads of Non-governmental organizations (24R/Ds (KIs))  
5. PC/PM- programme coordinator/ project manager (PC/PM) (total 48 KIs from 24 NGOs) 
6.  GRs-  government representatives (total= 4 GRs 
 
                        9 Regional States  





             Using Purposive sampling of two Regional States (PS) 
Gambella Regional State  Oromia Regional State 
              Purposive sampling of the two Regional Zones (PS) 
1FGD* 1FGD* GAMBELLA TOWN SELECTED BORANA ZONE SELECTED 
 
18 NGOs 19 NGOs  
Using purposive and proportionate Sampling size of 12 NGOs from each 
zone 
12 NGOs 12 NGOs 
8 INGOs 4 LNGOs 
4 LNGOs 8 INGOs 
4 PC/PM 
8 PC/PM 8 H/Ds 4 H/Ds 4 H/Ds 8 PC/PM  8 H/Ds 4 PC/PM  
2 GRs*  




4.3.3 Sampling for the household survey 
4.3.3.1 Research Setting: Study area and Population 
 
Sections 3.1 and 3.2 of chapter three provided a brief overview of the location of the Gambella 
and Borana regions. Their demography and socio-political historical background were also 
described briefly. The following section presents a description of the Yabello district and 
Gambella Town/ district. It also summarises the research process and sampling for the household 
survey.    
 Yabello District/Woreda 
 
One of the districts chosen for the study was Yabello, in the Borana Zone of Oromia Regional 
State, about 565 kilometers from Addis Ababa in the southern part of Ethiopia. Yabello district 
covers an area of 5,909 km
2
 and has a total population of 102,385 (CSA, 2007). The district 
contains eighteen rural Peasants’ Associations (PAs) (CSA, 2007). As indicated above (section 
3.4 chapter three), members of the Oromo including the Borana, Gabra and Guji groups 
dominate the conflict dynamics in the region (Bassi, 2010). More specifically, these groups 
inhabit the Yabello PAs of Surupa and Dida Hara. Additionally, these PAs have a high rate of 
violence among the Guji, Gabra, and Borana, and symbolise the change in nature and magnitude 
of intra- and inter-ethnic conflict in the Zone (Bassi, 2010; Odhiambo, 2012). These PAs also 
display strong indigenous conflict resolution practices, as discussed in detail in the previous 
chapter. For example, the three groups use the Gadaa institutions to negotiate access to natural 
resources and to resolve disputes. Furthermore, NGOs such as CARE Ethiopia, AFD, GPDA, 
and GOAL Ethiopia implemented numerous projects aimed at addressing the psychosocial, 
cultural and economic causes of conflict. These were part of the rationale in choosing these areas 
for study, as discussed in detail in the following section.  
 
Surupa PA has a total population of 4,368 persons with 685 households. Dida Hara has a total 
population of 11,755 with 2,458 household units (CSA, 2007). These areas are largely rural with 
pastoralism as the major economic activity. The Borana are predominantly cattle pastoralists and 
transhumant while the Guji are agro-pastoralists (Bassi, 2010). The Gabra rely primarily on 
camels and are highly mobile, relying on grazing land in the Borana and Guji plains in the dry 
season. Geographically, the Gabra have occupied a very contentious position between the Borana 
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and Guji groups creating a buffer zone between them; they have shifted their allegiance between 
the Guji and Borana groups over time, based on access to natural resources (Bassi, 2010; 
Watson, 2001). During conflict, those Gabra who live in close proximity to Guji groups aligned 
with those Guji. Similarly, the Gabra who live close to the Borana supported the Borana (Bassi, 
2010). For example, the Gabra supported the Borana when violent conflict broke out between 
Surupa Borana and Guji in May 2006, killing hundreds of people and displacing 24,000 others. 
SOS Sahel, AFD and Care Ethiopia initiated improved intra-ethnic relations through intra-ethnic 
cooperation initiatives.  
 
Figure 2. Map of the Borana Zone (study area) 
 
 
Source:  Ardajila, 2013 
 Gambella Town  
 
The second district in Gambella Regional State chosen for the survey was Gambella Town, 
which is the capital town of the Gambella district as well as the capital town of Gambella 
Regional State. As shown above (section 3.1, chapter three) the largest groups in the town are the 
Highlanders (including the Amhara, the Oromo, Tigre and others), the Nuer and the Anyuwa. 
These groups dominate the conflict dynamics in the region. According to the 2007 census, the 
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population of the town was 39,022, of whom 34% were Anywua, 10% Nuer and 56% were 
Highlanders (CSA, 2007). The town is subdivided into five Kebeles such as ‘01’, ‘02’, ‘03’, 
‘04’, and ‘05’. Kebele 02 has a total population of 5,841 persons; with 1,534 households while 
Kebele 05 has a total population of 7,501 persons with 2,458 household units (CSA, 2007). The 
area is predominantly urban with different livelihood strategies: the Highlanders dominate the 
trade and civil sectors, while the Anyuwa are represented in the civil service sector (Feyissa, 
2011). According to Borchgrevink and Lie (2009), despite their exclusion from the political 
process, the highlanders account for 56% of the civil service sector followed by Anyuwa at 36% 
and Nuer at 6%. 
 
Kebeles 02 and 05 were selected for this study because they experienced a marked level of 
conflict over the last two decades, ranging from sporadic violent conflicts to organised and 
systematic violence (Feyissa, 2011). These two Kebeles experienced the worst forms of violence 
over the last two decades (Feyissa, 2011; Human Rights Watch, 2005; Hussein, Kebede and 
Schaafsma, 2006). As a result more than a hundred people lost their lives, over four hundred 
houses burned to the ground and ten thousand people became Internally Displaced People (IDPs) 
(HRW, 2005; Hussein, Kebede and Schaafsma, 2006). NGOs such as the Red Cross, Zuid Oost 
Azie Refugee Care (ZOA Refugee Care), Pact Ethiopia and ACORD initiated specific projects to 
deal with these conflicts; these measures included the promotion of customary institutions, as 
well as supporting intra-ethnic and inter-ethnic peace groups consisting of the Nuer, Anywaa and 
Highlander residents of Newland and Echuey. They also initiated capacity building programmes 
for peace committees of elders and also facilitated the activation of customary laws for conflict 
resolution. The Red Cross initiated livelihood enhancement to promote a new shared interest for 
the Anywaa and the Nuer in the mixed and conflict-ridden neighbourhoods. For all these reasons, 
these two Kebeles were selected for more specific focus areas of study.  
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Figure 3. Map of Gambella Regional State (study area)  
 
Source: Adopted from Hussein, Kebede and Schaafsma (2006) 
4.3.3.2 Sampling for the household survey 
 
As briefly indicated above, this study used a sampling frame of the four NGOs from Gambella 
and six NGOs from the Borana zone to select the beneficiaries (see Table 1). Then, two INGOs 
from the Borana Zone and two other INGOs from Gambella were selected. Two districts, 
(Yabello district in Borana and Gambella Town in the Gambella Region) were selected from 
where these four NGOs are operating. From these districts, four local communities (Kebeles or 
Peasant Associations (PAs))
 
were selected. Within each Kebele, thirty households were selected 
following the framework provided by the NGOs. A combination of purposive and random 
sampling procedures was used to select households with similar characteristics. This approach 
was aimed at ensuring that the study reflects a wide variety of perceptions, so that any 
similarities that may emerge are likely to reflect core impacts (Roche, 1999). However, the 
sampling method was dependent on acquiring accurate lists of beneficiaries in the selected 
Kebeles. The NGO database containing the names and addresses of the beneficiaries was used as 
a sample frame to select beneficiaries. The local Kebele administrations also had “the most 
reliable data” on the beneficiaries per household because they used the data on a daily basis for 
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providing services and distributing public resources. Moreover, a pilot study for analysis of 
power further supported the selection of an appropriate sample for the study (see section, 4.5). It 
was from the data that respondents were selected using a systematic random sampling procedure. 
Note the following points below: 
   In Borana:   
 Surupha and Dida Hara, the PAs of Yabello district, were purposely selected for the 
study. 
 Two INGOs (CARE-Ethiopia and Goal Ethiopia) were selected from the NGOs 
working in these PAs. Goal Ethiopia operates in the Yabello and Teltelle districts and 
Care Ethiopia operates in all districts of the Borana Zone.  
 Using the records of these INGOs as sample frameworks, thirty beneficiaries from each 
Kebele or PA, who were heads of households, were selected randomly using systematic 
sampling with a random start.  
In Gambella Town: 
 Kebeles 02 and 05 of Gambella Town/ district were selected for the study.  
 This study purposely selected two INGOs (ACORD and Pact Ethiopia) from five NGOs 
working in these Kebeles. 
 ACORD operates in Gambella Town, Itang, Jikawo and Godere Districts. Pact Ethiopia 
operates in all twelve districts of Gambella Regional State, including Gambella Town. 
Kebeles 02 and 05 of Gambella Town were purposely selected from where these NGOs 
operate.  
 Using the records of these INGOs as sample frameworks, thirty beneficiaries from each 
Kebele or PA, who were heads of households, were selected randomly using systematic 
sampling with a random start. Table 1 shows the sample of households taken from each 





















Goal Ethiopia 30 30 Dida Hara 
  
Did Hara 
Care Ethiopia 30 30 Surupha 
  
Gambella Gambella Town 
02 Kebele 
Pact Ethiopia 30 30   
05 Kebele 
02 Kebele 
ACORD Ethiopia 30 30   
05 Kebele 
 
4.4 Research Instruments 
 
Three main instruments were used to collect data; these were key informant (KI) interview 
guides, focus group discussion (FGD) guides and household questionnaires. The choice of the 
instruments was based on the mix of qualitative and quantitative methodology.  
4.4.1 Interview Guide and key informant interview guides 
 
Detailed interviewing took place, using a semi-structured schedule with questions pertaining to 
the objectives of the research (Appendices C and D). This schedule was used as a guide. The 
Focus Discussion Group (FGD) guide was designed as a follow-up instrument for generating 
further information to augment the data generated from the quantitative survey. The guide was 
used to solicit information; sample guides are provided in Appendix D. 
4.4.2 The Household Questionnaire 
 
A standard questionnaire with pre-coded questions relating to the research objectives, was 
administrated to 120 respondents (heads of households), each one representing a household (see 
Appendix E). The technique adopted was a face-to-face interview as opposed to a self-
administrated questionnaire. Face-to-face interviews were preferred because of the relatively low 
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literacy level in Ethiopia’s rural community. Thus, a face-to-face interview was considered more 
practical; moreover, it would greatly minimize the level of non-response with regard to all or 
parts of the questionnaire. Key sections of the questionnaire included: involvement in 
peacebuilding activities and change in the level of the incidence of conflict, respondents’ 
perceptions of “social bridging” schemes, such as cross-community contact, trust, tolerance and 
social prejudice and the respondents’ evaluations of the NGOs’ livelihoods enhancement 
programmes, including their assessments of the extent of improvement, such as alleviating the 
economic and social consequences of conflict. Questions also covered any changes in the level 
of household income, reconstruction of physical and economic infrastructures, and cooperation 
in cross-community development. Space was provided for interviewers to note down any 
detailed comments and explanations during the course of the interview, if these could not be 
captured in the response categories.  
4.5. Piloting the research instruments and setting up KIs and FGDs 
 
A pilot study provides an opportunity to gain preliminary experience of the research areas as 
well as an opportunity for the researcher to perform reliability and validity tests of the study 
(Roche, 1999). A short pilot study was conducted to examine the effectiveness of the KI guide 
and survey questions. The questionnaire and interview guide were administered to four 
beneficiaries and three KIs, respectively. A review of these data helped the researcher to gather 
suggestions, and to adapt questions where respondents indicated that the questionnaire was 
vague or confusing, or needed to be changed from its original format. Based on the results of the 
pilot study, attempts were made to ensure that the questions were understandable and expressed 
in a suitable way. The availability of the NGO records, respondents, KIs and FGD participants 
was also assessed.  
 
The KIs who were met through preliminary appointments included: the Ethiopian Pastoralist 
Forum (EPF), which is a consortium of 27 NGOs working to promote the pastoralists’ 
livelihoods through advocacy and capacity building; the Save the Children Federation, a 
consortium of CARE Ethiopia, International Rescue Committee (IRC), Mercy Corps, and Save 
the Children/UK and US, and the Consortium of Christian Relief and Development Association 
(CCRDA), formerly known as CRDA, with 334 member agencies operating in food security, 
rural and urban development across the country. The researcher also had an opportunity to attend 
88 
 
a two-day annual workshop (27 and 28 October, 2011) titled: “Pastoralist Livelihoods Initiative 
(PLI) Policy Project, Review of natural resources management/enclosures in pastoralist areas”. 
This took place in Yabello and involved most of the NGO directors and heads (D/H) as well as 
their programme coordinators/ project managers (PC/PM). This workshop therefore provided a 
venue for the informal collection of information about NGOs in the region, and this was used to 
refine the data collection tools. 
4.6 Research Assistants 
 
Selecting and training enumerators was a crucial component of the survey method because the 
researcher does not speak the Nuer and Anyuwaa languages of the Gambella Town. This study 
involved face-to-face interviews for collecting accurate data in a “non-literate” society. 
Therefore, a deliberate attempt was made to include not only enumerators who work in NGOs 
but also outsiders; the intention was to balance experience, objectivity, and acceptance by the 
community. Also, these enumerators had knowledge of local languages. The research assistants 
were trained by the researcher himself and oriented in the current research to make sure that they 
understood the subject matter, the key objectives and research questions. They were also trained 
to administer the household questionnaire in such a way that vague or non-responses were 
minimized. As part of the training, the questionnaire was reviewed in detail to make sure that all 
the interviewers understood the questions properly as well as the response categories. 
4.7 Data Collection 
4.7.1 Collecting the qualitative data 
 
 Discussions with the KIs and FGDs were used to collect the qualitative data. 
 
 In-depth Interviews with Key Informants 
 
The researcher conducted all the in-depth interviews with the 52 key informants (KIs). Most of 
these interviews were conducted in the offices of the KIs. A small number were conducted in a 
private place on prior appointment with the KI, if the office did not provide a private, quiet 
environment. The KI interviews were recorded, with the prior permission of the interviewee, to 
ensure that all information was captured. In a few instances, the KIs did not give permission; for 
example, if they felt that their opinions and perceptions might be controversial. In such instances, 
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the interviewer made an effort to write notes as the interview proceeded. Follow-up interviews to 
get clarification of some information took place either by telephone or electronic mail with some 
KIs; otherwise a face-to-face meeting was rescheduled. This was particularly helpful after the 
initial analysis of the qualitative data, where some findings needed clarity or a second opinion 
was deemed necessary. 
 
 Focus Group Discussions 
 
As indicated in section 4.3.2, two FGDs were held with community members in the study area to 
assess current indigenous conflict resolution practices and the way that these are adopted by the 
NGOs to resolve conflict. Those FGDs also aimed to examine the participants’ perceptions and 
experience of the NGOs’ interventions. The objectives of the study were explained in simple 
terms to the participants, and it was mentioned that this study was primarily for academic 
purposes. This was very important for two reasons. First, some of FGD participants were 
members of local peace committees organised and trained by NGOs and Government; the 
conflict resolution activities and issues concerning the conflict were sensitive matters. Second, 
NGOs initiate development projects with the participation of these leaders. Therefore, the aim 
was to minimize suspicions about the purpose of the research in order to create a free 
environment for discussion and to avoid raising any unrealistic expectations among the 
participants. The researcher acted as the moderator while an assistant took notes to back up the 
taped records. The moderator made every effort to draw meaningful responses from all 
participants while at the same time attempted not to pressurise anybody to answer any particular 
question. Although each individual was encouraged to participate actively, it was ultimately the 
views of the group rather than those of the individual participants that were of interest to the 
researcher. The nature of the discussion allowed the moderator to probe for details, while at the 
same time allowed the moderator to keep discussion focused on the key themes and objectives. 
  
 Secondary Data 
 
A review of relevant documents, some obtained from organisations through the KIs, took place 
to capture information relevant to the research questions. An analysis of the new Proclamation 
(PPRRCS) and Poverty Reduction Strategy Program (PRSP) took place to put the study of NGOs 
in a proper context. The PRSP guidelines and sector performance reports were reviewed. Other 
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key reports included reports from the Bureau of Finance and Economic Development (BFED), 
the Department of Development, Cooperation Affairs and Non-Governmental Organisations and 
the Population and Housing Census of Ethiopia (2007). All these reports provided crucial data 
for the background (context) information, but were also useful reference points during data 
interpretation and analysis. Documents specific to peacebuilding and development projects were 
obtained from the NGOs’ libraries and some scheme documents from government departments 
such as BFED and Federal Affairs. NGO project proposals, baseline studies, and quarterly and 
annual progress reports relevant to the research questions were constantly but carefully reviewed; 
relevant aspects were incorporated in the discussion of findings.  
4.7.2 Collecting the quantitative data using the questionnaire 
 
Quantitative data was collected using a household questionnaire with face-to-face interviews. 
This procedure focuses much more on the presumed impact of peace interventions. The 
researcher, accompanied by research assistants, would collect data in each Kebele. One 
interviewer would interview the individual household heads once. The interviewer would ask the 
questions and then tick or fill in the appropriate response on the questionnaire. Interviewer bias, 
which can easily arise from face-to-face interviews, was minimized by using standardised 
questions, pre-coded responses and daily group editing to check for inconsistencies. There are 
several advantages in having a questionnaire administered by the interviewers, such as a high 
response rate, clarification of confusing questions and reduction of incomplete responses (Babbie 
& Mouton, 2005).  
4.8 Data analysis 
4.8.1 Analysis of qualitative data 
 
In this study, thematic analysis was employed. Thematic analysis is defined by Boyatzis (1998:4) 
as “a process for encoding qualitative data that enables the researcher to discover patterns or 
recurrence in the data and classify or describe them logically”.  Boyatzis (1998) has offered three 
reasons why thematic analysis is useful. First, it provides the researcher with the categorisation 
of patterns and a link between any new or emerging patterns observed in the data. Second, it 
allows the researcher to employ, systematically, diverse data that could enhance the reliability 
and validity of the data analyses. Finally, it provides a link to any patterns that others may have 
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observed and considered, through theory and conceptual framework (Maxwell, 2005). Therefore, 
in the case of data from the KI and FGDs interviews, thematic analysis was employed to identify 
emerging themes and subthemes based on their level of recurrence within the data collected and 
in line with the key research questions. Qualitative data was analysed in the following manner 
(Tesch, 1990). 
I. First, all interview responses were transcribed from tapes and typed into a Word 
document. 
II. In the second step, the researcher examined the data to get initial impressions.  
III. One transcript was taken as a preliminary impression of the nature of the interviewee’s 
response; it was critically analysed in relation to categories and themes emerging from all 
the data. Then, categories, themes and patterns were identified in relation to salient 
themes and language, as well as from the broader background of the research objectives. 
IV. These categories and themes were coded using colour coding and were grouped together.   
V. An organising system or development of theoretical concepts was developed, in relation 
to research questions and the available data. 
VI. Using the framework as a guideline, the findings were discussed in relation to the 
literature review and conceptual frameworks.   
 
4.8.2 Quantitative data analysis 
 
Bivariate analysis was the main approach used for the analysis, and it was based on the 
descriptive design of the study. A computer assisted analysis was done using the Statistical 
Package for Social Sciences (SPSS evaluation version). A causal-comparative approach was 
used to establish any correlation between participation in conflict resolution training and 
participation in peacebuilding. The approach examined the relationship between NGO 
intervention and “individual development”, “social bridging” and livelihoods enhancement. 
Here, it paid particular attention to the relationship between “individual empowerment” and 
tolerance, prejudice and trust. The change in the incidence of conflict as well as factors 
contributing to the change were highlighted. Relationships were examined between the NGOs’ 
interventions and the adoption by participants of new attitudes, new relationships, and their 
development of joint activities. Their willingness to undertake trade, and to do business with 
each other, was also examined. Cross tabulations were used to compare participants in conflict 
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resolution training with nonparticipants. Chi-square tests were done for selected variables to 
estimate the levels of significance of relationships between those variables and training in 
conflict resolution. Thus, these tests were deemed more appropriate.  
4.9 Credibility and validity  
 
There was a need to establish that the qualitative methods and the conclusions drawn by 
qualitative research are credible and do not stem from the researcher’s own biases. In research, 
the term “validity” is used to refer to the “correctness or credibility of a description, conclusion, 
explanation, interpretation, or other sort of account” (Maxwell, 2005: 106). The types of 
credibility procedures used in this study include triangulation and researcher’s reflexivity. 
4.9.1 Triangulation 
  
Triangulation is “a validity procedure where researchers search for convergence among multiple 
and different sources of information to form themes or categories in a study” (Creswell and 
Miller, 2000:126). It involves the “use of multiple and different sources, methods, investigators, 
and theories to shed light on a theme or perspective” (Creswell and Miller, 2000:127). In this 
study, data were gathered from a variety of sources, including the surveys and oral interviews. 
This served as a basis for triangulation. The use of quantitative as well as qualitative research 
questions, data analysis procedures, and inferences is also a form of triangulation. 
4. 9.2 Researcher’s reflexivity  
 
Creswell and Miller (2000:127) describe researcher’s reflexivity as “the process whereby 
researchers report on personal beliefs, values, and biases which may shape their inquiry”. A 
researcher’s opinions and potential biases should be acknowledged before the researcher 
interacts with participants and analyses the data. Creswell and Miller (2000:127) further 
recommend that researchers should explicitly “acknowledge and describe their beliefs and biases 
early in the research process to allow readers to understand their positions”. This researcher 
happens to be one of a generation of activists involved in the Ethiopian University students’ 
struggle for democracy. The researcher believed that the new Federal Government’s 
Proclamation to Provide for the Regulation and Registration of Charities and Societies 
(PPRRCS) was in fact curtailing civil society’s political space especially with regards to the role 
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of NGOs in conflict transformation. Despite this belief, deliberate attempts were made by the 
researcher to enter the field with an open mind so as to gain an unbiased account of what was 
‘happening on the ground’. Supervision played a key role in this regard where assumptions were 
constantly being tested. Thus the notion of bracketing or ‘suspending researcher biases’ was a 
constant process as the study progressed (Creswell and Miller, 2000).  
4.10. Ethical issues 
 
This study was initiated through discussions with government officials, district and local leaders 
(clan and village elders) as well as with NGOs. Official permission to carry out the research was 
granted by Oromia Administration and Security Office and by Gambella Administration and 
Security Office; this was granted after reviewing and approving the proposal. The approval 
letters also served as an introduction to the Worada Administration and Security Office in each 
district, in order to gain entry into the community where the research was conducted. To avoid 
any misunderstandings, it was made clear that the study was not sanctioned by any particular 
NGO or government agency, and that there should be no expectations from the study; such false 
expectations could include improvements or inauguration of development projects in the area or 
more funding, as was the case with most NGOs or government development planning. The 
respondents duly understood that this research was mainly for academic purposes, and that the 
results could be used to improve service delivery in the future, if the responsible authorities and 
agencies chose to make use of the results.  
4.11 Limitations of the study 
 
The main limitations of this study have been indicated in the discussion of the methodology 
(section 4.2: 74). Some other limitations are highlighted below, with ways of minimizing their 
adverse effects on the study outcome: 
 The nature of the research topic raises its own challenges and limitations. The volatile 
political atmosphere in the country and the unhealthy relationship between NGOs and the 
government affected the validity and reliability of the research outcome. This gap was 
reduced by building rapport with the groups under scrutiny. 
 The qualitative research design also carries its own limitations. The study relied heavily on 
cross-sectional data and had a weak design, making it difficult to infer causality. Thus, the 
94 
 
study does not claim to provide a direct causal relationship between the programme as an 
independent variable and change in perceptions of the beneficiaries as a dependent variable; 
the reason is that the study is not a longitudinal study and does not have a control group. 
The quantitative research design, baseline data and need assessments, might not be reliable 
if these were not conducted systematically, or not accessible or did not contain all the 
necessary information. This may affect the validity of the research. However, the data were 
reconstructed from the NGOs’ records and from beneficiaries. 
 The quantitative research design could rule out the likelihood that changes could be caused 
by chance, rather than by other factors such as the NGOs’ projects. However, this limitation 
was minimized by triangulating the survey findings with the information from the Focus 
Group Discussions, Key Informants and secondary sources. 
 The sample size is small and was selected through non-statistical procedures. This approach 
is appropriate, since the aim was exploratory rather than explanatory; however, it limited 
generalizability (Babbie and Mouton, 2005). Nevertheless, this does not preclude 
transferability and applicability to other similar situations.   
4.12 Conclusion  
 
The research methodology presented in this chapter provides a context for the presentation and 
discussion of findings in the following chapters. Essentially, the study employed a mixed 
methodology approach with an exploratory qualitative study. This allows for the triangulation 
and corroboration of research findings. Thematic and content analysis was used to analyse 
qualitative data, while bivariate analysis using SPSS was used to analyse the quantitative data. 
The findings are presented in an integrated manner with the qualitative and quantitative findings 









CHAPTER FIVE:  DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS OF THE FINDINGS 
5. Introduction 
 
This chapter presents and analyses the findings of the study. As indicated in Chapter One, the 
study intended to examine the peacebuilding potential of NGOs in areas of protracted conflict in 
Ethiopia. Field research conducted in 2011 examined the peacebuilding potential of development 
NGOs in the Gambella and Borana Zone of Oromia Regional State of Ethiopia. Specifically, this 
thesis, (1) explores the policy framework that impacts on NGOs in Ethiopia; (2) examines the 
nature of State and Civil Society relationships; (3) assesses current indigenous conflict resolution 
practices; (4) explores the strategies including indigenous practices adopted by the NGOs to 
resolve conflict; (5) examines the perceptions of the NGOs about the impact of their services in 
their respective regions and (6) examines the perceptions of the beneficiaries about the services 
of the NGOs. As indicated in Chapter Four, the research design adopted was that of a mixed 
design method with an emphasis on the qualitative, explorative approach. The findings and 
interpretation of results are presented in eight major themes as shown in Table Two. The table 
also highlights the corresponding objectives that each of these major themes address. 
Furthermore, particular “category factors” are clearly presented in the table. These category 
factors are linked to the major themes. Various references pertaining to studies that resonate with 
this study are also set out in the table. The manner in which the table has been constructed 
provides a logical framework for presenting and discussing both the quantitative and qualitative 











5.1. Framework for presenting the Findings 
Table 2. Main themes emanating from the Key Informant Interviews, Focus Groups 









Data Source  
References pertaining to Themes and 
Categories 







The Emergence of Civil Society 
 Civil Service Reform 
 decentralisation 
The Emergence of Advocacy NGOs 
 Adversarial relationship 
Donors & CSO Partnership  
 EU & DAG 
NGOs & State  Partnership 
 Origins  
 Legitimacy 
The New Proclamation 
 Change of Mandate 
 Innovative Approach 







Chanie (2007); Wondwosen (2009); 
Campbell (2001); Campbell (1996); 
Olowu, (1999); Wescott, (1999); Bratton 
(1989, 1994); Mamdani (1996);  Clark, 
Jeffrey (2000); Clark John (1991, 1995); 
Diamond (1994); Keane (1998); 
Chandhoke (2004); Katz (2006); Bratton 
(1989a, 1989b; 1990) Bratton and de 
Walle (1994);  Marcussen (1996);  
Gidron, Katz and Hasenfeld  (2002); 
Fowler (1991); Bebbington (1994, 1997); 
Ndegwa (1996); Edwards &Hulme 
(1992); Clarke (1998); Hadenius (2001); 
Riker (1995);  Watson (2001, 2003); 
Harrison (2002); Bashaw (2001, 2008);  
Muir (2007) 
B.The change from “relief 
and rehabilitation” to 
development NGO 
Objective 6  From relief and 
rehabilitation to 
development NGO  
 Decentralisation policy 
 Incorporating 
peacebuilding components 





Watson (2001, 2003); Harrison (2002); 
Bashaw (2001,  2008);  Rahmato, 
Akalewold and Yoseph (2008); Rahmato 
(2000); Bassi (2010); Pavanello (2009); 
Riker (1995);  Muir (2007);  Campbell 
(2001); Campbell (1996); Clark, Jeffrey 
(2000); Clark John (1991, 1995); 
C.A typology of 
peacebuilding approaches 
Objective  6  Comprehensive approach 
 
 The rights-based 
approach 
 
 Do-no-harm approach  
 






Azar (1986, 1990); Burton (1990); Bush 
(2005);  Galtung (1975, 1981, 1996); Sen 
(1999); Anderson (1999); Schmelzle 
(2006); Lederach (1997, 2005a); Watson 
(2001, 2003); Bassi and Tache (2011) 
D. Indigenous conflict 
resolution mechanism  
Objectives 
1, 2, 3 and 6 
The indigenous institutions  
 Reselient   
 Emphasis on social 
harmony 
 Responsive and accessible 
 Participatory and resorative  
 Supplements the judiciary 
Partnerships-NGOs, the state and 
the indigenous institutions   
 Indigenous institution as a 
bridge for the community 
 Government administrative 
structures as an entry point 
 Complementation of 
government and an 






Minja (2009); Wasonga (2009); Onwuka 
(2009); Bebbington (1994); Uphoff 
(1996); Cleaver (1999); Watson (2001, 
2003); Harrison (2002); Bassi and Tache 
(2011); Oba (1996); Scot-Villiers et al 
(2011); Bassi (2010);  Leach et al. 
(1997); Muir (2007); Warren (1996); 
Chambers  et al. (1989); Helland (1982, 
1996); Irwin  and Mitiku (2004); Irwin, 
Jordan and Temesgen (2005); Muir 
(2007); Feyissa (2003); Vaughan and 
Tronvoll (2003);  Woldemariam (2009);  
Abbink (2006); Johnson (1986); Bassi 
(1996); Legesse (2000); Assefa (1997); 
Muir (2007); Chambers et al. (1989); 
Muir (2007); Stepan (1999, 2003); Leach 
et al. (1999);  Homann, (2004); 













3, 4, 5 and 6 
 Re/institutionalisation of 
Customary Institutions 
 
 Activation of customary 
laws  
 











Table 3 & 4 
Figure  8 & 9 
Bassi and Tache (2011); Miall, 
Ramsbotham and Woodhouse (1999, 
2005, 2011); Miall (2004); Lederach 
(1995a, 1997, 2001, 2005); Burton (1990); 
Azar (1990);  Aall (1996, 2001); Curle 
(1994, 1996); O’Brien (2009); Bassi 
(2010); Scott-Villiers et al. (2011); 
Zartman (1986); Fisher and Keashly 
(1991); Bassi (2010); Pavanello (2009); 
Irwin and Mitiku (2004);  Irwin, Jordan 
and Temesgen (2005);  Muir (2007);  
Steglich and Bekele (2009); Cleaver 
(1999)  
 





3, 4, 5 and 6 
 Track One Peacebuilding 
Initatives  
 
 Track Two peacebuilding 
Initatives  
 
 Track Three peace 
initiatives 
 
 Peacebuilding from below 
 
 The need for effective 








Table 3 & 4 
 
Figure 4, 9 & 
10 
Chigas (1997); Kriesberg (2001);  Aall 
(1996, 2001); Azar (1990; 1986); Burton 
(1990); Kelman (1991); Galtung (1975, 
1981, 1996); Jabri (1996); Fetherston 
(2000); Rupesinghe (1995, 1996); Miall 
(2004); Michelle (2006); Boulding (1989;) 
Davies and Kaufman (2001); Diamond 
and McDonald (1996); Goodhand and 
Hulme (1999); Goodhand, and Lewer 
(1999); Goodhand, Hulme  and Lewer 
(2000); Bercovitch & Kadayifci (2002); 
O’Brien (2009) 




3, 4, 5 and 6 
 Training as a part of an  
inter/intra ethnic relations 
initiative 
 
 Has peacebuilding made a 
difference? : examining 
the beneficiaires’ 
perception of NGO 
services  
 
 Individual development 
 Social bridging 













5, 6, 7, 8  
 
Figure 6, 7 & 
8 
Kelman (1987, 1993, 1995); Tropp and 
Pettigrew (2005); Tam et al. (2009); 
Malhotra and Liyanage (2005) Biton 
and); Salomon (2004); Diamond (1997); 
Fisher (1997); Hewstone et al.( 2005);  
Bassi (2010); Scott-Villiers et al.(2011); 
Kriesberg (2001); Lederach (1995a, 
1997); Levy (2001);O’Brien (2009); Abu-
Nimer (2001); Liebkind and McAlister 
(1999); Gebrewold (2009);  Collier  
(2007); Homer-Dixon (1995); EUPPR 
(2006); CDACLP (2006); Neufeldt 
(2007); Menkkhaus (2004); Michelle 
(2006);Caprioli (2000); Anderlin (2007);  
Charlesworth (2008); El Bushra (2007); 




3, 4, 5 and 6 
Defining community development 
 
A people-centred approach 
 
Community development meeting 








Table  9 
 
Figure 9 &10 
Carmen (1993);Scott-Villiers et al. 
(2011);  Pavanello (2009);  Galtung 
(1975, 1981, 1996); Aall (1996, 2001); 
Azar (1990; 1986); Burton (1990); 
Kelman (1991); Homer-Dixon (1995); 
EUPPR (2006); Liebkind and McAlister 
(1999); Gebrewold (2009); Pausewang 
(2002) ;Pantuliano and Wekesa (2008); 
O’Brien (2009); Steglich, Mirjam and 
Gezu Bekele (2009)  
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5.2. Theme A: The State and Civil Society 
 
Five major themes were identified from respondents. The first of these presents the emergence of 
the civil society sector. The second presents the emergence of advocacy NGOs. The third 
highlights donors/CSOs/NGOs partnership. The fourth section presents the state and NGOs 
partnership. The fifth section highlilghts the new Proclamation to Provide for the Regulation and 
Registration of Charities and Societies (PPRRCS). These five are discussed below. 
5.2.1 The Emergence of the Civil Society Sector 
 
The following sub-section focuses on the period since 1991. It briefly highlights how Civil 
Service Reform (CSR) and the decentralisation process paved the way for the emergence of an 
advocacy-NGOs sector. It looks at attempts to reinvigorate grass-roots organisations to promote 
the democratic process and considers how the NGO-state relationship has shifted as a result. This 
entails an examination of policy reforms and how certain NGOs fit into the political economy of 
the new institutional arrangement; their role in the new arrangement is considered, with a look at 
how this impacted on civil society and government. Some of the issues discussed, therefore, 
include the following: ideological differences; conflict over resource arrangements; formalising 
the relationship between government and civil society; and the need for strengthening 
government and civil society. The sub-section discusses how the nature of government is likely 
to mould NGO patterns parallel to those observed in emerging democracies. In conclusion, the 
sub-section extends the argument about the emergence of innovative NGO and government 
relationships.   
 The Civil Service Reforms and Decentralisation and the Proliferation of the CSO 
Sector 
 
Ethiopia ushered in a landmark constitutional reform in favour of decentralisation around the 
same time that it launched a major civil service reform programme in the early 1990s, as a part 
of the process of state redesign. The argument behind these policy reforms within the neo-liberal 
Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) was a double critique: of both the dysfunctional 
state-centric development approach and its bureaucracy in meeting basic human needs (Olowu, 
1999; Chanie, 2007). The state’s inability to produce economic wealth, and its dysfunctional 
civil service, endemic fiscal crisis, pervasive personal patronage and corruption and economic 
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disarticulation, and ineffective service delivery hampered any sustained economic and social 
development (Wescott, 1999). Instead, reformers pushed for civil service reform and 
decentralisation policies, in the hope that these would set free other actors in the private and non-
governmental sectors. Whereas civil service reform sought to reduce the relevance of the state in 
development as well as reduce the scope and cost of the civil service, decentralisation sought to 
reduce the role of the state in general, through devolution of power from the central authority to 
the peripheries; it was thought that this would promote more effective and responsive 
government. Whilst the state and its bureaucracy would have a reduced role in the economy, the 
private and voluntary sectors would gain ground to provide public services delivered to the 
population and enhance government’s capacity to carry out its basic functions; this would 
promote devolution of power to the grass-roots, and also promote democracy and self-
government at the regional and woreda levels (Campbell, 2001). Additionally, it was hoped that 
decentralisation, through ethnic based regionalisation, would also help Ethiopia to diffuse social 
and political tensions and ensure local cultural and political autonomy. In the process, the 
voluntary sector emerged as an alternative vehicle for the provision of the basic necessities of 
health, education, agriculture and social initiatives. Hence, the role of the donor community
20
, 
from Wescott’s (1999) point of view, was to support the technical concerns of civil service 
reforms, and building and sustaining the institutional capacities for economic changes in the 
country.  
 
During the civil service reform, the government restructured its civil service through 
privatisation, closure of public enterprises, and retrenchment (Wescott, 1999; Campbell, 2001; 
Clark, 2000). Since the early 1990s, thousands of civil service employees have left the service. 
Local government almost crumbled under these reforms but funding channelled through NGOs 
played a significant role in allowing NGOs to take over functions previously provided by the 
state. As a result, skilled and professional civil servants have sought roles in the burgeoning 




                                                          
20
 They negotiate by imposing coercive conditions on aid. Third World countries then have to adopt these policies as 
a precondition, by lenders, for lending money to pay a Third World country’s debt.   
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This is revealed by a representative of an NGO in Borana in the following extract:  
 
…SORDU (Southern Rangelands Development Unit) (SORDU) (a state organisation) had the largest 
staff and was most successful in implementing programmes like water, road and forage development, 
veterinary services and rangeland management. Around 44% of SORDU’s funding was reduced by the 
donors’ institutions; it was forced to reduce its staff…most joined international NGOs. In its early 
phase, CARE-Ethiopia (an international NGO) became a major partner in SORDU and participated 
in institution building…after 1991 more international NGOs moved in…all the monies from the 
funders channelled towards these NGOs…further reduced support to SORDU. Most of SORDU’s 
traditional services are now run by these NGOs…but these NGOs have particularly short time frames; 
they are rarely able to commit themselves for more than 2-3 years ahead... they had little or no 
collaboration with government’s institutions. (A staff member, Bureau of Finance and Economic 
Development, November 2011).  
 
Several informants indicated that the NGO sector had continued to absorb most of the skilled and 
professional staff from civil service institutions. As a result, the civil service administrative 
bureaucracy is being dominated by poorly skilled politicians, leading to the politicisation and 
centralisation of public service delivery at Worada level (Mehret, 2002). This had led to further 
deterioration in the quality of public services, although NGOs are unable to replace fully the state 
organisations. The lack of collaborative partnerships between NGOs and local government has 
been attributed to untrained officials being unable to administer their bureaucracies effectively 
and civil servants being unable to implement strategies effectively and efficiently (Wescott, 
1999). In addition, competition for development resources led to an adversarial relationship 
between state and NGOs, leading to co-option and suspension. While NGOs’ dependence on 
foreign resources raises suspicions about the vested interests of donors and local elites, lack of 
transparency around donor/NGO funding contributed to the adversarial relationships.  
 
Bearing these factors in mind, the following sub-sections describe how these factors played into 
conflictual relationships over development locations and development priority.  
 Conflict over development locations 
 
Decentralisation proved to be problematic for various reasons. The politicisation and 
centralisation of public services delivered by the party members contributed to a lack of 
collaborative partnerships between NGOs and local government (Chanie, 2007). Local 
development programmes were perceived as running along ethnic lines and were therefore met 
with resistance from officials belonging to other ethnic groups. As a result, some of the local 
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government officials are reluctant to work with the NGOs. Some of the problems were described 
as follows:     
 
In 2009, we carried out a need assessment at a district frequently hit by water scarcity. It took women 
up to three hours to fetch water. We developed a proposal and secured funds from a donor. The 
regional office approved the project but a local administrative officer was reluctant and recommended 
us to relocate the project to another Kebele (apparently inhabited by his ethnic group). Given the 
urgency of the matter, we appealed to the regional authorities and provided them with convincing 
reasons: the desirability…and possibility of its socio-economic benefits. The water was a question of 
survival for Nyajani whereas it was about authority for the local official…but they (the regional 
authorities) recommended us to implement as suggested by local officer. We had no option, but to 
bargain…we agreed to split between the two areas (two boreholes at each area). We couldn’t 
withdraw the project as we had already collected the money…we had to disburse and finish the 
project within the stipulated time…and we had to do everything to implement the project. Finally, a 
donor came to carry out project evaluation…we took them to the project sites. In one of the project 
areas (suggested by the local administrator), we couldn’t find a single family around the water source. 
They (donors) were surprised and asked; “Are you joking?”…we explained how that had happened. 
These were pastoralists who usually move to the river banks during summer. It damaged our image. 
You know…ethnic-political alliance is deeply interwoven from top to bottom…adversely affecting 
development interventions. The regional officials and the local administration were from the same 
ethnic-based political party and we couldn’t bypass these barriers. (NGO project manager, October 
2011).   
 Conflict over development priorities  
 
CSOs aim to contribute towards the national development objectives and strategies as outlined in 
the PASDEP (See, section 5.2.4: 108-111). However there is tension over government’s 
resettlement programme; a strategy of addressing the problem of food insecurity in the country. 
The resettlement programme had been fraught with difficulties at a number of levels, but its 
association with “involuntary” resettlement of the Durge regime also played a part in its downfall 
(Feyissa, 2009). Therefore, most NGOs distanced themselves from the much-discredited 
programme although government tried to justify it on the basis of four pillars: voluntarism, 
availability of under-utilised land, consultation with host communities and provision of the 
minimum infrastructure:   
  
The regional government appealed to NGOs and other donor organisations to participate in the 
resettlement programme and support a larger scale of settlers. We made it clear that our organisation 
receives funds for twelve months for projects like water development…we explained that funders 
specified that their funds only were to be used to support the project for which they were granted…this 
money was normally earmarked and could not be used to defray resettlement…they were not happy 




Another contributing factor is that government officials complain of the relative abundance of 
resources brought into Ethiopia by NGOs, compared with the extremely weak capacity of 
regional and local government departments. Donors require NGOs to set out the capacity-
building components of projects in proposals but this is more often carried out in relation to local 
NGOs or community-based organisations, rather than in relation to local government. 
5.2.2 The Emergence of Advocacy NGOs: An adversarial Relationship  
     
The mid-2000s brought about a rapid turnover of politicians and those connected to government 
as a result of pervasive personal patronage and a one-party state system. Many felt marginalised 
from the political process and opted out of the state and its structure for ideological reasons. 
Foreign aid channelled to NGOs helped their redeployment into the civil society sector. The 
voluntary sector thus began to emerge as a site for those who intended to engage in rights-based 
activities and the counter hegemonic strategy of challenging state monopoly got off the ground. 
Thus the process of political democratisation, with the help of these CSOs, gained momentum 
and was evident in the 2005 parliamentary election. Moreover, the civil society, for the first time, 
played a very decisive role in the country’s democratisation process by undertaking a vigorous 
civic voter education programme; this covered the right to register, to vote, on voting procedures, 
by actively participating in the election observation (Wondwosen, 2009)
21
. As a result, a number 
of CSOs came to occupy much of the public space, leading to an adversarial relationship with the 
state. However, the government often treated the CSO sector with suspicion, accusing them of 
harbouring opposition members and viewed them as political opponents: 
 
Some CSO members were retrenched political personnel of the collapsed regime…and most of them 
joined international and local NGOs. They use these platforms to wage their ideological war against 
state policies. The government is aware of their political standpoint and often depict local 
NGOs/CSOs as ‘remnants of the military regime…even as a salient face of opposition parties’. This 
was verified when the founder and leader of Human Rights Organisation, earlier deemed to have close 
collaboration with the military regime, and who later joined the opposition camp by establishing a 
new political party. This gave the ruling party room to discredit the credibility and independence of 
local CSOs to be independent observers of the election. In my opinion, NEBE (National Electoral 
Board of Ethiopia) followed the ruling party’s discourse and decided not to register local NGOs/CSOs 
in the election observation. (NGO director, October 2011). 
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 For instance, some local NGOs offered a civic voter education programme on the right to register, to vote, on 
voting procedures, and the duties and responsibilities of the people themselves in the electoral process. Other NGOs 
trained and deployed 200 election observers in different parts of the country. 
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However, the CSOs challenged the NEBE’s decision to bar the local NGOs/CSOs from election 
observation. This was the first major confrontation by a civil society organisation in the post-
1991 era. In a campaign against NEBE’s initial refusal to allow local NGOs and CSOs to 
observe the election, the CSOs presented the first test case to find how serious government really 
was about democratic processes. The CSOs leaders put the democratic principle to the test not 
only taking the government to court, but also by winning the case. Many saw the action and the 
outcome of the court’s ruling as a good omen for the future democracy of the country:   
 
The campaign to take NEBE to court was the first major test for the rule of law and judicial 
independence. It was about testing and using institutional structures in place to challenge  NEBE’s 
arbitrary and unconstitutional ruling…it was a great success for CSOs…they obeyed the law. I regard 
this as a significant step forward in the democratisation process…because CSOs stood for what was 
right and the government was willing to accept the court’s ruling; the court, in my opinion, made a 
historic decision, even under an uncertain political environment. (NGO director, October 2011). 
 
However, many NGOs/CSOs were not able to send the necessary number of local observers 
since the court ruling came very late. While some of these NGOs were required to renew their 
licence to seek legal recognition, a government official from the Association Registration Office 
was given powers not to register any organisations “opposing the ruling party”
22
. These NGOs 
found that their activities and programmes were increasingly regulated and controlled, to the 
extent that government determined their mandates, funding resources and the nature of their 
relations with local constituencies (Wondwosen, 2009). For example, in the post-election period, 
the government officially accused various civil society organisations of instigating a revolution 
against the government through street violence, and threatened to prosecute and ban some of 
these CSOs
23
. This allegation led to the arrest of many activists and other individuals working for 
various NGOs/CSOs (see, for example, Wondwosen, 2009). In the post-2005 election, the clash 
between NGOs/CSOs and the state either led to the government to attempt to enforce its power 
or to accommodating some CSOs. For example, at times the government worked to control or 
co-opt those CSOs that ventured into advocacy or lobbying for the promotion of the rights of the 
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 Civil society joined the opposition parties, and the international election observers in condemning the emergency; 
this declared a one month ban on all demonstrations and protests in Addis Ababa effective from Monday, May 16, 
2005. 
23
 Christian Relief and Development Association (CRDA), later renamed to Consortium of Christian Relief and 
Development Association (CCRDA), openly challenged and criticised the government’s justification killings, and 
detention of civilians protesting against alleged vote rigging and for subsequently declaring emergency laws to ban 
any political protest for one month.   
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child, and campaigning against cultural practices harmful to women. At the other extreme, it 
banned NGOs that advocated for Human Rights, free and fair electoral campaigns or blocked the 
implementation of policies formulated by these CSO groups.  
5.2.3 Donors-CSOs/NGOs Partnership  
 
Despite the space being created for the development of NGOs and the paradoxical attempts by 
the state to “control”, muzzle or co-opt Civil Society, NGO proliferation was encouraged by the 
injection of significant amounts of development aid to the sector (Campbell, 1996). The 
participation in democracy building signifies the extent to which the “political space” for NGOs 
has expanded as a result of bilateral and multilateral development assistance. The three most 
important instances of this collaboration between bilateral and multilateral donors, CSOs and the 
Ethiopian government were: first, the European Union Civil Society Fund in Ethiopia (EU-CSF); 
second, the Development Assistance Group
24
 and third, the Civil Society Support Program 
(DAG-CSSP). One joint venture between the donor organisations, CSOs and the Ethiopian 
government has been financed to an estimated amount of one billion USD by the EU through the 
European Commission (EC), which manages its development assistance and DAG, a group of 
multilateral and bilateral donor organisations based in Ethiopia (Cerritelli, Bantirgu and 
Abagodu, 2008). The purpose of the joint venture is to provide funding to build the institutional 
capacity of CSOs in Ethiopia. Thus, the issues of democracy building, human rights and good 
governance became an integral part of CSOs by the early 2000s.  
 
The CSOs are largely financed by the donor community as a part of an elaborate civil service 
reform to enhance the role they play in service delivery, advocacy and policy formulation as well 
as their role in creating checks and balances. With more development partnerships between the 
state and CSOs, with a better quality of public services delivered to the public, there is a good 
likelihood that democracy and good governance will flourish.  
 
Campbell (1996) has recorded other cases where the conditions laid down by donors have a 
measurable impact on recipient governments. Two examples are in relation to structural 
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 The DAG is a “consortium” of 26 donor agencies providing development assistance to Ethiopia and was set up for 
the purposes of information sharing, policy dialogue and harmonising donor support to Ethiopia. Its broader aim was 
to enable the country to meet the targets set in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The background and 
structure of  DAG can be found at http://www.dagethiopia.org   
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adjustment programmes or human rights agendas. The notion of autonomous CSOs encouraging 
reforms has raised concern for some parties. The imposition of conditions became a central 
characteristic of many donor projects. These projects or partnerships envisage working with 
government and CSOs, to enhance networking and building good relations with the government. 
As could be anticipated, there were new challenges that had to be met within this approach as 
indicated in the following examples.   
 
 The European Union (EU) and Development Assistance Group (DAG) Civil Society 
Support Programme  
 
The European Commission’s Civil Society Fund (EC-CSF) was set up in 2005 and sought to 
reinvigorate the institutional capacity of CSOs by providing technical assistance and funding to 
promote rights-based activities. These include peacebuilding, women’s empowerment, human 
rights and democracy, accompanied by lobbying and advocacy to further these objectives. 
Tripartite partnerships were set up: these comprised CSOs, the Ethiopian government and the 
EU. Their purposes were to serve as a mechanism for increasing the capacity of government and 
local CSOs to deliver services, and to create a collaborative atmosphere for dialogue between the 
CSOs and the state. As a supplement to the EC-CSF, the Donor Assistance Group (DAG) 
introduced the Civil Society Support Program (CSSP); its purpose was to help CSOs in 
promoting democratisation, human rights, advocacy and governance. As in the case of the EC-
CSF, the DAG-CSSP main partners are the Ethiopian government, civil society organisations 
and the private sector
25
. About 2,000 local NGOs were drawn into these initiatives and about one 
billion USD were distributed over a five year period. These partnerships aimed at bringing 
citizens, CSOs and local government together in a common objective: to ensure efficient and 
equitable delivery of service to those areas in real need and to enhance social accountability 
(Cerritelli, Bantirgu and Abagodu, 2008). They employed a joint planning, monitoring and 
evaluation scheme that looked at the effectiveness and performance of the civil service, budget 
information and audits and quality of public services. Although these roles seem to limit the 
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 These partnerships comprised one-third government representatives (from the Ministry of Justice, Ministry of 
Finance and Economic Development and Ministry of Capacity Building), one-third from the voluntary sector 
(directors from the Consortium of Reproductive Health Associations, Christian Relief and Development Association 
and Poverty Action Network of Civil Society in Ethiopia) and the remaining one-third being representatives from 




participation of CSOs to “inspection”, it also meant that decision-making devolved to the sectors 
that understand the problems at grass-roots level, thereby increasing the effectiveness of services 
delivered to the poor. These partnerships also provided an opportunity for CSOs to contribute to 
dialogue on development issues, agenda-setting as well as delivery of services. The experts 
brought together in these partnerships contributed to understanding differences, negotiating 
compromises, building trust and thereby improving local government and empowering local 
actors.      
 
However, the funding arrangements were not entirely unproblematic:  
  
We used to get funds for our core projects on food security, natural resource management and health 
services…the criteria for the funding were gender sensitivity, involving local partners, sustainability 
issues, environmental issues, meeting donor’s country strategy and objectives, the area to be covered, 
the numbers of people served out of the total population, the most cost-effective way of achieving these 
objectives etc…but criteria keep on changing. These days they include ensuring human rights and 
good governance, monitoring and evaluating of public services deliveries…they are gradually 
increasing…diverting from our mandates…getting into the murky areas...we spent a significant 
amount of time and energy in finding funding resources to maintain our mandates.  (NGO director, 
October 2011).  
 
Some NGOs expressed fears about the political ramifications of involvement in the contentious 
areas of human rights and governance. Nevertheless, donors have a great deal of power in 
defining developmental agendas, by imposing criteria for project proposals. As the funding 
criteria continue to change, the NGOs are being diverted away from their original purpose. 
Under the new legal system, NGOs must unequivocally specify their mandates and register at the 
federal and regional levels; government expects them to fulfill their mandates in the stipulated 
time. This resulted in a great deal of tension between NGOs and the state.  
 
A further challenge to the donor/ NGO relationship is the unstable and irregular relationship 
between donors and the CSOs. Some NGOs perceive that they are co-opted by donors into new 
forms of engagement with government; they may also feel marginalised when donors have 
“good relations” with the government:   
  
When they (donors) are not on good terms with government, they came up with predefined roles (for 
CSOs) and just put on the table…pressure (CSOs) to adopt new format…like monitoring and 
evaluating local governments’ efficiency, responsiveness and accountability in the delivery of basic 
services. When their relationships improve, they do not make use of our reports and recommendations 




Additionally, NGOs were uncertain about the stability of funding for their projects and were 
constantly in search of resources to complete projects:  
 
We were working on rehabilitation of traditional water points for human and livestock consumption. 
Before our intervention, we carried out a need assessment, developed a proposal, and presented to our 
stakeholders. We entered the general operational agreement with a donor agency to provide us with 
funds that cover hand tools, industrial construction materials, masonry work and transportation of 
stones, sands and construction materials. The donor agreed to disburse (the money) over two years. 
Generally, the contribution of the community both in cash and in kind was estimated to be 55% 
whereas the contribution of the donor was 45%. They (donor) stopped after the first disbursement and 
later informed us that they no longer commit themselves for more than the first disbursement…we 
couldn’t finish the project. This paved the way for the local government to criticise…even to threaten 
to suspend us from operating in the area…the community was disappointed…it created uncertainty 
about the trend of future funding. (NGO project manager, November 2011).  
 
NGOs had little capacity to enforce signed agreements and they struggle with project and 
programme continuity, thereby hurting their credibility and adversely affecting their relationship 
with the local government. This suggests that donors must bear some responsibility for the 
deteriorating relations between NGOs and the state. They might be able to reduce conflict by 
specifying their terms of grants (periods of grants and conditions of renewals) and being more 
open about their development agendas.   
 
However, contrary to these problems highlighted it appears that most funders specified the 
period of grant, scope of project and conditions for withdrawal of commitment. Withdrawal of 
funding could happen if there are delays in commencement, unsatisfactory project progress and 
financial irregularities.  Most NGOs enjoyed a trusting relationship with their primary funders. 
Several factors contributed to the NGOs’ ability to build this trusting relationship and these 
included: a history of financial accountability, a track record of stability and delivering services 
efficiently (Cerritelli, Bantirgu and Abagodu, 2008). 
 
Donors do not necessarily determine the mandates of recipient NGOs unilaterally. There are 
instances when the NGOs were able to negotiate and dictate funding criteria, under which grants 
could be endorsed and disbursed; those NGOs included their own agenda as a condition for 
accepting money. For instance, an NGO involved in conflict resolution indicated that:  
 
…training [in conflict resolution] NGOs is not sufficient to bring about the required change. We have 
been advocating the donor community to include “do-no-harm” and conflict analyses into their 
funding criteria of NGO development projects. On this point we are somehow successful in convincing 
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the USAID and European Union, at a higher level. These days, gender sensitivity and environmental 
issues, :do-no-harm: and conflict analyses are the major criteria for securing funds in NGO 
development project proposals. (NGO project manager, December 2011).     
 
The funders demonstrated a clear desire to incorporate conflict sensitive/ do-no harm approaches 
into their funding criteria. Therefore, the potential for scaling-up these approaches in the NGO 
activities was more favourable.  
 
In response to the question whether an NGO would accept funding from a source that would try 
to influence its organisational mandates, a representative replied: 
 
…I do not know of any funder or funds allocated…or intended to influence or undermine the integrity 
of an NGO or the local government. But the point is…we (Ethiopia) are one of the least developed 
countries. Let alone the NGO sector, the state is highly dependent on external assistance…it covers 
one-third of the country’s national budget. It will be unrealistic to assume that there will be sufficient 
funding from domestic sources to reduce its dependency on external funding and influence. But, we 
need to look at the achievements of the NGO sector as a result of funding made available …on poverty 
alleviation, food security; fighting HIV/AIDs, gender issue…it doesn’t matter if it (funds) comes from 
international donors and foreign sponsors or local resources so long as we press on these... (NGO 
director, December 2011).  
 
It appeared that the potential benefits of NGO-donor cooperation greatly outweighed the 
perceived political interest of donors. Thus, in general, NGOs were more likely to be pragmatic 
in securing foreign funds to maintain existing work and to develop a collaborative relationship 
without compromising their integrity and credibility. Moreover, the presence of an autonomous 
organising body for NGO/ donor relations, the DAG-CSSP and EU-CSF, offered a platform for 
negotiating and building trust between NGOs and funding organisations.  
 
5.2.4 NGOs and the State Partnerships 
 
Respondents from the NGOs sector focused on the following: the origin of partnership, 
innovative partnerships, and the possibility of co-option. Two issues arise: the regulatory and 
coordination focused issue, and programmatic interactions. 
 The Origin of Partnership 
 
The origins of partnerships go back to the early 1990s and the reasons for their rise have already 
been highlighted (See sections 3.4: 69-73). The government enacted various legal and policy 
instruments and provisions pledging, encouraging and demanding proper CSO/state interactions 
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in poverty eradication; this fact could indicate the state’s commitment to build a working 
relationship with CSOs. Moreover, the government’s Civil Society Organisations Capacity 
Building Program (CSO-CBP), launched in 2004, created an enabling environment for CSO 
participation, democratisation, delivery of services, and decentralisation. The CSO-CBP policy 
statement reads:  
 
…it [the government] cannot achieve the objectives of promoting development, reducing poverty, and 
strengthening democracy set out in the SDPRP simply through its own institutions, agencies and 
programme but it must work in close collaboration with other development actors. This represents a 
shift in thinking from previous eras, and a change in the “rules of the game” from one where 
government monopolises the development process to a situation where promoting development 





Central to the CSO-CBP notion of poverty eradication, democratisation and decentralisation is 
the idea of partnership between government and civil society. The CSO-CB aimed at (a) creating 
an enabling atmosphere for organised CSOs, including capacity building (b) forging a 
partnership between government and CSOs, and (c) building the inter-institutional capacities of 
CSOs for enhanced participation in poverty reduction and democratisation processes
27
. The 
outcomes have, of course, been mixed. For example, the regulatory frameworks were liberalised 
and the legal status of CSO/NGO consortia was recognised: bureaucratic hurdles related to 
registration, license renewal and reporting processes both at federal and regional levels were 
relaxed (Cerritelli, Bantirgu and Abagodu, 2008). Accordingly, the programme provided an 
opportunity for building partnerships for working together and to negotiate and build trust. 
However, political space for policy dialogue remained narrow and NGOs were unable to muster 
the strength necessary to debate and negotiate on overarching national policies such as political 
and economic governance. This relationship remains, necessarily confrontational, but marks a 
critical period in the state-CSOs relationship in the post-1991 history of Ethiopia.  
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 See the policy draft from the Ministry of Capacity Building:  Civil Society Organizations’ Capacity Building 




 See Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Ministry of Capacity Building: Civil Society Organisations’ 
Capacity Building Programme (2004: 1).   
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 The Issue of Legitimacy and Representativeness  
The government’s view on priorities, CSOs roles and partnerships with the various NGOs was 
not uniform. The empirical studies reveal two types of partnership. In the one type, NGOs are 
expected to conform to key national policy directions of poverty eradication and programmatic 
frameworks provided by the government, thereby excluding NGOs from negotiating on “key 
national policy issues”. In the other type, the government engages Membership-Based 
Organisations (MBOs) and Civic Organisations (COs) in human rights, civic education, policy 
advocacy, women’s empowerment, voter education, and election monitoring activities. While 
NGOs were required to register to seek legal recognition and enter into operational agreements 
with the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Agency (DPPA), the MBOs and COs had to make 
direct implementation agreements with the government’s Justice Organs, National Election 
Board and other relevant sector offices. The differentiation of the roles was facilitated by the 
very theme of the Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP) 
policy document and the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission (DPPC) 
Proclamation
28
. The policy drove a wedge between the NGO and MBO mandates; in other 
words, between the right to participate in political activities and the freedom to be involved in 
development initiatives. The presumption that these rights should be restricted to citizens was 
adopted in the PASDEP, which describes the involvement of membership-based CSOs in 
political activities in the following manner:  
 
[m]embership-based CSOs have an increasingly important role to play in facilitating interaction, and 
mobilising groups and communities to participate in social, economic and political activities. 
Membership-based CSOs are important actors in helping promote good governance, human rights, 
and the development of democratic institutions as new structures evolve
29
. (PASDEP: 2005:177).  
 
The government came to regard membership-based CSOs as legitimate organisations that 
represent a specific segment of the population; therefore, government was prepared to interact 
with them. However, some argued over whether such rights should be confined to Ethiopian 
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 Proclamation No. 10/1995 (DPPC Establishment Proclamation) set up an independent public office in charge of 
registering and entering into agreements with relief and development oriented NGOs before commencing project 
activities.  For more information see Proclamation No. 10/1995 (DPPC Establishment Proclamation), August 24, 
1995 
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 See Ethiopia: Building on Progress a Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP) 





membership-based associations, or whether they should also be extended to NGOs with a narrow 
constituency. Critics pointed out that the right to political participation is limited to a member of 
the political community as defined by citizenship. International NGOs are not members of the 
political community and most local NGOs had no quantifiable and demonstrable constituencies, 
so they are not legitimate bearers of these rights. Therefore, the rights to political participation 
were limited those CSOs with legitimacy, representation, and accountability.  
  
This view was also widely held among the government officials. For example, a government 
official directly involved in the Forum raised the issue of legitimacy of representation and 
efficiency:  
 
Unlike membership-based organisations, NGOs do not have noticeable memberships and they are not 
elected to represent the interest of any particular section of the community or the different layers of 
the population on behalf of which they advocate. On the efficiency issue…these days some of the 
government departments could deliver services in a more effective way…with small cost. Some NGOs 
have high operating expenses which adversely affect the efficiency of service delivery. (A Staff 
member, Charities and Societies Agency (CSA, October 2011).  
 
This comment reflects the view, long held by most government officials, that the NGOs need to 
be more representative and accountable. It is often felt that NGOs lack legitimacy and are funded 
externally by foreign aid; they are unable to build a domestic constituency, or to raise domestic 
funding for survival and legitimacy. Some of these NGOs are also portrayed as “uncivil” and as 
a “rent-seeker” with an impenetrable boundary interwoven firmly together into an “economy of 
affection” (Fisher, 1991). Membership and functional relationships are based on kinship ties and 
they lack accountability. This has precluded their capacity to articulate, present and interact with 
government on the interests of the community. This issue, with that of partisanship, questions 
their legitimacy and efficiency; this is a hindrance for their involvement in the political dialogue 
with the government. Against this background of their formative stage and changing political 
context, the following subsection will discuss the perspectives of key persons about the impacts 
of the new Proclamation on their peacebuilding undertakings. 
5.2.5. The New Proclamation to Provide for the Regulation and Registration of Charities 
and Societies (PPRRCS) 
 
Five themes are central to this theme: change of mandate; innovative approach to peacebuilding; 
a people-centred approach; terminological and conceptual issues; organisational form- 
112 
 
centralisation of NGO management and, perceived reason for the promulgation of the 
Proclamation.  
 Change of Mandate  
As indicated above (section 3.4: 69-73), the new Proclamation has forced NGOs to redefine their 
raison d'être and mandates, which affects their choice of strategies to translate their goals into 
organisational output. It is worth noting that advocacy and peacebuilding activities account for 
less than ten per cent of the sectorial budget of NGOs. Therefore, the effect of the Proclamation 
was more unfavourable to those local NGOs dealing only with peacebuilding activities such as 
peace education and cross-community projects. Since these organisations had to receive most of 
their funds from foreign sources, the new Proclamation forced them either to shut down or to 
alter their mandates drastically. For instance, a local NGO that relied heavily on foreign funding 
had to change its mandate to a development NGO: 
Under the new law, we couldn’t continue with our core objectives. We had had two alternatives: to 
register as an Ethiopian Charity and raise 90% of our funding domestically and to continue our core 
activities or re-register as an Ethiopian Resident Charity and abandon our goals and change to 
“development activities”. We found out the first option was unrealistic and we had to switch to 
development and register as an Ethiopian Resident Charity. (NGO director, December 2011).  
NGOs are flexible institutions prone to organisational and environmental changes (Bashaw, 
2001). They adapt their values and choice of strategies according to political climate, resources, 
and ideological shifts to achieve their goals (Gidron, Katz and Hasenfeld, 2002). Organisations 
that resist adjustment to the new political climate run the risk of being shut down, but those that 
play according to the new rules are rewarded with incentives needed to achieve their “new role”. 
However, the choice of a new strategy can be criticised for its implied compromise of the NGOs’ 
raison d'être. Yet, the choice of mandates and strategies need to avoid the appearance of 
violating the provisions of the Proclamation. In other words, NGOs had to define their goals and 
strategies in a manner that corresponds to the provisions of the Proclamation. Adapting new 
tactics does not necessarily imply abandoning core activities: it could mean striking a balance 
between playing according to the new rules while keeping the old role. This implies striking the 
balance between peacebuilding and development in innovative ways.  
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 Innovative Approach to Peacebuilding  
The framework of the Proclamation is a set of assumptions which do not always reflect existing 
realities on the ground, particularly in the context of protracted social conflict. However, the 
clash between the Proclamation and realities can either lead NGOs simply to abandon their 
mandate or can help them in designing innovative approaches to pursue their goals. The adoption 
of the Conflict Sensitive Approach (CSA) to development is a case in point:  
We have incorporated CSA into our development intervention and this doesn’t contradict any of the 
provisions in the proclamations. This approach is a scientific method...defined as “a capacity of 
organisations to design, implement and monitor programmes in such a way that they maximise the 
positive effect and minimise negative impacts of their development intervention.” It has more to do 
with designing an appropriate “approach” and less to do with goals. Our goal [international NGOs] 
is not peacebuilding per se but to support grass-roots initiatives that contribute to conflict 
transformation…and the government has always been positive. (NGO director, October 2011).  
Distancing themselves from a confrontational relationship with government, some of the NGOs 
incorporated a “do-no-harm” approach, as found in Anderson (1999), into their development 
programme. In doing so, they abandoned the other clusters of fundamental needs, such as good 
governance, peacebuilding, accountable and responsive political environment that are critical for 
transforming protracted conflicts: 
After the proclamation we employ the Do-No-Harm-Approach. We no longer incorporate conflict 
resolution or good governance related issues into our development projects. If conflict arises, we 
report to the government. We avoid clash of programmes…for example, we involve government and 
local stakeholders. (NGO director, November 2011).  
Some NGOs were critical of this approach and maintained their ‘rights-based” approach to 
development. For example, an NGO director indicated the following reason for upholding their 
mandates:  
When we look at the root cause of conflict it is partly because of lack of development and absence of 
good governance. For us, if there is no peace there won’t be development. Therefore, we haven’t 
changed any of our mandates. (NGO director, November 2011).  
This view resonates with the broader discourse of “no peace without development” and/or “no 
development without peace” (Azar, 1990; Burton, 1990; Bush, 1998).  
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 Terminological and Conceptual Issues 
Some of the informants described the Proclamation as ambiguous and poorly drafted but others 
indicated that it limited their role to that of a relief-development continuum, and subsequently 
created a sharp division between the “rights-based” approach and development; this adversely 
affected the targeted communities. For example, to quote one of the informants:  
…in this country…children are exploited and women are marginalised…it is completely illogical to 
curtail NGOs from operating in rights-based activities. For instance, if an NGO intends to register 
under the name of “Children’s Rights”, it won’t be allowed…but, what are children’s rights? They are 
rights to food, health care, education and protection…who could prohibit you from working on these 
issues? It is just about terminological and conceptual issues. Maybe the confusion emanated from 
government’s attempt to align the proclamation with the international standard so that others would 
understand it. (NGO director, October 2011). 
However, the above quote might be construed as an unequivocal breach of the law or as 
manipulating legal ambiguity to erode the legitimacy of the state, thereby leading to a conflictual 
relationship with the state. This issue has also an adverse impact on the government’s 
decentralisation policy. For example, one of the informants stated:  
We are no longer operating on any rights-based activities like women’s rights, 
peacebuilding…however, the local government has continued to invite us to contribute to these areas 
because…there are enormous capacity building gaps that haven’t been fully covered by NGOs within 
the government structures. (NGO director, October 2011).  
Another interviewee considers a “rights-based” approach as a critical approach to conflict 
transformation in the context of protracted social conflicts: 
We are working in a very delicate environment…any development intervention which does not 
embrace a rights-based approach is not a development intervention at all. If NGOs cannot work on 
these areas, their development programme is not “developmental”. (NGO programme manager, 
November 2011).  
However, not all NGOs agreed that the new Proclamation had negative impacts on their 
approaches to peacebuilding:  
The law doesn’t prohibit them from integrating conflict sensitive approaches into 
development…conflict is a reality…we always encounter cattle rustling, theft, dismantling our 
development infrastructures...we cannot turn blind eye on it, keep silent? We are still working…other 




The other concern is the ”narrow understanding” of conflict resolution in the Proclamation that 
led most NGOs to turn away from peacebuilding activities. It is an understanding which equated 
conflict resolution with only its political dimension. As a result, the same NGOs that recognised 
the relationship between community development and peacebuilding undermined their own 
raison d'être:  
NGOs are concerned only about their goals, but not about “how to solve them”. For example, most of 
the NGOs design projects to secure funds, implement them rapidly to meet a deadline…their structural 
capacity, staff performance and effectiveness are measured in terms of burning rate [rate of expense]. 
If you look at their projects, you do not see any conflict impact assessment…this happened because 
there were knowledge gaps, no tradition of such method and this approach is a recent phenomenon. 
Thus, what we can say is they have never had a conflict sensitive approach to development before or 
after the proclamation. (NGO programme manager, November 2011). 
This highly restricted interpretation of the Proclamation forced NGOs to abandon work in the 
field of peacebuilding. For this reason, the assumption that conflict resolution equals CSA or the 
do-no-harm approach, which was widely held in most NGOs in the two regions, is likely to 
undermine development outcomes. Only a proper understanding of the provision in the article 
that incorporates its conflict dynamics alongside its political moment can check this tendency. 
 Organisational Form- Centralisation of NGO Management 
The Proclamation also affected the NGOs’ organisational structure as well as the resources 
required to sustain NGOs and help them achieve their goals. One informant states that:  
[w]e used to have branch offices at Yabello, Arero and Guji Woradas. However, after the 
proclamation, which allocates 70% of the budget to direct development and 30% to administrative 
costs, we have to centralise our management at Yabello. This has created some pressure …as we have 
to stretch out to remote geographical areas. For example, our staff frequently have to travel to our 
project areas rather than being stationed there for long (NGO director, November 2011).  
 Perceived Reason for the Promulgation of the Proclamation  
The Proclamation could manifest the state’s attitudes towards any CSOs that intend to challenge 
its legitimacy. However, there is consensus that the relationship between the state and NGOs has 
historically been adversarial. The following quote from one of the respondents summarises the 
nature of that relationship: 
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I should say it [the proclamation] was a cumulative effect of many factors. There had been 
unnecessary conflicts with government. Thus, the government had some grounds to curtail NGOs’ 
operation because some of them transgressed their mandates. Many NGOs had been banned even 
before the election and some NGOs were involved in pre-election and post-election politics, too. It was 
just what you call; it was the last straw that broke the camel’s back (NGO director, December 
2011).   
Whilst an adversarial relationship between NGOs and government was given as a reason in the 
statement above, other viewpoints seem to emphasise the specific issue of elites struggling for 
political power as being the real reason why both parties were reluctant to engage in constructive 
dialogue on the Proclamation:      
If I could sum it up [the negotiation] in a single word it had been TENSE. In my opinion, there were 
competitions from both sides…and both stubbornly defend their positions and claim their views were 
right. There was less willingness on both sides to work together and compromise. This has something 
to do with our tradition and culture of political leadership [laugh]. There should be some kind of 
change from both sides for compromise. (NGO director, December 2011).   
Thus, it seems as if an exclusive political system, elite factionalism and reluctance to negotiate 
and compromise all militated against drafting a working proclamation. However, some 
respondents felt that these elites can arrive at new rules of political interaction through 
negotiation, and accommodation. This was explained as follows:   
We shouldn’t rule out such eventualities…it [the proclamation] was an immediate overreaction to the 
unfolding political events that threatened their power base. Once the dust is settled down…I hope they 
will open up the ‘lid’ for CSOs and seek for a new regulatory mechanism. You can’t close and control 
every movement at a time. It is better to open the space (for the NGOs) and control the other (focus on 
other movements) (NGO director, December 2011).   
One might be tempted to predict that government would initiate reform of the law.  Instead, an 
earlier analysis (Section 5.2.1: 98-101) found that reforms in Ethiopia seem to be occurring 
because of pressure from below and externally. The initiative to undertake political reform was 
driven by donor pressure and opposition protesters in numerous cases.  
Some see the Proclamation as a mechanism of counteracting opposition NGOs. That means the 
law can be deployed selectively against political opponents. One of the statements that reinforce 
this view was made by a federal government official to reassure that the law will not affect the 
ongoing developmental activities of most NGOs. Rather it is meant: 
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To put a traffic light or a sign post for some serious abuses and deviances and ….to take 
administrative measures against foreign NGOs, who under the disguise of NGOs propagate terrorism 
and collaborate with extremists. (A Staff member, Charities and Societies Agency, December 
2011).  
This gives the impression that the new law is there to coerce rather than enforce. Some 
respondents doubt the structural capacities of the government to enforce the law. The core issue 
in the Proclamation was not limiting NGOs from operating in conflict resolution areas, but to 
curtail the claim of other NGOs to a right to participate in the political system and aggravate the 
environment in which they operate. Its effect was simultaneously to contain social movements 
and to sever their links with political movements.  
5.2.6 Conclusion  
 
The previous sub-sections outlined how various internal and external pressures paved the way 
for the proliferation of the NGOs sector and how these forces shaped the relationships between 
the state, the NGOs and the donors; the sub-sections also examined the implications for 
democratisation, service delivery, and decentralisation. It is worth noting that the actors and their 
objectives are enormously diverse and complex; each actor has differing interests, viewpoints 
and goals. It is also clear from the previous themes that NGOs have made a contribution, though 
insignificant in comparison to other actors, towards the democratisation and decentralisation 
processes. What has been less obvious is whether these NGOs were able to act as a 
counterbalance to the state’s monopoly of the political space or whether they strengthened the 
capacities of grass-roots organisations to influence the state actions.  
 
It also appears that the level of involvement of the NGOs in pre-election and post-election crises 
was unacceptable to the government and culminated in a breaking point in its relationships with 
NGOs. To suggest that the banning would immediately result in conflict would be to offer undue 
recognition of the NGOs’ contributions. However, the long-term impact remains to be seen as it 
is too early to identify the adverse effects of the Proclamation on peacebuilding.
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5.3. Theme B: Change from ‘Relief and Rehabilitation’ to Development  
This sub-section introduces the respondents’ perceptions of the general context that led to the 
formation of the various NGOs. It also examines the reasons that influenced these organisations 
to include peacebuilding and conflict resolution activities in each region.  
5.3.1 Relief and Rehabilitation to Long-term Development  
While a handful of the NGOs in the sample were established in the early 1980s and a few 
emerged in the early 1990s during periods of recurrent drought, most were founded in the late 
1990s in each region. Data from the field suggest that most of these NGOs were established in 
order to overcome various aspects of the 1984/1985 drought-induced famine as well as to 
contribute to relief and rehabilitation works and to assist government’s poverty reduction 
strategies. None of the NGOs investigated was established exclusively for the purpose of 
peacebuilding and conflict resolution. After these formative years, most of them are oriented 
toward protection and diversification of livelihoods, and natural resource management, to 
enhance the resilience of the pastoralist communities, thereby reducing their vulnerability to 
drought related shocks. An NGO director described the formative years in the following manner:  
We (the NGO) came to Borana to contribute to the alleviation of drought-induced famine. We 
continued to build on the achievements of the Freedom from Hunger Campaign, a programme 
operated by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO). In these marginalised and 
drought-prone areas...poverty has been prevalent and the pastoralists’ coping mechanisms have been 
unable to deal with the effects of cyclical droughts. As a result, we had to change our mandate from 
relief and rehabilitation to (becoming a) development organisation. Since then, this organisation has 
been working to improve the livelihoods of the pastoralists and enhance their capacity to resist the 
recurrent drought. (Director, AFD, October 2011).   
Another factor that contributed to the proliferation of the NGO sector in the area was the 
government’s decentralisation policy.   
5.3.2 Decentralisation Policy  
Following the promulgation of the Multinational Federalism of 1995 which institutionalised 
ethnicity as an organising principle, the state initiated ambitious decentralisation projects. 
Shifting power from the centre to the peripheries and empowering the local communities are 
seen as part of the democratisation processes (Feyissa, 2003). Moreover, the state’s inability to 
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deliver services and resources effectively to the peripheral pastoralist areas, as well as the 
increasing awareness of the role played by institutions at the local level, have compelled the state 
to enter into partnership with NGOs (Watson, 2001). This partnership implies the opportunities 
for innovations, involving the local community in planning, decision-making, implementation, 
and management and development projects. While the innovative approaches and their effects 
differ between these NGOs, of more importance are the common elements in their mandates and 
strategies, which correspond to the Government’s poverty reduction strategy “Plan for 
Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty” (PASDEP) of 2004. One of these 
partnerships includes working with NGOs on natural resource management: 
The area (Borana) is predominately semi-arid grazing; with limited natural forest often vulnerable to 
erratic rainfall, recurrent drought, environmental challenges and changes ... [N]atural resource 
degradation has been a major challenge for grazing livestock. These fragile forests are subject to an 
increased use that led to conflicting claims and counter claims over the use of the resource... [(this)] 
often resulted in violent conflicts. In order to address the forest loss situation...our organisation was 
asked to join Oromia Region, Department of Agriculture, and Forestry Department in the search for 
new forest management systems. As a result, we established the Collaborative Forest Management 
Project...towards the end of 1999. (Director, SOS Sahel, October 2011).   
Another factor that played a key role in the proliferation of NGOs is the political opportunities 
that arose, especially after the change of the government in 1991. A director who was involved in 
the formation of an NGO reported how the NGO sector has been expanding as a result of the 
prevailing political opportunities under the current government: 
This NGO was initiated and established by local scholars who had left for tertiary education in the 
1960s and 1970s. After the change of regime in 1991, they decided to come back and establish local 
NGOs that would serve the community. They found out that there were no indigenous organisations 
that work for the welfare of the local community in the area and they reached out to the Abba Gadas 
and local communities to address some of the social issues of the Borana community. (Director, 
GPDI, October 2011).   
The devolution of power from the centre to the peripheries meant, first, that organs of local 
government and communities came to occupy much of the public space; second, there was a shift 
of human resources and expertise away from the central government into local government and 
the NGOs, as discussed broadly at the beginning of the previous theme (Section 5.2.1: 98-101) 
and section 5.2.2: 101-105). Moreover, the political opportunity provided incentives for 
individuals to form and use the NGO sector as an alternative mechanism to counterbalance long-
standing political and economic marginalisation of the peripheries. It also meant that individuals 
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could use the NGOs for citizen activism and for advancing development and democracy to exert 
political leverage in policy formulation.  
5.3.3 Incorporating Peacebuilding Components into Development Projects 
In discussing the incorporation of peacebuilding components into development projects, 
informants often cited a general increase in the intensity of violence, the destruction of their 
development infrastructures and requests or even pressure on the part of government and donors 
as the main impetus for action. Accordingly, some of the NGOs selected for the study regarded 
peacebuilding and conflict resolution activities as only small parts of their work, rather than as 
their central focus.  
When asked the reasons that influenced the organisation to include peacebuilding and conflict 
resolution activities, one of the informants reported:  
We have been serving 4,142 households of fifteen Kebeles; twelve from Taltalle and three from 
Yabello Worada. We had to include peacebuilding and post-conflict rehabilitation indirectly after 
ethnic conflicts in our operational areas between Guji and Borana, Borana and Gabra in Surupha 
Kebele of Yabello Worada and between the Konso and Borana ethnic groups Harawayu of Taltalle 
Worada. Thousands of people were displaced, many lost their lives, their houses burned, causing 
destruction of development infrastructures built over a decade. Due to these conflicts we lost 
infrastructure we built for the last two decades like schools, health centres, water holes...all 
dismantled. Therefore, we had to consider conflict issues in our development projects. (Project 
Oficer, Goal Ethiopia, October 2011).   
NGOs started to incorporate peacebuilding components into their development projects after the 
conflict. The Research Center for Civic and Human Rights Education (RCCHE), Gambella 
Branch Office, indicated the following in its “Report on the Proceedings of the Annual Peace 
Conference” dated September 24, 2006:  
RCCHE has worked tirelessly for the promotion of human rights and democracy in Ethiopia. 
Similarly, under the inspiration of human dignity and human rights fortification, the Center has 
undertaken conflict management and peacebuilding activities in various regions including the 
remotest corners of the country…[R]CCHE has implemented peacebuilding activities in the violence 
stricken Gambella region of Western Ethiopia since the outbreak of Anuak/Nuer clashes of year 
2002/3. In response to the incidents of human atrocities, RCCHE has conducted research on the 
underlying causes of inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic conflict in the region, organized trauma healing 
workshops, peace conferences, and inter-faith dialogues. (RCCHE, 2006:1). 
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An NGO director described the rationale for, and the process of, integrating conflict resolution 
work into their mandates in the following manner: 
Sustainable development is possible when there is peaceful utilisation of natural resources. We started 
to involve local government and the community in development, planning and implementation for 
conflict resolution. We had to include peacebuilding. [W]e set up different forums including 
identifying the root cause of conflict and conflict resolution. We were playing a facilitating role... 
feuding parties, government and (others) sat together in search of resolution to the conflict. We also 
involved indiscernible actors that fuel or trigger conflict; for example youth and women. When conflict 
broke out they played a significant role in exacerbating the conflict. (Program Coodinator, Care 
Ethiopia, December 2011).   
Furthermore, other organisations, such as the Ethiopian Evangelical Church Mekane Yesus 
(EECMY) and Hilfswerk der Evangelischen Kirchen Schweiz (HEKS) offered a religious 
rationale for the need to advance peacebuilding (See section 5.6.5:159-163). 
An appeal by regional government was another reason put forward for including peacebuilding 
activities into the development programme: 
On December 13, 2003, Gambella town experienced some of the worst violence that ever occurred in 
the region. Many villages on both sides were burnt down, hundreds of people were displaced, and 
many lost their lives. Many were still living in makeshift houses or hosted by their relatives. The 
regional government has appealed to NGOs and other donor organisations to participate in the 
rehabilitation of the returnees and support a larger scale of repatriation. The regional government 
proposed what it calls “face-to-face community dialogue” between Gambella people…we facilitated 
numerous peacebuilding conferences, and training sessions. (Director, Pact Ethiopia, December 
2011).   
Another factor that influenced the NGOs to incorporate peacebuilding components into their 
development programme was the flow of funding coming from international donors and NGOs:  
Our donors were wary about the increased intensity of conflict and its impact on our development 
outcome …they approached us to work on peacebuilding. We welcomed the idea. We carried out a 
needs assessment, and the assessment confirmed the need to work in peacebuilding along with our 
development programmes. We developed a proposal and secured funds from a donor. We launched 
joint peacebuilding projects with other local NGOs, youth and government organisations and the 
outcome has been very encouraging. (Project Officer, ACORD, October, 2011). 
Virtually every NGO relied heavily on funding from international NGOs and foreign 
governments. Whilst flow funding coming from donors was given as a reason in the previous 
statement, some respondents felt that NGOs were pressured to emulate donors’ structural and 
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functional goals, and were increasingly being used as implementing and executing agents by 
donors:   
Donors tend to relate food insecurity to conflict, and absence of cross-community trade to cross-
border insecurity. USAID, for example, was concerned about conflict and encouraged other 
organisations to incorporate peacebuilding. Some other donors included conflict analyses as 
prerequisites for funding an NGO’s development projects. Therefore, the NGOs were forced to include 
peacebuilding components into their development project proposals. (Project Officer, Mercy Corps, 
October 2011). 
The heavy reliance of local NGOs on foreign funding appeared to have lured these NGOs into 
implementing and executing roles prescribed by generous donors. However, the “positives” were 
seen to outweigh the “negatives” in the collaborative relationship between donors and NGOs 
aimed at filling the gap created by the weakened state. For example, donors shaped the 
peacebuilding projects, and local NGOs are increasingly called upon to play a prime role in 
initiating, facilitating and mediating those peacebuilding activities. The relationship can also be 
complementary if and when both parties agree upon a proper separation of responsibilities and 
duties in order to achieve a balanced cooperation without infringing the autonomy of either 
party. For instance, the local NGOs are seen to represent the proactive side of the intervention 
and the external agents its passive side. Furthermore, the funding arrangements for NGOs take 
into account the implications of their development programmes on the local conflict; as a result, 
many NGOs operating in conflict-prone areas incorporated “do-no-harm” approaches or conflict 
sensitive approaches.  
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                                                     Figure 5. Summary of findings (Theme B)                   
 
5.3.4 Conclusion  
The previous sub-section of this report sketched some of the dominant features outlined by the 
respondents about the context that brought about the formation of the NGOs; it included the 
reasons that influenced those organisations to include peacebuilding and conflict resolution 
activities in each region. In discussion of organisational formation, informants often cited the 
1984/85 famine or recurrent drought, change in regime and the policy of decentralisation as the 
main causes for their formation. Other events that played a key role in incorporating 
peacebuilding activities were government and donor intervention. The donors’ funding 
arrangements have reformed the way in which NGOs design and plan development projects, and 
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have impacted on the NGOs’ relationships with the donors. The impact on the NGOs’ 
development approach will be discussed in the following sub-sections.      
5.4 Theme C: A Typology of Peacebuilding Approaches  
The NGOs across the sample had a tendency to use an eclectic mix of approaches ranging from 
the “comprehensive” approach to the “rights-based” approach and from the “do-no-harm” 
approach to the “indigenous empowerment” approach. Not only were the NGOs in the two 
regions likely to use a mix of approaches, but similar approaches were known and available to 
those NGOs, providing evidence of increasing inter-organisational and functional relationships. 
In the study, the NGOs selected activities that were either explicitly or implicitly informed by 
theories of peacebuilding and conflict resolution. Therefore, the study used those theories to 
understand how the NGOs made such choices. On the basis of these theoretical backgrounds, 
NGOs have adopted the following approaches to dealing with conflict. These are: comprehensive 
approach; rights-based approach; do-no-harm approach, and indigenous empowerment approach.  
5.4.1 Comprehensive Approach 
The comprehensive approach is the most prominent one adopted by the NGOs. This approach is 
closely linked to the larger theme of “no peace without development” and/or “no development 
without peace” (Azar, 1990; Burton, 1990; Bush, 2005). 
When asked about the link between conflict resolution and/or peacebuilding and the 
comprehensive approach, an NGO representative interviewed in Yabello indicated that: 
It includes meeting basic needs…protecting and improving their livelihood, building their capacities 
for sustainable development and increasing awareness about HIV/AIDS. Of course we cannot solve all 
of them at a time but must be integrated and be process-oriented…we integrated conflict 
resolution…and peacebuilding is not one-time project...it is a process that must be pursued in time 
of peace and conflict so that it would bring about sustainable peace in the long-run. It also involves 
working on the “culture of war”, for example, changing heroic killings. Such kinds of change cannot 
be achieved overnight. Peacebuilding is, therefore, changing the attitude and perception (Conflict 
Prevention and Resolution Program Officer, Mercy Corps, December 2011). 
The approach clearly shows the high premium that the NGOs place on Galtung’s (1975) notion 
of positive peace which entails the structural transformation of situations in which the 
communities find themselves (Bercovitch and Kadayifci, 2002). It also shows how the approach 
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is geared to a process-oriented, integrated approach. Both Azar (1990) and Burton (1990) 
contend that meeting “human needs” must be prioritised when attempting to resolve conflict in 
war-torn societies. In his attempts to combine the “human needs” and to address conflict, 
Lederach (1997) also presents the comprehensive approach, which is attentive both to short-term 
and long-term resolution processes.  
From the field research, there are instances of convergence between satisfying “human needs” 
and peacebuilding approaches. When asked how community development could contribute to 
peacebuilding: 
We have a project called Strengthening Institutions for Peace and Development. In this programme, 
for example, we see the drivers of conflict as both economic and institutional problems. We encourage 
women and youth to organise themselves for initiating small business, including macro-finance. This 
would create an environment for communication among the feuding parties… [T]the problems of the 
pastoralist community are usually water, bush encroachment and range land shrinkages. We also 
introduced cash-for work to reduce drought-and-war shock related problems. This was designed to 
give a kick-start for asset building and restocking for reconstruction. Our project is integrated but 
given the intensity and magnitude of the problem, our contributions to alleviating the whole dynamics 
of the existing problem is very minimal. (Filed Coordinator, Mercy Corps, November 2011).  
While pastoral areas have long been marginalised by successive regimes in the provision of basic 
services, recurrent conflicts dismantled infrastructures and caused destruction of property and 
life, and people’s capacity to respond to recurrent drought. Thus the satisfaction of “human 
needs” was seen as part of peacebuilding activity. Critical of this approach, most of these NGOs 
employed a “rights-based” approach as a viable intervention approach in favour of “satisfying 
human needs” when working in these conflict-prone areas. 
5.4.3 Rights-based Approach 
The second approach, the rights-based approach, is closely linked to Galtung’s (1981) notion of 
“positive peace” that involves removing structural contradictions and injustices through 
individual and group empowerment, to claim their respective rights. The solution, from these 
NGOs’ point of view, is, besides reducing the level of underdevelopment, to address the other 
clusters of fundamental needs; these include good governance, accountable and responsive 
government and are perceived as prerequisites for resolving protracted conflicts. Those NGO 
representatives who were interviewed felt that:  
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Our assessment shows that lack of good governance, political and economic marginalisation of 
minorities is partly responsible for poverty-induced conflict. Resolution of these conditions requires a 
rights-based approach to development, one that can ensure diverse and representative community 
engagement in leading changes that will empower and thus strengthen the community and …enable 
them to demand these rights from those in power. A detailed understanding the underlying causes of 
poverty and conflict in these societies is an impetus for designing and implementing a rights-based 
approach. A rights-based approach could raise the awareness of the marginalised communities with 
regard to their rights and processes through lobbying and making the government accountable.  (Pact 
Ethiopia, Director, October 2011).  
Similarly, other NGO representatives interviewed in Gambella pointed out that:  
Through our work, we learned that there were limitations to the traditional approach to addressing 
development and exclusion issues.  Focussing solely on service delivery meant that the project was 
only addressing the symptoms of the community’s problems, and creating a culture of dependence 
within the beneficiaries. It was important to identify the root causes of the problem and to engage the 
community in identifying both the causes and the solutions to their problems. This approach promotes 
dialogue between different groups of the community and creates a sense of ownership over the project 
by the community. As a result, our programmes and partners in Ethiopia are currently working on the 
basis of our new Country Strategy for Ethiopia in line with ACORD’s new global strategy which 
recognises that significant improvement in the lives of marginal communities cannot be achieved 
without confronting the institutions and policies that perpetuate structural injustice and result in 
social exclusion and marginalisation. (ACORD, Project Manager, December 2011) 
This view roughly coincides with Sen’s (1999) distinction between instrumental and substantive 
human freedoms; most conflict resolution efforts focus on addressing the first of these freedoms 
while tending to remain silent on the second. 
 
As indicated previously (Section 5.2.3: 104-108), there has been a shift in donor emphasis, away 
from a purely service delivery approach towards a rights-based approach. Thus, donor funding 
arrangements have influenced the objectives of many NGOs, sometimes compelling them to go 
beyond their original purpose and aims. Below, a representative of an NGO indicated how NGOs 
integrate the rights-based approach in all development activities:  
 
… At the time, donors stressed the need for developments in good governance, gender equality, and 
conflict resolution and citizen participation. There were debates that economic development cannot be 
detached from governance issues. They argued there is enormous “added value” in adopting such 
[an] approach…NGOs were trained in basic features and principles, and roles on how to monitor and 
evaluate a project using a rights-based approach. (NGO programme co-ordinator, November 
2011) 
 
Donors normally prefer to grant development proposals with orientation towards rights-based 
approaches…they don’t see significant added value in NGO projects for infrastructure development 




A rights-based approach has become an implicit criterion for funding. A number of informants 
within the NGO sectors also described that donors were disenchanted with the traditional 
service-delivery approach. This is a clear example of NGOs undergoing change as a result of the 
pressure being placed on them by the funders. However, donors were not alone in redefining the 
scope of community development. Government’s poverty eradication policy has also played a 
significant role in influencing the NGOs’ mandates.   
5.4.4 “Do-no-harm” Approach 
Reminiscent of the contemporary conflict resolution approaches as found, say, in Anderson’s 
(1999) “do-no-harm” development principle, most of these NGOs incorporated “do-no-harm” 
approaches in their development programmes. The assumption is grounded on the argument that 
NGOs’ development interventions in the context of protracted social conflict may cause or 
aggravate violent conflict either by undermining long-lasting values or by raising the stakes of 
economic competition (Bush, 1998; Schmelzle, 2006). One NGO respondent emphasised that:  
We lobby government and our partners to follow a do-no-harm development approach. It means that 
before initiating any development programmes in conflict-prone areas they have to understand the 
local conflict dynamics and the implications of their development programmes on the local conflict. 
Failure to pursue this approach or misunderstanding the local context...or development programmes 
uninformed by local conflict dynamics could cause or exacerbate conflict. (Conflict Prevention and 
Resolution Program Officer, Mercy Corps, October 2011) 
There is some empirical evidence to substantiate this fear. There are numerous instances of NGO 
development interventions exacerbating or creating conflict. For example, according to one of 
the NGO representatives, the conflict between the Gari clan of Somali and Boran was due to 
government’s failure to adopt the “do-no-harm” approach to its water drilling project on the 
Somali-Oromia borders where there was no clear boundary demarcation. According to this 
account:  
[t]he Borana pastoralist had to travel a long distance in search for water and pasture (since the water 
and pasture are located at different places). To resolve this problem, the government of Oromia 
decided to drill for water around the pasture area. However, the area was inhabited by the Gabra, 
Boran and Gari Somali and they share resources too. The government carried out a series of meetings 
to create a common understanding over common access and ownership rights to the water point 
among the three communities. The government started drilling based on the assumption that none of 
these groups would ever claim exclusive use rights over the water. The Somali perceived that it was an 
attempt by the Oromia government to claim and legitimise the land rather than just providing water. 
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They objected to the drilling....and the Boran[a] were furious and they said “how can we not run a 
development programme in our region.” Finally, it resulted in conflict causing the death of many 
people and destruction of properties and dislocation of thousands of people. This does not mean the 
development programme (water) was unnecessary but our development intervention has to take into 
account the local dynamics and contexts. A government-sanctioned series of meetings was not enough 
to create consensus and avoid conflict. But conflict analysis should have been carried out; elders, 
youth, and all stakeholders should have been involved. If this was impossible, it would have been 
better to suspend the programme. Moreover, they had been sharing resources long before the project 
and they (communities) could have survived without the state-sponsored water. One cannot say this is 
the only prescription (water drilling), if you don’t take it you would die. (Programme Coordinator, 
Care Ethiopia, October 2011). 
In these areas, most of the NGOs sought to move away from a “top-down” approach to 
development that could also lead to further conflict for indigenous empowerment for conflict 
transformation. 
5.4.5 Indigenous Empowerment 
The major challenge confronting the various approaches of the NGOs, according to authors of 
recent studies of the conflict resolution work of NGOs, is to overcome their strong preference for 
the risk-aversive approach to conflict resolution (see Lederach, 2005). In preferring an 
“indigenous empowerment” approach, some NGOs argue that the notion of “do-no-harm” is too 
narrow to address the intractable nature of conflict and include the reinvigorated indigenous 
capabilities that could be used for empowerment. Distancing themselves from the attempt to 
have a “top down/trickle down” approach, many of these NGOs have already announced the 
sublimation of indigenous conflict resolution strategies and any other cultural resources that 
promote development and peacebuilding (see, for example, section 5.6: 149-163 of this chapter). 
They designed people-centred approaches and concentrated on building indigenous institutions’ 
capacity to support a “bottom-up” approach. One of the respondents reported that:  
These communities have a complex indigenous socio-political system that governs its interactions and 
its relationships. In most parts of the region, this institution has been weakened; however, the system 
is relatively intact in the Borana area. The Borana people have trust in this institution. Its decisions 
are more respected than the local government’s decisions. We cannot ignore this institution when we 
launch any development programme if we really intend to see its sustainability. (Project Manager, 





Similar sentiments were expressed by another informant:  
We do not work on peacebuilding and development directly but our goal is to build local 
capacities…support community initiatives... for empowerment, to contribute to sustainable 
development and peace.  (Field Coordinator, GPDI, October 2011). 
This approach, they argue, recognises the ability of people and institutions to make a difference 
and to challenge the socio-psychological and structural causes of conflict. This approach has 
continued to reverberate in most NGOs’ goals and public policies (see, for example, Watson, 
2003; Bassi and Tache, 2011). 
5.4.6 Conclusion  
It should be noted that while these NGOs do not see any particular approach as particularly 
suitable for conflict resolution as such, they are united in their common ground, which attempts 
to empower those transformative agents whose struggles take up this stance. Common to all 
these NGOs is that they seek to reinvigorate indigenous social institutions and to increase 
indigenous peoples’ participation in and management of the natural resources of grazing land, 
forest and water and construct sustainable livelihoods and developments. All of these NGOs 
speak of revitalising local institutions and empowering the local community to take its 
development into its own hands. Each NGO also speaks of indigenous institutions’ potentials for 
initiating development projects and conducting conflict resolution. Each NGO also underscores 
the importance of forging partnerships with Government. While the detail and effect of the 
relationships between local government and NGOs may vary, complementary relationship 
benefits have accrued to the NGOs as well as to local government if both are willing to make the 







 5.5. Theme D: Indigenous Conflict Resolution Mechanisms   
 
This sub-section introduces the respondents’ perceptions of the customary and state mechanisms 
for conflict resolution and their perceptions of partnerships between NGOs, the state and the 
indigenous institutions.  
5.5.1 Customary and State mechanisms for conflict resolution 
 
Respondents focused on the following: the resilience of indigenous institutions in conflict 
resolution; indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms and their emphasis on social harmony; 
customary institutions and their responsiveness and accessibilty; and, the extent to which 
customary conflict resolution mechanisms are seen as participatory and restorative and as 
supplementary to the state judiciary. 
  The Resilience of Indigenous Conflict Resolution Mechanism  
 
Outsiders perceive that any conflict in the peripheries is first and foremost the result of failure of 
the indigenous institutions to uphold legitimacy and to sustain stability (Scott Villiers et al., 
2011). It is the manifestation of old patterns of primitive competition with disputes frequently 
resolved through violent conflicts, rather than through institutional arrangements or otherwise. In 
other words, the perception is that customary institutions have failed to resolve disputes and 
maintain order. This view was vigorously challenged by one of the informants:  
 
Gadaa system is a very broad system including cultural, social, political...it is like a full-fledged 
governance system. Its institution governs and manages natural resources such as water and pasture. 
These are just small portions of the entire system. What has been weakened or has ceased is its 
political wing that enables it to mobilise and wage military expeditions into its rival groups. But its 
cultural and social practices have continued to govern and dictate social relations, and to resolve 
disputes relating to natural resources on many occasions. (Director, GPDI, October, 2011).   
 
Indigenous institutions, despite constant attempts to co-opt them into the state institutions, made 
by successive regimes, continued to exercise influence in both conflict resolution and natural 
resource management.  
 Indigenous Conflict Resolution Mechanisms and Social Harmony  
 
Like any social system that purports to maintain its equilibrium, the Nagaa Borana sees conflict 
as a result of breakdown in peace-maintaining institutions and practices (Bassi, 2010; Scott 
132 
 
Villiers et al., 2011). Yet, like any social system, customary institutions are riddled with internal 
and external disputes and resulting shifts in focus and emphasis. According to a member of a 
focus group discussion the prospect of violence is continuously present, forcing customary laws 
to be more accommodative:  
 
There are always disputes over access to natural resources; cattle rustling, theft and reciprocal 
killings…but these disputes have their own rules and practices which must be dealt with and defused 
in order to maintain peace and harmony…these require the collective attention and action of every 
member of the community. There are new types of conflict cases…we have to deal with them…like 
conflict related to Kallo (private enclosure). The notion of [conflict] a Kallo is a recent one…has been 
increasing because it has become a coping mechanism from recurrent drought. The most important 
thing is to ensure the Nagaa Borana and to continue diffuse these conflicts on timely basis effort. 
(FGD, Korree Nagaa member, Surupha, November 2011).   
 
Community peace elders indicated that they have strong institutions in place that could deal 
effectively with conflicts that threatens social harmony:  
 
We resolve issues of conflict at various levels. In our tradition, we have an institution that responds to 
such kinds of challenge. Clan elders at two levels; Qae Millo (lineage level court) and Qea goossa 
(clan level court) usually settle dispute cases...with the exception of a few, most cases are not taken 
beyond Qea goossa. (FGD, Korree Nagaa member, Surupha, November 2011).  
 
Similarly, another focus group discussion member from Gambella indicated how traditional 
conflict resolution mechanisms play a crucial role in upholding law and order:  
 
There are conflicts over agricultural land, fishing, hunting, even among the neighbouring villages. 
Such kinds of conflict are usually resolved before reaching the Kwaroo (village headman) in order to 
contain its spilling over to other villages. Inter-village conflicts are usually resolved Nyieya (Anywaa 
nobel). (FGD member, Gambella, October 2011). 
 
Unlike the Anywaa, the Nuer settle disputes through ad-hoc assemblages of negotiators from 
conflicting parties: 
  
In Nuer, disputes are normally settled through negotiations between groups of leaders drawn from the 
disputing parties called tut wec or gaat tuot “sons of bulls”, and also included a kuaar (priest). There 
is no king Nyieya of Anywaa or Kwaroo, this ad hoc group is responsible for resolving disputes. 
(FGD member, Gambella, November 2011) 
 
To ensure social harmony in the face of growing disorder and insecurity, these institutions 
invoke the authority of Waq in Borana, the divine God, as a divinely guaranteed order to 




In our tradition... all the conflict resolution cases always begin and end with a prayer...[T]he qallu 
and senior elder invoke Waq, the divine God, to bless the gathering and lead the elders to make just 
rulings. …fine is handed down to the wrongdoer, but we usually encourage forgiveness from the victim 
and genuine remorse from the offender, as that is what will create genuine peace of the society and 
maintain the Nagaa Borana. (Koree Nagaa member, Surupha, November 2011). 
 
Another member of a focus group discussion, from Gambella, offered a similar account of the 
Anywaa tradition:  
 
The dispute resolution cases end with a bull slaughtering ceremony, with blessings from the senior 
elder Nyieya or Kwaaro. Both families of the offender and victim rise up in front of the elders’ council 
of the Nyieya or Kwaaro and stick a cow or a bull with the spears. Then they fold up the tip of the 
spears as symbol of “no-place for revenge” and guaranteeing peace. Finally, they slaughter a cow or 
a bull. Then they split its body into two from its head to tail and share equally. (FGD member, 
Gambella, October 2011).  
 
There are elements of divine justification to preserve and maintain social harmony and resolve 
disputes immediately. These play a pivotal role in resolving disputes harmoniously and jointly as 
a community. A member of FGD explained: 
 
The [conflict resolution] ceremonies not only create a feeling of assurance and reconciliation but also 
increase trust and avoid a curse (biit) by ancestral souls. Murder-related conflict is very sensitive 
among the Nuer and its settlement is traditionally sanctioned by a ritual, the sacrificing of an ox which 
symbolizes a covenant (ngot). The offender should honor the ngot to avoid nueer (sin) which could 
result in bitt. (FGD member, Gambella, October 2011). 
 
The very notion of the Nuer’s justice process is founded on a code of reciprocal obligation and a 
divinely sanctioned moral authority, where moral and social obligations often intertwine 
(Johnson, 1986). Besides moral and social obligations, there is an impetus to resolve disputes:  
 
It is better to resolve the disputes as soon as possible and repair the damage because we do business, 
share water and pasture…hence there is need to maintain a relationship even after very serious 
conflicts. We need to have access to those resources, trade and travel to the other side. Of course, it 
affects the whole clan lineage of the wrongdoer as they have to live with the guilt of the offender; 
therefore it affected the whole clan lineage. It is the responsibility of every clan to follow up the true 
remorsefulness of offender and see that the offender does not get back to the crime again. (Koree 
Nagaa member, Surupha, November 2011). 
 
Thus it would appear that maintaining cross-cutting ethnic ties is prioritised in order to maintain 
age-old ethnic relations that link individuals and communities to cross-border trade and access to 




When asked the reason why the entire clan shares the burden of an individual’s shame, a member 
of a FGD responded:   
 
An individual conflict over fishing rights or injury inflicted on an individual during hunting is 
considered as the injury to the entire village. (FGD member, Gambella, October 2011). 
 
When asked if it was reasonable for a person to be held responsible for a crime committed by 
another clan member, a focus group member replied:   
 
The wrongdoer’s clan has to endure the penalty since they should have warned the offender and 
stopped him from committing the offense. (Koree Nagaa member, Surupha, November 2011). 
 
According to a FGD member, frequent violations can cause the perpetrator to be segregated from 
rest of society:     
A person who repeatedly commits crime would be a social outcast and face severe consequences 
affecting his/her own entire clan lineage resulting in a denial of access to basic resources. (FGD 
member, Gambella, October 2011). 
 
The societal control system has a deterrent effect. Interestingly, another FGD member from 
Gambella indicated how a frequent offender can become a servant either in the victim’s family 
or for a local judicial officer in the following manner: 
 
The most serious crime is a repeated or premeditated murder. It usually resulted in the offender 
becoming a social outcast unless the offender performs a ritual ceremony for the purpose of 
purification. If a murderer surrenders himself to Nyieya or Kwaaro, then Nyieya or Kwaaro pays the 
compensation to the victim’s family and the murderer would become a servant of Nyieya or Kwaaro. If 
a rich person pays the compensation fixed by the Nyieya or Kwaaro then the offender becomes the 
servant of the rich man. (FGD member, Gambella, October 2011). 
 
It would appear the damage or harm caused to the victim is often less important. This is clearly a 
point that the statutory laws will challenge. An NGO staff member, with widespread experience 
in conflict resolution and mediation work, offered the following clarification: 
Generally, local courts do not rule on conflicts pertaining to access to natural resources or cross-
boundary issues because most resources are communal. They usually use indigenous systems, but 
government courts often deal with crime related to homicide, theft…even these crimes are often 
resolved through customary rules. But if these cases come to the court, they are dealt with by the 
statuary [statutory] laws. You see…a court’s rulings are often based on hard evidence and its rulings 
fail to satisfy the victim and often release offenders for lack of evidence. Therefore there is a high 
probability that both parties decide to pull out [of] the case to settle in accordance with their laws. 




It is clear from the above extract that there are gaps between the two legal systems. The 
reverence for customary institutions and their laws is strongly associated with their emphasis on 
compensation and repairing social harmony rather than on exacting punishment; the state judicial 
system focuses on punishment. This invokes the issue of relevance of the state judiciary and its 
statuary laws.  
 
The following sub-section discusses respondents’ perceptions of the legitimacy of both systems.  
  Customary Institutions are Responsive and Accessible   
 
Customary institutions and their laws have long-standing heritages and are respected by many 
people for flexibility and adaptation to modern circumstances (Scott Villiers et al., 2011). When 
compared with state law they were praised for responsiveness and availability. One Koree Nagaa 
member, with an extensive familiarity with the work of indigenous conflict resolution offered the 
popular assessment of the state judicial system:  
government courts are located in urban areas and the judicial process usually takes a long period and 
is time consuming…wrongdoers are imprisoned then released on parole and the injured person or 
family is given no reparation…or any apology from the offender or his clan members or his family, it 
just deepens animosity because it doesn’t redress the injury caused to the victim or the family. (Koree 
Nagaa member, Surupha, November 2011). 
 
Another Koree Nagaa member, extensively involved in inter-clan conflict resolution work, 
indicated a reason why people rarely rely on the government courts:   
Look… one person murders or harms another or steals a cow or a rapes a girl where one could not 
spot him. The government court often frees such persons for lack of evidence. A person who intends to 
rape a girl or a woman normally avoids being sought…in our laws we don’t need a witness to pass 
down punishment in case of rape because there is less prospect of finding a witness…we normally 
accept her (a victim of rape) allegation at face value, in case of suspicion we cross-examine the story 
critically. Moreover, in our tradition it is immoral for a woman to make up such allegations and bring 
it to the attention of customary elders. What do you expect from a victim or victim’s families to such 
impunity? Obviously, some would resort to revenge while the powerless end up in lifetime anguish and 
injustice. Even if the government court releases suspects on grounds of lack of evidence, we still hand 
down our own penalty and we work hard to discourage people from taking revenge. (Koree Nagaa 
member, Surupha, November 2011). 
 
In addition to their responsiveness and availability, customary conflict resolution methods are 




 Customary Conflict Resolution Mechanisms are Participatory and Restorative  
 
As indicated in section 5.5.1 the indigenous institutional apparatus fosters direct participation of 
offenders in the process of justice. Unlike the state’s retributive justice system, the indigenous 
institution is restorative and its emphasis is on consensus, not contradiction (Johnson, 1986; 
Bassi, 2010; Legesse, 2000). They gather under the shade of the acacia tree (which in itself 
symbolises peace) deliberate on how to re-establish the social harmony broken down and heal 
the harm done to the community and victim. An FGD member described the adjudication 
process in the following manner:   
 
Inter-village conflicts are usually resolved by Nyieya (Anywaa noble) or by Kwaaro (village headman) 
at Cuud (village court). When conflict broke out between two Kwaaros, Nyieya’s interference is vital 
for conflict resolution. The defence and the plaintiff have to be present for the case to proceed to trial. 
However, if the problem is beyond the capacity of the third party, a neutral Kwaaro, the case is 
normally referred to Nyieya. The Nyieya informs Nyiatuel (a messenger of a Nyieya) to call upon the 
defence and the claimant to present their case for arbitration. The defence has the right to present his 
case repeatedly to prove his innocence. The Nyieya, along with the Jocuud (elders of Anywaa people) 
and Nyikugu (representative of the Nyieya) deliberate on the case. (FGD member, Gambella, 
October 2011). 
 
The state’s retributive justice system has emphasis on punishing the offender but the customary 
justice system focuses on forgiveness, creating genuine bonding of society and sustaining peace 
and order. It does so by engaging the offender, the victim and the community:  
 
When conflict occurs that requires adjudication, the defence and the claimant have to be present to 
present their case. All sides have to give their side of the story…the cause of the conflict. Then, the 
elders extensively cross-examine both parties to ascertain and comprehend the state of affairs around 
the issue. After the deliberation, the elders issue their ruling [T]he guilty party is informed 
accordingly and urged to accept the guilt by ani balessa dha (am guilty). (Koree Nagaa member, 
Surupha November 2011). 
 
This participatory method is meant to: (1) address the psychological and physical impact of the 
harm inflected upon the victim; (2) reintegrate the offender into the community, and (3) make a 
pronouncement on guilt and innocence, thereby enforcing a deterrent punishment and making 
sure that the wrongdoer does not commit the crime again. Undoubtedly, this approach 





 Supplementing the Judiciary  
 
A discernible change in the legal system of Ethiopia has been developing over the past two 
decades. State institutions such as the judiciary or the administrative structure realised that they 
cannot prevent and resolve conflict on their own terms. Pressure from the peripheries and NGOs 
forced the regime to forge an alliance with customary institutions. For example, there is an effort 
to institutionalise Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanisms involving indigenous institutions 
and their laws. While this alliance reflects the force of indigenous institutions, the relationships 
fluctuate with changing socio-political circumstances. These relationships range from mutual 
disengagement on adjudicating conflict cases relating to natural resources to a close 
collaboration on conflicts related to regional dimensions.  
 
 Customary Courts can Deal Effectively with Conflict Relating to Natural Resources  
 
The customary law is not only well equipped to handle disputes about access to natural 
resources, but its judicial processes also provide a mechanism for restoring harmony. 
Furthermore, in the absence of strong state institutions, these institutions provide a reliable base 
for maintaining social order and security. The community is making innovative use of these 
institutions to manage conflict. A key informant gives the following reason why they still rely on 
customary means to claim justice in case of conflicts: 
 
The process for a local court’s adjudication of legal disputes is poorly equipped with immense 
backlog...often time consuming and the Gadaa ruling takes a day or two… [C]ourt’s verdict cannot 
supersede the rulings of the Gadaa because it is widely supported and respected. A government court 
ruling has little effect in deterring perpetrators from committing crimes. The Gadhaaba (equivalent to 
a policeman) enforces their rulings. (NGO programme manager, November 2011).   
 
The local community continues to rely heavily on these customary institutions for justice. The 
state, in attempting to consolidate its legitimacy in these areas, must first build transparent and 
accountable institutions at grass-roots levels. However, this attempt has led to some conflict with 
customary laws:   
 
A person from Guji killed a Borana. We handed over the culprit to police, and within less than a 
month, the perpetrator was released on bail. Then, we (customary court) restarted adjudicating the 
matter and suddenly we were ordered not to interfere in government’s work. The offender is walking 
within the community as a free man while the victim is grappling with the harm. We weren’t 
138 
 
interfering…we were solving our issues, an effort any government body should welcome. (Koree 
Nagaa member, Surupha, November 2011). 
  
Another FGD member indicated the government court’s rulings overlook the restorative aspect 
of justice:  
What we intend to achieve in our rulings is to restore the broken relationships. A few months back, a 
man killed a person suspected of cattle theft. He was arrested in Yabello. We tried to arbitrate the case 
but we couldn’t advance because we were told the case was already in police hands. The offender was 
a family headman responsible for the well-being of the entire family members. We thought the jailing 
of the offender would make the situation even worse as it could cause more suffering to his children 
and the extended family members. The offenders and his family were willing to compensate and yet the 
victim’s family couldn’t get any reparation.  (Koree Nagaa member, Surupha, November 2011). 
 
In addition to the external pressure, the customary system is being further challenged from 
within:  
In the past, the tendency was to use customary institutions. Currently, those who have some contact 
with urban mores usually prefer the Kebele administrations or the government courts. To reduce this, 
we got the government officials to take part in the process of customary institution rulings so that it 
could discourage people from going to the court. Customary institution rulings are binding and 
respected, even by government bodies. For example, the elders made a ruling for dismantling a 
private enclosure and entrusted the Kebele chairman to enforce the ruling. The elders punished him 
with five cattle for refusing to enforce the elders’ decision. He accepted the penalty.  (Koree Nagaa 
member, Surupha, November 2011). 
 
This success signifies the extent to which the collaboration between the two institutions has been 
expanded. However, this partnership has been unable to overcome the problem of protracted 
intra-ethnic conflict.  
 The Importance of State Institutions in Addressing ‘Political’ and Regional conflicts   
 
The state institutions may be incompletely formed, weak, and unable to engineer a lasting 
consolidation of power to contain violence, but they continue to play a critical role in shaping the 
dynamics of conflict. There are many basic political and economic functions for which the state 
is uniquely equipped, not only the guardianship of territorial integrity but also counterbalancing 
regional effects of conflict. Politically-based conflicts, including territorial claims and political 
representations, are entwined with the interests of various factions, and require a political 








Referendum: government’s dispute resolution mechanism  
 
The government tried to establish a set of regular institutions, which guaranteed the swift 
settlement of disputes over regional boundaries (Bassi, 2010). For example, in 2004, the Ministry 
of Federal Affairs facilitated a referendum to demarcate formally the boundary and to resolve the 
disputes between the Somali clans and Borana Zone (Bassi, 2010). An NGO staff member who 
has had worked with both communities commented:  
 
Conflict related to access to natural resources is normal because it can easily be resolved through 
traditional systems. However, when conflicts are over boundary issues or land claims, the solution is 
political and that involves government. Moreover, the resolution of such conflicts is time consuming. 
For example, the conflict between Borana and Gari (Somali sub-clan) around the Wachille involved 
land claims. Since this regime (EPDRF) has come to power (1991), everyone has been fighting to 
expand boundaries. The government preferred a referendum as a last resort for resolving these 
conflicts. Since then, no ethnic group is allowed to cross the boundaries and share the natural 
resources as before. However, such resolutions are incompatible with pastoralists’ livelihoods 
because their life depends on mobility. Both groups have lost access to vital resources that exist on 
both sides. As a result, we do not work on conflicts arising from boundary issues. (NGO programme 
coordinator, October 2011). 
 
A referendum failed to bring the desired outcome because the disputing parties did not see their 
judicial procedure in these terms. Their indigenous dispute resolution mechanism was not 
designed to obliterate seasonal mobility and access to a vital resource, or to eliminate long-
standing cross-ethnic bonds. As indicated above, customary concepts of justice were founded on 
principles of concession, consensus and negotiation sanctioned by reciprocal social obligations 
and a spiritually endorsed moral order (Johnson, 1986). Therefore, in the pastoralist context, 
using a referendum as a method for resolving disputes was considered incompatible with the 
systems of the pastoralist communities. A key informant indicated that the referendum diverted 
attention from a genuine effort required for addressing the underlying cause of conflict and also 
ignored pre-existing ways for addressing access to vital resources. Other informants indicated 
that the referendum has exacerbated tension and conflict as the root causes were not tackled:  
 
Whilst the successive Somali regimes aimed to create [a] greater Somali, the Gari Somali were on the 
front line to meet this goal. They substantiated this claim by citing the historical allegiance of the Gari 
to the Somali regime during the Somali-Ethiopian war (1975) and the referendum that was held in 
2005, in which they claimed large amounts of Borana land. However, apart from the areas given to 
them by the Ethiopian government they couldn’t succeed. But they are still claiming wet season 
grazing areas like Chabi, Ilfatu, Garbi, Buno and Soble, and similarly claiming the dry season grazing 
areas like Dogogo, Boji, Chichne, Sukela Saglan, Dhakawata, Buke and Qababitata. The Wachille 
community believed that directly or indirectly the local authorities of Udet Woreda of Liban Zone 
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mobilise the Gari and Gabra to move towards the residential areas of the Borana and cause 
destruction of life and property, and deploy militias and police forces to set up settlement in Borana, 
causing conflict. (NGO programme coordinator, October 2011). 
 
This had adverse implications for the NGOs’ peacebuilding efforts in contentious areas. When 
asked why some NGOs use a mix of government and customary institutions for initiating conflict 
resolution projects, an informant explained: 
They (protagonists) cannot mobilise the community without the awareness of the elders. Mobilisation 
for war would not happen without the knowledge of elders. Lack of good governance on the part of the 
local government also plays a crucial role in either creating or exacerbating conflict. They are also 
equally important in resolving conflict. That is why we engage and encourage these institutions to 
work together and find solutions together. For resolving conflict, both have to complement one 
another. However, at times, there is no consensus; one defies the other’s resolution and decisions 
often turn out to be competitive and conflicting. (NGO programme coordinator, October 2011). 
However, it should not be assumed that they are necessarily in opposition or incompatible. An 
expert at Conflict Resolution and Transformation Directorate, Ministry of Federal Affairs 
(MoFA) explained: 
Conflicts over access to natural resources are very complicated, and can be effectively resolved 
through long-standing customary institutions, but when it comes to cross-border cattle trade, the 
government has to provide security and enter into formal agreement with the Kenyan government over 
security and taxation. Customary leaders support police in sharing information over potential cattle 
raiding and alert police because they have the capacity to deal with conflict related to regional and 
international borders. (Conflict Resolution and Transformation expert, Ministry of Federal 
Affairs, October 2011). 
It seems that the indigenous and state institutions at a local level are quite capable of building 
alliances and working together. In many instances, the state has vowed to acknowledge and 
devolve more power to customary institutions, but this has met with scepticism:   
However, the contradiction between the formal and actual, between declaration and implementation, 
rhetoric and reality, remains a palpable one. When we hear the government’s rhetoric, it seems the 
government is committed to revitalising the Gadaa institution... in practice we can only see that it is 
getting weaker and weaker [P]ower is being transferred from the elders to the Kebele chairmen. I do 
not see how this can be seen as empowerment and how the government perceives this in transforming 
the conflict. The government has to give due recognition to these institutions and it seems there is a 
gap between government policy and its implementation. I tend to doubt if this is going happen in the 
near future, though one can see from the government rhetoric that the government believes in cultural 
diversity...to develop culture and language; also, involve in any programme so that they know their 
rights. (An NGO director, October 2011). 
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Conflict resolution is most likely to thrive in the presence, not only of strong local institutions, 
but also an effective state (Goodhand and Hulme 1999; Goodhand and Lewer, 1999). The 
neighbouring “old state” of Somali is a case in point. Peace efforts cannot flourish amid political 
disorder and an inadequate physical infrastructure. Peace depends upon the state for the creation 
of certain basic conditions of existence, at least in contemporary dynamics of conflict in the Horn 
of Africa. This implies that peace does not automatically spring up where the state’s power is 
beyond the control of ripple-effects of cross-border conflicts. For example, NGOs operating in 
Gambella cited the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan in January 2005 
(between the South Sudan and Ethiopian governments) as a turning-point in shaping the peace 
processes in the Southern Sudan, with huge implications for the Gambella region of Ethiopia. 
Because of the external alliances, the potential for spill-over effects is always present. For 
example, if conflict breaks out between Gabra and Borana in Ethiopia, it affects the Gabra and 
Borana in Kenya. According to one key informant: 
 
If a Gabra is killed in Ethiopia, then it would affect the entire Gabra clan both in Ethiopia and Kenya 
because of the family ties. (Programme Coordinator, AFD, October 2011)  
 
The resolution of such conflict requires, what Jarstad and Belloni (2012) describe as “hybrid 
peace governance” where a combination of Track One, Track Two and Track Three initiatives 
are more likely to deliver effective outcomes.   
5.5.2 The Partnerships-NGOs, the State and the Indigenous Institutions 
 
Three themes are central to this story: indigenous institutions as a bridge to the community; 
government administrative structures as an entry point; and a mix of government and indigenous 
institutions as an effective way of development. 
5.5.2.1 Indigenous Institutions as a bridge to the Community and Development   
 
Four themes were identified from the feedback from respondents, on the issue of why 
development organisations used indigenous institutions as a bridge to community and 
community development. These were:  a “ready-made” apparatus for participatory development; 
promote participatory development; the sustainability issue; and the competency issue. These 
four are discussed below.  
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 As a Ready-made Apparatus for Participatory Development 
 
Drawing upon the long history of the state-centric and exclusive natural resources management 
policy, some NGOs offered an “integrationist” account of indigenous institutions as a viable 
partnership in development initiatives. These NGOs showed a strong commitment to build upon 
the existing know-how and work with indigenous institutions to achieve development. For 
example, when one of the informants was asked why it is important to rely on these institutions: 
 
…our projects focus on pastoralist livelihood resilience enhancement against drought through 
rehabilitating traditional wells and they assist the community to reclaim rangeland encroached by 
bush. They (Borana) have traditionally relied upon a variety of “coping mechanisms” when 
responding to droughts…through rangelands enclosure and digging wells as a traditional way to avert 
drought… manage to survive in a delicate environment. These institutions are risk-averse and hence 
are highly suitable for initiating development projects… we rely on these institutions for example, for 
water development projects we work with the Abba Madda (father of the waters source)…for 
rangeland development we involve the Abba Dheda (father of grazing land) and Jarsa Dheda (the 
administrator of this unit of resource). If these local resources can be harnessed, then they can be the 
means through which local, empowering and sustainable development can be achieved. They are a key 
for development and stability [W]e have to make use of this ready-made apparatus as an entry point in 
any development intervention programmes. (Project Manager, Care Ethiopia, October 2011) 
 
Forging an alliance with these institutions is widely believed to provide a range of benefits.  It is 
also suggested as a way of promoting participation in general, by empowering local people with 
capacities and introducing more innovative approaches and accountability. It is viewed as a way 
to make development more responsive and efficient.  
 Promote Participatory Development 
 
In addition to their wealth of knowledge and their institutional apparatus, indigenous institutions 
are suited to the purpose of launching participatory development; if this could be integrated into 
development, it would help the process. Therefore, it was argued, relying on these institutions 
would prepare the ground for organising people for participation, planning and contributing to 
development projects (Watson, 2001). For example, one of the informants was asked how 
important these institutions’ knowledge is for launching participatory development: 
In the strict sense, pastoralists might not be soil chemists but their indigenous knowledge indicates 
that the well dug on the red soil had drinkable water while the ones dug on the grey soil had salty 
water…this knowledge reduced the problem that made their animals ill. Armed with this knowledge, 
our water development project…mobilised their clan members to contribute cows, labour… to dig the 
well on the red soil side. Our project purchased industrial construction materials while community 
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members prepare the local construction material consisting of sand and stone. The well now belongs 
to the whole clan and is managed by the traditional resource management system that allows for 
planning and equal use by all clan members. The management committee is also responsible for 
drawing up a schedule on usage time of the well by all community households and livestock. They are 
also responsible for allowing members of neighbouring clans to use the well. During the drought 
period of December 2007 to March 2008, the well served over 800 households and about 1500 herd of 
cattle per day. (Project Manager, Care Ethiopia, October 2011)  
This reflects the dominant view that indigenous institutions promote participatory development 
and their management is legitimately in the hands of the local people. This legitimises the 
genuine bottom-up partnership for sustainable development.  
 
Many descriptions are also used to give support to this dominant view, particularly of tensions 
between the participatory and techno-centric development approaches. This is bound to be more 
pronounced wherever the indigenous institutions regulate their day-to-day affairs. One example 
from the field is offered below. Thus, a water development officer spoke about the contradictions 
between a diesel powered borehole managed by women, and the indigenous borehole 
governance system. 
 
One example of this [conflict between the two] was an assessment of underground water cisterns 
regulated by indigenous institutions and a new borehole diesel regulated by women (both systems 
constructed by NGOs). The rationale varies. For the former, it is important to work with the existing 
institution because it is highly regulated by indigenous rules. For the latter, women are more 
susceptible to hardships caused by water shortages; therefore, empowering them through the 
management of water points would be inclusive and effective. Institutional apparatus for regulating 
access to the borehole diesel is very weak. In most cases, boreholes powered by diesel are 
unsustainable because the equipment requires maintenance skills and running costs. On the other 
hand, a well belongs to the whole clan and is managed by the traditional resource management system 
that allows for planning and equal use by all clan members. Rights to use the well are obtained by 
providing labour for the maintenance of the pond. Aba konfi (manager) is also responsible for day-to-
day administration and can appoint heryriga (an assistant). Heryriga draws up a schedule on usage 
time of the well by all community households and livestock. His job is to make sure there is no conflict 
over the use of the water and to take appeals from people who would wish to come and use the water. 
He is assisted in this work by hayu - individuals who hold ritual authority to judge. He is also 
responsible for allowing members of neighbouring clans to use the well. Women managing diesel 
powered boreholes lack such institutional apparatus to govern utilisation and maintenance. As a 
result most boreholes powered by diesel are not functioning. (An NGO water development officer, 
October, 2011).  
 Sustainability Issue   
 
In addition to the above description, there were claims that the local government structures are 
still at early stages of development and may not govern development projects efficiently. 
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Therefore, there is a lingering scepticism towards the sustainability of development projects that 
tend to rely on local government at the expense of the indigenous institutions.  
Our belief is that, for sustainability of our project and for accountability and reaching out to the 
grass-roots levels to mobilise and initiate development programmes, the indigenious institution is a 
viable way. (Poroject Officer, AFD, October 2011) 
In the absence of a strong state structure to manage development projects effectively and deliver 
resources, the best option was to turn towards indigenous institutions, strengthen their 
institutional capacities, enter into partnerships and integrate them into the development process. 
It was thought that this could empower people, include them in the development process and 
improve environmental and human welfare.  
 Local Government Incompetence and Legitimacy Issue  
 
On  account  of  its  many  failures,  the  local government structure has  lost  a great deal  of  
legitimacy, in many places, undermining its potential for forging alliances with development 
agencies. One informant described this in the following way:  
The local government is filled with inexperienced youth with little or no know-how of natural resource 
management. In places where the indigenous institutions are weakened, Kebele chairmen play 
significant roles…but they are often incompetent and their management system and rulings are 
marred by reports of corruption…and bad governance. (SOS Sahel, Project Officer, October 
2011). 
A NGO staff member involved in an NGO’s participatory need assessment programmes 
described how a lack of know-how and lack of clear roles in the development programme led the 
local government structures to be less relevant in forging alliances: 
Before our intervention in development, we had to carry out participatory need assessments… [W]e 
brought the two parties [local government officials and customary elders] in a joint problem 
identification and implementation programme using the participatory approach. The participants were 
split into two groups, four with participants from government officials and six from customary elders. 
The groups were asked to reflect on key obstacles and their roles in tackling these challenges and 
implementation programmes [pastoralist vulnerability]. Whilst the customary elder’s team came up 
with long lists of tasks and roles, the local government team couldn’t do the same. They were not 
happy because they had a minimal role in the implementation programmes…they used to think they 
could steer any development project initiated in their areas. We had no option but to work with the 
elders’ team. (Program Coordinator, Care Ethiopia, October 2011). 
145 
 
Thus, the NGO had directly forged alliances with, and initiated development projects with, 
customary institutions instead of with the local government structure; this met with some 
suspicion. A local NGO that was keen to be seen as an independent organisation, despite being 
suspected of ignoring local government structures, tried to gain the confidence of the local 
government structure:  
We need both acceptance and legitimacy. For example, the indigenous structure may have 
institutional mechanisms and community support while the government has the backing of the law of 
the country. This limited their role to observation, we consult them…let them know what we are doing. 
It can discourage the local people who tend to defy the supremacy of the state law. Therefore, for us, it 
is good to combine the two. (Project Coordinator, GPDI, October 2011). 
However, the actual practice of forging alliances with the local government structures remained a 
challenge because of bad governance. According to a key informant, many development 
problems arise out of lack of accountability in local government structures:   
…in one of the pastoralist associations a Kebele chairman had a private enclosure. Local elders 
passed a resolution that abolishes his private enclosure and he was ordered to dismantle the 
enclosure. However, the chairman defied their ruling and even threatened take revenge against them: 
he vowed to punish them in food aid rationing. He managed to intimidate and manipulate the others, 
even corrupted a few members to reverse their decision. (Program Officer, GOAL Ethiopia, 
October 2011) 
This observation shows the deep suspicions on both sides and points to the challenges facing 
NGOs in forging alliances with local government structures. However, not all local structures are 
corrupt, but some were perceived as incompetent and lacking legitimacy. Yet, there are some 
NGOs who have difficulties working with indigenous institutions because of their 
“incompatibility” with the new challenges facing the communities.     
5.5.2.2 The Government’s Administrative Structures as Partner in Development   
 
In contrast to the preceding account of the potential of indigenous institutions, some informants 
indicated that these institutions are either idealised or have outlived their usefulness, having 
failed to develop durable mechanisms to meet new challenges. Therefore, it is important to 
bypass tradition and the elders and create a new alliance with Peasant Associations (PAs). The 
interest in indigenous institutions had faded, and when asked why development agents and local 
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people had become more sceptical about institutional partnerships of this kind, one of the 
informants replied:  
We usually work with government. The government is mandated to be a conduit to the community and 
to do community development. We have to go through local government... first, there has been a shift 
of roles from traditional institutions to Kebele administrations. Second, the current language of 
development such as achieving gender equality and empowering women in which development goals 
are articulated and planned has become alien to the elders. The ways they propose and suggest 
ideas…created many challenges….one speaks of the traditional approach (the elders) and the other 
(the young Kebele chairmen) speaks of the modern one. Therefore, we work with the young Kebele 
chairmen as they understand what exactly we want to deliver especially in animal health, new seeds 
and reproductive health. (Filed Coordinator, CISP, October 2011). 
 
The indigenous institutions are believed to be obsolete and lagging behind current needs as well 
as less efficient in reaching the development goals of the country. Moreover, some NGOs were 
co-opted into local government structures to avoid confrontation. One project manager, with 
widespread experience in development and conflict resolution work, offered this account of 
bypassing government structures:  
 
I do not believe it is possible to bypass the new local government structures to access the community 
and initiate any development project. The government has put a Gott and Garee system (Gott vary in 
size but usually encompass between sixty and ninety households and Garee is roughly thirty 
households) in place that is closely tied to the dominant political party. The leaders of Gotta and 
Garee are more accountable to the government than to the community. (Project Manager, SOS 
Sahel, October 2011).      
 
Given the changing political context under the new dispensation, it is understandable why the 
NGOs forged partnerships with these institutions. However, there are some NGOs that creatively 
forge a working alliance with both institutions.  
5.5.2.3 A Mixed Partnership 
 
The third category warns that leaving any of these institutions out is likely to lead to conflict of 
various kinds. Instead, they suggest, it is important to look at the way in which the potential of 
these institutions can be reinvigorated and empowered to establish working partnerships for 
integrated development:  
 
We involve our stakeholders in launching our programme. We include the community, local NGOs 
and local government development agents. In the process, we all complement each other in our 
development endeavour…we negotiate with all stakeholders… instead of bypassing or overlooking 
them. We have a room for creating a common understanding … [we] have a meeting every two months 
147 
 
so that we assess our progress. We also have a weekly inter-NGO and governmental session for 
presenting the progresses of our achievements. (Project Officer, GPDI, October 2011). 
 
A director of an NGO saw NGO relationships with both institutions from an accountability 
perspective: 
Before our intervention, we carry out participatory need assessments, involving local communities and 
their institutions, develop a proposal, and present it to our stakeholders…and we create accountability 
among our stakeholders. Then we present it to the Worada Task Force and to a general community 
meeting for discussion. They elect a Development Committee of active members to run the project. 
(Director, AFD, October 2011). 
 
There is a tendency to draw a neutral and pragmatic account of partnerships. These relationships 
are not essentially one-sided and rigid. Both institutions can be flexible in forging alliances at 
different times. For example, when asked about shifts in alliance, one of the informants replied:  
It depends… if it is a new project, we include the Kebele chairman and then the Abba Olla …we use 
the Abba Ollas an entry point to the community … [we] cannot bypass them and access the community 
at Olla level. We use the Kebele for mobilising the community. You can also use the Olla for 
mobilisation but Olla is not more than 30-50 Warras (households) and general mobilisation needs 
maadda level mobilisation. (Project Officer, Care Ethiopia, October 2011). 
 
In places where the local government structure is weak, NGOs have a tendency to circumvent the 
local institutions, building alliances with indigenous institutions, community-based 
organisations, or user groups for implementation of projects. This would create room for 
engagement between the state, NGOs and indigenous institutions. Such engagement has potential 
for conflict (Bratton, 1989b, 1990). Therefore, development agents need to construct alliances 




                           Figure 6. Summary of the Findings (Theme D) 
 Indigenous Conflict Resolution Mechanisms    
 
     State Conflict Resolution Mechanisms    
  Resilient  
 Invoke the authority of the divine God 
 Maintain social harmony 
 Responsive and accessible  
 Participatory and restorative  
 Emphasis on compensation  
 Focus on reciprocal obligations  
 Settle disputes through ad-hoc 
assemblages 
 Can deal effectively with conflict 




 Incompletely formed, weak, and 
unable to to contain violence  
 Maintain law and order  
 Inaccessible  
 Non-participatory  
 Retributive  
 Can counterbalance regional 
effects of conflict 






The preceding sections presented some of the respondents’ views on their preferences 
concerning those institutions that they use to access the community, forge alliances and initiate 
development projects.  The degree of confidence expressed by the NGOs in the potential of these 
institutions was found to vary. Nevertheless, there was a general feeling that the indigenous 
institutions are effective and provide a valuable avenue for accessing the community and for 
initiating development interventions. While some of the NGOs had moved away from using 
these indigenous institutions as a foundation for development initiatives, others had integrated 
the customary and formal institutions to build relations between the state and the pastoralists’ 












5.6. Theme E: Indigenous Empowerment  
 
The following account of indigenous empowerment unfolds through the following six key 
themes: (1) re/institutionalisation of customary institutions; (2) activation of customary laws and 
re-establishment of customary institutions for conflict resolution and natural resource 
management (NRM); (3) building intra and inter-ethnic relations; (4) capacity building for local 
government departments; (5) gender issue and (6) the faith-based peacebuilding approach. 
 
5.6.1. Re/institutionalisation of Intra-Ethnic/Inter-Ethnic Peace Groups 
The most important achievement of CRT-type NGOs in the Arero, Moyalle and Yabello 
Woredas (districts) was their support for the establishment of Koree Nagga (Peace Committees) 
at grass-roots level and at Woreda level. These included School Peace Committees, Conflict 
Management Forums, Women’s Peace Committees, and district level Peace and Natural 
Resource Management Committees (see Appendix A for a documented listing of NGOs, 
strategies adopted by NGOs for conflict resolution, and areas of operation). In Gambella, 
ROCCRE, Pact Ethiopia and HEKS supported the establishment of the Joint Development 
Office and a Joint Peace Committee and Community Elders’ Peace Council. Similarly, in 2005, 
SOS-Sahel in collaboration with Arero District Administration and community leaders from the 
Borana, Guji and Gabra supported the establishment of the Elders’ Peace Committee (Gaadisa 
Naga) in Arero-Mata Garafrsa with the tasks of providing early warning of conflict and working 
at conflict resolution. Another example is GPDI, which supported the establishment of peace 
clubs at school as well as women’s peace clubs; this was done with the support of International 
Livestock Research (ILR). Once these institutions were established, they provided a framework 
to diffuse conflict concerning natural resources. In other words, the CRT-type NGOs were most 
successful at reinvigorating the available “cultural capital” for use in peacebuilding. The 
evidence from the Focus Group Discussion (FGD) sheds light on the relationship between the 
NGOs’ interventions and “indigenous empowerment”:  
Elders from the three clans (Guji, Borana and Gabra) usually come together for opening (the) peace 
process. Koree Nagaa are established at Ollas (neighbourhoods) and maddaas (area surrounding one 
water source), Woreda and Zone levels with the task of carrying out early warning of conflict, 
peacebuilding and conflict resolution. They also meet once a month to assess peace situations and 
carry out local peace-keeping tasks (Koree Nagaa members’ FGD, October 2011). 
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SOS Sahel, AFD, Care Ethiopia and Mercy Corps facilitated several peace accords, conferences 
and forums between Guji, Gabra, Borana and Garri. For instance, consider the Mercy Corps’ 
negotiation and development of the Negelle Peace Accord Process between the Gari, Gebra, Guji 
and Borana clans in 2009 and AFD’s Hallona Community Peace Conference and Yabello 
Worada Peacebuilding Conference between the Garri, Gebra, Guji and Borana at Haro-Bake in 
Yabello district in 2006 (Care, 2008; Mercy Corps, 2011). These both played a significant role in 
strengthening pastoralists’ own rules and in drawing by-laws relating to natural resource access, 
use and maintenance, as well as laws on murder, theft and injury. These laws have some 
common features, although there is wide variation in their implementation; in the case of a 
murder, the perpetrator must pay a fine of twenty head of cattle and will be penalised by 
government law. A thief who steals a cow must pay a fine of five head of cattle: 
They (AFD, GPDI, and Care) facilitated the declarations of agreed-upon by-laws for the management 
of natural resources and resolution of conflicts. In the declaration, the Guji, Borana and Gabra 
agreed to set up Koree Nagaa comprising the three groups. With the support of the government and 
NGOs, this peace committee has been working for peacebuilding; we are called the “United Nation 
Peace Soldiers” (Koree Nagaa members’ FGD, October 2011). 
Scott-Villiers et al. (2011) observed that the drafting and ratifying of agreed-upon by-laws had 
an instant effect on the Walda, Turbi and Rawan communities, especially in information 
exchange and surveillance; they resumed sharing water and pasture. They are provided with 
institutional apparatus not only to make laws but also to oversee their implementation and to 
address conflict over natural resources. AFD’s programme coordinator described the importance 
of drawing new rules as follows:   
At the moment, the causes of conflict have become diverse and complex…and traditional mechanisms 
are insufficient to deal with today’s conflicts...they needed new skills and new by-laws… build on the 
old ones (Programme Coordinator, AFD, October 2011). 
Thus, a more overarching and inclusive framework of law is required to bridge group 
differences. Frequently, people drawn from many different communities received little support 
or follow-up to negotiate, draft and ratify agreed-upon by-laws to govern and adjudicate future 
disputes. The following extract sheds light on this point:   
We (intra-ethnic peace committee) deal with conflict cases. In Surupha, our territory, the three 
communities reinforced customary law. Laws that deal with access to natural resources, murders, and 
cattle theft were strengthened. They are not new laws. Guji, Gabra and Borana had always used them 
151 
 
internally, now they apply between us too. In such [a] way, the number of murder and cattle rustling 
has been reduced. We have a good experience from the NGOs, we are able to focus on our 
development, built house, start agriculture, and get clean water… (Koree Nagaa members’ FGD, 
October 2011). 
 
The reinvigoration of these rules and their extension to the various ethnic groups endows the 
legal framework with the capacity to resolve group differences peacefully. Indeed, several 
authors (see, for example, Scott-Villiers et al., 2011; Kurtz and Scarborough, 2012) support an 
increase in the number of peace committees and participation in conflict resolution practices. To 
ascertain if the increase in peace committees contributed to peace, Focus Group Discussion 
participants were asked to indicate the number of conflict cases referred to the peace committees. 
An elder made the following comment:  
 
I do not remember the number of conflict cases being referred and adjudicated...but we arbitrated a 
number of conflict cases. We do not know how to write and read but now, we have just come from 
adjudicating the conflict between a Guji and a Gabra over a Kallo (private enclosure). We all travel 
across the different Ollas to make peace (Koree Nagaa members’ FGD, October 2011). 
 
We have been playing a significant role and everyone is accepting our ruling. For example, last month 
someone’s camel intruded into a Kallo and the case was brought to this committee. After we made 
extensive interrogations, the owner of the camel was penalised with two cows as a fine to compensate 
the damaged Kallo. There is always conflict over land claims and counter-claims and over natural 
resources among the Ollas (Koree Nagaa members’ FGD, October 2011). 
 
These examples indicate the NGOs’ facilitation of local conflict resolution and the emphasis 
placed on “cultural modalities and resources” and the indigenous knowledge they possess to deal 
with conflict within their own societal settings (Lederach, 1997). Additionally, these NGOs 
identified the activation of customary laws for conflict resolution and natural resource 
management (NRM) as a key mechanism to guarantee order. It is believed that the active use of 
these rules facilitates freedom of movement and access to important resources to mitigate 
resource-based conflicts and strengthens a group’s resilience mechanisms to cope with drought 
related shocks.  
 
5.6.2 Activation of Customary Laws for Conflict Resolution and Natural Resource 
Management (NRM)  
The second approach within the theme of indigenous empowerment is the activation of 
customary institutions relating to NRM. SOS Sahel, AFD and Care Ethiopia view the activation 
and re-establishment of customary institutions and strengthening their jurisdiction over land, 
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social and cultural issues as being the keys to stability and to reducing environmental 
degradation. Whereas activation of these institutions puts the community at the centre of NRM, 
reliance on them reduces differential access to resources, diminishes social exclusion and 
reduces conflict. Therefore, Care Ethiopia’s Regional Resilience Enhancement Against Drought 
(RREAD) project and SOS Sahel’s Borana Collaborative Forest Management Project (BCFMP) 
aim to transform the conventional, government-led NRM approach to community-based NRM 
systems. SOS Sahel’s Participatory Forest Management Approach (PFMA), a new collaborative 
resource management approach, was adopted to revitalise the indigenous institutions and to 
empower the local community to reclaim their rights to use and manage the natural resources 
(SOS Sahel, 2008). PFM, with its main objective being to address and resolve conflict and 
competition over forest resource usage, involves three distinct phases. The first of these is the 
Investigation stage, where Government forestry departments and forest users apply participatory 
planning activities to undertake appraisal of the forest resources, access and the existing 
management rules. The second is the Negotiation stage; here, stakeholders use a joint planning 
process to initiate dialogue for conflict analysis, negotiate over benefit sharing arrangements and 
develop the rules and regulations governing forest use. The third is the Implementation stage 
which involves implementing the signed Forest Management Agreements (FMA) (See SOS 
Sahel, 2008; Irwin, Jordan and Temesgen, 2005).  
To implement FMA, inter/intra-ethnic Forest Management Groups (FMGs) are convened at 
various levels from grass-roots up to district level. As well as implementing NRM, the FMGs 
also focus on conflict resolution in the forest priority areas of Arero, Yabello and Liben districts. 
The groups comprise representatives of local communities and government officials. It is worth 
noting that the system is not only built from age-old customary systems of community-based 
control over resources but also from new systems developed by the community, and agreed with 
local government (Irwin and Mitiku, 2004). In doing so, the NGOs facilitated the legal transfer 
of resources (use rights to, and/or, ownership rights of) from the government to communities
30
. 
The reaching of agreements between Government forestry departments and forest users 
                                                          
30 The legal transfer of the resources and their management systems are not uniform across the PAs. According to 
some informants, for example, in some areas the management of the forest and rangeland is conducted solely by 
elders though traditional institutions. In some other places, however, PFM involves local elders, the Jarsa Reera, 
government bodies, the cluster head and Abba Reera.  
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increased trust and reliance as well as empowered the capacity of local institutions for NRM and 
conflict resolution (Irwin, Jordan and Temesgen, 2005):  
FMGs were organised in 31 Maddaas (19 in Yabello, 8 in Arero and 4 in Liban) (and) are fully 
functional. Moreover, a legally binding document that defines the roles and responsibilities of the 
government and the community was developed. Currently, they (FMGs) are more effective than local 
government because the government bodies are not intervening in decisions given by elders on the 
rangeland and forest. Of course, when they primarily started reinstating the laws, they encountered a 
lot of challenges from the government officials. But later they settled and signed a memorandum of 
understanding with government offices to have a shared management. After this agreement those 
breaking the laws have no other choice than that [of being] ruled by the decision of the elders (SOS 
Project Manager, October 2011). 
These agreements also reactivated the long-standing method of selective bush firing which was 
banned during the military regime in 1979/1980 (GL-CRSP PARIMA, 2007b). This practice 
reduced the rate of rangeland shrinkage attributable to continued encroachment by bush; this 
shrinkage was reducing the availability of grassland for pasture (GL-CRSP PARIMA, 2007a). 
The agreements reinstated the community’s ownership, accountability and responsibility. 
According to the SOS Field Coordinator:  
The government policy (NRM policy) presumed…the local communities were responsible for the 
continuing destruction of the forest resources. Therefore, it used to be the people who were protected 
from the forest...not the forest resource. Thus, they (the communities) often used to set fire on the 
forest because they believed it was a “government forest”… but since (2004) ….. our project 
intervention ….. we haven’t seen a single forest fire. Moreover, the government forest department used 
to hire people for planting and logging trees but since its management was transferred to the people, 
they are the ones who have been participating in seed germination and planting... (Field 
Coordinator, SOS Sahel, October 2011).  
The FMGs played an important role in supporting local capacity and propensity for the peaceful 
resolution of conflicts. Although difficulties could arise
31
, their work resulted in a genuine 
bottom-up involvement in the NRM and also provided a forum for discussion, creating shared 
interests and initiating joint projects for reducing the incidence of conflict. For example, Irwin, 
Jordan and Temesgen (2005) note that the historically violent conflict over differential access to 
the forest resources in and around Arero forest has been reduced. That conflict was along ethnic 
lines among the Borana, Guji groups and the Garri camel pastoralists. Moreover, the 
                                                          
31
 Irwin, Jordan and Temesgen (2005) emphasised that disputes and conflicts of interest between different groups 
involved in the new management will continue to arise. However, the intensity and magnitude of conflict appears to 




establishment and effective development of inter- and intra-ethnic FMGs at the local levels in 
Arero and Yabello provide local communities with the opportunity to participate fully in 
decision-making in resource use and management; they can influence formal peace agreements. 
For example, the urban and peri-urban poor whose livelihoods depend on firewood and wild 
honey collection, and making charcoal, were able to benefit from subsistence use of resources 
(Tache and Irwin, 2003). The local FMGs are empowered further to adjudicate potential disputes 
and conflicts of interest between different interest groups. They deal with local problems and 
conflicts; for example, in the Yabello forest area, FMGs stopped illegal harvesters from within 
the community. More serious problems or potential conflict cases, such as new farmland 
clearances, are passed onto the district level FMGs, for higher level negotiation (Tache and 
Irwin, 2003). The incidence of conflict cases being referred to these FMGs in Yabello is 
increasing, which could indicate the recognition of the local FMGs as a legitimate and effective 
means of resolving conflict (See, for example, PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2007). The evidence 
from the FGD also confirms this: 
There are isolated killings and cattle thefts but not major conflicts. The intra-ethnic peace committee 
members usually meet every month to examine and expose perpetrators and punish them on the basis 
of the declaration. The committee also demolishes many Kallos and diminished their size. These days, 
we are also adjudicating several cases relating to trespassing and access to natural resources. We 
also meet every month to appraise the peace situation of our community for early warning and conflict 
prevention (Koree Nagaa members’ FGD, October 2011).  
There was consensus among the informants that the NGOs helped restore those customary laws 
that govern the utilisation of natural resources. For example, the principles of Karra Matta, 
Dongora Serra, Laffa sera roba, Lafa sera bonna and Forra have been activated. Since then, 
agreement on access to natural resources has been reached by the Borana and by nomadic Garri 
in Arero and Yabello; this has been done by negotiation rather than by following the previously 
assumed open access that led to conflict (Irwin and Mitiku, 2004). Following the process 
enhanced the capacity of the local institutions’ legal apparatus to address and manage resource-
based conflicts. The following extract from Care Ethiopia’s programme coordinator in Yabello 
captures how these laws are employed to govern access to natural resources: 
The roles of aba hirega and jarsa dheed (in NRM /rangeland and water) have been reinforced during 
the conflict resolution processes. They (Gabra, Guji, and Borana) are able to restore rules and 
regulations that they used in the past to punish those who enter the wet and dry grazing land without 
the knowledge of the elders. The penalty for grazing in the Kallos without the consent of the elders is 
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from 1-5 cattle depending on the seriousness of the situation (Care Ethiopia’s programme 
coordinator, October, 2011).  
Care Ethiopia, through the RREAD project, rehabilitated wells in Dire and Moyalle, and initiated 
reera (cluster) based bush clearing and kallo (rangeland reserve) management by jarsa Reera 
and abba Reera (cluster head). They have been able to restore the rules and regulations used in 
the past to punish those who entered the wet and dry grazing land without the knowledge of the 
elders. The penalty for grazing in the Kallo without the consent of the elders is from 1-5 cattle 
depending on the seriousness of the situation. The Mercy Corps’ Strengthening Institutions for 
Peace and Development (SIPED) project in the districts of Arero and Yabello aimed at building 
pastoralists’ resilience to drought by facilitating peace agreements for resource sharing, and by 
strengthening the capacities of local institutions for NRM (Mercy Corps, 2011). SIPED 
improved cross-ethnic ties and strengthened the capacities of local institutions to mitigate 
conflict. This in turn, gave pastoralist groups the opportunity to access natural resources and 
economic opportunities (Mercy Corps, 2011). The Mercy Corps’ Conflict Prevention and 
Resolution Program (CPRP) officer indicated that the SIPED project’s most significant 
achievement was to facilitate sharing of very scarce resources during a severe drought:  
During severe drought in 2010-11, the Garri-Somali, including from Kenya, with more than ten 
thousand animals had settled moderately better areas of pasture and water around Arero and Yabello 
districts of Borana zone and Shakisso of Guji-Zone of Oromia. What [all] we did was to bring them 
together for discussion and work together for the settlement. Rebuilding those relationships was vital 
for survival of the pastoralists’ livelihood during the drought seasons. During their stay, no major 
cattle theft and no killings occurred. Occasional cattle theft used to be conceived as ethnic conflict and 
resulted in massed based conflict but at this time it was just perceived as an individual crime and 
treated as such. (CPRP officer, Mercy Corps, October 2011).    
Similarly, Kurtz and Scarborough (2012) reported the contribution of the SIPED project towards 
facilitating freedom of movement and access to natural resources by the Garri and Gabra in the 
Arero and the Yabello districts during the recent drought. Although such arrangements could be 
attributed to an age-old cross-ethnic alliance, Kurtz and Scarborough (2012) indicated that such 
cooperation was not evident in other neighbouring areas where peacebuilding initiatives had not 
taken place. For example, conflict prevented the migration of the Garri-Somali of Udet Woreda 
to share the resources available in the Borana of Wachille, Arero Woreda; this exacerbated their 
vulnerability to drought-shocks. SOS Sahel’s BCFMP contributed to creating conditions that 
enabled a negotiated access to important resources, thereby reducing conflict and protecting the 
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forest resource in the Yabello and Arero districts. A statement from SOS Sahel’s Projects 
Manager provides some valuable insight into these initiatives:  
BCFM contributed to the preservation of the forest resources in Yabello and Arero areas. However, 
forest resources which were not included in [the] BCFM project were completely destroyed. For 
example, the forest resources in the areas of Gamato, Gubalo Ate, Edi Lolate [Liban district] were 
completely destroyed. (Projects Manager, SOS Sahel, October 2011). 
The following section highlights how community relations efforts contributed to the on-going 
conflict transformation in the Borana Zone.  
5.6.3 Building Intra and inter-ethnic Relations 
EPaRDA, Mercy Corps, OPA, AFD and Care Ethiopia have been promoting cross-community 
contacts for groups in conflict. According to a Chairman of the Oromia Pastoralist Association 
(OPA) interviewed in the study area, these cross-community interventions were not aimed at 
resolving conflicts conclusively. Their first objective was to help in revitalising economic 
opportunities, to improve the capacity for trade and to increase links between traders across the 
border. The second objective was to reduce the intensity of resource-based conflict by 
encouraging the “values” of communal resource sharing, and thereby facilitating herd mobility 
along borders. EPaRDA, AFD and Care Ethiopia adopted different strategies to initiate 
relationship-building activities between conflicting parties along borders, and sought to bring 
people together in order to work at reducing the incidence of cross-border raids. For example, in 
2009, AFD and Care Ethiopia facilitated experience-sharing tours with the aim of sharing 
information and forging cross-border relations between Borana, Konso and Hamer communities. 
In 2008, when operating in the Hamer-Borana corridor, EPaRDA facilitated a peace conference 
in Hawassa between Borana and Hamer. The conference provided an opportunity to diffuse a 
long-standing conflict over a cross-border raid that killed a Borana and raided their cattle in 
2008. The Hamer community agreed to pay 110 head of cattle and 200 goats to the Borana, and 
handed over the suspected murderers to police (EPaRDA, 2010). The compensation was a 
significant achievement for the Hamer-Borana peace process because it was a case that had, for 
some time, strained relationships between communities across the borders (EPaRDA, 2010). The 
cooperation also contributed to a reduction in the incidence of cross-border cattle raids, and has 
clearly had a significant effect on the dynamics of conflict in the region.  
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Similarly, in 2009, OPA and AFD jointly organised a Cross-border Peace and Reconciliation 
Conference involving Gabra and Borana from Kenya. It was held in Sololo, Kenya, about 30 km. 
from Ethiopia-Moyalle. Moreover, OPA facilitated Dukana (Kenya) and Maikona (Dillo district, 
Borana) peace initiatives in 2009. These initiatives led to “The Dukana-Dillo Declaration”, 
resulting in the restoration of resource sharing arrangements between Gabra of Kenya and 
Borana Ethiopia (note that the pasture was in Kenya with the water points in Ethiopia). The 
initiatives also created Local Peace Committees (LPCs) to prevent and resolve conflict, and to 
create effective mechanisms for gathering and disseminating information about threats and 
possibilities of raids (PCI, 2009). To implement the declaration, Conflict Early Warning and 
Response Mechanism (CEWARN) supported the efforts of LPCs in helping the Borana 
pastoralists, from the kebeles of Arbole, Goray, Qadim and Hoboq (Dillo district), to access 
grazing areas of Beda Huri, 260 km inside Kenya (CEWARN, 2010a, 2010b). Similarly, 
following two consecutive failed rainy seasons (2009-10 and 2010-11), pastoralists from Kenya 
migrated and settled in the Yabelo and Arero districts (Kurtz and Scarborough, 2012).  Also, 
LPCs in the Dukale Kebele of Miyo Woreda and the Anona location of Sololo District in Kenya 
facilitated resource sharing agreements in which both sides agreed to share resources peacefully 
(CEWARN, 2010a). A Chairman of OPA with much experience in inter-ethnic negotiation 
describes how cross-border peace committees of elders were able to reduce the incidence of 
cattle raids and prevent violence in the following way:  
…two months ago there was a regrouping of the same youth from Goray (Dillo, Borana) who planned 
to launch a cattle raid on the Gabra of Turbi (Kenya)… they (Dillo Local Peace Committee) managed 
to foil the plan and hand over the suspects to local police…they also informed the other party to take 
precautionary measures. (Chairman, OPA, October 2011).  
At the same time, communities with long-standing inter-group bonds were able to re-establish 
and re-build trust. They describe their confidence in the capacity of their indigenous institutions 
to rebuild their cross-ethnic ties: 
 
The frequent meetings reduced mistrust and suspicion among us…with the establishment of inter-
ethnic peace committees we share resources; we participate in funerals and weddings. We negotiate 
access to the pastureland and water points for the wet and dry seasons and move to the other side 
during the dry season. We no longer suspect they (other groups) would violate these rules. This used 
to be one of the causes of conflict in our area (Koree Nagaa members’ FGD, October 2011).   
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It is clear from the above discussion that NGOs played key roles in bringing people together for 
relationship-building, which assisted access to natural resources; those NGOs also helped 
communities to cope with severe drought.  
The evidence from the FGD also suggests that inter-ethnic peace committees of elders were able 
to forge strong inter-ethnic networks of engagement and were successful in dispelling certain 
fears and rumours and in avoiding violence: 
A year ago, young people from our group raided our neighbours and one person was killed and at 
least fifteen to twenty cattle were stolen. Everyone anticipated counter-raids and rumours abounded 
and spread through frightened communities… words flew round an anxious public like wildfire, and 
people ready for violence. We immediately sent our delegates and contacted our counterparts to calm 
down the alarms and rumours about planned raid…negative incidents or intentions had to be quickly 
quelled. This would not happen if the networks were not created and were not put into practice. 
(Koree Nagaa members’ FGD, October 2011). 
 
These communities were able to implement decisions to refrain from any action that would 
provoke violent reactions; this prevented conflict.  
The following sub-section will discuss the perspective of key persons involved with capacity 
building for local government departments.  
5.6.4 Capacity Building for Local Government Departments  
 
Most of the NGOs operating in these areas are aware of the need for capacity building for local 
governments and draw a positive correlation between lack of good governance and conflict. 
Therefore, one way of addressing conflict is to promote good governance for economic and 
political development. This is because, according to one informant: 
 
 Good governance is one method of conflict resolution. (Project Manager, Mercy Corps, October 
2011). 
Most NGOs responded to the government’s decentralisation policy along the following lines:   
In 2008, our assessment of the local institutions’ capacities for good governances revealed a 
widespread capacity problem in the local governance system, particularly among the new Kebeles of 
the Somali and Oromia Regions. The politically-assigned local administrators did not have the 
required skills to handle and address the mounting conflicts. We support the government’s 
decentralisation policy and capacity building; we even built local courts and supplied office furniture 
to strengthen the judicial system. We provided short training for the local police officers and judges on 
human rights and good governance and we contributed to the capacity building of the judicial system. 
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As a result, abuse of human rights by police began to decrease, judges at the district and Region level 
began to respond promptly to cases, which in the past were characterised by very long judicial 
processes which used to take years. (Project Manager, Mercy Corps, October 2011).  
The newly reconstituted Worada administrations with feeble local government structures are 
unable to maintain the rule of law and political order and this diminishes state legitimacy, 
generating instability and encouraging a culture of impunity. In these regions, cases of power 
abuse, nepotism, and arbitrary arrests and release on the basis of political expediency abound 
(Scott-Villiers et al., 2011; Feyissa, 2009). Moreover, lack of coordination among the law 
enforcement agencies such as the court, police and prosecutors undermines the relevance and 
legitimacy of each agency. The NGOs stepped into this vacuum:  
There is a particularly urgent need for such training in the newly reformed Worada administration in 
Itang. The Itang (Gambella) local administration is well known for its partisanship. Government 
officials and the police participated in the conflicts supporting their respective ethnic groups. As one 
of the largest mixed settlement areas, Itang was given special attention in peacebuilding in the region. 
Currently, there is a remarkable “peace energy” in the district that surrounds the euphoria on the 
restoration of the Worada. As “good governance” has become one of the buzz words in government 
circles there seems to be a favourable environment for organising training for the same. (Program 
Coordinator, Pact Ethiopia, November 2011).  
The NGOs supported capacity building in local government structures to lay the groundwork to 
build strong state institutions which would provide political order, the rule of law, and conditions 
allowing successful economic and political development.  
Thus, empowering these institutions was seen as a means of conflict resolution. 
5.6.5 Gender Issue  
 
In Borana, NGOs such as Care Ethiopia, Mercy Corps, AFD and GPDA have clarified their 
approaches on gender issues. Firstly, these NGOs argue that women are marginalised as a socio-
economic, political and cultural group and were thus prevented from participating meaningfully 
in any decision making processes. Secondly, some claim to have integrated a “gender balance” 
when nominating or promoting candidates for the peace committees and other positions at 
various levels. Likewise, in Gambella, NGOs such as Pact and ACORD focused on 
strengthening the capacity of women for participation in conflict resolution institutions. These 
NGOs, therefore, have been at the forefront of incorporating women in peace and development 
initiarives and have tried to maintain at least 33% women’s representation at all levels of their 
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organisational and operational structures (see, for example, AFD, 2009; Care, 2009a; Pact, 
2007). Most NGOs have established guidelines for quotas for women, focusing on gender 
equality and women’s empowerment, which emphasises the participation of women and men as 
being necessary for promoting peacebuilding and development. The detailed contribution and 
impact of these NGOs on women’s empowerment and their participation in peacebuilding 
activities is referred to in section 5.8.1 and section 5.9.3. 
5.6.6 Faith-based Peacebuilding Approach 
 
As indicated in chapter three (Section 3.1: 52-59), the Anywaa and Nuer ethnic groups dominate 
the dynamics of protracted ethnic conflicts in the Gambella regional states. These conflicts have 
also engulfed the churches, and as in the case of government institutions, the churches have been 
“captured” by ethnic or other group affiliations (Pax Christi, 2004). The Mekane Yesus church 
(part of Ethiopian Evangelical Churches Mekane Yesus) has the largest number of followers 
among the Anywaa and Nuer (WGBP, 2008). In 1992 the church was split along ethnic lines on 
issues related to differential access to resources and leadership. The split became more formal 
when both were accorded the status of synod by the national Mekane Yesus Church in 2001. The 
Western (Nuer) Gambella Bethel Presbytery (WGBP) has become a separate synod as a result of 
resentment at the Eastern (Anywaa) Gambella Bethel Presbytery (EGBP) (Pax Christi, 2004). 
This WGBP separation was grounded in the perception of injustice, fuelled by long-standing 
political tension. Apart from preaching the Gospel, the churches of all denominations have 
emphasised the importance of including community development and running small 
development projects (WGBP, 2008). When one of the church leaders was asked what factors 
motivated the church to work on peacebuilding, his reply was: 
 
When the conflict among the Nuer, Anuywaa and Majengir reached its peak, resulting in the killing of 
more than 150 people, the two church leaderships rose up with the initiative from the EECMYPC 
(Ethiopian Evangelical Church Mekane Yesus Peace Commission Office). In the earlier conflicts, the 
two leaderships seemed to play a limited role in conflict resolution. They were silent at times. After the 
first initiative from EECMY, the conflict issue has been taken as one of the core objectives of the two 
churches. We cannot live without having compassion and Christian love for one another. Both 
leaderships realised that they had to work together to live in peace. (Church Leader, WGBP, 
December 2011).  
 
NGOs such as ACORD, Pact Ethiopia and HEKs supported the churches’ peacebuilding 
initiatives and used them as an entry point for further peacebuilding efforts. These NGOs suggest 
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that targeting such pre-existing networks is not only critical for peacebuilding, but was the most 
effective method of stimulating and maintaining commitment to collective action. One major and 
effective strategy that the churches used to bridge the two communities was to institutionalise 
cross-ethnic projects into the dominant peacebuilding toolkit. These projects include the 
establishment of the Joint Development Office and a Joint Peace Committee under the auspices 
of HEKs. The Joint Peace Committee initiative, supported by EECMYPC and other NGOs such 
as the Ethiopian Catholic Church Social and Development Coordinating Office of Gambella 
(ECC/SDCO), has resulted in the establishment of the Gambella Peace and Development 
Council (GPDC). Whilst the GPDC was set up with a mandate of joint planning and 
implementation of peacebuilding projects, the Joint Development Office was entrusted with 
initiating inter-ethnic development programmes aimed at enhancing Anywaa-Nuer relations. The 
GPDC was effective in staging a joint Nuer and Anywaa Peace Choir that draw attention from 
the two ethnic groups. According to one of the informants:  
  
In 2004, a joint peace choir was set up. In fact, it was not an easy task because of the language 
barrier. They travelled along with the GPDC which was involved in peacebuilding conferences and 
dialogue. The choir intended to build the relationship between the two communities in Itang, Lare, 
Abobo and Pinyido. They were welcomed by the Itang Parishes and congregations of both Synods, 
Kebele administrations, police, and delegated members from the neighbouring districts of Jikoaw and 
Alouro Openo. They presented dramas on the parable of the Good Samaritan in the Gospel (aimed at 
conveying a message that one should love one’s neighbours) and sang spiritual songs in both 
languages and inspired the participants of the meetings. It was the first time that the two 
congregations came together for Sunday Worship. For many people, this was unthinkable but with the 
help of God it was possible. For example, the Choir won the hearts and the minds of the people… 
invited even by the Regional Government to give their blessing for peace conferences. The impact was 
also felt at individual level: people said, ‘I am Simon by name not by being an Anywaa; I am Jonah by 
name not by being a Nuer’. The same is with religion; we may originate from different families and 
different villages but we all worship the same God. [The] participants were encouraged openly to 
discuss the root causes of conflict and seek out solutions. The conference set up nine peace committees 
and entrusted them with the task of peacebuilding and reconstructing dismantled Anywaa churches 
(during conflict) and opened them for both congregations. (Church leader, WGBP, December 
2011). 
 
The central role that religion plays in the individual and collective peacebuilding initiatives is 
evident from the above quote. Several informants emphasised that inter-faith peacebuilding 
schemes were the most effective way of stimulating collective action for peace. This was 
because religious values can motivate people either to fight or to reconcile (Abu-Nimer, 2001). 
Similarly, religious rituals can be powerful tools in transforming animosity into cooperation. 
Mutual trust and interdependence can easily be turned into inter-group solidarity for planning 
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and carrying out collective action to bridge ethnic divisions (Abu-Nimer, 2001). Individuals 
operating on a religious or spiritual basis are often better equipped than political leaders to reach 
people at the level of the individual and subnational group. The qualitative data shed light on 
this: 
 
A Pastors’ and Evangelists’ peacebuilding workshop was conducted in November 2004, in the 
compound of Western (Nuer) Gambella Bethel Presbytery (WGBP). This was the first time that the two 
Synods’ pastors and Evangelists were brought together since their split in 1992. Moreover, members 
of the other ethnic groups such as Majengir, Opo and Highlanders were invited. The training involved 
60 participants from both Synods with the aim of bringing the Synods together to discuss openly and 
identify the root sources of the conflict. This training was supported by the government and NGOs. 
For example, the Vice President of the region, Ato/ Keat Tuach, was invited to inaugurate the 
workshop, and he encouraged the two Synods to work together on peace. The closing ceremony was 
accompanied by an event whereby the participants were encouraged to write down their sins on a 
piece of paper: these included sins committed as an individual or as a community towards the other 
community. The pieces of paper were collected and put into container and burnt. This meant they had 
got rid of the sins they had committed and could open a new beginning for reconciliation. Participants 
spoke that they would like to seek peace. (Church leader, WGBP, December 2011). 
 
The church has been given the assignment by the Lord to declare God’s forgiveness to men and 
women who are repentant (Abu-Nimer, 2001). Before people can be repentant they must 
acknowledge the sins of which they are guilty. A pastor makes the Gospel relevant to the issues 
that people are concerned about. The use of rituals and sermons for reconciliation and 
forgiveness can provide another set of principles for collective action. This can also be used for 
“meeting the other” and for enriching the perspective of all participants. Participants 
acknowledged the notion that the positive religious values that support peacebuilding and 
critiquing exclusionist values in one’s own religion pave the way for learning conflict analysis; 
this is the first step in dealing with any conflict (Lederach, 1999). For the church leaders and 
NGOs the moral legitimacy of the church, with its stance of enhancing reconciliation among the 
devotees, was a real source for building the cultural and social capital necessary for building 
inter-group relations. Moreover, partnership with the church lent a moral legitimacy to the local 
government’s capacity to manage conflict:    
 
At the wake of the December massacre and the humanitarian crisis that ensued, the government was 
desperate to calm the situation. It has sought to use the good image of the GPDC derived from its 
contribution to Anywaa-Nuer peace to stabilize the situation, and particularly to bring the Anuak 




Churches stand out as the main civil organisations engaged in peace promotion in the area. In 
recent years, there has been a rising interest in how religion can be used in the conflict resolution 
and peacebuilding processes (Abu-Nimer, 2001; Lederach, 1999). Lederach’s (1999) faith-based 
conflict, transformation and peacebuilding model is oriented toward restorative justice. Scholars 
and practitioners have recognised the critical influence of religious attributes in the escalation 
and de-escalation of conflicts; these play an equally important role in conflict resolution.  
 
According to one informant, the establishment of separate ethnic-based settlement areas, 
including institutions of faith and development associations, reinforces divisions and differences 
and thereby perpetuates tensions. Recognising this, the Joint Development Committee initiated 
various cross-ethnic development projects: 
The NGOs supported Echuey and intervened in the neighbouring Pinykiw area where the Anywaa and 
the Nuer have lived harmoniously for years but where social peace has been disrupted since 2002. 
These NGOs facilitated a peace dialogue among the Anywaa and Nuer and initiated joint micro-
agricultural schemes such as joint vegetable gardens. They also facilitated the process of Echuey 
Anywaa returnees through dialogue with the community and Worada administration; 65 homes were 
reconstructed by the Anywaa and Nuers (communities previously in conflict). This activity had the 
purpose of healing the relationship between the two communities. (Program Coordinator, ACORD, 
November 2011).  
Apart from the provision of social services and reconstruction of social amenities, the church 
also runs a participatory forest management initiative, which promotes a dialogue between the 
community and the local government to ensure ultimate ownership of the forest by the 
community. The church, under the auspices of NGOs, also introduced alternative income 
generating activities among the Majangir in order to discourage forestland sale (Pact, 2008).  
5.6.7 Conclusion  
In concluding this sub-section on the faith-based peacebuilding approach, it appears that several 
NGOs are engaged in the institutionalisation of peacebuilding apparatus to handle conflict and 
build cross-cutting ties. There seems to be some linkage such as the establishment of the Joint 
Development Office and the establishment of a joint choir. Several NGOs worked with the Joint 
Development Office in its peace building projects. The establishment of the Nuer and Anywaa 
Council of Churches for Peace and Development has been very encouraging, although it is still 
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in its formative stage and NGOs need to give support to its further development. The detailed 
contribution and impact of these NGOs towards conflict resolution is referred to in section 5.7. 
The preceding sections have presented some of the contributions of the various NGOs. The 
multi-faceted dimensions of indigenous empowerment have been unfolded through 
re/institutionalisation of customary institutions. 
 
The following subsection focuses on the nature and impact of conflict resolution in the Gambella 
region.    
 
5.7 Theme F: Multi-Track Conflict Resolution  
 
Conflict resolution initiatives are unfolded in the following themes: (1) initiating and facilitating 
dialogue among opposition political parties; (2) peacebuilding efforts at middle-range; (3) 
peacebuilding from below; (4) grass-roots peacebuilding initiatives; and, (5) the need for 
effective ‘Track One’ processes with government involvement.  
 
This section focuses on the peacebuilding initiatives of NGOs across the three levels in the 
Gambella Regional State. When focusing on grass-roots peace initiatives, some NGOs adopted a 
combination of Track One (regional political parties) and Track Two (religious leaders and 
ethnic groups) approaches in dealing with protracted conflict. These approaches offer classic 
examples of how Lederach’s (1997) “pyramidal model” for conflict transformation was 
employed synergistically to address conflict. There is evidence that suggests a coordinated 
“horizontal” and “vertical” relationship across the three levels that adapted to effect “pyramidal 
participation”. Hence, the focus is on how the creation of neutral environments and 
empowerment of ordinary people contribute towards peacebuilding in the new dispensation. The 
following sub-sections demonstrate how Track One, Track Two and Track Three initiatives were 
sought to address conflict in the two regions.   
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Figure 7. Lederach's Pyramid and Multi-Track Conflict Resolution Approach in Gambella 
 
Source: Adapted from Lederach (1997: 39) 
5.7.1 Track One-Initiating and Facilitating Dialogue among Opposition Political Parties 
 
As indicated in section 3.1: 52-59, the GPDUP (the Nuer-based Gambella People’s Democratic 
Unity Party) and the GPLP (Anywaa-based Gambella People’s Liberation Party) are locked in 
conflict and dominate the region’s conflict dynamics over political power and representation, 
indigeneity, and other issues. Track One peace initiatives and dividends have failed to trickle 
down to mid-level leaders and grass-roots community leaders, and have therefore not led to 
durable settlements. In the absence of formal political institutions that guide political 
negotiations, political elites used ethnicity to mobilise groups to achieve political goals, thereby 
leading to protracted violent conflicts (Kaufman, 2001; Lake and Rothchild, 1998). An absence 
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of inter-ethnic trust and a lack of a supportive political environment gave rise to “all-or-nothing” 
power struggles (Bratton, 1989a; Bratton and de Walle, 1996). Feyissa (2007: 74) summarised 
the situation as follows:  
The way the regional politics is organized, it is devoid of a scenario of win-win outcomes. Group 
interest is framed in terms of ‘the code of group amity” in reference to “the code of out-group 
enmity”. That is how collective actors design their security, as if inter-ethnic peace depends on intra-
ethnic conflict.             
 
The latent ethnic rivalry resulted in mounting tension, spilling over to the Anywaa and the Nuer 
communities.  
After protracted political tension between the GPDUP and the GPLP, deadly conflict broke between 
the Anywaa and the Nuer in 2002. The trigger of the conflict was a petty quarrel over soap along the 
Baro River in Itang district but by then the stage was already set for a major confrontation between 
the two. This conflict spread from Itang to Gambella town and other mixed settlement areas. The 
scale of violence involved public transport ambushes, throwing hand grenades and destruction of 
entire villages. (Feyissa, 2007: 30).             
 
The focus of political negotiation over this conflict continued to be on politically influential 
individuals, sponsored by government, rather than on community leaders and ordinary people. 
As part of its “conflict resolution mechanism”, the federal government took a series of political 
measures: high-ranking officials, including the president, were imprisoned; parties were 
dissolved and restructured under a single umbrella of EPRDF (ruling party); members of the 
regional police who were accused of inciting and participating in the violence (largely Anywaa) 
were jailed or dismissed from their jobs; and, the contentious multi-ethnic district was abolished 
and divided between the Nuer and the Anywaa districts (Feyissa, 2007: 31). These measures, 
however, were insufficient to address the resentment and the sources that generated it. This 
prepared the stage for an armed rebellion:  
The political measures taken by the federal government, on the other hand, have alienated a large 
segment of Anywaa society. In fact, what is dubbed as Anywaa banditry that gradually evolved into an 
armed rebellion is largely organised activity of ex-Anywaa police who were dismissed from their jobs. 
Failing to sustain their own family and claiming to represent Anywaa discontent, the ex-police officers 
have resorted to violence against not only government establishments but also civilian highlanders. 
This has happened because of the categorical association between the highlanders and the Ethiopian 
state. (Feyissa, 2007: 31). 
 
In the government-led approach the root causes were not addressed and genuine negotiation did 
not take place; these factors protracted the conflict. A political vacuum was created and the 




NGOs such as ACORD, Pact Ethiopia, and GPDC were involved in a variation of Track One 
initiatives aimed at overcoming the protracted political tension between the two ethnic-based 
political parties; the GPDUP and the GPLP. These initiatives emphasised creation of an enabling 
atmosphere, which included the creation of neutral environments and welcoming spaces for the 
parties: 
Within these terms of government-sponsored negotiation, we facilitated inter-party dialogue to 
negotiate differences and diffuse tensions. (NGO director, October 2011).     
 
There was consensus among informants that NGOs had no overt influence on the political 
process at top-level. According to one of the informants: 
There was no way that NGOs could replace the dominant party (EPRDF) and broker political 
negotiation. Whatever role NGOs could play at this level must be sanctioned by the government. 
(NGO director, October 2011). 
 
However, there was greater agreement that the NGOs did lay the groundwork for building upon 
government-initiated peace processes. This focused on facilitating a channel of communication 
between influential leaders of antagonistic ethnic groups. This initiative prepared the ground for 
a negotiated settlement for the recurring conflict. The NGOs played a central role in paving the 
way for politicians to get back to the table for dialogue. One respondent indicated that:  
…we facilitated a peace dialogue between the Anywaa and the Nuer …….. influential leaders so that 
they can negotiate their concerns on…the issue of political power and security. The 
dialogue…generated optimism that more negotiations could be carried out to address one of the root 
causes of intra-ethnic conflict in the area. (NGO project coordinator, December 2011). 
 
Feyissa (2007: 20) argued the optimistic political environment was “established by default, 
rather than by design”. Tadesse (2007) regarded state coercion and force, and formal 
negotiations at the top-level as a turning point. There was consensus that the new dispensation 
created a new discourse of peace and provided an alternative model for public debate. Once this 
was accepted into the political debate, the NGOs made use of the optimistic political 
environment of peace to engage with the elite who are connected to the political leadership as 
well as the ordinary people (Pact, 2006a). The shift in discourse among the ordinary people, from 
the language of violence to peace, was used to further peacebuilding efforts at middle-range and 
grass-roots levels. Therefore, Track Two and people-to-people initiatives followed from the 
Track One initiatives.   
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5.7.2 Track Two Peacebuilding Initiatives  
 
Track Two peacebuilding initiatives were organised by the South Ethiopian Evangelical Church 
Synods, as well as by representatives of the NGO sector, such as HEKs and Pact Ethiopia, to link 
to the negotiations and the larger political process. This development has already been referred to 
in this chapter (Sub-section 5.6.5:159-163). In addition, the Gambella Peace and Development 
Council (GPDC), a consortium of eleven inter-faith groups and the Gambella Intellectuals’ 
Association
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 (GIA) were set up to promote peace, tolerance and co-existence. The church and 
the NGOs joined forces in convening a peace conference as part of bridging the two 
communities. The Anywaa and the Nuer political leaders therefore joined this plan and set up a 
committee that was fairly representative in terms of ethnic groups. Various key participants from 
NGOs, GIA, and the churches played their part in setting up the alternative dispute resolution 
apparatus:  
…significant change is that elites of the antagonistic ethnic groups which in the past were part of the 
conflict and who were polarised in accordance with their ethnic group started to come together and 
analyse the problem of cyclic conflict in the region. They also started to undertake activities aimed at 
resolving conflicts in a coordinated way, resulting in a decrease of occurrence of conflict between 
Nuer and Anywaa. (NGO staff, December 2011). 
 
Mention should be made of the role of the Group Four Initiative (GFI) which is an independent 
peacebuilding body that consists of four intra-Nuer ethnic groups: a Gaajok, a Gaaguang and two 
Gaajak. Thus, the peace process reached a turning point when the GFI was set up to mediate and 
facilitate a series of peace dialogues between political elites at different levels. For instance, the 
GFI and the GIA organised, in collaboration with other NGOs, numerous forums and debates on 
underdevelopment and conflict transformation issues (WGBS, 2008). They also facilitated inter-
ethnic peace dialogues between the Gaajak elites, between the Gaajak and the Gaajok, and 
between the Nuer and Anywaa elites to diffuse the rising tension. Furthermore, there were 
attempts to transfer these initiatives to the grass-roots level and to impact public discourse on a 
wider scale through various peace conferences and the mass media.  
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5.7.3 Track Three: Peacebuilding from Below  
Parallel to the Track Two peace process, NGOs facilitated Track Three peacebuilding initiatives 
involving grass-roots community leaders and ordinary citizens. The NGOs played a central role 
in helping those at the grass-roots level to participate in the peacebuilding initiatives. For 
example, when ex-police officers and students resorted to violence against government’s 
“indiscriminate killings” in 2002, it was ordinary people such as traditional elders, families of the 
“rebels” and victims who were involved in a variation of Track Three initiatives; they negotiated 
a political settlement between the government and “rebels”. Also, they mediated the legitimate 
concerns of both parties such as the issue of amnesty and guaranteeing the safety of the Anywaa 
“rebels” as well as the issue of disarmament. One of the informants described the peace process 
as follows:  
 
After a series of instability and conflict, there was the emerging hopeful atmosphere of peace…we 
used this opportunity for carrying out further peacebuilding activities to de-polarise the situation. We 
facilitated a general conference for peace dialogue…they agreed to bring the “children” [also called 
rebels] home. Secondly, to work with the government in granting the children amnesty so that they 
would be reintegrated to the community. They elected a team of community elders’ comprising 
“highlanders”, government figures and women to commence the peace process. Government also 
played a significant role in sanctioning amnesty and guaranteeing the safety of the “rebels”. In the 
negotiation processes, the traditional elders and the families of the rebels, from Anywaa communities, 
also played an important role in brokering a peace deal between the government and rebels. They 
conveyed the message of the government [to the rebels] that it would not take any retaliatory 
measures; ……… willingness of the government to grant them amnesty if they were disarmed and 
abandoned the insurgence. …the government didn’t take any [retaliatory] measures. The rebel group 
disbanded; the students went back to schools; the policemen were reinstated into their previous posts, 
the farmers went back to their villages, all were brought back to their livelihoods. In the process, they 
realised that they were part of the government body, and the government even offered them job 
opportunities. Had the government broken its word (amnesty), the problem could have been 
exacerbated and the rebels could have returned into the jungle. (NGO programme manager, 
December 2011). 
 
Several informants from this region could point to some critical impact, in which these initiatives 
played a significant role. One of the major achievements was to bring the parties together for 
discussions. They worked at finding the root sources of conflict and at resolving it; they ate 
together, rebels integrated into the community and roads that had been closed because of the 
conflict were reopened. Even the government military force learned the importance of dialogue 
and negotiation:  
…the rebels fled to the jungle with weapons and they fought back [against] the military, which was 
sent to crack down on them. But it led to loss of life on both sides. However, on their way back to 
Gambella town the military realised the risk of an ambush and decided to open a dialogue for making 
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peace to avoid being ambushed. They raised money to prepare meals, and after protracted negotiation 
the rebels guaranteed them safe passage and joined them for a meal. (NGO Project manager, 
December 2011). 
 
Another contribution of the NGOs was to offer training in business skills following the 
demobilisation of all child soldiers and to engage in cross-border trade; many soldiers opened 
shops. One of the informants described the reason for supporting the child soldiers:  
…following the peace agreement between the government and the rebels, a number of child soldiers 
came home. Without any real prospects for schooling, marketable skills or job opportunities, there 
exists a risk of these children again resorting to violence or being recruited into fighting groups. We 
offered them entrepreneurships and small business skills to start trade…we encouraged those who 
were interested, to go back to school. (NGO staff, December 2011). 
 
According to Feyissa (2007), however, this optimistic mood was short-lived. In January 2006, 
some of the repatriated youth were arrested because of their alleged link with a “surreptitious” 
political movement. This turn of events dashed the confidence that had been created.  
5.7.4 Grass-roots Peacebuilding Initiatives  
 
NGOs such as GPDC, Pax Christi Netherland, ACORD and Pact Ethiopia were among the first 
to recognise and harness the potential of using sport to promote peace, after the 2003 conflict. 
These NGOs funded games and tournaments between school teams, which are often from 
communities with different ethnic groups. Participation in sports can break down stereotypes, 
transform negative attitudes about “the others”, and empower communities to create a less 
conflict-prone society:  
 
NGOs were the first to organise football games among youth from the five ethnic groups in Gambella 
and the neighbouring ethnic groups. Some of the sport activities focus on the promotion of a specific 
sport like football…it also incorporates an aspect of social integration and reconciliation through 
games and tournaments between school teams. It targeted schools with multi-ethnic groups that have 
been sites of violent conflict for years. We organised a public rally involving the youth, women, and 
all sectors of the society. We prepared and distributed sport kits such as t-shirts with slogans of 
“peace”. You don’t believe me; the public rally had become an eye-opener. It was an indication of 
the existence of the seeds of peace. It made us optimistic about the possibility of building peace in the 
area. Then, we organised a football match among mixed ethnic groups. These games brought youth 
from different ethnic backgrounds to play in the same team. Sport offers an easy and low-cost 
interaction opportunity in which the rules of interaction and socialisation are clear. (NGO Project 
manager, December 2011). 
 
In addition to funding sports activities that aim at creating cross-cutting ties, NGOs also 
collaborated with local community groups, artists, and government bodies and arranged music 
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concerts. This project showed that participants in a concert create a space for interaction and 
their attitudes and behaviour can assist. Also, the public performance of a concert can have an 
impact on the audience: 
  
As a result of a number of years living in conflict, there seems to be a conflict fatigue among the 
ordinary men and women who have shouldered the brunt of the violence. Pact has helped generate 
“peace rhetoric” through highlighting the peace motif through music, arts and sports. The September 
2006 high-profile Peace Day concert was a case in point. Following the concert, people euphorically 
spoke of the end of violence, referring the era “before the concert” and “after the concert”. People 
who once considered each other deadly enemies got into “a hugging mood”. In the months after the 
concert, the trend has been to externalise blame of conflict to outside sources. This symbolic act of 
scapegoating might not address the root causes of the conflict, but nevertheless in a polarised society 
such as Gambella, it is relevant. (Pact’s IMPACT Bulletin, 2006:3).  
 
Gidron, Katz and Hasenfeld (2002) underscored the significance of cultural activities in 
addressing conflict and seeking alternative non-violent solutions. It would appear that the concert 
introduced a new way in which conflict is interpreted and it presented an alternative image of 
cross-community relations. In a case study example from South Africa, however, Höglund and 
Sundberg (2008) cautioned not to ascribe too much weight to symbolism derived from sport as a 
tool for reconciliation. According to these authors the integrative and bridging functions of these 
initiatives are momentary events, coming and going quickly. Despite some criticism, the Peace 
Concert increased the confidence of the NGOs in initiating innovative approaches to 
peacebuilding.     
5.7.5 The Need for Effective “Track One” Processes: Government Involvement 
  
Several informants indicated that although the peace facilitation went very well with some 
results trickling down to the grass-roots level, the big challenge was that the peacebuilding 
initiatives only took into account the day-to-day manifestation of the conflict: 
There has been a relative peace, though fragile, between Anywaa and Nuer… otherwise the conflict is 
latent in as much as the root causes are not tackled. Four years on, the question of Anywaa Internally 
Displaced Persons has not yet been addressed. (Pact, 2006b: 37). 
 
This latent tension became manifest in October 2006 when road construction workers were 
killed, followed by a series of indiscriminate killings of highlanders (Feyissa, 2007). The tension 
escalated until the federal army intervened to manage and de-escalate the conflict. A project 
manager working in a conflict resolution project summed up the role of government in the 
following way:   
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In this area, whatever peace there is, is marked by the absence of conflict, usually imposed by 
“Mekelakeya” (Ethiopian National Defense Force).The very presence of the “Mekelakeya” in town 
had brought about some kind of peace. (NGO Project manager, December 2011).  
 
This demonstrated the coercive power of the military in the de-escalation of conflict and bringing 
temporary peace. This is important given the intractability of conflicts that often spread quickly 
and reach across wide areas. Even where there has been relative stability, the presence of the 
military continues to play a critical role in mitigating and containing conflict:  
Nothing explains this more than the highlanders’ panic early January 2006 when the existing defense 
force left the town for replacement. The entire highlander community was going to leave as well, but 
the Red Cross calmed the situation. (Pact, 2006b: 19). 
 
This statement clearly demonstrates that NGOs could play a significant role in addressing fears 
and suspicion, by responding quickly to events that could instigate violent conflict. Given the 
history of deep-rooted conflicts in the region, the government will continue to play crucial roles 
in preventing, containing and ending violent conflict.                                                                                                                                                                                   
5.7.6 Conclusion 
 
The preceding section highlighted how Track One, Track Two and Track Three approaches 
worked synergistically and played key roles in addressing the conflict. The Track One initiative 
related to political leaders from the GPDUP and the GPLP. This initiative emphasised the 
creation of an enabling atmosphere, including the creation of neutral environments for the 
parties. In an attempt to link Track One negotiation outcomes with Track Two and Track Three 
constituencies, the NGOs involved middle-range representatives of conflicting parties for face-
to-face dialogue. The Gambella Peace and Development Council (GPDC), and Gambella 
Intellectuals’ Association talks are an example of this. Another example would be a dialogue 
between the Western (Nuer) Gambella Bethel Presbytery (WGBP) and the Eastern (Anywaa) 
Gambella Bethel Presbytery (EGBP). Track Three initiatives of NGOs involved traditional 
elders, families of the “rebels”, and victims of the conflict. One could argue that all the three 
levels have, to some degree, helped to manage and resolve conflict in the communities. 
Nonetheless, there are NGOs specially geared for Track Three initiatives. At this level, the 
emphasis is on training grass-roots leaders and “key actors” in the skills and concepts of conflict 
resolution and peacebuilding. Thus, they all have roles to play within their own communities and 
spread their experiences. The following sub-section will discuss the peacebuilding initiatives of 
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NGOs at the grass-roots level. The focus is on how empowerment and capacity building of the 
ordinary citizens contributes towards peacebuilding.  
 
5.8. Theme G: Inter/intra-ethnic Relations 
 
The issue of inter/intra-ethnic relations has the following two major themes: training as a part of 
an inter/intra-ethnic relations initiative and the beneficiaries’ perceptions of NGO services. 
5.8.1 Training as a part of an inter/intra-ethnic Relations Initiative  
Respondents from the NGO sector who are involved in conflict resolution training focused on 
the following: the problem of defining and determining the content of training; the rationale for 
cross-ethnic training; training as a part of capacity building and empowerment; training as part of 
a social bridging initiative; and, involving “key actors” as “ambassadors of peace”.  
 The problem of defining and determining the content of training 
 
Indigenous conflict management mechanisms influence strongly the approach towards “joint 
training” projects in the regions. Some organaisations have difficulties in adopting the 
conventional term “training” because of its association with a prescriptive approach, where the 
trainer assumes an expert role (Lederach, 1995; Fisher, 1997). A director of a capacity building 
unit, with wide experience of facilitating joint training programmes, offered an account that 
resonates with Lederach’s (1997) elicitive approach. This latter approach draws on indigenous 
knowledge that echoes the work advanced by Lederach (1997):    
 
In strict sense of the term, it is very difficult to call it “training” because we, as “trainer”, do not 
claim to possess many of the skills or concepts to be imparted on the participants. We don’t have a 
specific model or module or many new skills that weren’t already in their system…for example 
information exchange on potential cattle raiding…could be called conflict analysis, frameworks of 
conflict analysis; investigating accusations and incidents or following up could go along the line of 
conflict management…are all entwined in their daily life. Probably, what is new in our approach is, 
we promoted the inclusion of women and youth, and put gender issues, and human rights principles on 
the agenda… [in] accordance with the Constitution of the country. We facilitated dialogues across 
conflict lines for negotiations. Most of these concepts are already intertwined within the cultural 
knowledge of a people. They are responsible for generating or devising the training models that are 
suitable in their locale and the consequences of the negotiation strategies they have chosen. (NGO 
director of a capacity building unit, December 2011). 
 
This clearly demonstrates, as Lederach (1995a) proposed, the emphasis the NGO placed on 
identifying “cultural modalities and resources” and the indigenous knowledge and skills that the 
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participants possess to deal with conflict within their own societal settings. For example, training 
themes such as daimtu (information sharing and investigation) can be termed early warning and 
conflict analysis. These resources gave NGOs more confidence in initiating contacts and 
building relationships between antagonistic ethnic groups. Furthermore, since NGOs were 
already active in the provision of services, they were pressured to work to reduce violence and 
increase dialogue. They used their formal and informal contacts with the community leaders and 
key actors to initiate dialogue as a peace strategy that would enable the main antagonists to find a 
political settlement to the recurrent conflict.  
 The rationale for cross-ethnic training-initiating dialogue  
 
As previously indicated (Section 5.3.3: 121-123), several respondents argued that NGOs 
developed contact and relationship-building capabilities because of the escalation of violence, 
which threatened their own operations. After violent conflict, NGOs worked to encourage 
dialogue at cross-ethnic level in the belief that it would prepare the ground for a negotiated 
solution to the conflict. The coordinator of an NGO working in cross-ethnic training highlighted 
how important it was to initiate cross-community work at the time:   
 
They were sharing neither water nor pasture, even though the drought was very severe. They had been 
apart for almost ten years. One side had grazing and the other had water and neither group would 
share with the other. Before the conflict they used to interact and marry, do business together, and 
trade a lot of sheep and livestock, but there have been cold-hearted relations between them. 
Rebuilding those relationships were vital for building resilience towards the recurrent drought and 
diversifying livelihoods…for survival of the pastoralist livelihood. Furthermore, such a divide 
undermines our limited contribution to development because they depend on one another…the reason 
people fight is because they are very poor. We supported them to open up small trade across the 
borders. The long-term strategy was rebuilding relationships across ethnic lines for sharing 
information and economic generation. We wanted to break the silence and initiate dialogue and build 
the capacity and skills of the participants to spread peace to the grass-roots. (NGO programme 
Coordinator, November 2011). 
 
Thus it would appear that initiating contact and dialogue between the conflicting parties was 
given high priority. In doing so, the NGO broke a major blockade in the cross-communities 
relationships. Once enabling environments for dialogue were created, the parties agreed on 
creating joint ideas for conflict resolution, with a positive effect on de-escalating and resolving 
the conflict. In other words, the NGOs were successful at reinitiating and re-activating the 
cultural toolkit available for negotiation to respond to and resolve the conflict. This laid the 
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groundwork for further negotiations for bridging gaps in intra and inter-ethnic conflict resolution 
mechanisms.  
 Training for bridging gaps in cross-ethnic conflict resolution mechanisms 
 
The training aimed to create joint ideas for conflict resolution activities. An NGO programme 
coordinator described the importance of the training as follows:   
Each ethnic group has its own mechanisms for resolving disputes and has its negotiation strategy for 
managing access to key resources and for resolving disputes…but it has begun to change over recent 
decades. At the moment, the causes of conflict have become diverse and complex…and it is insufficient 
to deal with the inter-ethnic conflicts...they needed to draw new by-laws… build on the old ones. We 
facilitated joint training programmes…we provide a working environment…participants were drawn 
from many different communities…reflect on their own attitudes and assumptions, their own 
underlying interests, concerns and fears, their own goals and ideals. (NGO programme 
Coordinator, November 2011). 
We offered little support or follow-up to negotiate or to strengthen the existing intra-ethnic conflict 
management…they agreed to form a new cross-ethnic peace committee that would represent them and 
set up information exchange mechanisms, law and surveillance…they also drafted and ratified agreed-
upon by-laws to govern and arbitrate future disputes. (NGO Project manager, December 2011). 
In the context of multiethnic training programmes, Lederach (1995a) suggests an elicitive 
training approach to fill the cultural “gaps”. The training created an opportunity for activating the 
moral authority of those customary institutions that govern cross-ethnic ties over access to 
resources.  
Another important facet of training is capacity building and empowerment of participants.  
 Training as capacity building and empowerment  
Most NGOs are aware of the need for empowering community members locally, through training 
and capacity building strategies, so that people are able to handle issues themselves. The NGOs 
are keen to train and build their capacity through conflict resolution training projects with the 
following objectives: 
Women were included in peace meetings…they were being employed in peacebuilding by various 
groups…youth were trained in entrepreneurships skills. The elders improved governance and 
management of natural resources; increased opportunities for income diversification; enhanced 
alternative livelihoods; increased participation of pastoralists in development planning; enhanced 
decision-making for pastoralist communities in development activities; and, improved development 
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planning for pastoral areas, sustainable development and Human Rights. These approaches are the 
best use of scarce funding resources for peacebuilding. As a result, useful skills become resources for 
peacebuilding. (NGO programme Coordinator, November 2011). 
It would appear that the training incorporates the elements creating opportunities for youth and 
women’s participation, providing skills for alternative dispute resolution, as well as community 
development. This form of training is generally geared towards empowering people to carry out 
development planning and enhancing alternative livelihoods for their own communities. Another 
vital aspect of the training is that it helps social bridging. 
 Training as building social bridging  
While some training focused on building an individual’s capacity for bridging cross-community 
gaps or for resolving conflict, other training sought to influence the attitude and beliefs of “key 
actors”:     
They all want peace, but they have fears of raids and ambushes by the other…have little information 
about the intention of the other and that is why they have these problems and doubts…they had 
stopped sharing vital resources due to fear and mistrust. Everyone was ready with his gun cocked. 
They hear bad news about the other parties’ intentions. The objective of the joint training was to 
enhance collaboration and trust among these groups and reduce suspicion and mistrust among the 
various ethnic communities living across the border. They agreed once again that there should be 
peace, trade and resource sharing between them. They decided to rebuild cross-border governments 
and communities to strengthen relationships and actively participate in resolving and preventing 
violent conflict. (NGO programme Coordinator, November 2011). 
The focus of the training is on building relationships and trust across conflict lines, facilitating 
cross-ethnic trade and resource sharing. This development has been referred to in sub-section 
5.8.2.3: 194-198. At grass-roots level, conflicting ethnic groups started sharing resources and 
furthermore, cross-border trade is burgeoning.  
 Involving “key actors”: “ambassadors of peace” 
When asked why joint training primarily targeted “key actors” of conflicting groups rather than a 
broader community, the response was:   
They are with the elders. We have had so many meetings with some of the participants. Participants 
have generally been drawn from the grass-roots...we call these elders, women and youth the 
ambassadors of peace. Most of the participants have never held meetings together before, others are 
meeting for the first time and they still have their own conflicts with them. These people have 
distinctive kinds of access to those with whom they speak, in many cases having trust and common 
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language at their disposal, while also having the regular biases of their groups. They have very high 
levels of influence. People believe that elders are elected because they have the character and skills to 
behave as they should, and they also have faith in the training that elders get when they are part of the 
system. (NGO programme Coordinator, November 2011). 
 
The “key actors” orientation of the NGOs led them to target people who influence the conflict 
dynamics; they did not target ordinary people.   
 The limit of the “trickle-down” effect  
 
When asked if changes at the personal level were translated into action at the grass-roots level, 
an informant explained:   
As to the measures taken so far to contain the occurrence of violent inter-and intra-ethnic 
conflict….various dialogue forums have been conducted at different levels up to the village level. And 
these actors are promoting dialogue and peaceful settlement of conflicts in a better way than before. 
But, still these activities need to be carried out in a systematic and sustainable manner. (NGO 
programme Coordinator, November 2011). 
 
The evidence from the FGD suggests that this did not happen, at least not automatically, and that 
“spillover” cannot be assumed. However, the long-term impact remains there to be seen (Section 
5.8.2.1: 178-185). 
The following sections will examine whether this could contribute more effectively to reducing 
tension and generating a sustainable and meaningful form of inter-ethnic cooperation; this would 
include restoring cross-cutting ties and reducing suspicions.  
5.8.2 Has Peacebuilding made a difference?  Examining the Beneficiaries’ Perceptions of 
NGO Services 
 
This section examines the beneficiaries’ perceptions of NGO services. The findings are linked to 
the quantitative questions in Appendix E. They respond to objective 4 of the study: that is, to 
ascertain the communities’ perceptions and experience of the NGO programmes. The underlying 
assumption was that all NGO interventions have both positive and negative impacts on the 
beneficiaries’ lives, livelihoods and inter-group conflicts. Moreover, depending on their 
particular worldviews and experience of violence, different beneficiaries provide different types 
of information for an impact assessment. As stated in the previous chapter (Section 4.1: 74), the 
approach adopted for presenting the findings is triangulation, where findings from various data 
sources are integrated. The quantitative findings are presented and then compared and contrasted 
with the findings from the qualitative and secondary data resources. Furthermore, they are 
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discussed in the light of the theoretical underpinnings of the study as well as related literature. A 
summary of key findings is presented at the end of the section.  
The sub-section sketches some of the key findings from the three-part survey that aimed at 
evaluating the perception of the beneficiaries toward the NGOs’ services. The first part of the 
survey explores the impact of the NGOs on “individual development”. This cluster includes two 
dependent variables: these are involvement in peacebuilding activities, and change in the level of 
the incidence of conflict. The second part examines respondents’ perceptions of “social 
bridging” schemes, such as cross-ethnic contact, trust, tolerance and social prejudice. The third 
part explores the respondents’ evaluations of the NGOs’ livelihoods enhancement programmes, 
including their assessments of the extent of improvement, such as alleviating the economic and 
social consequences of conflict. More specifically, these include change in the level of household 
income, reconstruction of physical and economic infrastructures, and cooperation in cross-
community development. 
5.8.2.1 “Individual development” 
 Conflict resolution training and individual development for peacebuilding 
 
Conflict resolution training attempts to impact participants’ skills and concepts (Fisher, 1997). It 
also attempts to challenge collective narratives and memories about the dynamics of conflict 
(Salomon, 2004) and “change people’s hearts and minds”. Finally, this training helps to address 
entrenched patterns that characterise conflict habituated systems (Diamond, 1997), empowering 
trainees to explore, analyse and reframe their interests (Chigas, 1997), and create an enabling 
environment for negotiation (Lederach, 1997). As indicated above (Section 5.8.1: 173-174), the 
NGOs operating in the study areas brought together individuals from opposing groups and 
offered them conflict resolution training aimed at “individual empowerment”; this entailed 
building conflict analysis skills, negotiation and problem solving skills, skills in identifying 
conflict-connectors and dividers, and human rights awareness. Conflict resolution training is one 
of the traditional approaches employed to impact positively on the capacities and attitudes of 
individuals and communities in areas of protracted social conflict. Thus, the training is seen:  
… as a forum for learning, where learning itself becomes a meta-goal; for capacity building, where 
useful skills become resources for peacebuilding; for dialogue, where participants have a safe space 
for engaging each other on subjects of critical interest; for community building, where people form 
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alliances and deep bonds as a human infrastructure for peacebuilding; for modeling, where the 
training staff demonstrates the principles and practices it teaches; and for culture change, where the 
culture created in the learning community acts as an agent of change within the culture of the conflict 
habituated system (Diamond, 1997: 353). 
 
Hence, the underlying assumption is that participants in conflict resolution training are more 
likely to be “empowered” to become agents of peacebuilding since they are presumed to have the 
skills and positive attitudes needed to become trainers within their own communities (Fisher, 
1997). This, in turn, fosters the psychological and political preconditions necessary for peaceful 
conflict transformation (Kelman, 1982). Based upon this assumption, the study examines the 
relationship between participation in conflict resolution training and the respondents’ perception 
of “empowerment”. The results are presented in Table 3. 
Table 3. Training in conflict resolution and “individual empowerment for peacebuilding” 
                                          Status of participants   
 
N % 
      Have you been trained in conflict resolution programmes? 
   Yes 108 90 
      No         12 10             
         Training in conflict resolution and individual empowerment  
         
    
Built skills and 
capacities 
Did not bring any 
change Total Significance 
  




Yes 95 87.9 13 12.1 108 100 
0.067* 
No 8 66.7 4 33.3 12 100 
*the chi-square statistic is significant at the 0.01 confidence level. Approximate significance of the value in 
parenthesis is based on chi-square tests. 
 
Respondents were asked whether they had been trained in conflict resolution. Table 3 shows that 
a large majority of the respondents (90%) had received such training. The Table also denotes that 
87.9% of the respondents who participated in the training felt that it had built their skills and 
capacities; this term referred to conflict analysis skills, negotiation and problem solving skills 
and human rights awareness. In contrast, 12.1% responded that the training did not bring any 
change. Whilst two-thirds (66.7%) of nonparticipants in training mentioned that their individual 
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capacity had been strengthened, one-third (33.3%) said it did not bring any change. The chi-
square test, however, did not show a significant relationship between training in conflict 
resolution projects and individual empowerment (P= 0.067).  The overriding view was that 
conflict resolution training is not a significant predictor of individual empowerment.  
An opinion from the FGD, however, indicated that the NGOs’ interventions had an impact on 
individual empowerment:  
This Koree Nagaa (Intra/inter-ethnic peace committees) have been set up and provided training on 
conflict early warning, conflict management and conflict resolution skills. The objective of the training 
was to build the skills for carrying out an assessment of conflict indicators for developing action plans 
for conflict prevention in the Surupha Peace Initiative. They also meet once a month to assess peace 
situations and carry out [a] local peace conference. Some of our people went on experience-sharing 
tours to the South Omo Zone…learned skills too…we were able to talk about cross-border cattle raids 
with elders after many years…we participated in a joint dialogue and training programmes…based on 
the training … we agreed to share information on potential cattle raids …return stray animals…we 
have been carrying out early warning of conflict, peacebuilding and conflict resolution. (Koree Nagaa 
member, October 2011). 
 
This view is similar to those of some other authors (Diamond, 1997; Chigas, 1997). For instance, 
a study by Diamond (1997:337) revealed that participation in conflict resolution training 
provided participants with “transactional skills and transformational opportunities” to cross-
examine their collective narratives and memories about the dynamics of conflict and experiment 
with different methods that could build a more mutually satisfactory system for peace. From a 
recent study in El Salvador and South Africa, Chigas (1997) also found that negotiation training 
contributes to a successful mediation by empowering the protagonists to explore, analyse and 
reframe their interests; this builds confidence and trust. Furthermore, the skills and attitudes 
developed by the participants during the training are important variables when analysing their 
participation in peacebuilding activities; these include trust, willingness to compromise, 
negotiate and tolerate the values of another ethnic group. 
 Training in conflict resolution and participation in peacebuilding activities 
 
The relationship between training in conflict resolution and participation in peacebuilding 
activities was examined because it was assumed that (a) the skills and concepts the participants 
acquired during training would become resources for peacebuilding, and (b) the participants are 
more likely to become trainers within their own communities and spread their experiences to 
others. This proposition is widely entrenched in the broader theoretical literature of conflict 
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studies, which highlights the relationship between “individual empowerment” and participation 
in peacebuilding activities (Diamond, 1997; Chigas, 1997; Fisher, 1997; CDACLP, 2006). 
According to these writers, what distinguishes the “key participants” from “others” is the fact 
that “others” who do not participate in training have a significant influence on the conflict 
dynamics and are able to “spoil” or undermine peace (CDACLP, 2006). Therefore, the key 
participants are able to bring some change within the culture of the conflict habituated system 
(Diamond, 1997).  
Furthermore, it was assumed that the personal and group relationship change catalysed by the 
conflict resolution training would lead to change in political attitudes and actions, or influence 
the broader community members (CDACLP, 2006). Based upon this assumptions, the 
respondents were asked if they had participated in peacebuilding activities; in other words, in 
mediation, negotiation, arbitration and conciliation. 
Table 4. Training in conflict resolution and participation in peacebuilding activities 
           Training in conflict resolution                     
    Yes (%)   No (%)   Total Significance 
Participation in 
peacebulding activities 
     
    (P-Value) 






Some 32.4 33.3 65.7 





          
*the chi-square statistic is significant at the 0.01 confidence level. Approximate significance of the value in  
parenthesis is based on chi-square tests. 
 
Of the 90% of respondents who participated in conflict resolution training, two-thirds (66.7%) 
indicated that they had participated in peacebuilding activities very much, slightly less than a 
third (32.4%) had participated a little  and 0.9 % indicated that they did not participate in 
peacebuilding activities at all. Of those respondents who did not participate in conflict resolution 
training, 20.5% participated in peacebuilding activities very much, one-third (33.3%) a little and 
two-fifths (46.2%) indicated they did not participate at all. The evidence in Table 4 seems to 
support this association between conflict resolution and participation in peacebuilding activities; 
thus, the percentage of participants in training and peacebuilding is 21.2 percent higher than 
nonparticipants. In other words, the higher the level of participation in the training programmes, 
then the higher the level of participation in peacebuilding activities. The converse also applies; 
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the lower the participation in training, the lower the participation in the peacebuilding activities. 
Moreover, the chi-square test indicates a significant association between training in conflict 
resolution and participation in peacebuilding activities (P=0.000). The test confirms that training 
in conflict resolution projects run by the NGOs could augment participants’ activities in peace 
processes, as indicated in the relationship in the chi-square value. The following extracts from 
the FGDs’ findings capture the extent of the relationship.  
The NGOs gave us training on peacebuilding skills based on government laws and rooted in the 
customary institutions and laws. They also trained us on how to assess early warning, conflict 
prevention and work with our neighbours on peacebuilding and development activities at Itang and 
Lare districts. We share our experience of conflict resolution, conflict early warning and cross-border 
conflict prevention. We sat down together with other sub-clan elders to find solutions out of 
impassable situations. (FGD member, October 2011) 
 
Twelve intra-ethnic conflict management/monitoring committees were established with the tasks of 
carrying out early warning of conflict, peace building and conflict resolution. They also meet to assess 
peace situations and conduct a local peace conference. These peace committees also work in the 
management of natural resources including access to water, and rehabilitation and maintenance of 
water sources. We also work on development, health services; we work with the NGOs and 
government. (Koree Nagaa member, October 2011). 
 
For NGOs to discover any affirmative responses after years of intervention is encouraging. This 
is particularly so when we consider the fact that after attending the conflict resolution training, 
participants had to return to their respective groups and carry out peacebuilding activities and 
become trainers within their own communities. A close examination of training in conflict 
resolution and participation in peacebuilding activities and bivariate analysis of the results in the 
chi-square value (P=0.000) indicate that the training variable interacts with the peacebuilding 
variable. This implies that participants in training programmes may be more likely than 
nonparticipants to be involved in peacebuilding. Furthermore, the qualitative data, such as 
Diamond’s (1997) finding in his study in Cyprus, indicate a strong relationship between training 
and involvement in peacebuilding activities. These data offer strong empirical support to the 
conflict resolution literature, which contends that participants in conflict resolution training are 
more likely to be involved in peacebuilding activities (Fisher, 1997; Chigas, 1997). 
 Incidence of conflict and factors contributing to change in the incidence of conflict 
 
Figure 8 denotes that most respondents (93 %) believed that the level of conflict decreased in 
their area in the last two years; very few mentioned that it increased (2%) and only 5% reported 
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that it stayed the same.  Respondents who indicated a decline in the incidence of conflict cited 
the following reasons; relative stability in the neighbouring areas (19%), federal government 
security police (16%), local administration interventions (14.5%), NGO involvement (20%) and 
local elders’ negotiations (22.5%) (Figure 9). Qualitative information also demonstrated that 
government structures played a crucial role in de-escalating and managing violent conflicts. This 
has already been highlighted (see Section 5.7: 137-144).  
            
                      Figure 8. Incidence of conflict 
 
                  
Figure 9. Factors contributing to change in the incidences of conflict 
 
*Other reasons most commonly recorded include conflict fatigue, improved dialogue and change in cause 
of conflicts.            
2% 5% 
93% 
Do you think the level of conflict in your area increased or 




0 10 20 30
relative peace in the neighboring areas
Federal Government security police
Local administration interventions
NGO involvement
Local elders’ negotiations   
Other
Percent 
What reasons contributed to any deacrse in the incidence of conflict? 
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The qualitative data also revealed how leaders representing various ethnic groups, religious 
institutions, as well as NGOs played a leading role in conflict resolution and conflict prevention. 
An FGD member attributed the trend to the preventive and capacity building measures being 
undertaken by NGOs and government to reduce the incidence of conflict:  
Of course with the support of NGOs and government, we drafted by-laws…since the three ethnic 
groups reinforced the customary laws and have been functional, there has been a decrease in the 
incidences of murder and cattle theft, which in turn resulted in a decrease in wide scale conflict. One 
source of conflict was access to water…they built a new borehole. As a result, we no longer need to 
cross to the other side. We also cooperate in tackling cattle theft. For example, two months ago a 
Gabra man stole a cow. The elders’ peace committee was able to identify the culprit and locate the 
stolen cow. The thief was fined 5 cattle heads as compensation. The thief was then handed over to 
[the] police and jailed for further punishment. (Koree Nagaa member, October 2011). 
 
This clearly demonstrates how Track Two and Track Three approaches were used synergistically 
to reduce the incidence of conflict. Yet, it is challenging to demonstrate clearly the extent to 
which these forces, in aggregate, contributed to the decline in the incidence of conflict. Neufeldt 
(2007), Menkhaus (2004) and Michelle (2006) point to a fundamental problem in attributing 
causality; thus, events in conflict environments cannot be predicted, because they are the result 
of multiple influences. In both regions the state influenced the peace process far more than the 
NGOs and the local leaders (see Section 5.5.1: 131-141 and Section 5.7: 164-172). For example, 
the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan in January 2005 (between the 
South Sudan and Ethiopian governments) and government-led negotiations between dominant 
political parties in the Gambella region, and Ministry of Federal Affairs facilitated referenda 
between the Somali clans and Borana Zone (Bassi, 2010); these marked a turning-point in 
shaping the peace processes in the regions. Qualitative data also indicate the importance of 
NGOs in complementing the peace process where Track One, Track Two and Track Three 
approaches were used synergistically to address the conflict (See Section 5.7: 164-172).  
5.8.2.2. Training in Conflict Resolution and ‘Social bridging’  
 
The previous sub-section examined the relationship between conflict resolution training and 
individual development, paying particular attention to the relationship between “individual 
empowerment” and participation in peacebuilding activities. The change in the incidence of 
conflict and factors contributing to the change were highlighted. The overriding conclusion was 
that “empowered individuals” are more likely to become participants in peacebuilding activities.  
It was within the context of the conflict resolution training programmes that NGOs also 
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attempted to build cross-ethnic relationships and trust across conflict lines; the aim was to 
increase tolerance and reduce prejudice to transform attitudes, perceptions and build trust. This 
sub-section attempts to examine whether the training programmes helped participants to adopt 
new attitudes, form relationships, develop joint activities, undertake trade, and do business with 
each other.  
 Training in conflict resolution and level of cross-ethnic contact 
Table 5. Training in conflict resolution and level of social contact 
           Level of cross-ethnic contact                      




contact  Total Significance 
  
N % N % N % (P-Value) 
Participation in conflict 
resolution training 
Yes 73 67.6 35 32.4 108 100 
0.435* 
No 9 75 3 25 12 100 
*the chi-square statistic is significant at the 0.01 confidence level. Approximate significance of the 
value in the parenthesis is based on chi-square tests. 
 
The survey findings demonstrate high levels of contact between the communities in a number of 
environments, particularly within informal group occasions such as weddings, births and deaths, 
and also cross-border contact. This was generally true for programme participants and the 
population, as shown in Table 5.  
Table 5 reports the results for the relationship between training in conflict resolution 
programmes and cross-ethnic contact. This relationship is important, because it allows one to 
assess whether inter-group contact through training programmes makes people more, or less, 
willing to engage in contact with other ethnic groups. Over two-thirds (67.6%) of repondents 
who participated in conflict resolution training indicated that they have had some kind of cross-
community contact in the form of participation in informal group occasions, such as weddings, 
deaths and cross-border trade. 
It was also assumed that participants in conflict resolution training were likely to have more 
cross-ethnic contact than the nonparticipants. The findings, however, show that the amount of 
cross-ethnic contact among the nonparticipants is 7.4% more than among the participants. 
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Additionally, the chi-square test (P=0.435) indicates lack of any significant relationship between 
training in conflict resolution programmes and cross-ethnic contact. This pattern was also 
reflected in nonparticipants where 75% indicated that they engaged in some form of cross-border 
contact.   
One way to address this disparity could be to separate support for cross-ethnic contact from 
actual participation in cross-ethnic events: participants did not have to cross any border to share 
resources, nor do they have to cross any border to have a positive attitude towards cross-ethnic 
contacts. In other words, the respondents who were considered to have “optimal” training in 
conflict resolution were less compelled to have cross-border or cross-ethnic relations as they 
might not necessarily need to cross borders either for trade or for sharing resources. Note that 
32.4 percent of the respondents indicate they had no contact. However, the qualitative 
investigation suggested an increase in the general cross-ethnic contact:   
The other significant change shown in the project intervention area is that people of Gambella town  
living in segregated residential quarters based on their ethnic alignment, used to consider passing to 
another ethnic group’s settlement as a risk; they began to walk in every area[s] of the town freely 
after the Baro Peace Run Race hosted by ACORD. (FGD member, December 2011). 
 
The peace dividend was noticeable in the creation of a safe passage between Anywaa and Majangir 
areas. As a peace gesture, Anywaa participants in the dialogue invited their Majangir fellows for a 
wedding. As a result, there is now a free movement and the complementary exchanges are restored. 
(Pact, 2006a: 42). 
 
It must be noted that these data are only cross-sectional; the results are susceptible to bias due to 
a very small number of cases and clearly need to be supported by both more controlled and 
extensive experimental studies and longitudinal research. Nonetheless, there is evidence from 
societies divided along group lines that promoting inter-group contact as a pathway could reduce 
prejudice and facilitate cross-community/border contacts (EUPPR, 2006; Hewstone et al., 2005). 
Thus, although the chi-square value reveals lack of significant association, the descriptive results 
and the evidence from the qualitative data still provide support for continuing inter-group contact 







 Training in Conflict Resolution and level of Social Relations (prejudice) 
The NGOs operating in the study areas found that bringing together individuals from opposing 
groups can reduce inter-group conflict. Much research work has been done on reducing prejudice 
and bias via inter-group contact; for example, through conflict resolution training schemes. This 
work shows a significant and positive effect of inter-group contact schemes on reducing inter-
group prejudice (Tropp and Pettigrew, 2005; Tam et al., 2009; Malhotra and Liyanage, 2005; 
Salomon, 2004; Diamond, 1997; Fisher, 1997). Furthermore, as reported in the literature review 
section (2.4.3: 33-34), some writers suggest that the emerging trend of cross-border trade and 
inter-ethnic development cooperation among these communities is likely to reduce prejudice 
(Pavanello, 2009).  
Based on this assumption, survey respondents were asked a series of questions which have been 
used previously to assess levels of prejudice (Appendix E). According to Figure 10, over 88 % of 
the respondents had either always felt comfortable (63.4%) or sometimes comfortable (25%) 
when meeting people from the other community while only 5 percent of the respondents stated 
they were not usually comfortable. Figures 11 and 12, below, demonstrate that most (85%) 
respondents would mind if a close relative were to marry a person from the other community. 
Similarly 85% would be reluctant to purchase goods or services from the other community.     
         Figure 10. Meeting people from other ethnic group 
 
 
                                                                                                   




Not at all comfortable
Can’t say/don’t know  
Percent  




         Figure 11. Cross-ethnic trading 
         
Figure 12. Inter-ethnic marriage 
 
Table 6. Training in conflict resolution and reduction in social prejudice 
           Increase in social tolerance                      
    Not Mind Mind Total Significance 
  
N % N % N % (P-Value) 
Participation In conflict 
resolution training 
Yes 94 87 14 13 108 100 
0.081* 
No 8 66.7 4 33.3 12 100 
*the chi-square statistic is significant at the 0.01 confidence level. Approximate significance of the value in the 
parenthesis is based on chi-square tests. 
Table 6 demonstrates that respondents who participated in conflict resolution training (90%) are 
more likely to rate prejudice-related questions (a, b, and c questions) favorably (87%) than 
Mind 
85% 
Not mind  
15% 
If you were purchasing goods or services, would you mind whether 
the person who owned the business from which you were buying was  
from the other ethnic  community? 
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nonparticipants (33%). However, the Chi-square test indicates no relationship between 
participation in conflict resolution training and level of prejudice (P=0.081).  
According to the participants of the FGDs, intermarriage still occurs among these groups, but it 
is often discouraged when sociopolitical unrest is heightened: 
Before the conflict, the three communities participated in funerals and marriages. They used to 
contribute to the ceremonies in labour and funerals. They used to share the depleted natural 
resources. After the peace initiative, there is some progress …. we are trying to restore these values, 
and ties of unity and the NGOs have been working to build upon this custom. Thus, we are trying to 
farm together now, share labour and resources. (FGD member, December 2011). 
 
During conflict, the three clans settle along their line of clanship but due to government and NGOs 
intervention, we encourage them to be neighbours of the Guji, Borana, and Gabra. We also encourage 
inter-clan marriage thus they would become relatives. (Koree Nagaa members’ FGD, October 
2011) 
 
This claim is grounded on the historical realities of these communities. For example, Bassi 
(2010) and Feyissa (2011) argue that although ethnic settlement patterns are along lineage lines 
they are interconnected through marriage and other forms of affiliation; they cover wide areas 
linked by social and marital ties. Today, however, Scott-Villiers et al. (2011) and Feyissa (2006) 
argue that the social and geographic divisions (including religion) have complicated this 
structure of social cohesion and social “bridge”, as confirmed in the FGDs:  
[t]here must be inter-marriage between these sub-clans. If we are related to one another through 
inter-clan marriages, we will be relatives, and relatives [are] not embroiled in conflict. However, we 
(Boran) do not marry Gabra because of their religion (Islam) and we need to call upon them to share 
this value. We farm, graze and eat together, but it is the religion (Gabras are Muslim) that created a 
problem. NGOs argue that it is our right to marry anyone regardless of their religious background  
(Koree Nagaa members’ FGD, October 2011) 
 
The quantitative results indicate that inter-group contact can reduce inter-group prejudice (see 
EUPPR, 2006). However, caution has to be taken not to generalise such findings for two reasons. 
First, the chi-square value at P=0.081 levels, indicates a lack of relationship between training in 
conflict resolution programmes and the level of inter/intra-ethnic prejudice. Secondly, these data 
are only cross-sectional and clearly need to be backed up by more rigorously controlled and 
extensive experimental studies and longitudinal research. Nevertheless, there is growing 
evidence from longitudinal studies that inter-group contact can have a positive effect on attitudes 
in the context of protracted conflict.  
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 Training in conflict resolution and level of tolerance  
Survey respondents were asked whether they support the display of the cultural and political 
symbols of the other community; the purpose of this question was to assess levels of tolerance. 
The rationale for testing this presupposition is derived from the conflict resolution literature, 
which suggests that inter-group contact through training may play a crucial role in establishing 
new and positive inter-group norms (Gebrewold, 2009). This is essential in supporting inter-
group tolerance in the context of protracted social conflict areas where noticeable support for 
inter-group tolerance is lacking. For example, inter-group contact is likely to reduce negative 
expectations and also reduce fears, suspicion and reciprocal antagonism (Liebkind and 
McAlister, 1999; Gebrewold, 2009). This should lead to a more positive impression of the other 
group, and support the socio-political and cultural rights of other groups. This view is widely 
entrenched in the conflict resolution training manuals of the NGOs.  
Table 7. Training in conflict resolution and level of tolerance 
Would you support display of the cultural and political symbols of the other community? 
 
N % 
      Yes  112 93.3 
      No           8 6.7             
         Training in conflict resolution and tolerance  
           Increase in social tolerance                      




Did not bring 
any change Total Significance 
  
N % N % N % (P-Value) 
Participation in conflict 
resolution training 
Yes 103 95.4 5 4.6 108 100 
0.033* 
No 8 66.7 4 33.3 12 100 
*the chi-square statistic is significant at the 0.05 confidence level. Approximate significance of the value 
in the parenthesis is based on chi-square tests. 
 
A large majority (93.3%) stated that they would support display of the cultural and political 
symbols of the other community. Table 7 also demonstrates the relationship between 
participation in conflict resolution training programmes and support for the display of cultural 
and political symbols of the other community. The findings indicate that respondents who 
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participated in the training tend to be more tolerant than the nonparticipants (95.4% and 66.7% 
respectively). In other words, participation in conflict resolution training programmes increases 
the support for cultural and political symbols of the other ethnic group by an average of 28.7 %. 
The chi-square result (p=0.033) also demonstrates a significant relationship between 
participation in the training and change in the level of tolerance. The qualitative analysis also 
highlighted a similar finding:  
Under the peacebuilding project, eighty people from both Anywaa and Nuer groups were trained in 
conflict resolution skills and learnt human and cultural rights principles. We have to appreciate the 
unique history and culture of each ethnic group…their rights to promote their culture, educate in their 
own language. These are very important for the stability of the region. For example, in collaboration 
with NGOs we organised the International Peace Day concert involving all the ethnic groups of the 
region: the Anywaa, Nuer, Komo, Opo and Majangir. The youth groups performed songs advocating 
messages of peace, love and unity. (FGD member, December 2011). 
 
This example shows the relationship between the respondents’ training and their support of local 
power over collective matters for ethnic minorities. The finding indicates conflict resolution 
training that covers group rights is likely to encourage respect for the socio-cultural and political 
rights of other groups. This relationship is also important, as the Multi-national Federal system 
and democratic governance in Ethiopia aims to foster inter-group respect and tolerance (Alem, 
2004; Woldemariam, 2009). However, additional research is needed to test whether variables 
such as perceived respect of political and cultural rights, or perceived differences in ethnic group 
rights, should be embedded in the training programme manual; if so, this might foster tolerance 
among the participants. 
 Training in conflict resolution and level of trust 
 
Respondents were asked a series of questions used previously to assess levels of cross-ethnic 
trust. These asked (a) if they were willing to share access to natural resources (water and grazing 
land); (b) if they think that most members of the other ethnic group would try to take advantage 
of you if they got a chance; (c) if they would ask other ethnic group members for different 
assistance (e.g., labour); and (d) if they think that most members of the other ethnic group would 




Table 8. Participation in conflict resolution training and level of trust 
Would you say that most members of the other community could be trusted? 
 
N % 
      Yes, could be trusted            112 93.3 
      No, couldn’t be trusted           8 6.7             
         
         
         
    
Could be 
trusted 
Could not be 
trusted Total Significance 
  
N % N % N % (P-Value) 
Participation in conflict 
resolution training 
Yes 104 96.3 4 3.7 108 100 
0.003* 
No 8 66.7 4 33.3 12 100 
*the chi-square statistic is significant at the 0.01 confidence level. Approximate significance of the value in the parenthesis is 
based on chi-square tests. 
 
A large majority (96.3%) of the participants in conflict resolution training indicated that the other 
community could be trusted. The findings in Table 8 also demonstrate that those respondents 
who participated in the training are more likely to develop trust towards the other ethnic 
community as compared to their counterparts (66.7%). This finding implies that participation in 
the training programmes is likely to increase participants’ trust towards members of the other 
ethnic groups by an average of 29.6 percent. The results in Table 8 confirm the assumption that 
participation in conflict resolution training is more likely to affect the degree of “inter/intra-
ethnic trust”, as reflected in the significant chi-square value (P=0.003). A number of FGD 
participants’ views support this claim:   
We share the same blood, we are friends and in-laws. We now come together and share our common 
problems. We share water and pasture and restock the poor after droughts. Our children go to the 
same school. We all went back to our previous ways of life. (Koree Nagaa members’ FGD, October 
2011) 
 
Skilled individuals from the Nuer side helped the Anywaa a lot in the preparation of fishing nets and 
other necessary tools. And the Nuers participated in the construction of houses (many of the houses 
were devastated in the locality as a result of recurrent conflicts) for the Anywaa community displaced 
as a result of Anywaa-Nuer conflict. These days they also began to discuss penalties at community 





The study showed that respondents who participated in the training had more positive attitudes 
toward the other groups than nonparticipants. This is important because these groups have 
traditionally relied upon a variety of “coping mechanisms” when responding to droughts and 
conflicts. These include: 1) moving animal herds over vast areas in search of water and pasture; 
2) managing resources and resolving disputes by way of well-defined social customs and 
institutions, and 3) “Bussa Gonofa”, a form of social security for rehabilitating the poor after 
drought. Hence, it was presumed that rebuilding the long-standing cross-cutting linkages plays a 
pivotal role in allowing freedom of movement, trust and reciprocity. More specifically, it was 
assumed that they would be more willing to share natural resources, and to rely on each other for 
support; they would approach members of the other group more readily than would people who 
are less trusting of the other community. It was also assumed that people who are more trusting 
of the other ethnic group would be more inclined to act in less negative ways toward them, and 
be more likely to support collective tenure, customary and territorial rights, customary law, 
governance and leadership. They would be less likely to view their relationships as being zero-
sum and more likely to support the psychological and political environments necessary for 
negotiation and compromise (Fisher, 1997).  
The relationship between inter-group contacts (using inter-group training) and promoting mutual 
trust for preventing violence after protracted ethnic conflicts forms part of the literature on 
conflict resolution and reconciliation (Tim et al., 2009; Fisher 1997; Kelman, 1999). This 
literature contends that distrust of the adversary is a central impediment to political negotiation 
and compromise (Kelman, 1987, 1993, 1995). The promotion of inter-group contact programmes 
may support and establish trust that, in turn, promotes more positive inter-group behaviour in 
societies marked by inter-group conflict (Kelman, 1987; Tim et al., 2009). In inter-group 
negotiations, trust increases the exchange of valuable information and cooperation and promotes 
conciliatory rather than coercive bargaining strategies. In order to move the peace process 
forward, these writers insist upon increasing the level of trust among the antagonists through 
addressing mutual needs and fears, employing confidence-building measures, and actively 
mediating with third parties. Inter-group trust could reduce the intensity and magnitude of 
conflict because “it allows individuals to accept the risk of being vulnerable and to make 
conciliatory initiatives to the other party with some degree of assurance that they will not be 
exploited” (Tim et al., 2009: 46). 
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5.8.2.3 Livelihood Enhancement  
 
In addition to promoting relationship-building, NGOs emphasis the importance satisfying basic 
need aimed at addressing the economic cause of conflict. The rationale behind diversification of 
livelihoods is derived from the growing body of conflict resolution literature, which suggests that 
livelihood diversification could have the potential to reduce poverty and inequalities; this in turn 
will reduce the likelihood of conflict as well as open up opportunities for a peaceful relationship 
(Collier, 2007; Homer-Dixon, 1995). These writers, therefore, propose that the socio-economic 
problems must be tackled to facilitate peacebuilding processes. Based upon these arguments and 
in view of the NGOs’ role in tackling the economic needs of the disadvantaged, this section will 
examine respondents’ perceptions of change on their household income, sustainable access to the 
natural resources, reconstruction of physical infrastructures and on the extent of enhanced cross-
community interdependence. The findings partly complement the qualitative findings presented 
in section 5.9.2: 204-212. The study, however, does not claim to draw a link between changes in 
economic conditions of these groups and any increase in their support for the peace process. 
Rather, it is assumed that improvement in economic conditions, with economic interdependence, 













Table 9. NGO intervention and livelihood enhancement 
Since the NGOs programmes/ services your monthly income has: 
 
N % 
      Increased 37 30.8 
      Stayed the same 83 69.2 
      
         Do you attribute this economic improvement to NGO intervention? 
Yes 12 32.4 
      No 25 67.6 
      
         Have NGO programmes created a sustainable access to natural resources (water and grazing land)?__ 
Yes 96 80 
      No 24 20 
      
         Has it increased cross-community cooperation?           
Yes 87 72.5 
      No 33 27.5 
      
         Has it increased the reconstruction of physical infrastructures? 
Yes 83 69.2 
      No 37 30.8 
      
         General impact of NGO services on your livelihoods 
A little worse                                        17 14.2 
      Some improvement   58 48.3 
      A lot of improvement  37 30.8 
      Do not know 8 6.7             
 
 Household income, sustainable access to the natural resources and increased 
(re)construction of physical infrastructures 
 
As shown in Table 9, more than two-thirds (69.2%) of the respondents stated that their monthly 
income has stayed the same since the NGOs’ programmes and services began, while less than 
one-third (30.8%) mentioned that it has increased. Those respondents reporting an increase were 
asked whether this could be attributed to the NGOs’ interventions. In response, more than two-
thirds (67.6%) of that group of respondents mentioned that the increased income was not because 




All respondents were asked if the NGOs’ programmes had created sustainable access to the 
natural resources: water, grazing lands and fishing. Most (80%) respondents indicated that the 
programmes created sustainable access those resources, while one-fifth (20%) stated that they 
had not. More than two-thirds of respondents (69.2%) stated that the programmes increased the 
reconstruction of physical infrastructure such as schools, health clinics and water points; about a 
third (30.8%) stated that it had not.  The FGD findings also confirm this: 
Both humans and animals were able to access a clean water supply near their village without any 
problems. Before the intervention we used to travel 15-20 km to fetch water and watering our animals 
was causing conflict…but now can access clean water…near our village [a]s a result, weakened 
animals and calves, which cannot travel long distance[s] and were expected to die when travelling a 
long distance with the shortage of water during drought season have been saved. And currently the 
pastoral community has commenced utilising the Elas (water points)… with good follow up and 
monitoring of community elders. (Koree Nagaa members’ FGD, October 2011) 
 
 Cross-community trade 
In respect of cross-community activity there was evidence of projects which sought to address 
the legacy of the conflict, both in social and economic terms. Particularly good examples 
included the cross-border promotion of livestock marketing, cross-border work to promote the 
livestock trade sector and to improve cross-border mobility for petty-traders and transhumance. 
The respondents were asked if these cross-community programmes have enhanced cross-
community cooperation. Most (72.5%) responded affirmatively, while 27.5% responded 
negatively, as shown in Table 9. There is also a growing traditional cross-border livestock 
movement and trade, helping to forge inter-group cooperation. This encourages cross-cutting ties 
as it creates a reciprocal interdependence and a vested interest in reducing conflict:   
The (NGOs’) projects constructed roads along the conflict fault lines in the border area. The 
flourishing cross-border trade is evident in Pinyudho [Gambella] town in the loads of items the tracks 
are carrying to Pochalla [South Sudan]. Consumer goods are exported from Pinyudho to Pochalla 
and refugee goods are imported from Pochalla. As a result, many Anuwaa have opened shops, both in 
Pinyudho and Pochalla. Currently, the bulk of the cross-border trade is carried by vehicles [rather] 
than by donkeys and camels as in the past. The cross-border trade gives a comparative advantage to 
the indigenous people. (FGD, November 2011)  
 
The NGOs’ projects seem to have assumed the notion of liberal theory that trade and other forms 
of economic interdependence promote peace and economic advantage for both parties. There has 
been intense debate among liberal theorists about whether economic interdependence created by 
trade generates reciprocal dependence between trading partners (Levy, 2001: 9-11). As a result, 
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this issue is well documented (Levy, 2001). The NGOs’ projects have constructed roads along 
the conflict fault lines in the border area. Businesses have begun to regain traditional markets and 
rural youth have gained access to education. The increased amount of cross-border trading and 
the increased access to capital have reduced the economic marginalisation of the targeted 
communities (See section 5.9.3: 208-209). This finding is consistent with the broader research 
findings on the socio-economic impacts of many development agencies in Northern Ireland (See 
EUPPR, 2006).    
 General impact of the NGOs 
 
The respondents were asked about the general impact of the NGOs’ programmes on their 
livelihoods: 48.3% of the respondents indicated that the NGOs’ services had made some 
improvement to their livelihoods, 30.8% stated these had made a lot of improvement to their 
livelihoods, while only 14.2% indicated these had either worsened or did not improve their 
livelihoods. This sentiment was also indicated in the qualitative data: 
The mortality of animals susceptible to drought (weak animals, lactating cows and calves) was 
dramatically reduced because of the positive impact of a key drought reserve intervention. The 
productivity of cows showed much improvement with milk production at household level increasing 
three times because of improved productivity of cows. As a result, the availability of milk both at 
household and community level has shown improvement following the establishment of the pasture 
enclosure intervention. (Koree Nagaa members’ FGD, November 2011)  
 
The assumption is that a more sustainable access to natural resource, enhanced cross-community 
cooperation and reconstruction of infrastructure all had a general impact on the livelihood of 
respondents. Moreover, the relative improvement in livelihood would contribute to reduction in 
resource-based conflict and vulnerability to drought:  
Conflicts over scarce natural resources such as pasture and water were commonplace. NGOs worked 
on pasture, rangeland improvement, and water rehabilitation in our vicinity…reducing the distances 
trekked and often accessing the patchy resources. The intervention obviously reduced drought 
mortality and enhances survival of those animals vulnerable to drought and further protects the 
nucleus herd; this implies contribution to natural herd growth and household milk production. 
Moreover, the increase in private enclosure reduced access for water and pasture. This used to cause 
numerous clashes. These private enclosures have been dismantled and converted into communal 
enclosures for communal use and have reduced conflict over herd mobility. (Koree Nagaa 




The quantitative and qualitative analyses offer strong empirical support to the conflict resolution 
literature, which draws a link between the satisfaction of basic needs and peace (Azar, 1990; 
Lederach, 1997). The data also lend strong empirical support to this literature, which contends 
that communities with a high level of economic interdependence are more likely to be peace-
oriented because of their common interest in reducing conflict.  
5.8.3 Summary of Key Findings and Conclusion  
 
This section describes three empirical investigations of the antecedents and consequences of 
intervention by NGOs in the study areas. It is imperative to review the key findings, 
acknowledge some potential limitations, and illustrate linkages between key findings before 
drawing conclusions.  
The following are considered to be the most significant findings in this section: 
 Conflict resolution training and “individual development” 
The “individual development” section of the discussion examined how conflict resolution 
training is related to individual empowerment, which in turn impacted on participants’ skills in 
taking part in peacebuilding activities. 87.9% of the respondents who participated in the training 
felt that it had built their skills and capacities. Specifically, the skills and attitudes learnt during 
training are important for developing trust, willingness to compromise and to negotiate and to 
tolerate the values of the other ethnic groups. The evidence demonstrates a significant 
relationship between the training and “empowerment”, although that evidence is statistically 
much weaker than expected (P=0.067) (Section 5.8.2.1:180). The empowerment outcome is 
more difficult to measure but, as indicated above, many NGOs saw this as being their most 
distinctive contribution to promoting peace. 
 Training in conflict resolution and participation in peacebuilding activities  
The study also indicated that individual development is important for participating in 
peacebuilding activities. The main purpose was to assess whether participants in the training 
were more likely than nonparticipants to engage in peacebuilding activities. Analysis of the data 
obtained from 120 respondents showed that participants in conflict resolution training are indeed 
more likely (21.2%) to be involved in peacebuilding activities (Section 5.8.2.1: 182). The study 
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indicates a significant relationship between training in conflict resolution and participation in 
peacebuilding activities (P=0.001). 
 Incidence of conflict and factors contributing to change in the incidence of conflict 
Most (92.5%) respondents indicated that the incidence of conflict has decreased over the last two 
years. Key reasons for this decline include relative stability in the neighbouring areas (19%), 
federal government interventions (16%), local administration interventions (14.5%), NGO 
involvement (20%) and local elders’ negotiations (22.5%). It is evident that no specific reason is 
predominant; they can all influence the dynamics of the conflict, but with varying degrees of 
legitimacy in this jurisdiction. This suggests that conflict resolution intervention needs to be 
comprehensive and complementary, and also  needs to involve these actors and factors (Section 
5.8.2.1: 184). 
 Training in conflict resolution and change in the level of individual tolerance and trust  
The second part of this study showed the effect that training in conflict resolution has in 
promoting positive behavioural tendencies. The results from the survey suggest that those who 
participated in the training programmes have more tolerance and trust towards the other 
community. The bivariate analysis also indicates a significance relationship between training in 
conflict resolution and increase in tolerance (P=0.033) and trust (P=0.003). It is worth noting that 
the data (see Tables 5, 6, 7 and 8) show that inter-group contact is associated with better cross-
community trust, improved tolerance and more positive behavioral tendencies in these settings. 
In other words, people who have more contact with other communities are more trusting, tolerant 
and willing to make contact across communities in general (Sections 5.8.2.2: 185-194). 
 Household income, sustainable access to natural resources and increased 
(re)construction of physical infrastructures 
Regarding the impact of economic enhancement projects, survey evidence suggests the 
following: in the case of the groups that received NGOs support, the support involved an 
increase in sustainable access to the natural resources such as water, grazing lands and fishing, 
reconstruction of physical infrastructure and cross-community activity. Most (79.1%) of the 
respondents indicated that NGOs programmes had made either some improvement (48.3%) or 
much improvement (30.8%) to their general livelihoods while 14.2% indicated these had 
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worsened a little (Section 5.8.2.3: 196). However, the study was unable to establish the extent to 
which the economic strand was a catalyst for change in respect of peacebuilding processes, 
although the consequences of economic measures tend to have indirect rather than direct 
impacts.  
The following Theme will discuss the perspective of key persons involved with the community 
development sector. 
5.9 Theme H: Community Development  
 
Four themes are central to this theme: defining community development; community 
development and partnerships; a people-centred approach; and, community development meeting 
social and human needs.  
 
5.9.1 Defining community development 
The socio-historical and political context in Gambella, and Borana clearly influenced the way in 
which NGOs in each region define community development:  
These are pastoralists…now affected by a variety of growing pressures…undermining their drought 
response and livelihood strategies, including: increasing populations, increased frequency of 
droughts, conflicts…are today increasingly vulnerable to mounting food insecurity, growing poverty, 
and escalating conflict. We have to respond to these challenges, but how? Through community 
development…but it means many things for many NGOs. For us, it has two components: ‘software and 
hardware’. ‘Software’ development is about people’s development… it focuses on people’s 
empowerment for self-reliance and building people’s capabilities for controlling their development. It 
is empowering the community for participation, increasing awareness of the community to plan, 
identify, and implement development programmes. It also involves behavioural and attitudinal 
changes through awareness creation for long-term development. Our emphasis is on these issues. 
‘Hardware development’ is about supporting and developing infrastructure…but we work on asset 
building. Our approach is more of ‘software development’ and less of ‘hardware development’. 
(NGO Project manager, October 2011). 
In a contemporary sense, NGOs regard “hardware development” and “software development” as 
concepts; they pertain to different development interventions. The “hardware development” 
approach largely focuses on direct-service delivery and building development infrastructures for 
reducing resource-based conflicts. “Software development” refers to capacity building, local 
empowerment, prejudice reduction and confidence-building goals. For those NGOs working at 
grass-roots, “software development” has always been about enhancing skills and knowledge of 
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individuals, groups and institutions so that they take responsibility for contributing to sustainable 
development. In this approach, community development projects incorporated peacebuilding 
components to contribute towards sustainable peace. A project manager working in an integrated 
community development describes the goal as follows: 
The main objective [of community development] is to build the capacity of local institutions and 
individuals for sustainable utilisation and management of the natural resource, which in turn 
contributes to sustainable development. We do not work on conflict directly, we integrated it into 
development and…we support community peace initiatives...empowerment, peaceful co-existence to 
sustain the livelihoods of the pastoralist and contribute to sustainable peace. We believe [I]f there is 
poverty there might be a conflict and if there is no access to resources or movement (pastoralist 
mobility) there will be conflict. (NGO project manager, November 2011). 
One way of achieving this goal was to have a holistic approach. A director of an NGO 
underscored the need for a holistic development programme for reducing conflict. One of the 
examples given by the director was a project called Pastoralists’ Livelihoods Initiative Phase I 
and II (PLI) relating to conflict resolution:    
It [PLI] is an integrated development initiative that aimed at enhancing livestock and related 
production, the sustainable use of natural resources and economic growth through diversification, 
cross-cutting issues such as linking relief, rehabilitation, and development, conflict, gender, and 
environmental impacts HIV/AIDs,  It aims to improve attitudes, reduce suspicions and perceptions 
about women and minorities. It is process-oriented, a long term process to influence deep-rooted 
patterns from history and it takes time to change.When there is drought, then there is conflict over 
scarce resources. Thus, community development is a tool for conflict resolution and peacebuilding. 
(NGO director, November 2011). 
A representative of a community development organisation made an interesting observation 
about the rationale for adopting a holistic development approach:   
Conflict and development are related because they have social, political, [and] ecological aspects and 
conflict affects social cohesion and destroys our development achievements as well. A holistic 
development approach is responsive to these needs. (NGO representative, October 2011).  
Conflict resolution is seen as a part of any community development process and uses strategies 
of participatory development for addressing the economic causes of the conflict. Both Azar 
(1990) and Burton (1990) contend that meeting “human needs” must be prioritised when 
attempting to resolve conflict in war-torn societies. Drawing on a holistic approach, these NGOs 
attempt to combine the “human needs” and to address conflict, while being attentive to short-
term and long-term resolution processes.  
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 Community development as a means of peacebuilding 
Another informant saw community development from the perspective of peacebuilding. The 
following quote provides an excellent example of the link between community development, 
conflict resolution and peacebuilding:  
Community development has its own positive contribution to peacebuilding because when we look at 
the root cause of conflict it is because of lack of development either in the form of satisfying basic 
needs or lack of good governance or other forms of development. Thus they are interdependent. That 
is how we understand their relationships. Some others argue that lack of development is the root 
source [of] conflict and others argue otherwise. For us, if there is no peace there won’t be 
development, and for us they are interdependent. (NGO director, December 2011). 
Although most NGOs have focused on satisfying these needs, their preoccupation with service 
delivery caused criticism from other NGOs. For example, one NGO leader commented:  
Presently, for most NGOs at grass-roots level, development means solving the day-to-day problems of 
the community. But the very essence of community development is not only providing basic social 
amenities...its essence is to bring about structural change. Peacebuilding and Community 
Development (CD) converge on many points, and to bring structural change conflict is a hindrance. 
CD has three core aspects such as building people’s capacities, providing social services and creating 
awareness that could affect people’s consciousness. If these three core aspects are met, we can see 
change in perceptions, attitudes and belief... and people can bring about structural change. (NGO 
director, December 2011). 
For this NGO, traditional basic services and projects oriented towards social welfare (human 
needs approach) left relatively untouched the structures that sustain and reproduce violence. This 
critique resonates with Galtung’s (1996) argument that any one-sided approach makes “conflict 
resolution dependent upon meeting unsatisfied needs”, leaving little room for the asymmetric 
conflict, and does not bring about conflict transformation.  
 Community development as empowerment through capacity building  
 
Many NGOs in the sample recognise that capacity building is an important component for 
building people’s ability to be self-reliant and to face challenges. Only when people have the 
necessary training and skills can they be expected to cope with shocks. Central components for 
sustainable development include the ability to respond to recurrent drought and livelihoods 




Our experience has shown us that merely implementing development alone cannot adequately build 
the pastoralists’ resilience towards recurrent drought…and improve the quality of life of marginalised 
communities…we needed to incorporate knowledge, skills and resources transfer to cope with these 
challenges…to diversify the sources of their incomes and to complement existing livelihoods. We got 
into training, capacity building and skills dissemination such as in the provision of technical 
assistance, improved seeds, feed and fodder production. (NGO project manager, November 2011). 
 
Most of the work done by these NGOs involves working with pastoralist leaders to identify 
vulnerable pastoralists and then get them to work on joint initiatives to respond to drought more 
effectively, to protect their livelihoods. Thus there is an integrated approach both to life-saving 
and livelihood protection:      
 
Knowledge and skills transfer is one way of building resilience against hazards and drought. 
Especially this [2010] drought was severe and we made an enormous contribution to avert the adverse 
impact. Earlier droughts (2005/2006, 2008 and 2009), …………. they used to wait for government and 
NGOs support which was limited to relief and rehabilitation…they lost between 70%-80% of their 
livestock assets and take much longer to recover these assets after drought. Now, what we have done 
is we have integrated  and implemented life-saving and livelihood-support aimed at protecting 
livelihoods…and also linked disaster management cycle to drought cycle so that pastoral communities 
are appropriately prepared for drought; enhance the resistance and resilience…could safeguard their 
productive assets…we are able to see the outcomes. They efficiently used the land, water...also use 
supplementary feed [fodder] and...They know where and how to get supplementary feed for their 
livestock during drought. Now, they are in a better position to respond effectively and have more 
confidence in their capacities to respond to drought and… today [t]hey think “I have to sell some of 
my emaciated animals and buy supplementary feed so that I can save the remaining productive 
assets”… they actually value this form of support. There is a change in perception and this had 
broadened the window for recovery of lost productive capabilities. We contributed to this change. 
There is a water bank and no one’s life was lost due to water shortage. Therefore, these days they can 
find solutions on their own, even some of the pastoralists were able to travel as far as to the North 
Shewa (Central Oromia) to buy supplementary feed to save their productive assets; that would be 
unthinkable a few years back. (NGO Project manager, October 2011). 
These mechanisms have transferred skills and technology to communities. The knowledge has 
empowered and capacitated them significantly and has helped to sustain key activities in 
livelihood protection. This has become the starting point to promote sustainability. It is clear that 
NGOs realise that community development can be achieved only if people are given the 
necessary training and capacity to pursue alternative livelihoods and diversify their income. 
5.9.2 A people-centered approach  
 
The central tenet of community development is that people are assisted towards advancing their 




We do not try to do development work for them…we help them to do the development…build their 
capacity and this approach is built on traditional systems that existed in the past, the whole point is to 
put the community at the centre of development planning, monitoring, evaluation and 
managing…building institutions and empowering the local community to reclaim their right to initiate 
and manage development initiatives. Instilling a sense of community ownership of programme 
activities and maintaining their continuity is crucial for long-term development. (NGO project 
manager, November 2011). 
 
We use a participatory approach…aimed at empowering the community so that local people will 
analyse and then articulate their needs…relationship with local government and hold it [government] 
accountable. Once the community has developed the experience and expertise, established networks, 
and engaged in advocacy, then they do not need our support. (NGO director, October 2011). 
 
If CD only emphasises service delivery, it destined to deal with the signs of the community’s problems, 
and create a culture of dependence in the beneficiaries. It was important to identify the root causes of 
the problem and to engage the community in identifying both the causes and the solutions to their 
problems. (NGO project manager, December 2011). 
 
From discussions with informants, development was linked to individual and group 
empowerment. This allows people to identify and address the causes of the main problems facing 
their communities. Conflict transformation is made possible by approaches that promote people’s 
decision-making capacity, strengthen autonomous development, and ensure long-term 
development. However, there is a big difference between the concept of participation and the 
actual practice.  
 Origin of participatory development  
 
In Ethiopia, the notion of a participatory development approach has existed for a long time 
(Harrison, 2002). For example, as far as back as the 1980s, Care Ethiopia’s water development 
projects called for such an approach. Moreover, SOS Sahel Ethiopia pioneered a participatory 
approach and likewise the Borana Collaborative Forest Management Project (BCFMP) since its 
inception in 1999. A representative of an NGO indicates:  
 
In order to address the forest loss situation...SOS Sahel was asked to join Oromiya Region, 
Department of Agriculture, and Forestry in the search for new forest management systems. As a 
result, SOS Sahel initiated the Borana Collaborative Forest Management Project (BCFMP)...towards 
the end of 1999. Stakeholders’ analysis, social mapping and negotiation on the right of the forest 
management... and use … were the basis for the implementation of BCEMP. The government 
acknowledged its [BCEMP] merits and urged the adoption of a new collaborative resource 




There is little doubt that donors and international NGOs played a critical role in the adoption of 
participatory development in Ethiopia (Harrison, 2002; Rhamato, 2002). This formed the basis 
for its proliferation and over the last two decades, the approach has produced a number of good 
practices; intervention models have been replicated and mainstreamed in the government’s 
development policy (Harrison, 2002).  
 
 Participatory development and government’s poverty reduction policy 
  
The government had already adopted a participatory approach to development in the 1980s 
(Harrison, 2002) and it was later incorporated into the government’s poverty eradication policy. 
Most NGOs have undergone a transformation since 2005 and have aligned their development 
goals with the development priorities and principles of the government’s PASDEP. These 
priorities and principles are outlined in section 5.2.1: 98-102. Most NGOs responded to the 
government policy by integrating PASDEP’s priorities and principles into their modus operandi. 
For example, CARE Ethiopia, in its Strategic Plan (2007-2012), mainstreamed the participatory 
process as a “core pillar” with a view to having a lasting impact on redressing the underlying 
causes of poverty: 
 
To undertake a highly participatory process that would draw upon the experience and knowledge of 
staff at all levels of the organisation, as well as the perspectives of key external stakeholders. (CARE 
International in Ethiopia, Strategic Plan, 2007-2012: ii).   
 
A project coordinator working at Participatory Forest Management describes the pattern of 
participatory strategies that have been adopted to address various problems in the areas: 
 
Most NGOs talk about Participatory Forest Management (PFM), participatory research appraisal 
techniques, and Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA). Most NGOs adopted participatory methods as 
the intervention targeted against the source of poverty in the region and envisage the rational use of 
the available community and government resources. Focusing on awareness raising, capacity building 
and advocacy and using a wide network of partners, ensured the sustainability of the project. (NGO 
project coordinator, November 2001). 
 
There is much debate about the way participatory agendas are generated and implemented at the 
grass-roots level (for example, Chambers et al., 1989); here, unequal power relationships  do not 
augur well for participatory approaches (Harrison, 2002). Harrison pointed out that the pervasive 
use of the language of participation glosses over the issues of who defines the content of 
participation and its actual implementation. Muir (2007) has indicated that participation is 
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limited to core indigenous leaders rather than including a wide spectrum of the community, and 
excludes marginalised social groups. In the pastoralist areas, most NGOs engage in partnership 
with the customary institutions. However, the degree of partnership and participation differs 
(Tache and Bassi, 2011). For instance, partnerships with indigenous institutions are strong in the 
field of natural resource management because they have customarily been flexible and can adapt 
to precarious and changing micro-environments (Watson, 2001). There is evidence that 
development agents have become more sceptical about customary institutions and pay lip service 
to participation on health and agricultural inputs. In some instances the notions of “partnership” 
and “participation” have been challenged (for example, Cleaver, 1999). In most cases the power 
that dictates the development agenda lies with the NGOs, because of their professional expertise 
and their access to resources. For example, a number of informants working with the 
technicalities of soil science and forestry indicated that expert-driven development planning 
might not necessarily be participatory because local actors may not have the knowledge and 
expertise. From a pragmatic perspective, most of the NGOs in the sample adopted a mix of 
“indigenous participation” and “expert-driven” approaches; outside experts provide skills and 
knowledge that are not available in the communities. Nevertheless, there is evidence from the 
field that experts and indigenous communities could work together in a genuinely participatory 
manner on natural resource management and conflict resolution activities. In addition, there is 
consensus that participation is a key instrument in sustainable development. This approach is 
linked to the fact that the grass-roots leadership needs to be developed and that empowerment 
can happen only through capacity building. Furthermore, some of these NGOs have played a key 
role in facilitating the growth of people’s capacities for handling development projects.  
 
5.9.3 Community Development Meeting Human Needs  
 
A range of NGOs targeted various social problems in the Borana zone and Gambella Region. 
Some are specifically geared to diversifying livelihoods, strengthening indigenous social 
protection mechanisms, supporting policy initiatives to protect pastoral livelihoods and, 






 Drought management systems and partnerships 
 
Conflict in the pastoralist areas of Moyalle and Arero usually sparked during prolonged dry 
seasons when the pastoralists would move in search of water and pasture for their livestock 
(CORDAID and FSS 2009). For instance, a recent conflict between Gabra, Guji and Borana in 
Surupa concerned the common grazing and watering points and led to the loss of life and 
property. CARE Ethiopia, AFD, GPDA, ACDI/VOCA and GOAL Ethiopia implemented key 
drought reserve grazing areas; they rehabilitated traditional water points in the Surupa Kebele of 
Yabello that created sustainable access to the natural resources. These improvements would 
reportedly contribute to a reduction in resource-based conflict and vulnerability to drought:  
 
AFD worked on pasture, rangeland improvement, and water rehabilitation in Surupa areas 
…reducing the distances trekked and often accessing the patchy resources. Water and (the) Natural 
Resource Development project obviously reduced drought mortality and enhances survival of those 
animals vulnerable to drought and further protects the nucleus herd; this implies contribution to 
natural herd growth and household milk production. Moreover, the increase in private enclosure 
reduced access for water and pasture. This used to cause numerous clashes. These private enclosures 
have been dismantled and converted into communal enclosures for communal use and have reduced 
conflict over herd mobility (AFD Project coordinator, October 2011).  
 
Sustainable access to resources and infrastructure created a vested interest in reducing and 
avoiding conflict. The following extract captures the extent of the NGOs contribution described 
by a member of Koree Nagaa:  
 
There is peace now (in Surupa). We (Guji, Gabra and Boran) work hard to prevent conflict that could 
cost human life and livestock …… and ruin our schools and water points, our livelihoods. Our 
children were left out of school due to conflict and we also lost everything. AFD, GOAL, Care rebuilt 
our schools… underground water, and they bought us oxen for asset-building and to start small-scale 
farming currently; our children have a very good access to schools. We do not want to be dislocated 
(due to conflict) from our area because there are schools, ground catchments and other 
infrastructures built by different NGOs (Koree Nagaa members’ FGD, October 2011). 
 
The CRT-type NGOs prioritised those specific economic factors that tend to lead to conflict. 
Thus, they aimed to reduce poverty-induced conflict, although their efforts are likely to have an 
indirect rather than a direct impact on the incidence of conflict.   
 
 Supporting cross-border livestock trade 
With regard to cross-community activity there was evidence of projects which sought to address 
the legacy of the conflict, both in social and economic terms. Particularly good examples 
208 
 
included the cross-border promotion of livestock marketing, and cross-border mobility for petty-
traders. For example, the ACDI/VOCA’s Pastoralist Livelihoods Initiative-Livestock Marketing 
Project (PLI-LM) upgraded market facilities at Harobake (Yabello) and Dubuluk by creating 
marketing facilities. This initiative enabled the Gabra, Guji and Borana pastoralists to conduct 
economically optimal marketing transactions (ACDI/VOCA, 2007). Kurtz and Scarborough 
(2012) found that Mercy Corps’ SIPED programme significantly improved the extent to which 
Gabra, Guji, Borana and Garri could access the Harobeke and Finchawa livestock markets, to 
sell their livestock. However, these writers also note that the Mercy Corps’ SIPED non-target 
areas reported significant decreases in access to Dellomena, Haro-Dumal, and Yadi during the 
recent drought due to conflict. As a result of the Global Livestock Collaborative Research 
Support Program’s (GLC-RSP) project of Improving Pastoral Risk Management on Pastoral 
Rangelands (PARIMA) there is an increased level of traditional cross-border livestock 
movement and trade, which helps in forging inter-group cooperation. This in turn encourages 
cross-cutting ties as it creates a reciprocal interdependence and vested interest in reducing 
conflict. As one participant member of FGD states: 
There has been trade between these groups (Gabra, Guji, Garri and Borana), and it’s not only 
livestock trade, it is opening up for communication. It is opening up the market for animal sale, 
including milk to Moyalle and Kenya. People came here to buy livestock and our people travel to 
other places and buy camels. We couldn’t sell them to any market and now there is peace and the 
roads are open…we can sell and buy other items we need… (Koree Nagaa members’ FGD, October 
2011).  
The NGOs’ projects seem to have implicitly assumed the notion of liberal theory that trade and 
other forms of economic interdependence promote peace and economic advantage for both 
parties (Levy 2001, 9-11). The evidence from the qualitative data appears to support this claim. 
The Mercy Corps’ SIPED programme promoted trade along the conflict fault lines where 
Borana, Gabra and Garri groups co-exist, in the Somali-Borana border districts of Arero and 
Liben.  Here, livestock trade has begun to regain traditional markets and has increased access to 
capital for the targeted communities (Kurtz and Scarborough 2012). The following section 
highlights how community relations efforts contributed to the on-going conflict transformation in 
the Borana Zone. 




 Protecting pastoralists’ livelihoods  
 
As livestock are the basis of pastoral livelihood and incomes, protecting and strengthening 
livestock has always been a high priority (Watson and Catley, 2008). Various initiatives have 
been undertaken. Most NGOs engaged in livestock-based drought responses intended to 
safeguard pastoral assets by providing emergency animal health services, and supplementary 
feeding of core breeding animals. A key informant with much experience in protecting 
livelihoods of pastoralists indicated how the NGOs’ innovative approach to livelihood protection 
initiatives made a difference:   
 
In response to the 2006 and 2008 droughts, we intervened to protect core breeding livestock by 
providing supplementary food. We had to protect these breeding animals and provide livestock feed 
otherwise it would take up to ten years to rebuild herds after a major drought. We also supported 
slaughter destocking in drought affected woredas which has resulted in the slaughter of hundreds of 
cattle and thousands of sheep and goats. We purchased emaciated animals from the pastoralists above 
market price at the time with the objective of injecting much needed cash into drought affected 
households…so that they could invest in animal feed and veterinary services for the remaining 
animals. The slaughtered animals were shared amongst poorer households and in this way the meat 
supported household food security. (NGO Project coordinator, October 2011). 
 
Whilst some NGOs have been protecting pastoral assets as their central focus, others have 
tackled the crisis through livelihood diversification strategies.  
 
 Livelihood diversification 
 
Since the late 1990s, the NGO sector has come to realise that pastoralists need to diversify their 
livelihood strategies to mitigate risks inherent in recurrent drought; these risks include the loss of 
large numbers of livestock, land alienation, and conflict (Little et al., 2001). Some NGOs and 
government agencies initiated various livelihood diversification programmes aimed at building 
sustainable livelihoods. For example, Mercy Corps, and Save the Children/UK and US, initiated 
a livestock products marketing and processing scheme, dry-land products (including gums, and 
essential oils), promotion of backyard vegetable gardening and small-scale farming; the 
establishment of women’s savings and credit groups was of vital importance. SOS Sahel 
Ethiopia and CARE worked with private sector traders to train collectors in techniques for 
natural gum, incense and myrrh tapping, harvesting, cleaning, grading, and storing. The Save the 
Children/US provided beekeeping skills, to develop higher-value markets for honey and 
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beeswax. On the issue of livelihood diversification a senior member of an NGO described the 
change in the following manner: 
 
We emphasise the most vulnerable sections…those that have fallen out of the pastoral livelihood 
system… those livelihoods now based on small farming, firewood collection and charcoal making. 
Supported non-livestock and market driven interventions …women to engage in milk trading 
activities...restocking schemes that encourage re-establishment of viable herds. For example, we 
offered training to improve the quality of milk sold. For vegetable production we distributed improved 
vegetable seeds, and seed stocking, and use of organic fertilizer produced through composting. In so 
doing, we contributed to an improvement in their household income. (NGO Project coordinator, 
October 2011). 
 
A programme co-ordinator in a pastoralist livelihoods initiative describes their contribution: 
 
The mortality of animals vulnerable to drought reduced and milk production at household level has 
increased three times following the establishment of the pasture enclosure intervention. In general, the 
community’s livelihood has shown dramatic improvement. (NGO programme co-ordinator, 
November 2011). 
 
Other organisations have focused on small-scale farming and livestock protection as a priority, 
given recurrent drought in the area. Small-scale farming projects attract widespread support in 
that context and NGOs have incorporated these as part of the service they render. Cross-border 
livestock trade in the regions has been quietly expanding and government is keen to invest in 
livestock marketing infrastructure and security; after all, cross-border livestock trade is critical to 
pastoral livelihoods and to the economy of Ethiopia and its neighbours. Another emphasis is on 
improving the economic conditions of pastoral and ex-pastoral women.   
 
 Supporting women’s savings and credit groups 
 
A project leader, working specifically with livelihood diversification for women, reports as 
follows:   
 
We supported the establishment of more than 100 women’s income generating groups in Dhas, Diere 
and Moyale Yabello, Teltele, and Miyo districts [of the Borana Zone]. Seed money was dispatched and 
we offered basic literacy and business skills training so they are able to keep records. Some of the 
women engaged in milk trading activities that benefited their household income. Many of these groups 
have since launched small-scale income generating activities that helped the household to support 
children’s education, purchase food and cover medical services. I can tell you that women are 
excellent entrepreneurs and managers of small businesses, provided they have access to the right 
capital (including credit) markets and resources. (NGO Project manager, November 2011). 
 
The Women’s Income Generating Project (WIGP) has contributed to economic empowerment. 
For example, in Moyale the women engaged in crop farming as a group and invested in seeds 
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using their savings; they engaged in water development such as building a pond for their family 
and traded animals for consumption. Nevertheless, despite the sterling work done by these 
NGOs, the economic conditions in the two regions are extremely poor. A study by Steglich and 
Bekele (2009) revealed that NGOs and WIGPs had a significant impact in increasing household 
incomes, but without customary institutional support the impact of NGOs is limited. A WIGP 
has the risk of being conceived as a “competitor” or “external” to the indigenous natural 
governance system and thereby there is the risk of excluding WIGPs from accessing natural 
resources. For example, one of the women’s groups engaged in livestock trade was denied access 
to communal water resources on the ground of “use-rights” for their trade cattle during 2008. 
There was another instance when a Women’s Income Generating Group had lost a significant 
amount of its capital to the Borana-Konso war, increasing dropout. Institutional support remains 
a critical means of assisting livelihood diversification; efforts to encourage WIGPs should be 
made in collaboration with these systems.  
 
Besides supporting women’s savings and credit groups, NGOs are also strengthening customary 
social protection mechanisms. 
 
 Strengthening indigenous social protection mechanisms  
 
Pastoralists have developed strategies to reduce risks to their livelihoods and to cope with 
predictable shocks. Central to these coping strategies is mobility and herd management, relying 
on clan solidarity and a social safety net that offers some protection against risks (Pantuliano and 
Wekesa, 2008; Panvello, 2009). A busa gonofaa, (Borana traditional, clan-based, herd-
restocking system) is coming under increasing pressure due to persistent poverty (Desta et al., 
2008). As a result, the numbers of pastoralists leaving pastoralism are increasing every year 
(Panvello, 2009). Some NGOs emphasise strengthening those strategies involving local people 
and using their know-how. A livelihood management officer gave a rationale for supporting 
indigenous social protection mechanisms for livestock redistribution and restocking:   
 
It takes 8 to 10 years to restore herds after a major drought. We supported busa gonofaa because it 
[the system] protects a clan member from becoming Qolle (impoverished). Based on the system, we 
helped the poor pastoral to rebuild his herd by reciprocal monetary exchange or matching two-for-
one of core breeding, or, in the case of richer communities, one-for-one livestock. We also supported 
restocked households with monthly payments to purchase food to ensure high levels of animal health 
care [for the core breed] for the first six months so that the core breeding livestock are not 
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slaughtered or sold to meet household food requirements.  (NGO livelihood management officer, 
October 2011). 
 
Hence, supporting the customary livestock redistribution and restocking mechanism was seen as 
protecting the livelihoods of poor pastoral households.  
5.9.4 Conclusion  
 
The preceding sections have presented some of the contributions of the community development 
NGOs. These NGOs aspire towards participatory development built on indigenous institutions 
(Watson 2001, 2003); in practice, though, participation has been limited to the realm of natural 
resource management (Harrison, 2002). Given the persistent drought, the NGOs development 
projects give emphasis to early warning systems (EWS), drought cycle management, and 
livelihood protection and diversification goals. The notions of peacebuilding and conflict 
resolution are integrated into these projects.  
5.10 The Similarities and Differences between the Two Study Contexts   
The Borana and Gambella regions are socio-politically different in all respects. Nevertheless, the 
historical and political dynamics that underpinned these contexts as they moved from a unitary 
government system to multi-national democracy show some similarities. It should be clear that 
this thesis is examining the peacebuilding potential of development NGOs in these two contexts. 
More specifically, the contributions of the NGO sectors that incorporated peacebuilding 
components into development projects are being studied. The perspectives of those directly 
involved with the NGO sector at the grass-roots level have influenced some of the comparisons. 
The following five key themes emerge from both contexts: the socio-political history; the 
dynamics of conflict; the nature of the NGO sector; framing the nature of the conflict and its 
solution, and the nature of indigenous conflict resolution. 
5.10.2 The Socio-political History  
It is important to consider similarities and differences in the nature and characteristics of the 
regions in which the NGOs operated. In terms of similarities, both regions (a) have witnessed 
substantial changes in the nature, intensity and magnitude of conflict; (b) have long been 
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marginalised by successive regimes in the provision of basic services; (c) their intra-ethnic and 
inter-ethnic conflicts become intertwined and regionalised; (d) had experienced colonial rule in 
the past (at least colonial empires tried to incorporate the region under their rule); (e) the 
indigenous practices of the different ethnic groups, including oral customs and rules, have been 
used to resolve a range of inter-communal and inter-group conflicts; and (f) a number of NGOs 
operating in the study areas have incorporated peacebuilding components into their development 
programmes, and have made significant contributions towards addressing the economic causes of 
protracted conflicts.  
There were also some distinct differences between the conflicts. The most important of these 
included size and demographic composition, and the notion of indigenous conflict resolution, 
discussed below. Demographically, Gambella region is very small compared to Borana. The 
same was true regarding population size: 306,916 in Gambella Regional State and 2,019,383 in 
the Borana Zone. The populations in Borana consisted primarily of three major Oromo groups: 
the Guji, Borana and Gabra, which also were the parties involved in the conflict. In contrast, 
Gambella was a multi-ethnic society and the conflict was over political ownership of the regional 
states and territory. Unlike the Borana Zone (which is under Oromia regional state), where 
demographic size and “distinct” ethnic composition made it a nation, and allowed it to form a 
state of its own within the federation (Art. 39/3), Gambella is designated as a People’s National 
Regional State because of its multi-ethnic composition. Accordingly, the regional constitution 
gave sovereignty in the five “indigenous” nationalities: the Anywaa, Nuer, Mezhenger, Opo and 
the Komo. 
5.10.3 The Dynamics of Conflict  
The conflicts had to some degree, specific regional dimensions underlying their causes. For 
instance, it is difficult to understand the history of these regions without understanding the 
history of their relationships with their neighbours or their geopolitical importance to the 
“superpowers”. In both contexts, intra-ethnic and inter-ethnic conflicts are intertwined and 
regionalised. Because of the external alliances, the potential for spill-over effects is always 
present. For example, if conflict breaks out between Gabra and Borana in Ethiopia, it affects the 
Gabra and Borana in Kenya. Similarly, Anywaa-Nuer conflicts in Gambella could affect 
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Anywaa-Nuer relatons in the Southern Sudan. For example, Anywaa-Nuer conflicts have forced 
a significant number of Nuers to cross the border and settle in the Southern Sudan (Feyissa, 
2009). In both regions the state influenced the peace process far more than the NGOs and the 
local leaders (see Section 5.5.2.1:184). For example, signing of the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement in Sudan in January 2005 (between the South Sudan and Ethiopian governments) was 
a turning-point in shaping the peace processes in the Southern Sudan, with huge implications for 
the Gambella region of Ethiopia (5.7: 164-172). To a certain degree both conflicts had their 
origins in how they were incorporated into the Ethiopian state, the history of the relationship 
with neighbours or their geopolitical importance to the superpowers (Chapter Three). 
Assimilation and settlement strategies and strong central government were used to justify 
successive state-building projects, which attempted to melt all ethnicities and polities within a 
territory into one national identity (Helland, 1996; Borchgrevink and Lie, 2009). Thus, another 
feature common to both conflicts was related to inter/intra-ethnic division, with diverging 
identity discourse based on territory and livelihoods. These divisions, in turn, largely coincided 
with and were reinforced by ethnic-federalism, and exacerbated conflict over access to resources 
among the ethnic groups.  
5.10.4 The Nature of the NGO Sector 
It could also be argued that the notion of an NGO sector is much stronger in Borana than in 
Gambella. Despite the fact that there is no single and homogenous NGO sector evident in both 
areas, NGOs in Borana had a more grass-roots constituency than in Gambella. In Gambella, just 
as in Borana, there is a proliferation of NGOs. However, the Borana Zone has a relatively vibrant 
non-profit NGO sector. For example, most of the Borana NGOs had a tendency to use an 
extensive mix of peacebuilding and development programmes ranging from natural resource 
management to livlihoods protection, combined with diversification from gender empowerment 
to building local resilience that provides a strong basis for improving resilience to drought. In 
Gambella, on the other hand, most of the NGOs focus on emeregency aid, health and and 
sanitary projects (see Appendix A). Additionally, in the Borana Zone, more than 25 such 
organisations serve about one million people (BZBFED, 2011). In Gambella, 22 organisations 
serve over 300,000 people (See Appendix A). The NGOs referred to in this study have been 
involved in meeting the objectives of poverty eradication and the Millennium Development 
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Goals, democratisation and decentralisation. All of the aforementioned could, in fact, contribute 
towards conflict transformation.   
5.10.5 Framing the Nature of the Conflict and its Solution 
There were slight differences in how the various NGOs framed the nature of the conflict and its 
solution, the approaches they employed, and what impact they had on their respective areas of 
work. First, the ethnic composition, historical animosity and new political discourses of 
indigeneity, were at issue in each area. Thus, in the case of Gambella, the conflicts were over 
diverging identity discourses based on indigeneity, livelihoods system and political ownership of 
the regional states (Section 3.1: 52-59). In Borana the crucial question was how vital natural 
resources were to be shared between conflicting communities (Section 3.2: 59-69). In both 
regions, the NGOs assumed that the problem was an absence of a reliable shared-institutional 
apparatus to diffuse tension and govern fair allocation of resources (Section 5.6: 149-163 and 
section 5.8: 173-200). In Borana, NGOs such as Care Ethiopia, Mercy Corps, AFD and GPDA 
were geared towards reinvigorating indigenous social institutions and increasing indigenous 
peoples’ participation in and management of the natural resources of grazing land, forest and 
water; the goals were to construct sustainable livelihoods and developments and to reduce the 
dynamics of the current conflict (Section 5.6: 143-163). Secondly, in Gambella, NGOs such as 
ACORD and Pact Ethiopia assumed that violence is partly motivated by prejudice, 
misperceptions, and growing economic hardship (Section 5.7: 164-172). The solution for the first 
challenge was to concentrate on building “social bridges” and individual empowerment, and for 
the second challenge, the solution was to focus on building human and institutional infrastructure 
for peacebuilding. Thirdly, in both regions, NGOs also underscore that basic needs should be 
satisfied, to bring about a resolution to conflict (Section 5.9: 200-212). The solution is to address 
the socio-economic problems and resources that perpetuate the dynamics of the conflict 
relationship.  
5.10.6 The Nature of Indigenous Conflict Resolution 
The issue of indigenous conflict resolution practices and “indigenious empowerment” appears to 
have greater relevance for the NGOs operating in the Borana Zone than in Gambella. Undoubtly, 
this is again due to the richness of the indigenous knowledge of the Borana, the wealth of Borana 
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institutions and their capacity to regulate access to resources and resolve disputes (Watson, 
2001). Therefore, it was argued, relying on these institutions would prepare the ground for 
organising people for participation, planning and contributing to peacebuilding and development 
projects (Helland, 1996). As a result, both CDT and CRT NGOs operating in Borana showed a 
strong commitment to build upon the existing know-how and work with indigenous institutions 
as a way to achieve peace and development (Section 5.6: 143-163). They worked to revitalise 
institutional capacities of indigenous institutions and to enter into genuine partnerships for 
bottom-up development.  
In Gambella this commitment towards reinvigorating indigenous institutions or entering into 
partnerships and integrating them into the development process is not as evident as in Borana. 
Again this may be largely due to the weakening of indigenous institutions through constant 
attempts to delegitimise them, thereby weakening their long-standing cross-cutting bonds and 
reducing their capacity to handle conflict (Borchgrevink and Lie, 2009). Also, a lack of interest 
in these institutions may be due to the fact that NGOs and local people have become more 
skeptical about institutional partnerships of this kind (Terlinden, 2002). Cascão (2013) further 
argues that cross-ethnic trust and norms of reciprocity that govern their relationships have 
become weak as the result of the weakening legitimacy of the traditional institutional apparatus. 
This trend may also be related to the inability of indigenous institutions to cope with the change 
in the nature and magnitude of local conflicts that has outstripped their capacity to manage and 
contain these conflicts, thereby generating instability (as conflicts are based on a diverging 
identity discourse, indigeneity and a livelihoods system). As a result of these changes, 
indigenous institutions can become less relevant in the context of contemporary conflict. 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter presents the triangulated findings gleaned from key informants and from interviews 
and focus group discussions as well as survey data. The field work was conducted in the Borana 
and Gambella regions. The findings were presented in the format of eight major themes which 
shed light on the contributions of the NGO sector with regard to peacebuilding in areas of 
protracted conflict. The sterling contributions of both the Conflict Resolution-Type (CRT) NGOs 
and the Commmunity Development-Type (CDT) NGOs with regard to indigenous 
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empowerment, livelihoods enhancement and promotion of cross-ethnic relations have become 
apparent. One could also argue that CRTs and CDTs have both, to some degree, helped to 
prevent and/or manage conflict in the communities.   
The following, concluding chapter presents a review of the key findings, main conclusions, 
























The aim of this study was to examine the peacebuilding potential of development NGOs in the 
Oromia and Gambella regions of Ethiopia. This chapter will present the main conclusions in 
relation to the research objectives. Furthermore, upon reflecting on these conclusions, critical 
recommendations will be put forward. Finally a brief epilogue will bring this report to a close.  
6.1 Main Conclusions 
 
The following are the main conclusions pertaining to each specific objective of the study as well 
as the key categories. 
Objective 1: To ascertain the nature of State and Civil Society relationships  
 In the post-1991 period, the NGO sector proliferated in size, influence, and scope of its 
responsibilities. The reasons for this proliferation are varied: they include the civil service 
reform and decentralisation, availability of foreign funding for local organisations and 
political opportunity (Section 5.2.1: 98-101). In this period, NGOs were more focused on the 
economic causes of conflicts rather than concerning themselves with the broader underlying 
structural causes of protracted conflict (Section 5.3.1: 119). 
  
 By the early 2000s, the role of the NGOs had been transformed to one encompassing the 
broader agenda of the “rights-based” development approach that aimed to build institutions 
for good governance and democracy-building (Section 5.2.2: 102-103 and section 5.3.2: 119-
121).  
 
 NGOs often cited a general increase in the intensity of violence, the destruction of their 
development infrastructures and requests from donors and the religious sector as reasons for 
including a peacebuilding approach (Section 5.3.3: 121-123).  
 
 The state and CSOs are making greater efforts to influence each other. The state attempts to 
engage or co-opt CSOs into its own policies by promoting national poverty eradication 
policies and encouraging the NGOs to have the Millennium Development Goals as part of 
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their agenda (Section 5.2.4: 108-114). While the state engages these CSOs within its 
development policy dialogues, CSOs use this platform to negotiate and bargain for their own 
goals (Section, section, 5.2.4: 109). 
 
 The CSOs attempt to influence the state’s national policy though lobbying and advocacy. 
Here, the state tends to use coercive strategies to influence CSO behaviour. Accordingly, 
CSOs had strategic choices open to them: either to work in close collaboration with the state 
in the poverty eradication programmes or to engage in contentious issues of human rights and 
democracy building, with some state censure (Section 5.2.4: 109-10). This does not mean 
that these CSOs could not be involved in lobbying and advocacy, and have influence over 
national policies (Section 5.2.2: 102-103). For example, one strategic pillar of the 
decentralisation policy was to forge partnerships with the CSO sector. These CSOs have 
made a contribution, although insignificant in comparison to other actors, to the 
democratisation and decentralisation processes (Section 5.2.2: 102-103 and section, 5.6.4: 
158-159).  
Objective 2:  To examine the policy frameworks that impact on NGOs in Ethiopia. 
 The new Proclamation (PPRRCS) has limited the NGOs’ role to that of being placed on a 
relief-development continuum with any advocacy for human rights being limited. 
Subsequently this has created a division between the “rights-based approach” and 
development (Section 5.2.5: 112-113). Furthermore, some NGOs feel constrained from 
carrying out conflict resolution as part of their development mandate. Needless to say, it is 
far more difficult for NGOs operating in conflict prone areas to separate development from 
peacebuilding (Section 5.2.5. 113 and section 5.9: 200-212).  
 
 The new Proclamation forced NGOs to redefine their raison d'être and mandates, thereby 
affecting their choice of strategies and their ability to translate their goals into organisational 
output (Section 5.2.5: 112-113). For instance, local NGOs that relied heavily on foreign 
funding had to change their mandate to one emphasising development (Section 5.2.5: 112). 
In doing so, they abandoned initiatives concerning other fundamental needs critical for 
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transforming protracted conflicts; these include good governance, peacebuilding, human 
rights, and an accountable and responsive political environment. 
 Not all NGOs agreed that the new Proclamation had negative impacts on their approaches to 
peacebuilding. NGOs such as GPDI and AFD adapted their mission and choice of strategies 
to accommodate the political climate and to be able to carry out their goals in a different way. 
Since the new dispensation curtailed a “rights-based” approach, these NGOs incorporated a 
“do-no-harm”/”conflict sensitive” approach (CSA) into their development programmes 
(Section 5.2.5: 113-114), so they were still able to deal with the conflict although in a 
circumscribed manner. 
 
 The Proclamation also affected the NGOs’ organisational form and resources required to 
sustain them and help them achieve their goals. For example, after the Proclamation, which 
allocates 70% of the budget to direct development and 30% to administrative costs, NGOs 
such as SOS Sahel and GPDI were forced to centralise their management and human 
resources at Yabello district (Section 5.2.5: 115-116). This created a logistical and 
administrative burden as they had to reach out to remote geographical areas. Thus, the work 
of NGOs with regard to peacebuilding was severely constrained. 
 
 In general, there is consensus that it is far more difficult for NGOs operating in conflict-
prone areas to separate peacebuilding from development (Bush, 1998; Schmelzle, 2006; 
Watson, 2001). Some NGOs have therefore integrated peacebuilding strategies into their 
development projects to address the challenges (Section 5.2.5: 113 and section 5.4.1: 125).  
Objective 3: To assess current indigenous conflict resolution practices that are still used  
 
 Indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms have remained resilient despite the new state’s 
judicial arrangements. Despite the weakening of indigenous institutions for several reasons, 
they continued to exercise influence in both conflict resolution and natural resource 
management (Section 3.3: 65-69 and section 5.5:131-148).  
 
 The practice of indigenous conflict resolution in Borana (See section 3.3: 65-69 and section 
5.5.1: 131-135) is stronger than it is in Gambella (See section 5.5.1: 13-132 and section 
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5.10.6: 216). This may be linked to the fact that indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms in 
Gambella work best within ethnic groups and have made intra-ethnic conflict resolution and 
peacebuilding possible (Greuel, 1971). However, these indigenous mechanisms are 
insufficient for dealing with inter-ethnic conflicts (Section 5.6.1: 150). Thus, a more 
overarching and inclusive framework of law is required to bridge group differences.  
 
 The idea of using indigenous institutions has been adopted by some Conflict Resolution-
Type NGOs because of their acceptance by parties to the conflict, their emphasis on social 
harmony, their responsiveness and accessibility. Also, customary conflict resolution 
mechanisms are seen as participatory and restorative and as supplementary to the state 
judiciary (Section 5.5.1: 131-136).  
 
 Similarly, Community Development-Type NGOs have used indigenous institutions in their 
work with communities with regard to community development. Indigenous conflict 
resolution practices promoted possibilities for participatory development planning and 
development work (Section 5.5.2: 142-143). The discourses around the use of these 
indigenous mechanisms range from their feasibility and pragmatic approaches to local 
empowerment and sustainable development (Section 5.5.2: 143-147). 
 
 There are differences between the indigenous and state’s legal systems. The community’s 
validation of customary institutions and its laws is strongly associated with its emphasis on 
compensation and repairing social harmony (Section 5.5.1: 136), rather than on exacting 
punishment, which is seen to be the sole focus of the state judicial system (section 5.5.1:137). 
It would thus appear that much more research needs to be done into the state judiciary system 
and ways of transforming it so that it could incorporate a restorative justice approach which 
approximates the indigeneous ideal of social harmony.   
 
 Respondents felt that neither customary nor state institutions should hold the monopoly of 
how to mete out true justice, in the pastoralist areas of Borana and Gambella. Both 
indigenous and state institutions are active and operational, but with varying degrees of 
legitimacy. On one hand, the structural limitations of the state judicial and military systems 
have rendered them less effective in resolving local conflicts. On the other hand, it is far 
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more difficult for indigenous institutions to deal effectively with “political” causes of conflict 
such as conflict over political boundaries, representation and power (Section 5.5.1:137-141). 
Customary courts and laws may never completely replace the formal statuary laws in all 
functions, nor could they address political causes of conflicts. Instead, they are well placed to 
address local conflict over natural resources (Section 5.5.1:137-138). The state and 
customary courts need not always interact in opposition but, under certain circumstances, 
could be complementary (Section 5.5.1:139).  
 
 Respondents indicated that indigenous conflict resolution institutions can adjudicate conflicts 
over resources, relieving the state of part of the judicial burden of extending authority and 
delivering benefits to a large conflict-ridden population. The state’s legitimacy could be 
strengthened through permitting customary institutions to play their roles (Section 5.5.1:140). 
 In general, the basic structural features of the Borana system of indigenous conflict resolution 
remained relatively stable despite the historical changes of the last four decades, whereas the 
Anywaa’s and Nuer’s systems broke down in several ways within a century of their 
incorporation into the Ethiopian State. Even among the Borana, where it remained relatively 
intact, the system underwent significant structural modifications. 
 
Objective 4: Find out which strategies NGOs use to resolve conflict     
 
 NGOs have adapted a mix of approaches for dealing with conflict. These include a 
comprehensive approach, the rights-based approach, do-no-harm approach and indigenous 
empowerment (section 5.4: 125-130). 
 
 NGOs designed the various approaches centred on human needs, people-centred approaches, 
and on building the indigenous institutions’ capacity to support a “bottom-up” approach 
(Section 5.4.5: 129-130 and section 5.9.2: 140). 
 
 Key informants from Gambella indicate that in the absence of strong indigenous conflict 
resolution mechanisms, there is great potential for the NGOs to  use faith-based institutions  
as an entry point for further peacebuilding efforts (Section 5.6.5: 159-163). These NGOs 
adopted a faith-based peacebuilding approach and engaged in the institutionalisation of 
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peacebuilding apparatus to handle conflict and build cross-cutting ties. These informants 
suggest that targeting such pre-existing networks is not only critical for peacebuilding, but 
were the most effective method of stimulating and maintaining commitment to collective 
action (Section 5.6.5: 160-161). 
 NGOs could be instrumental in reinvigorating and formulating innovative approaches to the 
conflict. Earlier approaches were previously weakened or overlooked in the conflict 
resolution toolkit of each region (Section 5.4.5: 129-130). 
 
 NGOs could also view indigenous knowledge and the existing local institutional apparatus, 
including indigenous institutions, as more suitable than top-down development practices for 
building durable peace and creating sustainable development. Their reliance on these 
institutions helped prepare the ground for organising people for participating, planning and 
contributing to peace and development projects (Watson, 2001).   
 
 All NGOs sought to adopt approaches that could reinvigorate indigenous social institutions 
and increase indigenous people’s participation in and management of the natural resources of 
grazing land, forest and water. These NGOs also saw the potential of indigenous institutions 
for initiating development projects and conducting conflict resolution (Section 5.4.5: 130-131 
and section 5.6: 149-163). However, in Gambella, the interest in indigenous institutions had 
waned, and NGOs in that area have become more skeptical about institutional partnerships of 
this kind (Section 5.10.6: 216). 
 
Objective 5: To explore the perceptions of the NGOs about the impact of their services 
 
 Several respondents from Borana indicated that they were instrumental in facilitating the 
activation and re-establishment of customary institutions and strengthening their jurisdiction 
over land, social and cultural issues. Once these institutions were established, they provided a 
legal framework with the capacity to resolve group differences peacefully (Section 5.6: 149-
163). For instance, a number of focus group discussion participants from Borana pointed to 
an increase in the number of conflict cases being referred to these peace committees, which 
could be an indicator of the recognition of the local peace committees as being a legitimate or 




 Several key informants from both regions felt that they played a significant role in the 
establishment of inter/intra-ethnic peace groups and strengthening pastoralists’ own rules and 
in drawing by-laws relating to natural resource access, use and maintenance, as well as laws 
on murder, theft and injury (Section 5.6.2: 151-156). For example, respondents from Borana 
indicated that inter-ethnic peace committees of elders were able to forge strong inter-ethnic 
networks of engagement and were successful in dispelling certain fears and rumours and in 
avoiding violence (Section 5.6.3: 158). 
 
 Key informants from both regions felt that inter/intra-ethnic relations initiatives such as 
experience sharing tours are effective in augmenting cross-cutting or integrative ties in 
societies, and thereby facilitating herd mobility along borders (Section 5.6.3: 157). All lines 
of evidence strongly support significant positive impacts of inter/intra-ethnic relations 
initatives most notably with respect to improving cross-border cooperation, and reducing 
cross-border cattle raids and killings; these have clearly had a significant effect on the 
dynamics of conflict in the region (Section 5.8.2.3: 194-198 and section 5.9.3: 208-209). For 
example, key informants from Borana indicated the contribution of cross-border cooperation 
to a reduction in the incidence of cross-border cattle raids carried out by Borana-Hamer, and 
Borana, and Garri and Gabra (Section 5.6.3: 158). Similarly, in Gambella, some key 
informants pointed out how inter/intra-ethnic development projects helped communities to 
become economically interdependent (Section 5.8.2.3: 194-198). 
 
 Several respondents from Borana indicated that the promotion of intra-ethnic/inter-ethnic ties 
between the Gabra and Garri of northern Kenya and Borana facilitated freedom of herd 
mobility and access to natural resources during the recent droughts, thereby protecting the 
communities’ livelihood by reducing their vulnerability to drought risks (Section 5.6.3: 155-
158).  
 Some informants from Gambella emphasised that inter-faith peacebuilding schemes were the 
most effective way of stimulating collective action for peace (Section 5.6.5: 159-163). They 
indicated that churches were used to bridge the two communities and to institutionalise cross-




 Several informants from Gambella pointed to some critical impact, in which Track Three 
peacebuilding initiatives played a significant role. Positive impacts include: bringing the 
parties together for discussions; helping those at the grass-roots level to find the root sources 
of conflict and its resolution; helping the shift in discourse among the ordinary people, from 
the language of violence to peace; facilitating the negotiation of political settlement between 
the government and “rebels”; and, helping the re-opening of roads previously closed because 
of the conflict (Section 5.7: 164-172). 
 
 Most key informants reported a number of positive impacts that they attributed to the NGOs’ 
development projects. These include: diversifying livelihoods, strengthening indigenous 
social protection mechanisms, supporting policy initiatives to protect pastoral livelihoods and 
supporting cross-border livestock trade (Section 5.9.3: 207-212). 
 
 A number of key informants indicated that, to a great extent, NGOs have positive impacts in 
revitalising economic opportunities, which in turn improve the capacity for trade and 
increase links between traders across the border (Section 5.6.3:157). They indicated that 
these initiatives were critical in increasing the level of traditional cross-border livestock 
movement and trade to help in forging inter-group cooperation. Many key informants felt 
that cross-border trade encouraged cross-cutting ties as it created a reciprocal 
interdependence and a vested interest in reducing conflict (Section 5.8.2.2:196 and section 
5.8.2.3: 208). 
  
 There was overall agreement that integrated conflict resolution and development initiatives 
built on local agents and indigenous resources at grass-roots helped to contribute towards a 
more sustainable peace in societies experiencing protracted conflict (Section 5.6: 149-153). 
Nevertheless, most informants indicated that these initiatives are becoming inadequate in 
view of the frequent occurrences of droughts, rapid socio-political changes, fluctuations in 






Objective 6: To explore the perceptions of the beneficiaries concerning services rendered by 
the NGOs  
 
 Several beneficiary respondents from Gambella and Borana felt that NGOs’ development 
programmes had created sustainable access to natural resources: water, grazing lands and 
fishing (Section 5.8.2.3: 194-198). Most of these respondents (69.2%) indicated that the 
programmes increased the reconstruction of physical infrastructure such as schools, health 
clinics and water points (Section. 5.8.2.3: 198).  
 
 With respect to the impact of NGOs’ cross-ethnic/border initaives, several beneficiary 
respondents from both regions indicated that NGOs’ programmes have enhanced cross-
border livestock marketing, and improved cross-border mobility for petty-traders (Section 
5.8.2.3: 196-198). They also point out that cross-border trade has begun to regain traditional 
markets and rural youth have gained access to education. 
 
 Overall there was agreement among the beneficiaries that participation in conflict resolution 
training programmes built their conflict analysis skills, negotiation and problem solving 
skills, and their skills in identifying conflict-connectors and dividers  (Section 5.8.2.1: 178-
179). Most (87.9%) respondents who participated in the training felt that it had built their 
skills and capacities (Section 5.8.2.1:179). Furthermore, focus group participants indicated 
that the skills and concepts learnt during conflict resolution training programmes were 
important for becoming trainers within their own communities, developing trust, willingness 
to compromise and to negotiate and to tolerate the values of the other ethnic groups (Section 
5.8.2.2: 185-194).  
 
 Of the 90% of respondents who had participated in conflict resolution training, more than 
two-third (66.7%) indicated that they had participated in peacebuilding activities; in other 
words, in mediation, negotiation, arbitration and conciliation (Section 5.8.2.1:181-182). This 
implies that training in conflict resolution projects run by the NGOs could augment 
participants’ activities in peace processes.  
 
 Beneficiary perceptions in Gambella and Borana indicated that the incidence of conflict has 
decreased over the last two years. Key reasons for this include relative stability in the 
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neighbouring areas, federal government interventions, local administration interventions, 
NGO involvement and local elders’ negotiations (Section 5.8.2.1:183-184). It was found that 
none of these reasons is predominant; they all have some influence on the dynamics of the 
conflict, but in varying degrees. This finding suggests that conflict resolution interventions 
need to be comprehensive and complementary, involving all the above mentioned factors 
(Section 5.8.2.1:184). 
 
 Several beneficiary respondents, both from Borana and Gambella, felt that the “other 
community” could be trusted. The great majority of participants in conflict resolution 
training indicated that they would be more willing to share natural resources, and to rely on 
each other for support; they would approach members of the other group more readily than 
would people who are less trusting of the other community (Section 5.8.2.2: 192-194). These 
findings were important because they could facilitate freedom of movement and access to 
important resources to mitigate resource-based conflicts and strengthens a group’s resilience 
mechanisms to cope with drought related shocks (Section 5.9.3: 207-208). 
 
 Overall, several beneficiary respondents from both regions felt that the NGOs’ inter-group 
contact schemes helped to establish trust, reduce prejudice, and increase tolerance and cross-
community contact; all of this, in turn, helped participants to adopt new attitudes, form 
relationships, develop joint activities, undertake trade, and do business with each other 
(Section 5.8.2.2: 185-194). This work shows a significant and positive effect of inter-group 
contact schemes on reducing the magnitude and changing the nature of violence that often 
exists between groups in protracted conflicts.  
6.2 Recommendations  
The evidence reviewed in this study suggests seven recommendations for development agencies 
and policy makers that aim to reduce the pastoralists’ vulnerability to recurrent drought and also 
aim to reduce the incidence of conflict in conflict-prone areas of the Borana Zone and Gambella 
regional states.  
 First, if development NGOs operating in those conflict areas are to have a meaningful 
impact, then their peacebuilding projects need to build on indigenous institutions and 
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local actors. They also need to build local capacities and enhance social cohesion as these 
are factors that underpin pastoralists’ resilience in the face of disasters and conflict.  
 Second, those development NGOs that aim to strengthen pastoral livelihoods and drought 
resilience in conflict-prone areas need to incorporate peacebuilding activities as a core 
component since cooperative mechanisms appear to be a pre-requisite for strengthening 
their resilience to drought-related risks.  
 Third, despite the challenges encountered in conflict resolution programmes in the 
context of protracted social conflict areas, the evidence reveals the importance of “social 
bridging” projects, and suggests that schemes for improving inter/intra-ethnic relations 
might be introduced as a key part of the conflict resolution process.  
 Fourth, the present judicial system has not demonstrated an ability to diffuse tensions; 
moreover, the failure of “top-down development” practices resulted in serious 
environmental degradation and destabilizing of the population’s coping mechanisms, 
thereby threatening their livelihood system (Homann, 2004). There is a need to 
incorporate indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms involving indigenous institutions 
to address community conflicts.  
 Fifth, indigenous conflict resolution institutions can adjudicate conflicts over resources, 
relieving the state of part of the judicial burden of extending authority and delivering 
benefits to a large conflict-ridden population. The state can become stronger and be 
perceived as more legitimate, by permitting customary institutions to play their roles.  
 Sixth, if NGOs are to play their roles successfully, the state needs to amend the new 
Proclamation to allow NGOs to extend their mandates to include conflict resolution 
strategies. The current terms of the Proclamation are detrimental to the NGOs’ funding 
sources and legitimacy.  
 Finally, further large-scale research into aspects of these recommendations could add 
leverage for substantive policy changes which could benefit the Federal State of Ethiopia 







In conclusion, this study raises three interesting and important dimensions with regard to key 
emerging issues. These are: the challenge of ending violent conflict; the importance of state 
institutions in addressing “political” and regional conflicts, and conceptualising the nature of the 
conflict and its solution.    
 
The future of peace in both contexts remains fragile for different reasons. In Gambella, inter-
ethnic politics present a legacy of diverging identity discourse based on indigeneity, livelihoods 
systems and citizenship (Feyissa, 2009). For example, the Nuer and Anywaa ethnic groups 
continue to fight over ethnic identities, local and national representation in government, federal 
funds, language at schools and land for agriculture. Furthermore, the history of Nuer and the 
Anywaa is one of bitter political rivalry between the GPDUP and GPLP that had made trust 
building at grass-roots level difficult. The activities of political elites and other factions will 
continue to engage in political power aimed at destabilizing the region. As a result, the potential 
for spill-over effects is always present. How the new power sharing arrangement and 
decentralisation process can continue to exacerbate or contain these challenges will be central to 
the future of the region. Generally, conflict is latent even though negotiation platforms are set up 
to tackle the root causes. To reduce full-blown inter-group conflict, effective interventions also 
need to build inter-group trust, address latent reciprocal mistrust and its related concept of 
exclusive ethnic spaces.  
In the Borana region, the biggest challenge facing the pastoralist communities is addressing the 
problem of recurrent drought; this affects more than two-thirds of the population. As indicated 
previously, the livelihoods of pastoralists are becoming increasingly vulnerable because of 
population growth, climate change, lack of livestock markets, severe restrictions in herd 
mobility, and breakdown of customary institutions and social relations (CARE, 2010). A recent 
survey of households affected by drought in the Borana Zone shows the following disturbing 
trends: poverty is deepening amongst those who are already poor; loss of productive assets and 
increasing household food insecurity; growing numbers of pastoralists are moving away from 
pastoralism every year; more and more are having to depend on emergency relief food provision 
for survival; the resilience of pastoralist communities to drought in Ethiopia will continue to 
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decline; traditional pastoralism could no longer support their communities (GL-CRSP PARIMA, 
2007a; CARE, 2010). For example, conflict in the pastoralist areas of Moyalle and Arero usually 
sparked during prolonged dry seasons when the pastoralists would move in search of water and 
pasture for their livestock. Although various NGOs in partnership with government have been 
trying to addresses the underlying causes of vulnerability as well as diversifying their 
livelihoods, their efforts are becoming inadequate in view of the frequent occurrences of 
droughts, rapid socio-political changes, fluctuations in the nature and intensity of conflict and 
long-term climatic changes. 
Given the history of deep-rooted conflicts in the region, the state will continue to play crucial 
roles in preventing, containing and ending violent conflict. It is also a major player in influencing 
the outcome of political negotiations to the extent that it exerts pressure on antagonists and alters 
the power balance through positive and negative inducements. A case in point is how FDRE 
settled the power struggle between antagonistic and irreconcilable ethnic groups of Nuer and the 
Anywaa of the Gambella Regional State (Section 5.7.1: 166-167). Another example is where the 
Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF), known as the Mekelakeya, often intervened to 
manage and de-escalate conflict in both areas (Feyissa, 2009; Bassi, 2010). Furthermore, there 
are many basic political and economic functions for which the state is uniquely equipped, not 
only the guardianship of territorial integrity but also counterbalancing regional effects of 
conflict. For example, the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan in January 
2005 (between the South Sudan and Ethiopian governments) was a turning-point in shaping the 
peace processes in the Southern Sudan, with huge implications for the Gambella region of 
Ethiopia. The NGOs’ Track Two and Track Three initiatives may not completely replace the 
government’s role nor could they contain external factors. Instead, they are well placed to 
complement and assist the peace process by bringing political elites and community leaders of 
conflicting parties together to explore their grievances. 
 
Furthermore, Vaughan and Tronvoll (2003) argue that reliance on the coercive power of the state 
alone is inadequate; it cannot promote lasting peace. For example, although the military and 
regional authorities intervened to manage and de-escalate conflict, they are short of conflict 
negotiation skills and lack the cultural sensitivity needed to handle conflict and reinstate durable 
peace (Adunga, 2010). The significance of customary procedures is still important in the view of 
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local ethnic groups and so the state should incorporate these customs into its judicial procedures 
(Abbink, 2006). The rituals and ceremonies performed for conflict negotiation in the social 
setting has a meaning and purpose “beyond its judicial outcome” (Abbink, 2006:401).  
Once it was recognised that not all of the NGOs investigated had framed the nature of the 
conflict and its solution in the same way, a decision was taken to classify them as either Conflict 
Resolution-type (CR-type) NGOs or Community Development-type (CD-type) NGOs. As 
indicated previously, the CR-type NGOs largely identified the main causes of conflict as being 
the disintegration of long-standing cross-cutting bonds and the weakening of indigenous 
institutions. The way forward is, therefore, to strengthen indigenous institutions and build their 
integrative ties and mutual interests. This certainly does not mean that the CR-type NGOs were 
in any way less dedicated than the CD-type NGOs in addressing the economic causes of conflict. 
It merely means that they were committed to peacebuilding programmes because they believed 
that peace is a pre-requisite to freedom of movement and access to important resources, both of 
which lay the foundations for greater drought resilience. For instance, Care Ethiopia, Mercy 
Corps, AFD and GPDA were geared towards protecting pastoralists’ livelihoods, diversifying 
those livelihoods, and supporting cross-border livestock trade; the aim was to foster pastoralists’ 
resilience to chronic drought.  
In contrast, the CD-type NGOs identified chronic vulnerability to drought, limited access to 
scarce natural resources and deprivation of basic needs, as factors that exacerbate conflict. Thus, 
their primary focus was building the pastoralists’ livelihood and resilience. These NGOs only 
incorporated peacebuilding projects as a part of broader efforts needed to address pastoralists’ 
vulnerability and improve their resilience. Here, then, was the point of convergence between the 
goals of the CD-type and CR-type of NGOs: the two goals collapsed into a common objective of 
strengthening the resilience of the pastoralists to climate-related shocks. Not only were the 
NGOs in the study area likely to use a combination of approaches, but similar strategies were 
known and available to the NGOs across the three districts. For example: OPA’s inter-ethnic 
peace conferences, SOS Sahel’s Collaborative Forest Management Project, Care Ethiopia’s 
rangeland and water development projects, and PARIMA’s and ICRC’s livestock marketing 




After reviewing the relative impact that the NGOs had on their respective areas, the following 
four key outcomes stand out. These are: re/institutionalisation of inter/intra-ethnic peace groups; 
activation of customary laws and re-establishment of customary institutions; strengthening 
inter/intra-ethnic ties; and, addressing economic causes of conflict. 
Re/institutionalisation of inter/intra-ethnic peace groups  
The most important achievement of NGOs in the Borana Zone and the Gambella region was 
their support for the following: the establishment of Koree Nagaa (inter/intra-ethnic peace 
committees) at grass-roots level and at Woreda level, School Peace Committees, Conflict 
Management Forums, Women’s Peace Committees, Inter-faith peacebuilding initatives (such as 
Joint Development Office and a Joint Peace Committee) and district-level Peace and Natural 
Resource Management Committees (Section 5.6.1: 149-151). Once the indigenous institutions 
were strengthened and new ones established, they provided the apparatus to diffuse conflict over 
natural resources and other causes. In other words, the NGOs were successful in reinvigorating 
the available “cultural capital” for peacebuilding. For example, in Surupa (Yabello), the 
establishment of the Koree Nagaa (peace committee) provided institutional apparatus used not 
only to draft and ratify agreed-upon by-laws relating to access to resources, but also used to 
oversee their implementation. They did so through peacebuilding projects that encompass 
facilitating peace dialogues and peace accords and reinvigorating local institutions for resource 
sharing and economic opportunities. Likewise, in Gambella, NGOs such as Pax Christi 
Netherlands and HEKS supported the establishment of intra-ethnic and inter-ethnic peace groups 
consisting of the Nuer, Anywaa and Highlanders. Inter-faith peacebuilding initatives brought 
together individuals from opposing groups and, as described in previous chapters, played a 
significant role in a number of peacebuilding processes.  
Activation of customary laws and re-establishment of customary institutions 
Both CD-type and CR-type of NGOs viewed the activation and re-establishment of customary 
institutions and strengthening their jurisdiction over land, social and cultural issues as keys to 
stability and reducing environmental degradation (Section 5.6.2: 151-156). Whereas activation of 
these institutions places the community at the centre of Natural Resource Management (NMR), 
reliance on these institutions reduces differential access to resources, diminishes social exclusion 
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and reduces conflict. Therefore, the NGO projects aimed to transform the conventional, 
government-led NRM into community-based NRM systems. The Participatory Forest 
Management Approach (PFMA), a new collaborative resource management approach, was 
adopted to revitalise the indigenous institutions and to empower the local community to reclaim 
their rights to use and manage the natural resources. The informants noted that the activation of 
customary laws helped to tackle protracted conflict over access to, utilisation and management of 
resources. For example, since the activation of the principles of Dongora Serra, Lafa sera roba, 
Lafa sera bonna and Forra (Section 3.3:65-69), there has been a significant reduction in conflict 
between the Borana and Guji and nomadic Garri in Arero and Yabello, over access to forest 
resources and grazing areas (Section 5.6.2: 151-155). Since then, access to natural resources has 
been reached through negotiation rather than by following the previously assumed open access. 
As a result, the organisational structure that evolved organically has been reinvigorated, thereby 
enhancing the rules and regulations for governing access to the resources and reducing the 
intensity of conflicts. 
 Strengthening inter/intra-ethnic ties  
The promotion of inter/intra-ethnic ties between the Gabra and Garri of northern Kenya and 
Borana was another important contribution of the CR-type NGOs. In doing this, the CR-type 
NGOs facilitated freedom of herd mobility and access to natural resources during the recent 
droughts, thereby protecting the communities’ livelihood by reducing their vulnerability to 
drought risks (Section 5.6.3: 156-158). The cross-border cooperation also contributed to a 
reduction in the incidence of cross-border cattle raids carried out by Borana-Hamer, and Borana, 
and Garri and Gabra. It has also clearly had a significant effect on the dynamics of conflict in the 
region.  
In Gambella, the CDT-type NGOs were instrumental in facilitating the formation of inter/intra-
ethnic peace committees that were very active and quite successful in handling disputes (Section 
5.6.5: 159-163 and section 5.7: 168-171). Pact Ethiopia’s cross-border peace projects were also 
identified as important in community development and for addressing issues of social division, 
providing opportunities for relationships to develop on a cross-border basis and for breaking 
down suspicion and mistrust between different communities (Section 5.8.2.2: 185-194). Pact 
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Ethiopia also constructed roads along the conflict fault lines in the border area between Gog 
town (Pinyudo Woreda/Ethiopia) and Pochalla town (Pochalla County/Sudan). Similarly, 
EPaRDA, Mercy Corps, OPA, AFD and Care Ethiopia helped in revitalising economic 
opportunities, to improve the capacity for trade and to increase links between traders across the 
border of Borana and Kenya (Section 5.6.3: 156-157). These projects promoted cross-border 
livestock marketing, the livestock trade sector and improved cross-border mobility for petty-
traders (section 5.9.3: 208-209). As a result, there was more movement of livestock across 
borders, forging inter-group cooperation. This creates interdependence and a vested interest in 
reducing conflict. Nevertheless, the reconstruction of the road seems to have made the trafficking 
of small arms easier with the resulting proliferation of small arms in the area.  
Economic causes of conflict addressed  
CD-type NGOs implemented rangeland and water development, livelihood protection and 
income diversification, improvements in production and marketing, and improvements in natural 
resource management (Section 5.8.2.3: 194-198 and section 5.9.3: 207-212). These NGO 
projects seemed to have made the pastoralists more resilient, with livelihood diversification 
leading to a reduction in poverty and inequalities; the projects also reduced the likelihood of 
conflict. For example, in Surupa (Yabello), AFD, GOAL, and Care Ethiopia developed drought 
reserve grazing areas and water points that created sustainable access to the natural resources, 
thereby minimizing the amount of travel over long distances that normally resulted in conflict. 
This has reduced herd mobility and has led to an improvement in livelihoods, which, in turn, 
contributed to a reduction in the likelihood of resource-based conflict and vulnerability to 
drought (Section 5.6.3: 157).  
Similarly, ACORD and Pact Ethiopia revitalised economic opportunities and the capacity for 
trade, and also increased links between traders across the border of Gambella and Southern 
Sudan. Businesses have begun to regain traditional markets; rural youth have gained access to 
education and, with increased cross-border trading and increased access to capital, the Project 
has reduced the economic marginalisation of the targeted communities. For example, NGOs such 
as HEKS and GPDC played key roles in initiating inter/intra-ethnic development projects and 
helped communities to become economically interdependent. Cross-border livestock trade in the 
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regions has been quietly expanding and government is keen to invest in livestock marketing 
infrastructure and security; after all, cross-border livestock trade is critical to pastoral livelihoods 
and to the economy of Ethiopia and its neighbours (Section 5.9.3: 207-212). Nevertheless, these 
interventions are becoming inadequate in light of the frequent occurrence of droughts, rapid 
socioeconomic changes, changes in nature and intensity of conflict and long-term climatic 
change. 
There has also been lingering skepticism about whether these NGOs contributed effectively in 
reducing conflict and in generating sustainable and meaningful forms of inter-ethnic cooperation 
that would tackle the roots of conflict in the area. For example, there was consensus among the 
respondents that the NGOs had limited, and possibly marginal, impact on tackling the 
intractability of the conflict. This was not unexpected since in the region critical events were 
influenced either by the political dynamics of the country, or by protagonists in the conflict, or 
by external events in neighbouring countries. For example, in July 2012, Southern Sudanese 
Murle attacked and raided the cattle of the Nuer communities on the Ethiopian side. In the 
conflict, more than 36 Nuer were killed, six villages were burned and 5,000 persons were 
displaced. Another example is the recent deadly conflict between the Garri and the Borana 
groups in Moyalle in 2008/ 2009 and then in 2012. Despite the NGOs’ potential for conflict 
resolution, there is still doubt whether they have the legitimacy and capacity to respond to 
contemporary conflicts. There is the real danger of exaggerating the NGOs’ role in peacebuilding 
on the assumption that they are flexible and closely attached to grass-roots communities and 
serve as an “agent of change” in peacebuilding.  
Studies by Goodhand and Hulme (1999) and by Goodhand and Lewer (1999) reveal that NGOs 
had a limited impact on reducing conflict but could assist short-term relief support. Goodhand, 
Hulme and Lewer’s (2000) analysis of the NGOs’ role in “social bridging” in Sri Lanka leads 
one to be sceptical about their success in “building bridges” to cross ethnic cleavages. Moreover, 
these contributions should be seen as complementing peacebuilding; one could not expect small-
scale NGOs to make a major contribution to the peace dividend but at the same time one should 
not underestimate their value in the context of protracted conflict. The question of whether the 
impact at the “micro-level” translates into action at the “macro-level” remains open, but the 
NGOs’ effect on peace could be discernible in some areas. For example, they played an 
236 
 
important role in facilitating the endorsement of the principle of Karra Matta by the Gummi 
Gayyo (general assemblage) with an immediate effect on the communities of Guji, Boran, and 
Gabra, thereby reducing the incidence of resource-based conflicts. 
The approach followed in this study can only provide a partial picture of the NGOs’ impact on 
their operational areas. Further work is needed to assess their efficacy in reducing conflict. The 
findings of this study, including evidence from FGDs and survey data sources, offer valuable 
insights into the impact that NGOs had on the target population. Furthermore, further research 
into the inter-linkages between the three issues of “indigenous empowerment”, “cross-
community relations” and “livelihoods enhancement” would provide more insight into how they 
are mutually reinforcing. The “indigenous empowerment” strand focuses on institutional 
development for peacebuilding; the “cross-community relations” strand promotes social 
cohesion. The “livelihood enhancement” strand tended to enhance resilience to drought and to 
reduce poverty-induced conflict, although it is likely to have indirect rather than direct impact. 
The “indigenous empowerment” and “cross-community relation” strands create opportunities for 
cross-border freedom of movement and sharing resources; they also create institutional 
arrangements for handling inter-group disputes. This was coupled with economic incentives for 
cross-ethnic contact and activities, through joint projects such as greater access to natural 
resources and market opportunities. This inter-linkage could be regarded as indigenous 
empowerment as it focused directly on the people involved in the conflict and built on 
indigenous knowledge and institutions.  
In conclusion, if the role of customary institutions in peacebuilding is to be effective, then the 
development agencies and government policy need to recognise them fully, thereby contributing 
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APPENDIX A: PROFILE OF NGOs OPERATING IN THE BORANA ZONE AND 
GAMBELLA REGIONAL STATE 
 
Profile of NGOs operating in the Borana Zone (key representatives of targeted NGOs, 
programmes, and their operational areas) 
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shocks and secure more 













































Increasing resiliency through 
improved livelihoods: 
protection of livelihoods in 
drought; improving livestock 
production, health, and 
marketing; enhancing NRM 


















2 Mercy Corps 
Ethiopia  
 







Strengthening of government 
and customary institutions; 
 Community dialogues 
 Joint livelihood activities; 
 Formation of peace 
committees; and 
Development of peace 
accords and resource use 
plans 
Facilitate peace 
dialogues, develop peace 
accords and agreements 
governing the 
management of natural 
resources, and strengthen 
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of pastoralists 
Enhance their 
livelihoods and prevent 
resource based conflicts, 
community managed 












                                                          
33
 Many of these NGOs have incorporated peacebuilding components into their development and therefore, they can 
be both classified as both CRT and CDT NGOs. 
34
 The list of projects related to peacebuilding is not complete but highlights the major projects. Information is taken 
from NGOs’ libraries and their quarterly and annual progress reports, from Borana Zone Bureau of Finance and 
Economic Development, and from interviews. Largely left out here were projects dealing with a variety of 
development issues such as community based initiatives, health, education, promotion of backyard vegetable 
gardening and small-scale farming, the establishment of women’s savings and credit groups.   
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 Profile of Local NGOs operating in the Borana Zone & key representatives of targeted NGOs 
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 Profile of NGOs operating in the Gambella Regional State (key representatives at 
these NGOs, programmes, and their operational areas) 
  A) Profile of International NGOs operating in the in the Gambella Regional State& key 
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 B) Profile of Local NGOs operating in the Gambella Regional State & key representatives 
of targeted NGOs 
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APPENDIX B: SAMPLE OF KEY INFORMANTS (GOVERNEMNT 
REPRESENTATIVES)  
 
Sample of key informants 
No. Category  Location    No. of 
Respondents   
1 An expert at Conflict Resolution and 
Transformation Directorate, Ministry 
of Federal Affairs (MoFA) 
Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia 
          1 
2 A Staff member at Information and 
communication office, Charities and 
Societies Agency (CSA) 
Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia 
           1   
3 A staff member at Borana Zone’s 
Bureau of Finance and Economic 
Development, a section of the 
Department of Development, 
Cooperation Affairs and Non-
Governmental Organisations (BBFED-
DDCANGOs) 
Yabello, Borana  
Zone 
           1 
4 A staff member at Capacity Building 
Coordination Bureau,  the People’s 

























APPENDIX C: KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW GUIDES 
 
   General Background Questions: Formation and mandates 
a) Can you give a brief background of the general context that brought about the formation of 
your organisation in Borana/Gambella (e.g. relief and rehabilitation, education, health)?  
b) Why were these initial goals, mission and vision important at that time? (explore) 
c) What was the socio-political situation prevailing at the time of formation relating to the 
prevailing policy and resources?  
d) How do you describe the intensity and magnitude of conflict, particularly in this area since 
1991? (Probe for: increased, decreased or remained the same) Why? 
e) Has your organisation played a role in any conflict resolution activities? If yes, would you 
describe the role your organisation played in peacebuilding and conflict resolution in your 
area? (Probe; what do you mean by peacebuilding? How do you build peace?) 
f) What reasons influenced the organisation to include peacebuilding and conflict resolution 
activities? How? 
g) What difficulties has the organisation faced in dealing with peacebuilding and conflict 
resolution? (Probe for: tensions between feuding parties, lack of clear mandates, effective 
institutional structure and secure institutional synergies regarding peacebuilding) 
h) What are the main development programmes in this area? (Probe; how did you carry out 
these?) 
i) Do you see any linkage between development and peacebuilding programmes? (What kind 
of linkage and how have these linkages affected this work?)   
 
Objective One:  Explore policy framework issues that impact on NGOs in Ethiopia 
 
The government promulgated the new Proclamation for Regulation, Registration of Societies, 
and Charities (PRRSC) (Proclamation No. 621/2009 of Ethiopia (Civil Society Law or CSO law) 
on 6 January, 2009 and this began to be enforced fully after a one-year grace period ending on 6 
January, 2010.  
 
a) My experience with NGOs is that the new proclamation can have both positive and 
negative outcomes in your operation.  
 What is your understanding of the new proclamation? (Probe for: how it impacted 
NGOs? Give examples) 
b) In which ways has it impacted the mandates, identity, and autonomy of your organisation?  
 How it has made a positive impact?  
 How it has made a negative impact? 
 Are there any changes in the structure, mandate, strategies, administrative 
structures, funding, activities, etc., because of the proclamation?   
 If yes, would you explain the extent of the change? 
c) Would you tell me its specific impact on peacebuilding and conflict resolution work? (Give 
examples)  
d) Did NGOs and government work together on the policy formulation?  
e) What roles have NGOs played in influencing government’s position on these issues?   
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f) What role could NGOs play in peacebuilding/conflict resolution under the new 
proclamation? (If any, at all) or formulate alternative solutions for peaceful conflict 
transformation?  
g) Would you say that it is desirable for NGOs to continue operating in this community? 
Would you advocate it to be adopted in other conflict-prone areas of Ethiopia? 
h) What overall recommendations/suggestions do you propose for improving the 
proclamation?  
 
Objective 2: Examine the nature of State and Civil Society relationships.  
 
a) What was the nature of the relationship between the “state structures” (at Federal, regional, 
Zonal, Worada, and Kebele levels) and Civil Society?  
 What are the difficulties?  
b) How did the nature of the relationship affect NGOs’ mandate and organisational and 
functional autonomy?  
 How did this relationship influence the success of development and peacebuilding 
activities; beneficiaries in particular? 
 Does the proclamation have anything to do with the election of 2005? 
c) How can the relationship between the government and NGOs be improved? 
 
Objective 3: Assess current indigenous conflict resolution practices. 
 
The indigenous practices of the different ethnic groups, including local institutions, customs and 
rules, have been used to resolve a range of inter-communal and inter-group conflicts in the 
Gambella and Borana zones.  
a) What indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms have been working in this area?  
b) What are the major sources of conflict in your area (s) of operation?  
 Who are the actors?  
 How do these actors frame the nature of conflict and its resolutions?  
c) What is the role of indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms in resolving these 
conflicts? 
d) What factors explain the success or failure of the conflict resolution process?  
 What elements of continuity exist in indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms 
over different times? 
 Do conflict resolution mechanisms and outcomes differ according to the types of 
conflict and resources involved? (for example conflict over resources, over 
political representation)   
e) Were these conflict resolution mechanisms affected by change of regime (for example, 
during the previous regime and current regime)? If yes, how?  
f) What is your perception of these indigenous institutions as a strategy for improving 
development and peace? Probe for: Strengths, weaknesses, facilitating factors and 
hindrances and future prospects. 
g) What do you consider to be the strengths and weaknesses of government’s conflict 
resolution mechanisms?  
 How would you describe the relationship between the two strategies?  
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 Has there been any conflict arising out of this context? 
h) How are inter-group conflicts regulated in a context where statutory law has little 
influence and customary authorities are increasingly challenged? 
i) Which institutions were highly effective and valuable, and could be used to ‘access’ the 
community for launching development programmes? 
 
Objective 4: Examine the perceptions of the NGOs about the impact of their services. 
 
a) Looking at the conflict from the critical years, can you identify key events, projects or 
developments that have contributed to peacebuilding or the resolution of conflict?  
 Can you list them and give a brief description? 
b) To what extent did the project(s) play a role or contribute toward each of these events or 
goals?  
 Can you identify any projects especially pivotal? 
 What are the indicators and how do you confirm your impact? (Probe impact or 
change indictor)  
c) What are the changes that have taken place in this area?  
 Did the project foster or support sustainable structures and processes, which 
strengthen the prospects for peaceful coexistence and decrease the likelihood of 
the outbreak, reoccurrence, or continuation of violent conflict?  
 In which ways have changes contributed to reduce conflict? What do you think 
caused those changes?  
d) NGOs operating in conflict-prone regions may have already conducted impact 
assessments of their interventions.  
 Have your projects been successful according to pre-set developmental criteria?   
e) The outcomes of development interventions might not always be positive. They may 
cause unintended effects such as causing or exacerbating conflict.  
 Have any of your interventions led to such outcomes?   
 What other suggestions would you make to avoid unintended effects? (Probe: 
Strategies to be adopted at policy level, implementation – or service delivery, 
community’s involvement etc.) 
f) Finally, looking at the region/local area over the last twenty years or of so, what do you 
think would have happened to the conflict and its resolution without the work of the 
NGOs? 
 
Objective 5: Exploring the strategies including indigenous practices adopted by the NGOs to 
resolve conflict. 
 
a) What are the strategies adopted by NGOs in conflict resolution/peacebuilding within the 
societies in which you operate?  
 How did you choose these strategies?  
 How did you organise the projects and decide who should participate in, 
contribute to, and benefit from, development projects? 
b) How do you view traditional social institutions and resources for conflict resolution? 
c) What is the relationship between the customary institutions and state structures?  
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 Which one is preferable for launching development projects and resolving 
conflict?  
d) Which institutions were highly effective in natural resource management and conflict 
resolution or tackling the inter-linked problems of the development, welfare, and 
conflict? Why? 
e) Institutions are constraining and enabling structures, making possible different forms of 
social action and organisation, but also limiting.  
 What have been the enabling and constraining factors of both state and indigenous 
institutions?  
 Would you say that it is desirable for NGOs to continue to adopt indigenous 
practices in this community?  
 Would you advocate their adoption in other conflict-prone areas of Ethiopia? 
f) What other suggestions would you make to help indigenous practices have better impact 
on peacebuilding and development? (Probe: Strategies to be adopted at policy level, 
implementation or service delivery, community’s involvement etc.) 
 


















APPENDIX D: FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION GUIDES 
 
Theme 3: current indigenous conflict resolution practices 
 
a) Most parts of this region have experienced the worst forms of violence over the last two 
decades. What have been the major causes of conflict in your areas? 
 What are the main factors, historical and contemporary, that contributed to the 
conflicts?  
 What are the types of conflict and groups involved in conflict? For how long?  
 Describe how the conflict has affected your family and community (give 
examples). 
 Is there a change the intensity and magnitude of conflict, particularly in this area 
since 1991? (Probe for: increased, decreased or remained the same) Why? 
 
b) Would you explain the current indigenous conflict resolution practices? 
 
 Conflict resolution pattern. Indicate the process (es) and the individuals/bodies 
involved in conflict resolution processes around the following: actors, leaders, 
processes, procedures and enforcement.     
 What are the processes and procedures involved in enforcement of justice among 
the Borana/Nuer/Anywaa?  
 How do you achieve justice through these indigenous institutions in resolution of 
conflicts? 
 Isn’t this against the state’s statutory law?  
 What are the implications of the tension that may exist between customary and 
formal justice systems and how can this be overcome? 
 How did you resolve the conflicts that broke out with other groups who do not 
share your mechanism? Are the practices working practically? And how much 
does it improve peace for people governed by it? What are some of the reasons 
that are making them still rely on customary means to claim justice in case of 
conflict? 
 What needs to be done to strengthen indigenous conflict resolution or make it 
sustainable? 
C) Explain the current status of indigenous conflict resolution? (Probe for: weakened, 
strengthened, or remained the same) Why? 
d)  Do you think indigenous institutions could adequately respond to the current change in 
the nature and magnitude of local conflicts? In what way? If not, Why not? 
f)  What other suggestions would you make to help indigenous practices have a better impact 
on peacebuilding and development? (Probe: Strategies to be adopted at policy level, 





Theme 6: strategies including indigenous practices adopted by the NGOs to resolve conflict. 
 
a) Do you think NGOs should also resolve conflict? If yes, why? If no, why not? 
b) Have the NGOs adopted any indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms? How? What has 
the outcome been? 
c) Do all NGOs adopt traditional conflict resolution mechanisms? (Give these NGOs; do 
they adopt and encourage traditional conflict resolution practices?)   
d) How does the involvement of NGOs vary from the conflict resolution methods of formal 
institutions (state’s judicial system)?  
e) How did the NGOs assist in resolve conflict? (give me examples) 
f) Do you think the NGOs’ use of traditional conflict resolution mechanisms helped to 
resolve or reduce conflict? In what way? If not, Why not? 
 
Theme 4: perception of the beneficiaries about the services.  
 
The groups will discuss whether there is a change in their lives due to NGO interventions and 
will identify the reasons for these changes.  
 
a) What are the services that the NGOs provided? Would you mention the name of these 
organisations? Please provide details of the type of development assistance that you 
received?  
b) What difference has the project made to your lives?  (Follow-up probing points as per 
context: decrease in food vulnerability, increase in income, access to markets, confidence, 
self-help abilities, sense of community, security…). 
c) How have the project activities supported you in dealing with the present conflict?  
d) What are the aspects that the project must include to reduce conflict and build peace?  
e) As you mentioned earlier, different NGOs have been working on schools, water, health, 
drought...in this area for long time. I would like to know their contributions to 
development and peace building.  
 Would you tell me the changes brought to your life, the changes in your livelihood 
because of the NGOs development interventions?  
 First, what was the situation before the intervention?  
 Second, have there been any changes in the situation after the NGOs’ intervention? 
If yes, what aspects of your livelihood changed?    
f)  What means did you use to resolve conflicts in your community earlier? Are they still 
being used?  How can they be further developed?  
g) What have been the most successful forms of NGO support for you and why?  
 










 QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER  
RESIDENTIAL AREA OR LOCATION 
NAME… 
 
RESEARCHER NAME: … 
 
 
 DATE OF INTERVIEW: …..... /... /… 
 
1. Demographic Background 
No.         Question  Comment 
Q1    Age………………  
Q2    Sex          1. Male        2. Female  
Q3    Permanent accommodation location:  1. Urban       2. Rural   3. Refugee camp  
Q4    Household head: 1. Father 2. Mother 3. One of family male members  
   
 
Q5    Social Status: 1. Single 2. Married 3. Divorced 4. Widow 5. Separated  
Q6 What is your religious denomination? 1 Catholic 2. Ethiopian Orthodox Christian 
3.  Other-Christian (Protestant) 4. Muslim 5. Indigenous/traditional 6.  None 7. 
Refused 
 
Q7 What is your ethnic background?   
2.  2. Socio-economic profile   
FIELD FOLLOW UP 
DATE OF QUESTIONNAIRE REVISION BY RESEARCHER 
                   ....../........../....... 
 
DATE OF QUESTIONNAIRE REVISION BY THE FIELD 
SUPERVISOR… /.../... 
 







1. 1. Work, specify type of work__________    2. Doesn't work 
 
Q9      Education (Higher Education Obtained):  
 1. Cannot read and write      2. Can read   and write  
 3. Primary school                 4. Secondary school  
 5. High school                      6. Diploma 7. Bachelor and More 
 
Q10     Monthly family income/approximate   
 3.    Type of development assistance           
 
 
Q11 Please provide details on the type of development assistance that you 
received  (Interviewer: through the project initiated by an 
NGO/NGOs)____________ 
 
Q12 Did the NGO explain the beneficiary selection criteria?             
14.1 Yes   
14.2 No  
(a) If yes, explain the criteria____________________________________ 
 
Q13 Do you judge the beneficiary selection criteria as fair and transparent?           
23.1 Yes   
23.2 No  
(a) If no, why? _______________________________________________ 
 
Q14 Were you involved in working with the NGO to plan and design the type and 
content of assistance that you received: 
           1. Yes    2. No, the NGO did not ask me to be involved  
           3. No, the NGO asked me to be involved but I chose not to be involved 
(a) If yes, please provide the major development programmes and their objectives 
that you planned and designed (Interviewer: through NGOs such as PACT, Care 
Ethiopia.)  
      _________________________________________________ 
 
4.  4. Individual empowerment  
4.1 4.1 Training in conflict resolution 
 
Q15 Have you been participated in conflict resolution training offered by any of the 
NGO working in your area?          
17.1 Yes   
17.2 No  
 
 
Q16 To what extent your participation in conflict resolution training affected your skills? 
Instructions  
      For the following question, please state to what extent the activity affected your perception. On 
a  scale of 1        to 5 were 1=to a very great extent 2=to some extent 3= 4= very small extent 5= no 
effect  at all   
  Scale  




16.2 It gives me the ability to challenge others and how they work 
in our area and tackle the problems in our area 
1 2 3 4 5 
16.3 I feel that I am good at understanding the problems of others  1 2 3 4 5 
16.4 It strengthens negotiation and problem solving skills 1 2 3 4 5 
16.5 It strengthens identifying conflict-connectors and dividers 
skills 
1 2 3 4 5 
16.6 I become more aware of each other’s differences and 
similarities 
1 2 3 4 5 
16.7 Increased human rights awareness      
 Others (please specify)      
                 4.2 Participation in peacebuilding activities  




Q18 Would you tell me the number of conflicts in which local community leaders are 
involved as mediators, negotiators, and advisors? 
 
Q 19 Do you believe in possibility of obtaining fair treatment and outcome through these 
local community leaders?           
22.1 Yes   
22.2 No  






 4.3 level of the incidence of conflict  
Q21 Do you think the level of conflict in your area increased or decreased in the last two 
years? 
22.1 Increased   
22.2 Stayed the same  
22.3 Decreased  
22.4 Don’t know  
(a) If Decreased, do you attribute this to NGO intervention? 
23.1 Yes   
23.2 No  
(b) If you answered ‘no’ for question what could be the other reasons that contributed 









5.  5. Livelihood Enhancement  
 
            5.1 level of household income 
 
Q22 Since NGOs programmes/ services your monthly income has: 
24.1 Increased   
24.2 Stayed the same  
24.3 Decreased  





Q23 (a). If you answered ‘Increased’ monthly income, do you attribute this economic 
improvement to the NGOs intervention? 
24.1 Yes   
24.2 No  
(b) If you answered ‘No’  what could be the other reasons that contributed towards an 
increase in your income, please state below_____________________ 
(c) If you answered the household income has ‘Stayed the same’ despite NGOs 
support why  below____________________________________________________ 
(d) If you answered the household income has ‘Decreased’ state below what could be 





 5.2 Reconstruction of physical and economic infrastructures  
Q24 Have NGO programmes created a sustainable access to natural resources (water and 
grazing land)? 
25.1 Yes   
25.2 No  
 
 
Q25 Have they increased cross-community cooperation? (mobility between the 
communities, accessibility market, access to basic transportation services) 
26.1 Yes   
26.2 No  
 
 
Q26 Have they increased the reconstruction of physical infrastructures? (neighbourhoods / 
community infrastructure destroyed /damaged are constructed, able to restore private 
property destroyed / damaged during conflict) 
 
27.1 Yes   
27.2 No  
 
 
 5.3 General impact  
Q27 In your opinion, what has been the general impact of NGO services on your 
livelihood? 
         1. Worsened our situation    2. A little worsened 3. Some 4. A lot 5. Do not 
know much about 
(a)If you answer ‘a lot’ what has been the impact of NGO services in your 
livelihoods?  Please indicate the impact of this on your livelihood. 
 
Q28  What would have happened to you / family/neighbourhood if you did not receive this 
assistance? 1. Worsened our situation    2. No change     3. Better situation 
(a) Explain why? _____________________________ 
 
Q29 What alternative types of assistance would have helped you cope with your situation 
at the time? ___________________________      
 
Q30 If you answer ‘Worsen our situation’ what has been the negative impact of NGO 
services in your area? Please explain________ 
 
 
6 6. Social Bridging 
6.1 Cross-community contact 
   
 
Q31 How willing are you to participate in cross-community activities? 
1. Always willing 2. Not usually willing 3. Not at all willing 4. Can’t say/ don’t know 
 
Q32 How often do you participate in informal occasions with them? (e.g., weddings,  
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births, or deaths)?  
1. Very often 2. Sometimes 3. Rarely 4. Never 5. Can’t say/don’t know 
Q33      How often do you cross the border? 
1. Very often 2. Sometimes 3. Rarely 4.  Never 5 .Can’t say/don’t know 
 
 6.2 Social Relations  
Q34  Now we would like to ask a few questions about how you feel when meeting people 
from the other community? 
(a) Do you feel comfortable? 1. Always comfortable 2. Sometimes comfortable 
3. Not usually comfortable 4. Not at all comfortable 5. Can’t say/don’t know 
 
 
Q35 Would you mind or not mind if one of your close relatives were to marry a person 
from the other community? 
 1. Mind a lot 2. Mind a little 3. Not mind very much   4.  Not mind at all 5.   Can’t 
say 
 
Q36 If you were purchasing goods or services, would you mind or not mind whether a 
person who owned the business from which you were buying these comes from the 
other community? 
1. Mind a lot 2. Mind a little 3. Not mind very much 4. Not mind at all 5. Can’t say 
 
 6.3 Level of tolerance  
Q37 In general, do you support the display of cultural and political symbols by the 
other community? 
1. Yes at particular time of a year 2. Always 3.  Some times 3.  Not at all 5. Can’t say/ 
don’t know 
 
 6.4 level of trust  
Q38 How willing are you to allow access to natural resources (water and grazing land) for 
other community members on the contested pastoral land? 
1. Always willing 2. Not usually willing 3.Not at all willing 4. Can’t say/ Don’t 
know 
 
Q39 Do you think that most members of the other community would to return all the stray 
animals? 
1. Definitely return 2. Probably return 3. Definitely they would not 4. Do not know 
 
 
Q40 Do you think that most members of the other community would try to take advantage 
of you if they got a chance, or would they try to be fair? 
1. Definitely take advantage 2. Probably take advantage 3. Neither takes advantage 
nor tries to be fair 4. Probably try to be fair 5.  Definitely try to be fair 6.  Do not 
know 
 
Q41 Do you rely on other ethnic group members for different kinds of assistance (e.g., 
goods, labour,   cash, finding employment, entering schools, etc.)? 
   1. Definitely try to rely on 2. Probably try to rely on 3. Probably look out for 
themselves 4.Definitely, I would not rely on 5. Do not know 
 
 
